Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Thumpalumpacus]

Some of that goes down to context. If you look at key victories by the Germans in 1940- early 42, including the Western Desert, once you get into the weeds quite often it turns out key moments hinged on Stuka strikes blowing holes in the lines of their enemies.

... or Torbeaus hampering supply lines ... or the weather in Central Africa making the Takoradi route hard ... or ...

So yeah, nuance. It's difficult to say "airpower is decisive" and then turn and say "yeah, but context". Decisive is a magazine getting hit, or 54 dive bombers killing three of your carriers in five minutes, or what-have-you. In a months-long campaign, "decisive" inherently involves many factors. History just ain't that simple.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Six x 250 lb bombs ... that's 1,500 lbs right there.

I think this is probably like 1943 or 44, 112 sqn with a 1,000 and two 500 lb

Image caption says this is a 1,000 lb GP bomb (photo colorized) with two 500lb

This seems to have been worked out in the field on a kind of ad-hoc basis by some very brave pilots. I have an account by one guy who volunteered to test an overload of bombs. I'll see if I can find it and post later.

Two things on types -

P-40D and E ("Kittyhawk I" and "IA") started out as a big let down for the British, because performance - going by the operations guidelines in the manual - was considerably worse than the P-40C ("Tomahawk IIB") in terms of performance, particularly climb. Losses initially went up when they switched to the Kittyhawk. Then after two or three painful months, they worked out what they could get away with in terms of increasing the boost, which eventually brought in Allison engine company and the US War Dept etc.. By around April they are boosting these things about 20% higher, with increased RPM, and emergency horsepower goes from 1,100 to 1,475 hp.

So this meant by mid-1942 (First El Alamein) the existing P-40Es were performing a little more like P-40Ks, (albeit at greater risk of engine breaking down, and more difficult trim management and / or heavier rudder work) so this seems to have translated into better combat outcomes.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

... or Torbeaus hampering supply lines ...

That would be Allied air power, so yes.

or the weather in Central Africa making the Takoradi route hard ... or ...

So yeah, nuance. It's difficult to say "airpower is decisive" and then turn and say "yeah, but context".

You are free to disagree. I think I'm on pretty solid ground here though and I believe I can prove it. If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein and if they lacked the new planes and / or had neglected to reorganize their tactics and air strategy, they would have lost the second one too.

Air Power was decisive in the Battle of El Alamein.

"Context" is key to understanding any kind of history for any era. But this is a fact.

Decisive is a magazine getting hit, or 54 dive bombers killing three of your carriers in five minutes, or what-have-you. In a months-long campaign, "decisive" inherently involves many factors. History just ain't that simple.

Well in this case, the decisive factor was German AT guns and tanks being knocked out by bombs, German fuel and supplies being cut off. German attacks bogging down due to air strikes.

It's not like it's just some amorphous blob of data we can never understand just because it's complicated. Land battles are never as obvious and stark as naval battles but you can see the key factors pretty clearly in the data. And I'm hardly the first one to point this out about the Desert War.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Time to go back and reread references like Firepower The British Army Weapons & Theories of War 1904 – 1945 by Shelford Bidwell and Dominck Graham, instead of relying on memory. I will be using regiments in the British sense, a battalion sized unit or an administrative unit under which battalion sized units are raised.

Finding a good online Order of Battle for 8th Army at Crusader that details Corps Troops is hard, maybe 4 regiments of artillery with maybe some guns heavier than the 25 pounder plus 3 anti tank regiments. The 4.5 inch gun came into service in 1941 the 5.5 inch gun made it to the desert in May 1942.

Joslen of course gives a detailed order of Battle for Second Alamein, the trouble being the artillery listing includes those in the divisions, so it is hard to come up with a corps/army troops list, in any case at the start of the battle a number of corps etc. artillery units were attached to the assault divisions. The numbers 23 October 1942, available 246 Grants, 255 Shermans, 421 Crusaders, 167 Stuarts, 223 Valentines and 6 Matildas total 1,348 of which 1,136 were runners. 188 Humber, 96 Daimler, 212 Marmon-Herrington and 4 AEC armoured cars, of these 65 in reserve etc. 53 at various HQ and 382 in the 7 armoured car regiments. Artillery 832 25 pounder, 24 105mm, 32 4.5 inch, 20 5.5 inch, 604 2 pounder, 870 6 pounder less 50 2 pounder and 21 6 pounder in reserve etc. Total number of Field and Medium guns allocated 939, less 31 in reserve etc. leaving 908 ready to engage. Also 1 mortar company with 18 4.2 inch mortars. The listing ignores the 50mm and 75mm anti tank guns with the two Free French brigades. Some infantry divisions had a machine gun battalion attached, with 48 0.303 inch Vickers. "Fighting Strength" 10,570 Officers, 209,906 men, total 220,476. The New Zealand division was 2 infantry and 1 armoured brigades 122 tanks in the brigade, 29 more in the divisional cavalry regiment, making it a more powerful armoured division than either 1st or 7th Armoured, numbers wise anyway. The infantry divisions had 64 anti tank guns up from 48 in 1941, less than the 110 in 1944/45.

For all practical purposes allied artillery in the desert was 25 pounders and while there were clearly at least corps artillery units at Crusader and Gazala no idea of how they were used. In one way the desert battles were rather like a naval battle, moving about, around and between strong points/islands and assaulting those strong points or fighting around them. Units like ships moving with clear distance to the next friendly "ship" and likely to run into the enemy doing the same thing, good idea to take along some guns in case the enemy main battle tank/ship arrives in numbers, but not a good place to be a heavy artillery unit unless at one of the strong points. The need to be dispersed to a degree plus have AA weapons to reduce the threat of air attack, but then came the need to quickly concentrate when an enemy ground force was sighted.

The Aberdeen operation was the attempt to counter attack Rommel at Gazala using massed artillery support in the then biggest barrage 8th Army had done, 92 25 pounders, which made a mess of empty desert thanks to a lack of reconnaissance, the Germans spent a day over running the gun line, 62 artillery and around 100 anti tank and light AA guns lost, along with lots of casualties.

British armour was split into two groups, the tank corps, infantry support, which applied themselves to that task, with traditions coming from the First World War, and the armoured forces traditions coming from the cavalry, including the Guards cavalry where prime candidates for British upper class snob and twit of the year could be found. They did not like General Hobart subordinating the polo to training with the tanks. That doctrine was tanks were to take the position then the support units, like infantry would arrive and mop up. The Matildas did this quite well in 1940/41, while the cavalry did the classic get ahead of the retreating enemy and capture many, Beda Fomm.

The CS tanks were issued on a scale of 2 per squadron (assuming they had two available.)
Radio use and Artillery support made advancements during this time but I am guessing it was in fits and starts. By the fall of 1944 the British army had the best rapid responce Artillery support network in the world. How long it took to get there is a question.

The provision for Close Support tanks in British formations was actually not that much different percentage wise to that of Panzer IV with the short 75mm in the desert panzer divisions 1941/42 but the German gun had a higher muzzle velocity and a shaped charge AT round. I do not have the production dates to know when the 3 inch replaced the 95mm in the CS tanks nor how many were used in the desert, in any case that process was short circuited by the arrival of the Grants then Shermans. In particular the Shermans as using the 75mm on the Grant meant not hull down with attendant casualties.

The 1941/42 British reports on German tactics actually got most things correct, but were then filtered through British doctrine before conclusions were drawn, the sort of method that when pre war observing a German sand table exercise for junior officers and senior NCO's decided the fact all the groups came up with the same solution meant German soldiers trained to be robots, not a common army doctrine well taught and ignoring the solutions had to be provided in much less time than the British exercises allowed. 8th Army was a collection of units with different traditions and ways of doing things, not only within the British but extending to the Australians, Indians, New Zealanders and South Africans, with cameo performances from Greek and free French units and possibly others. Coming up with an army doctrine had plenty of hurdles.

In France in 1940 the artillery command system was so cumbersome units would have clear targets but not receive permission to fire in time. Divisional artillery was formed into pairs to support units deployed in threes, that obstacle took until 1942 to fix in the desert. The siege of Tobruk laid down the foundations of the new doctrine by necessity, Australian and Indian Infantry and British Artillery had to find a way to work together fast. The solution was linking individual artillery and infantry units, the same guns and forward observers for the same troops, but allowing the guns to concentrate as required and as things were proved giving more authority to the forward observers to call in more guns. When the 70th division largely relieved the Australians it was indoctrinated with the system, word spread informally so by the time it was written down it was as current practice. The Jock columns also allowed this sort of affiliation between units, 7th Armoured division was trying things and in 1941 had artillery officers in tanks with a radio for the artillery and another for the tank command net but that still did not translate into a combined arms doctrine comparable to the Germans. When a regiment of artillery that had been in Tobruk found itself supporting armour again, trained with them on the new ways "but all was thrown to the winds" when they went into combat. The artillery with the armour was being seen but not heard. It took to late 1942 before the Armoured Divisions had their artillery under a CRA, Commander Royal Artillery and so able to concentrate. However the new artillery system reached Britain early enough for most of 1st Army have it before Torch.

When the heavier guns became available Brigade sized AGRA, Army Group, Royal Artillery were formed and used the system, so in spring 1944 an emergency call by an FOO in Italy resulted in 600 guns answering within 35 minutes.

Air Force, pre war RAF officers in Lysanders normally sitting over the target were to direct artillery fire, from 1938 the army pursued the idea of a small aircraft able to take off from a field, using trained artillery personnel to direct fire while remaining over friendly territory, after a long fight these made their debut in combat in November 1942.

Post France Army Co-Operation Command came up with the mechanisms that were refined by experience to become the allied army/air command and control system, "tentacles", the forward observers, a parallel chain of command, the idea everyone listen to everything and be able to talk direct to their opposite number and normally let the appropriate level of command make the decision, no passing things up the chain for permissions. A trained unit arrived in North Africa and attached to XIII corps for Gazala, Rommel attacked XXX corps, in any case much of the communications net was not in place. So while the RAF stood by for 3 days to attack Rommel's concentration the army was unable to supply accurate information about who was where to enable the air attacks to occur or the forces were too close together. Where used the new system did reduce the time to respond from 2 hours to 30 minutes. With the arrival of Montgomery this parallel command and talk system extended to HQ 8th Army. Medenine/Mareth in March 1943 was the first use of Forward Air Controllers.

At Gazala 8th Army initially fell victim to its beliefs about where Rommel was going, threw away several chances because of various command problems and slowness while Rommel was marooned with no good supply lines, and again allowed Rommel to defeat each allied unit in turn. The better air support system was only partially working. The disparity in air power and supplies did enable the allies to retreat largely unhindered by the axis air power.

Alamein July 1942, even without reinforcements both army and air force were better able to mount operations as they were effectively sitting on their supply ports but the command problems seen at Gazala nullified a lot of this advantage. Meantime Rommel had the opposite problem, longer and more vulnerable supply line, including for the Luftwaffe units.

Montgomery enabled 8th Army to fight as an army, divisions as divisions, not Jock columns and gained better control of the armour, though one source claims the armour had become more cautious anyway after one too many defeats.

By Second Alamein both allied army and air force had grown in size and quality and communication, they also had to punch through a defence of similar density to that at Kursk. Airpower alone did not force Rommel to retreat nor reduce the axis supply lines to where they could not support a static army and building the defences up. In the end the allies were unable to stop the axis retreating in reasonable order with the core of their army. Remembering Hitler's intervention delayed that withdrawal by a couple of days.

According to Firepower the army looked at the results of air attacks on axis formations, the claimed results were exaggerated, no real surprise there. Air Power at the Battlefront supplies some numbers for this from the fighting in France/Germany.

Just a few M7s but I think these made a significant difference. More likely to cause casualties with each strike (if relatively accurate).

No. The 105mm howitzer M1, range 12,205 yards, muzzle velocity 1,250 feet per second. Unfortunately the 25 pounder figures are charge super, range 13,400 yards, muzzle velocity 1,700 feet per second.

Effective AT guns - hard hitting, flat trajectory and small targets. Pretty easy to hide. But useful for the most part on defense, not on attack. Attack and defense are very different animals in the Western Desert.

That would be a surprise to the Germans in the desert, the anti tank gun was very much a part of attack and defence.

July 1942 Kittyhawk III (mostly P-40K type with some P-40M) arrive, with improved capability (K much faster down low, up to 1500+ HP, M with higher critical altitude of about 17k' rather than 12k for De and E type). (I)

One K-1 accepted in May 1942, 65 in June. Not sure when they arrived in the Middle East. The RAF Taken on Charge dates for P-40K-1 start mid August 1942. The K-5 and later start in August 1942, P-40M in November 1942.

July to August 1942 - Tedder arrives.

Tedder arrived in 1940, given responsibility for the Western Desert. Please provide the evidence for Air Forward Observers being around in July/August 1942.

I wrote my Honours thesis on the Axis air force in the lead-up to the Second Battle of El Alamein, and thought it might be of relevance to this thread.

Thanks for this.

If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein

No. Rommel spent all but the first few days on the defensive. For Second Alamein 23 October to 3 November 1942, fighter offensive and escort sorties, 7,205 total, 11.8% Spitfire, 31.7% Hurricane, 38.2% Kittyhawk, 5.8% Tomahawk, 0.9% Beaufighter, 11.4% P-40. There were plenty of Hurricanes still around 4 months after July. AIR 22/401 figures.

Air Power was decisive in the Battle of El Alamein.

No, the army had to defeat its opposite number. The air force made a much more effective contribution to this than previously.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You are free to disagree. I think I'm on pretty solid ground here though and I believe I can prove it.

Well, get after it.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

No. The 105mm howitzer M1, range 12,205 yards, muzzle velocity 1,250 feet per second. Unfortunately the 25 pounder figures are charge super, range 13,400 yards, muzzle velocity 1,700 feet per second.

Yes. 105mm howitzer had 2.18 kg TNT / amatol, 25 pounder had 450 - 900 grams explosive charge, i.e. 20-40% of the 'boom' of the 105. Which is the important bit. Muzzle velocity doesn't matter that much in an artillery round. Range does matter but they weren't attacking at those distances in either battle under discussion, and the extra 1,000 yards isn't that significant.

That would be a surprise to the Germans in the desert, the anti tank gun was very much a part of attack and defence.

Towed anti-tank guns (like the 6 pounder I was referring to, or the German ones) are used much more for defense than offense, the obvious reason being that they have to be towed. This means by trucks or little tractors (like Universal" carriers) or halftracks, all of which are very vulnerable to attack. And towed anti-tank guns have to be unlimbered and deployed before they can shoot anything. This is why on offense, tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers are more reliable.

AT guns are brought along in case an attacking column is counterattacked, but they are by and large defensive weapons.

One K-1 accepted in May 1942, 65 in June. Not sure when they arrived in the Middle East. The RAF Taken on Charge dates for P-40K-1 start mid August 1942. The K-5 and later start in August 1942, P-40M in November 1942.

Desert Air Force Order of battle, 27 Oct 1942 (page 16)

RAF WESTERN DESERT AIR FORCE (WDAF) & DESERT AIR FORCE (DAF) – Orders-of-Battle April 1941 to April 1945

A detailed order-of-battle of the RAF - and allied - air forces in ground support in the North African Campaign (No. 204 Group, Air Headquarters Western Desert and Western Desert Air Force) and the Desert Air Force in the Italian Campaign

www.academia.edu

"The best types of fighter aircraft being concentrated in No. 211 Group to form the spearhead"

No. 211 Group:

- No. 6 (SAAF) Squadron (Hurricane IID, T.D.) - No. 7 (SAAF) Squadron (Hurricane IID, T.D.)
- 64th Fighter Squadron (USAAF) (aircraft establishment : 25 Kittyhawk II/III, S.E.-F./F.B. )
- 65th Fighter Squadron (USAAF) (aircraft establishment : 25 Kittyhawk II, S.E.-F./F.B. )

No. 233 Wing
- No. 2 (SAAF) Squadron (Kittyhawk I / II / III, S.E. - F.)
- No. 4 (SAAF) Squadron (Kittyhawk I / II / III, S.E. - F.)
- No. 5 (SAAF) Squadron (aircraft establishment : 16 Tomahawk, S.E. - F.)
- No. 260 Squadron (aircraft establishment : 16 Kittyhawk I/II, S.E. - F.)

No. 239 Wing
- No. 3 (SAAF) Squadron (Kittyhawk I / II / III, S.E. - F. / F.B.)
- No. 112 Squadron (Kittyhawk I / II / III, S.E. - F. / F.B.)
- No. 250 Squadron (Kittyhawk I / II / III, S.E. - F. / F.B.)
- No. 450 (RAAF) Squadron (Kittyhawk I / II / III, S.E. - F.)
- 66th Fighter Squadron (USAAF) - attached - (aircraft establishment 25 P-40 Kittyhawks II)

No. 244 Wing
- No. 73 Squadron (aircraft establishment : 16 Hurricane IIC, S.E.-F. ( N.F. ))
- No. 92 Squadron (aircraft establishment : 16 Spitfire VB/C, S.E.-F.)
- No. 145 Squadron (Spitfire VB, S.E.-F.)
- No. 601 Squadron (Spitfire VB, S.E.-F.)

Kittyhawk III = P-40K or M, Kittyhawk II is P-40F (IIA is P-40L)

By my count at least seven squadrons had some P-40K.
According to Shores MAW 13 Kittyhawk III were lost during Oct 1942, while pilots flying Kittyhawk III made 15.5 claims.

P-40K were sought after by RAF units and Australian squadron leader and double ace Bobby Gibbes mentions that he 'stole' one from another unit before shooting down a German ace.

Tedder arrived in 1940, given responsibility for the Western Desert. Please provide the evidence for Air Forward Observers being around in July/August 1942.

He was appointed "Air Marshal" in April 1942, which was the beginning of the big reorganization I have mentioned several times. I'll get more into the operational details a bit later.

No. Rommel spent all but the first few days on the defensive. For Second Alamein 23 October to 3 November 1942, fighter offensive and escort sorties, 7,205 total, 11.8% Spitfire, 31.7% Hurricane, 38.2% Kittyhawk, 5.8% Tomahawk, 0.9% Beaufighter, 11.4% P-40. There were plenty of Hurricanes still around 4 months after July. AIR 22/401 figures.

Yes. You seem to have somehow missed my point. You seem to have ignored the second part of my statement there, or maybe glossed over it in your zeal to deny! I'll repeat: "...and if they lacked the new planes and / or had neglected to reorganize their tactics and air strategy, they would have lost the second one too." Let me be even more clear: If the British only had Hurricanes and Blenheims at El Alamein, and if they hadn't also reorganized their air combat tactics, they would have lost.

I am very well aware of the history of the use of the Hurricane in North Africa and have posted about it at length in many other threads on this site.

No, the army had to defeat its opposite number. The air force made a much more effective contribution to this than previously.

Yes. Once again, you seem to be strangely missing my point about air power. I never said that air power wins land battles by itself. I said, essentially what you note above: "The air force made a much more effective contribution to this than previously." to which I would add, "and if they hadn't done, the battle would have been lost."

Air power played a decisive role. However, tanks, AT guns, infantry and artillery are all required to win a battle in this era.

 

[MikeMeech]

View attachment 701431
Six x 250 lb bombs ... that's 1,500 lbs right there.

View attachment 701432
I think this is probably like 1943 or 44, 112 sqn with a 1,000 and two 500 lb

View attachment 701433
Image caption says this is a 1,000 lb GP bomb (photo colorized)

This seems to have been worked out in the field on a kind of ad-hoc basis by some very brave pilots. I have an account by one guy who volunteered to test an overload of bombs. I'll see if I can find it and post later.

Two things on types -

P-40D and E ("Kittyhawk I" and "IA") started out as a big let down for the British, because performance - going by the operations guidelines in the manual - was considerably worse than the P-40C ("Tomahawk IIB") in terms of performance, particularly climb. Losses initially went up when they switched to the Kittyhawk. Then after two or three painful months, they worked out what they could get away with in terms of increasing the boost, which eventually brought in Allison engine company and the US War Dept etc.. By around April they are boosting these things about 20% higher, with increased RPM, and emergency horsepower goes from 1,100 to 1,475 lb.

So this meant by mid-1942 (First El Alamein) the existing P-40Es were performing a little more like P-40Ks, (albeit at greater risk of engine breaking down, and more difficult trim management and / or heavier rudder work) so this seems to have translated into better combat outcomes.

Hi
Increase of bomb loads on fighter bombers did mean other things had to go, a quote (from 'Shark Squadron Pilot' by Bert Horden) on page 106 of 'Undaunted, Britain and the Commonwealth's War in the Air 1939-45' by Ben Kite. (This is Volume 2, Volume 1 is 'Through Adversity', the chapters are basically summaries of the related air arms actions during the war):

A fairly recent single volume history of the air war in the theatre, which may be useful for some, is 'The Mediterranean Air War, Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II' by Robert S. Ehlers, Jr., University Press of Kansas 2015.

Mike

 

[EwenS]

Something struck me as odd about the Kittyhawk variants noted above in that OOB. Halley "Squadrons of the Royal Air Force & Commonwealth 1918-1988" has this:-

2SAAF - Kittyhawk I 4/42-6/43 then Kittyhawk III
4SAAF - Kittyhawk I 6/42-7/43
5 SAAF - Tomahawk IIB 2/42-1/43, then Kittyhawk III to 12/43
260 - began to receive Kittyhawk III in Dec 1942
3 RAAF - No Kittyhawk III until 4/43
450 - Kittyhawk III from 9/42 replacing Mk.I
250 - Kittyhawk III from 10/42 replacing Mk.I
112 - Kittyhawk III from 10/42 replacing Mk.I

So at El Alamein only 3 squadrons with Mk.III

According to that reference the only RAF/Commonwealth users of the Kittyhawk II were
250 - 4/42-10/42 alongside Mk.I
260 - 2/42-5/43 alongside Mk.I with Mk.III joining the mix 12/42
3 RAAF - 11/42-3/44 alongside Mk.I 11/42-12/42 and then Mk.III from 4/43

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Hi
Increase of bomb loads on fighter bombers did mean other things had to go, a quote (from 'Shark Squadron Pilot' by Bert Horden) on page 106 of 'Undaunted, Britain and the Commonwealth's War in the Air 1939-45' by Ben Kite. (This is Volume 2, Volume 1 is 'Through Adversity', the chapters are basically summaries of the related air arms actions during the war):
View attachment 701487
A fairly recent single volume history of the air war in the theatre, which may be useful for some, is 'The Mediterranean Air War, Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II' by Robert S. Ehlers, Jr., University Press of Kansas 2015.

Mike

Yes and to be clear, maxing out the bomb load to 1,500 or 2,000 lbs on a Kittyhawk was really just one of several options - for short range strikes against targets that maybe needed the extra boom to take out. Another option was a fuel tank in the center and two 250 lb bombs on the wings, for a longer ranged strike. They played with all kinds of options.

I was looking at Andrew's Thesis data, and while I don't fully agree with all the numbers in here*, you can see an interesting pattern. As I have been pointing out, the fighter (and strike) reforms kicked in during mid 1942. Most of the fighter escort and top cover missions were being lown by Kittyhawks at this point. In Andrews numbers you can see the fighter losses (all types as follows:

May -
18 Hurricane
55 P-40 (40 Kittyhawk, 15 Tomahawk)

June -
3 Spitfire
44 Hurricane
79 P-40 (44 Kittyhawk, 35 Tomahawk)

July (First battle of El Alamein)
8 Spitfire
63 Hurricane
38 P-40 (29 Kittyhawk, 9 Tomahawk)

August
6 Spitfire
27 Hurricane
29 P-40 (24 Kittyhawk, 4 Tomahawk, 1 USAAF P-40F)

Sept
14 Spitfire
37 Hurricane
43 P-40 (27 Kitthawk, 14 Tomahawk, 2 USAAF P-40F)

Which looks like a sudden and lasting decline in P-40 losses of about 50%. Some of this may be due to Spitfires, but the Spitfires were only flying missions on about half of these days and only the shorter range missions, while the P-40s were doing all the longer range escort missions and the medium range fighter bomber strikes, so they were often on their own. The difference here is i would say the new tactics (using finger four and turning into attacks from above), the new boost ratings, and the newer Kittyhawk types (type II and III).

* I think in particular the losses in October (during 2nd El Alamein) were much higher for both Axis and Allies - per Shores MAW I count 81 Axis aircraft lost (62 shot down or MiA, 19 crash landed) and 90 Allied aircraft lost (73 shot down or MiA, 17 crash landed), these are all direct losses to military action not counting other operational losses.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Something struck me as odd about the Kittyhawk variants noted above in that OOB. Halley "Squadrons of the Royal Air Force & Commonwealth 1918-1988" has this:-

2SAAF - Kittyhawk I 4/42-6/43 then Kittyhawk III
4SAAF - Kittyhawk I 6/42-7/43
5 SAAF - Tomahawk IIB 2/42-1/43, then Kittyhawk III to 12/43
260 - began to receive Kittyhawk III in Dec 1942
3 RAAF - No Kittyhawk III until 4/43
450 - Kittyhawk III from 9/42 replacing Mk.I
250 - Kittyhawk III from 10/42 replacing Mk.I
112 - Kittyhawk III from 10/42 replacing Mk.I

So at El Alamein only 3 squadrons with Mk.III

According to that reference the only RAF/Commonwealth users of the Kittyhawk II were
250 - 4/42-10/42 alongside Mk.I
260 - 2/42-5/43 alongside Mk.I with Mk.III joining the mix 12/42
3 RAAF - 11/42-3/44 alongside Mk.I 11/42-12/42 and then Mk.III from 4/43

I can double check this from Shores, though it will take me a while to go through it, you should be able to see in there how many units had IIIs.

Distribution of the different later model P-40 types is a bit complicated. I know that 64th FS of the 57th FG had to use P-40Ks during El Alamein and into early 1943 due to a shortage of P-40F and spare parts for the Packard V-1650-1 / Merlin XX engines, so that is a 4th squadron for sure. One of them was famously featured on a Life Magazine cover (you can tell that is an early P-40K due to the big rudder fin). I believe this was the only US P-40 Fighter squadron equipped with anything other than P-40F/L in the Mediterranean Theater during combat deployment.

I also believe only two RAF squadrons were fully equipped with the Kittyhawk II / P-40F (a bone of contention with the British as they had been asking for these for a long time but the majority went to the 5 US Fighter Groups that were established in North Africa) I think it was 3 RAAF and 260 RAF.

DAF quickly figured out sources of spare engines and parts / consumables for Merlin XX which helped with the shortages, as the Kittyhawk II types were highly regarded. One of the two RAF squadrons using Kitty IIs switched back to III (unlcear if those were actually K or M type) for a while and losses went up (probably because they were still flying a lot of 'high cover' missions) so they switched back to Kitty IIs and IIAs when more became available. They were in heavy use through 1943 and some were still engaged with US units at Anzio in 1944.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Anyway the point is there clearly were P-40K there, in at least some numbers (assuming Shortround6 is right and there were no M yet)

There was another "incremental" but I'd say very important change with the later mark Kittyhawks (II, IIA, III and the later IV) which is that they made some kind of change to the ammunition storage and / or the guns in the wings so that they had much fewer stoppages / gun jams. This was a big improvement over the Mk I and IA.

I think they also had some kind of analogous changes with the Hispano in the Spitfires and Hurri IIC around this time but I don't know precisely when.

 

[DBII]

And here was a difference in sights.
The British tanks used 7.9mm X 57mm ammo, the same as the Germans, not .303 ammo.
And yet the German tanks could shoot to 1200 meters or more. (sights may have gone higher).
The German sights had graduations for the different ranges and it had geared elevation (on the co-ax gun) so the gunner could fire a burst and the commander could call corrections, like up 200 and the gunner could simple bring the correct aiming mark to the target or use the elevation wheel move the sight in relation to the gun.
British gunner basically had cross hairs and had to guess how high to hold over to get 200 yds. and fire another bursts while trying to hold his shoulder steady against the shoulder piece.
The US had two types of ammo. M1 Ball (and some other equivalent stuff) and M2 ball. Ultimate range for the M1 was almost 2000yds further than the M2, practical difference was several hundred meters. I don't know what the differences were in the scopes.

Shortround6, are you a reg leg or tanker?

 

[Shortround6]

Shortround6, are you a reg leg or tanker?

Just a reader who wants to know how things worked.
Some war games used to (and maybe still do) stress how accurate they were.
All machineguns had the same "game" ammo (number of bursts, ignoring rate of fire, feed system and ammo capacity) regardless of type of gun or nationality.
Or why did one nation have 50% more range using the same ammo?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

My No was about the claim "Just a few M7s but I think these made a significant difference." There were 24 105mm guns in the artillery park, under 3% of total guns, so explain, backed by evidence like combat reports of the significant difference these 24 guns made instead of quoting technical specifications. If these really did make "a significant difference" the US army should have been about unstoppable.

Towed anti-tank guns (like the 6 pounder I was referring to, or the German ones) are used much more for defense than offense, the obvious reason being that they have to be towed. This means by trucks or little tractors (like Universal" carriers) or halftracks, all of which are very vulnerable to attack. And towed anti-tank guns have to be unlimbered and deployed before they can shoot anything. This is why on offense, tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers are more reliable.

AT guns are brought along in case an attacking column is counterattacked, but they are by and large defensive weapons.

Well you would not go far in the WWII German Army and have trouble in the US Tank Destroyer Corps. It is a weapon, then comes how it is used.

Desert Air Force Order of battle, 27 Oct 1942 (page 16)

My point was your claim of P-40K and M arriving in the desert in July 1942 which is wrong. No response except to post the October 1942 order of battle. Irrelevant to the July claim.

By my count at least seven squadrons had some P-40K.

And in the 1980's they had things like Jaguars. Where is the evidence they P-40K and M were in the western desert in July 1942 as per the claim?

He was appointed "Air Marshal" in April 1942, which was the beginning of the big reorganization I have mentioned several times. I'll get more into the operational details a bit later.

Arthur Tedder arrived in late 1941, given command of the RAF in June 1941 with the temporary rank of Air Marshal, made permanent in April 1942, temporary rank of Air Chief Marshal July 1942. After starting with "July to August 1942 - Tedder arrives. " we go to "He was appointed "Air Marshal" in April 1942," neither statement is valid. Please read more before attempting the details report, particularly of the army.

For the second time, Please provide the evidence for Air Forward Observers being around in July/August 1942.

You seem to have somehow missed my point.

I am not missing your point I am watching you ignore problems with the evidence you bring forward, dates, actual results, from Tedder to P-40K to operation Oyster, to the 1942/43 Mosquito day raids, to the Axis supply position, various garrison strengths and so on.

your zeal to deny!

Thanks for the label, zealot, fanatic = bad person, cannot be correct, denial for the sake of denial, can be safely ignored, look everyone read the label, put their for your reading convenience, ignore the information. Ignore the lack of support for your claims, I am the defective one, see the label helpfully attached.

As for ignoring your statement, my answer was two parts. The first dealt with the claim "If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein " which is clearly wrong because Rommel was stopped after 3 days. That is not dealt with. Instead the second part, the actual fighter data from the battle around 4 months later is the focus, except now it generic Alamein, maybe first, maybe second and from near the start there were more than Hurricanes and Blenheims in the RAF and still plenty of Hurricanes at Second Alamein which was the point of providing the figures.

Let me be even more clear: If the British only had Hurricanes and Blenheims at El Alamein, and if they hadn't also reorganized their air combat tactics, they would have lost.

Is this first or second Alamein, in any case the answer is no. Rommel had put himself in an impossible position, army and air force.

The role of the air force:

to which I would add, "and if they hadn't done, the battle would have been lost."

No to the lost to put it mildly. And the decisive role is also an exaggeration.

Air power played a decisive role. However, tanks, AT guns, infantry and artillery are all required to win a battle in this era.

But obviously in a supporting role to airpower, how much more airpower would enable further reduction in this army equipment list but still give the win?

In June 1942 the axis supply line in North Africa was pushed to breaking point, like the US on in France in 1944 it shattered, creating all sort of secondary effects making the situation worse. Both armies found themselves unable to do much as a result and in the US case taking weeks to restore things.

Tanks are tough, hard to knock out, harder to kill, but mechanically fragile. Between 27th August and 7th September 1944 as 21st Army group undertakes its pursuit the average British armoured brigade will advance 317 miles, and lose an average of 6 tanks per brigade per day to mechanical failure. If there were no repair facilities then after the 12 days the 226 tanks in a brigade would be reduced to 154. As an alternate way of looking at this a brigade on the move would see a tank dropping out on average every 4.4 miles. The Sherman and Cromwell were considered very reliable.

On 12th September 1944 Guards Armoured Division completes its pursuit. In the 18 days since August 28 it has covered some 495 miles and has been issued some 692,000 British or 831,000 US gallons of fuel. Note the distance from Caen to the furthest point reached by 21st Army Group is about 300 miles. In effect the rule of 2 miles travel for every 1 mile advance is being roughly followed even in a pursuit.

The distances involved from Gazala to Alamein is over 500 miles, double that and at 1 drop out per 5 miles = 200 drop outs, leaving 26 tanks as runners in a British Armoured Brigade The repair services will increase the number of runners, once they and their continued supplies reach where the broken down tanks are.

First day of first Alamein DAK 55 operational tanks, second day 37, third day 26. Luftwaffe support problematic, but apparently 8th Army plus the Desert Air Force with just Hurricanes and Blenheims would have been defeated.

The loss of the Fellers reports 29 June plus the tactical intercept unit captured 10 July with records telling the allies what they were doing wrong are also important factors.

The Germans thought it was 350 tons per day for a light division in combat. Rommel's forces at Alamein in July were well under strength, which helps the supply situation, but so were the supply units, which does not help the supply situation and then more troops were sent forward.

Mid September 1944, the 12th Army Group minimum needs of 550 tons/day/divisional slice including aircraft, or 13,000 tons per day. All up. 27 October 1944, based on the first 4 months of combat SHAEF calculates the daily supply requirements as 541 tons per divisional slice in normal combat, 426 tons if regrouping or negotiating natural obstacles and 462 tons in a rapid advance. Of the 541 tons the division itself consumed 223 tons and the rest by corps and army overheads.

The Bf109F fuel tank held 400 litres/88 imperial gallons/635 pounds of 100 octane, with slightly more weight if lower octane rating. Sortie using 400 pounds of fuel, say times 10 aircraft = 4,000 pounds, so 2 tons of supplies please, plus the spare parts, the food and water etc. for the crew. Add ammunition. Aircraft were supply intensive. A 1944 British armoured division required 1,000 British gallons per mile, so a 25 mile movement is 25,000 gallons. Putting say 30 fighters into the air each consuming 100 gallons for a flight is 3,000 gallons. Dedicated strike aircraft tend to consume more fuel as the price for heavier bomb loads and more crew.

Rommel in June 1942 took the chance that 8th Army was so disorganised it could be confused further into defeat all the way to the canal. The confusion was there at Mersa Matruth, with one corps withdrawing without telling the other. The Alamein line had some fresh troops and reinforcements began arriving, while Rommel was even further forward with fewer troops and only incorrect ideas of allied dispositions, having gone so far. Three days of DAK attacks then it was defence and reaction. A pull back was what the supply situation demanded. When that did not happen the usual brawls started over what was arriving with associated waste and confusion.

Previously the allied plan was to defeat DAK then the Italians, at first Alamein that became attack Italians, force Rommel to react. Also use mass artillery.

The Luftwaffe had a major strength crisis at the end of 1941, half authorised bomber strength, half of which were serviceable for example. The army losses in the east meant the Luftwaffe found itself more and more confined to battlefield support, giving up on interdiction, in order to cover the lack of ground troops and firepower. That showed up in the Mediterranean as airpower was shuffled in, out and around. The accident rate made things worse, the dust in North Africa worse again.

It is interesting while the Germans had a very efficient tank salvage operation there was not a similar one for the air force, it made 8th Army one of the "top scorers" in the air war, capturing large numbers of abandoned aircraft when it advanced.

Airfields in the desert largely consisted of graded ground and so were often called Landing Ground by the RAF, there were 70 between Daba Egypt and Gambut in Libya. Plenty of alternatives, like in France in 1941/42, if the Luftwaffe was able to move around to each, but Ultra was following them.

One reason Luftflotte 2 moved to the Mediterranean in late 1941 was the supply situation in the USSR, plus the weather, plus the reaction to the British offensive and growing air strength. The battle for Moscow air operations was similar to Alamein, the axis from improvised/simple airfields at the end of a long supply chain, the allies on more permanent and much better supplied airfields.

The ground support job of the Luftwaffe was helped by the allies being more static, those defensive "boxes" in 1941/42, too far apart for effective mutual support, to be picked off if required. While the Italian units were also mostly static the allies were not after them as much, trying to hit the German units.

Courage Alone by Chris Dunning, Italian Air Force including basic unit histories, deployments and organisation.

 

[Shortround6]

Artillery 832 25 pounder, 24 105mm, 32 4.5 inch, 20 5.5 inch, 604 2 pounder, 870 6 pounder less 50 2 pounder and 21 6 pounder in reserve etc.

Unfortunately it shows the rather dismal state of the British heavy (or even medium?) artillery. It does show the rather rapid change over to the 6pdr gun.

he provision for Close Support tanks in British formations was actually not that much different percentage wise to that of Panzer IV with the short 75mm in the desert panzer divisions 1941/42 but the German gun had a higher muzzle velocity and a shaped charge AT round.

Germans did tend (on paper?) to keep the MK IVs more grouped together. Granted the Africa Corp tended more to ad hoc formations than German units else were but the MK IVs were 'supposed' to concentrate in the key battle areas. The higher veleocity of the German short 75mm allowed for about double the point blank range (or less than 1/2 the time of fight to 1800-1200yds, could be 8-9 seconds or more for the 3in How, a long time to wait for smoke) than the British 3in How. Germans could fire HE and smoke to 3,000yds or beyond if need be, subject to ammo supply.

I do not have the production dates to know when the 3 inch replaced the 95mm in the CS tanks nor how many were used in the desert

Let's not get confused the British were rather good at that. The 95mm was the CS weapon in the Centaur, Cromwell and later Churchills. The 3.7in (94mm) was the contraption used in the A9 and A10, perhaps(?) in a few A-13s. accounts differ. The 3in How was used in everything in-between and off shoots (Tetrarch and possible Daimler Armored cars).
Neither 3.7 (94-95mm)had anything to do with the 3.7in mountain howitzer. Pretty much in 1941,42, 43 if the British had a CS tank in NA it had a 3in Howitzer. Barring a few one offs like sticking an 18pdr on a Stuart.

Towed anti-tank guns (like the 6 pounder I was referring to, or the German ones) are used much more for defense than offense, the obvious reason being that they have to be towed. This means by trucks or little tractors (like Universal" carriers) or halftracks, all of which are very vulnerable to attack. And towed anti-tank guns have to be unlimbered and deployed before they can shoot anything. This is why on offense, tanks, assault guns and tank destroyers are more reliable.

AT guns are brought along in case an attacking column is counterattacked, but they are by and large defensive weapons.

Germans were rather adept at using the AT guns in the offence although it took a bit planning and finesse. The 5cm Pak 38 was often more available than good guns in the MK III and IV. The Germans would attack to certain point with the tanks moving forward while the AT guns and infantry dismounted (often shielded by the dust of the tanks), the German tanks would then retreat through the AT gun screen and turn left or right. Pursuing British tanks would run into the AT gun screen. German tanks would then attack from one flank or the other. The Pac 38 was light and low and only needed a shallow hole to help blend in. The 88 was the size of a small cottage and needed considerable time to dig in even if it could be fired in just a seconds on restricted arcs. British 6pdr was only a bit larger and wasn't that much heavier than the 2pdr, it might have been lower.

the 360 degree traverse came at a cost.

Air power played a decisive role. However, tanks, AT guns, infantry and artillery are all required to win a battle in this era.

Very true, however if the RAF had not sucked up so much money the Royal Artillery might have had more/better medium/artillery and not need as much air support.
If you starve the Army then the Air Power gets to play and more decisive role.

" Artillery 832 25 pounder, 24 105mm, 32 4.5 inch, 20 5.5 inch,"

that is a truly pathetic inventory of larger than 25pdr artillery for a force that size.

 

[EwenS]

" Artillery 832 25 pounder, 24 105mm, 32 4.5 inch, 20 5.5 inch,"

that is a truly pathetic inventory of larger than 25pdr artillery for a force that size.

I'm really not sure that list is complete. Before being too critical look at what was lost in France in 1940 (tables at the foot of this post). Then consider:-

1. The 25pdr Mark 2 was only approved for production in late 1939 and was first issued in April 1940. It was the successor to both the 18pdr field gun and the 4.5" howitzer.
2. The obsolete 4.5" Howitzer was not finally withdrawn until the end of the North Africa campaign.
3. The 6" Howitzer and the 60 pdr were obsolete at the start of WW2 but continued in service during the North African Campaign. ISTR that some were still around at El Alamein.
4. The 4.5" and 5.5" were replacements for the guns at 3. above.
4. The 4.5" Gun Mk.2 was designed from 1938 and approved for production in Aug 1939. But production had to wait until late 1940 with the first guns issued for service in early 1941.
5. The 5.5" Gun was designed from Jan 1939 but was delayed by the designers being too ambitious. It first reached service in May 1942 in North Africa.
6. ISTR there were also some Heavy 7.2" Howitzers present
7. Those 24 105mm are of course in the self propelled M7 Priests.

Field​

Field​

Field​

Anti tank​

Anti tank​

Med

Med

Med

Heavy

Heavy

Heavy

Super Heavy

Super Heavy

25/18pdr​

18pdr​

4.5" How​

2pdr​

25mm​

6" How​

4.5/60pdr​

60pdrs​

6" Gun​

8" How​

9.2" How​

9.2" Gun​

12" How​

704​

216​

96​

509​

98​

221​

32​

19​

13​

13​

27​

2​

4​

​	Lost​	Stock 6th June 1940​	% Lost​
2pdr Equipments​	509​	333​	60​
Bofors Equipments​	-​	283​	-​
3.7" Equipments​	-​	662​	-​
18/25pdr Equipments​	704​	492​	59​
25pdr Equipments​	0​	114​	0​
18pdr Equipments​	216​	180​	55​
4.5" How Equipments​	94​	280​	25​

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

A lot was lost in France, it was also the artillery park of an army of 9-10 divisions, much larger than Forces at El Alamein.

1. The 25pdr Mark 2 was only approved for production in late 1939 and was first issued in April 1940. It was the successor to both the 18pdr field gun and the 4.5" howitzer.

Quite true and it was delayed due to budgets, it was also only 1 of 4 guns (not including AA) that didn't date from WW I. It does includes the 2pdr.

There is also a significate difference in old guns and new guns. The Old guns almost always had a traverse of 6-8 degrees before they had to be dug out and relayed.
That means they had a covered area about 1400yds wide at 10,000yds (700 yds each side of the center line of sight).
A gun with even 40 degrees of travers could cover 7280 yds at 10,000. Which makes it much much easier for neighboring batteries to be used for support fire.

Granted the US didn't have much in the way of new stuff either. Lots of plans in Drawers.
But the UK was not fighting the US, the UK was fighting Germany. And the Germans had been using split trails and wide angles since the early/mid 30s, Granted the Allies had force the Germans to throw out a lot of their old WW I junk and they had to start over.

The UK did have split trail guns going back to WW I, the 3.7in mountain Howitzer and one version of the 18pdr

Which dated to 1919-20? without the Pneumatic tires.
Not criticizing the 25pdr MK II here. It's carriage worked for what it was designed for. But it doesn't work well on larger guns.

And the British shot themselves in the foot (or both feet) with the crappy cheap shells again.
The 4.5in and 5.5 in guns had a very low HE weight per round.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

My No was about the claim "Just a few M7s but I think these made a significant difference." There were 24 105mm guns in the artillery park, under 3% of total guns, so explain, backed by evidence like combat reports of the significant difference these 24 guns made instead of quoting technical specifications.

Sure, glad to help. The 24 105mm guns amounts to six (?) batteries of M7 priests. Unlike the vast majority of those 25 pounders, the 4.5 or 5.5 inch etc., these are self propelled howitzers. So they can be rapidly placed wherever they are needed. They can be used to target the most problematic enemy AT guns, especially the 88s, near the point of the spear during attacks. They can keep up with the tank columns and hit targets of opportunity that present themselves. That's why self propelled artillery was invented - to keep up with armored units.

So in terms of just the number of gun tubes it may seem insignificant, but in impact maybe a little more than 3%. That said, there were fewer than I thought, I admit.

If these really did make "a significant difference" the US army should have been about unstoppable.

If the Germans continued to (exclusively) use 1942 kit and to fight in the open desert, the M7 would have been quite dangerous for them, just as the M3 and M4 medium tanks also posed problems. Of course the Germans developed plenty of new kit and more than kept up in the arms race, including the development of their own self-propelled artillery, like the Wespe (self propelled 105mm howitzer) and the Hummel (self propelled 150mm howitzer) in 1943.

The British also obviously liked the idea of a self propelled howitzer and wanted one of their own, but the original British design the Bishop) which did see use during second El ALamen, was very slow, had limited elevation and challenging ... ergonomics. It was deemed inferior by the British themselves. It just took a bit longer for the British to field a good one (the Sexton, appearing in 1943) though it used the somewhat obsolescent 25 pounder.

Well you would not go far in the WWII German Army and have trouble in the US Tank Destroyer Corps. It is a weapon, then comes how it is used.

US Tank Destroyer corps worked a lot better with self propelled AT guns

Towed AT guns, especially small ones, can be brought along on attacks and be quickly deployed to help prevent counterattacks. And as Shortround6 noted, these could be used quite cleverly by armored columns (as was done by the Germans) to lure enemy units into ambushes, but a towed AT gun is not strictly speaking an offensive weapon in the same way that a tank or self propelled gun is.

My point was your claim of P-40K and M arriving in the desert in July 1942 which is wrong. No response except to post the October 1942 order of battle. Irrelevant to the July claim.

And in the 1980's they had things like Jaguars. Where is the evidence they P-40K and M were in the western desert in July 1942 as per the claim?

You are right, I was wrong - there do not seem to have any P-40K operating during 1st El Alamein or in July 1942.
Looking at the day to day operational history in Shores MAW volume two, the earliest I see Kittyhawk III in action is by October 1942. So my timeline is a little off.

Spitfire Mk V (145 Sqn) June (I see 601 Sqn by Sept, 92 Sqn by Oct)
Kittyhawk II and IIa (F and L) RAF 260, Sept 2 1942 (3 RAAF by Oct)
US 57th FG (64th and 66th FS) P-40F, also Sept 1 1943
Kittyhawk III Oct 8, 1842 with 250 Sqn RAF and 450 RAAF, 112 RAF by Oct 20, 3 RAAF by Oct 21) - this is just before 2nd El Alamein.

At this time 250, 450 and 112 RAF seem to be mainly or all Kittyhawk III (that is all that shows up in claims and losses), 3 RAAF seems to have a mix of I, II and III types. I think they were actually transitioning to the Mk II but there probably wasn't enough available yet.
260 RAF is all Kittyhawk II or IIa
US 57th FG, now all three squadrons, has P-40F or L, except one squadron has at least some P-40K

So prior to 2nd EL Al, that's three RAF units fully equipped with Kittyhawk III, one partially equipped.
One US squadron at least partially equipped with P-40K
One RAF and two US squadron equipped with Kittyhawk II / P-40F
At least three RAF squadrons flying Spitfire Mk V

Several other RAF units still flying Kittyhawk I or Hurricane IIB
5 SAAF is still flying Tomahawk IIB rather amazingly

So the impact of the newer US fighter types is being felt starting in September.
At least one squadron of Spitfires (145) are already there in June, but that is just one squadron in action until Sept.

The Spitfires were available already by 1st El Alamein, and the fighter tactics did change at this time (June-July), as did the engine modifications for the P-40s. I'll provide some evidence of that in a later post.

Arthur Tedder arrived in late 1941 (snip) Please read more before attempting the details report, particularly of the army.

It was a timeline, summarized so it doesn't go into legalistic detail. The big reorganization seems to have taken place in mid 1942 during a series of meetings headed by Tedder. By this time he seems to have had enough allies and support to get what he wanted done.

For the second time, Please provide the evidence for Air Forward Observers being around in July/August 1942.

Mate, you write extremely long posts and demand specific answers to a myriad of specific points (which are sometimes rather tangental to the actual discussion, though not in this case) and sprinkle in a lot of dismissive or demeaning comments, and then ignore when these are actually answered. Give us a minute to get down into the weeds.

So to answer this specific question as to the timing of forward air controllers (or their equivalent, I have a feeling there may be a lawyerly 'gotcha' in some kind of distinction in the specific terminology here so I'll be very careful with my words). Under Tedder, the DAF was shifting toward a more coherent system of coordination between air and ground forces of the 8th Army. Tedder put Arthur Coningham in charge of this specific aspect. They first developed "Forward Air Support Links" (FASL) which was more for airborne spotter aircraft to direct intelligence to ground forces (sometimes called "tentacles"). Then came the "Air Support Control' (ASC) system "which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. This system included what was at the time called a "Mobile Fighter Controller" who was assigned to a vehicle traveling with the army columns. This was the beginning of what came to be called Cab Ranks. This is sometimes credited to the Aussies, as you can see here.

This is a direct quote from the Wiki on Coningham:

"Faced with equipment shortages, a hostile desert environment, and superior enemy planes, Coningham's management system, through judicious deployment of his squadrons, gradually achieved air superiority in the North African campaign. In particular, Coningham developed the use of fighter-bombers, able to fight as fighter planes in the air or in bombing and strafing attacks of enemy ground targets. Coningham developed an efficient ground support system to keep planes flying, and a command and control system to allow ground observers to radio in air attacks. Coningham's Western Desert Air Force, in continuous air attacks of enemy ground targets, was instrumental in stopping the enemy offensive at El Alamein in July 1942. Coningham formed a close relationship with the new commander of the British Eighth Army, General Bernard Montgomery.[3] Montgomery and Coningham recognised the importance of joint operations. The air power doctrine devised by Coningham is the basis of modern joint operations doctrine. The dominance of the Allied air force was a critical factor in the British victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein in November 1942. Coningham's doctrine of tactical air power would reach its fruition in early 1943, when RAF and USAAF fighter-bombers and bombers attacked enemy land forces."

(bolded sections by me)

I am not missing your point I am watching you ignore problems with the evidence you bring forward, dates, actual results, from Tedder to P-40K to operation Oyster, to the 1942/43 Mosquito day raids, to the Axis supply position, various garrison strengths and so on.

No. You are wrong about the Mosquito and definitely missed the point, Tedders big reorganization on fighter tactics took place when I said it did - in mid 1942. The P-40K was a factor in Second El Alamein, and I was mistaken in the timeline since it wasn't available by July, but I never put my theory 100% on that one model of aircraft. Newer P-40 models, Spitfires and (as I said several times) new tactics are together what made the difference in fighter combat. Targeting Axis airfields with escorted bomber strikes made a bigger difference.

The most important specific fighter types on the Allied side in 1942 were the Spitfire V and Kittyhawk II / P-40F/L, because they allowed the Allied pilots to engage the Axis fighters at the altitude where they typically attacked.

Thanks for the label, zealot, fanatic = bad person, cannot be correct, denial for the sake of denial, can be safely ignored, look everyone read the label, put their for your reading convenience, ignore the information. Ignore the lack of support for your claims, I am the defective one, see the label helpfully attached.

Why don't we both attempt to be more charitable? You seem to have thrown a few epithets around yourself mate.

As for ignoring your statement, my answer was two parts. The first dealt with the claim "If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein " which is clearly wrong because Rommel was stopped after 3 days. That is not dealt with. Instead the second part, the actual fighter data from the battle around 4 months later is the focus, except now it generic Alamein, maybe first, maybe second and from near the start there were more than Hurricanes and Blenheims in the RAF and still plenty of Hurricanes at Second Alamein which was the point of providing the figures.

See this to me is (charitably) a misunderstanding on your part. I never said that Hurricanes and Blenheims weren't in action past 1942 and I think you are well aware of that. My rather obvious point is that Hurricanes and Blenheims alone were not sufficient. It took the arrival better US fighters (Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks, especially once used with new fighter tactics) , Spitfires, and a bunch of mostly US strike aircraft (Boston, Maryland, Baltimore, B-25, B-17, and later B-24), plus some Beaufighters, to make the difference.

Is this first or second Alamein, in any case the answer is no. Rommel had put himself in an impossible position, army and air force.

The role of the air force:

No to the lost to put it mildly. And the decisive role is also an exaggeration.

No it isn't and I'm hardly the first to notice the significance of the DAF in both of these battles.

But obviously in a supporting role to airpower, how much more airpower would enable further reduction in this army equipment list but still give the win?

In June 1942 the axis supply line in North Africa was pushed to breaking point, like the US on in France in 1944 it shattered, creating all sort of secondary effects making the situation worse. Both armies found themselves unable to do much as a result and in the US case taking weeks to restore things.

One of the things you are missing is that the Axis supply lines were pushed to the breaking point in large part by the air power. They were losing 40% of their supplies going across the Med, and this only got worse, how much of that was to air power? We can dive into those numbers. Then they were losing another big chunk bringing supplies from ports to forward depots. Then more were being lost when those depots were hit.

As it was, both battles of El Alamein were hardly cakewalks. They were in fact pretty close. I don't know how much of the Axis supplies were lost to bombing ships, bombing trucks, bombing supply depots, but it's a fair bet that in aggregate it was a good deal more than half. So that is a significant effect already. Add to this that whereas in previous battles, the Germans had had a significant effect on Allied supplies and logistics, but that was now largely curtailed, you have another notch. Now consider that the Allies had become significantly more impact on the Tactical battlefield, both because they were now contesting the air superiority much more effectively (note the steadily increasing Luftwaffe fighter losses from mid 1942) and had their own answer to the deadly Stuka in the Hurricane and Kittyhawk fighter bombers, plus fast strike aircraft like the A-20. The fighter bombers in particular seem to have been quite accurate by WW2 standards, maybe not as much as a Stuka but there were many more of them.

The situation with the US army in 1944 was different, because they had air superiority. It was just a matter of shifting assets to other units and establishing better port facilities.

First day of first Alamein DAK 55 operational tanks, second day 37, third day 26. Luftwaffe support problematic, but apparently 8th Army plus the Desert Air Force with just Hurricanes and Blenheims would have been defeated.

yes, they would have. Glad you seem to have grasped my actual point there.

With just Hurricanes, fighter losses to the Allies would have bee much more severe, fighter operations would have been much more limited. Strikes would have been constrained to much shorter range (no deep hits to enemy supply lines, or much fewer - you could still do some maritime attacks with Wellingtons) and losses to strike aircraft would be much higher. Just look at the losses to Blenheims in the earlier months of the Desert War.

Previously the allied plan was to defeat DAK then the Italians, at first Alamein that became attack Italians, force Rommel to react. Also use mass artillery.

If mass artillery alone worked then WW1 would have been over a lot quicker.

The Luftwaffe had a major strength crisis at the end of 1941, half authorised bomber strength, half of which were serviceable for example. The army losses in the east meant the Luftwaffe found itself more and more confined to battlefield support, giving up on interdiction, in order to cover the lack of ground troops and firepower. That showed up in the Mediterranean as airpower was shuffled in, out and around. The accident rate made things worse, the dust in North Africa worse again.

My point in the original argument that started all this is that the Germans stopped being able to use their bombers, starting with the longer ranged operational / interdiction targets because they lacked an escort fighter and their early war bomber types were becoming vulnerable to the newer generations of Allied fighters, and therefore couldn't range freely behind the lines. The Anglo-American Allies did not have this problem however and were able to send escorted strikes to medium range targets (and as far as Benghazi by fall 1942).

The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe in the shorter ranged tactical role, once so decisive in France (Hannut, Arras), Russia, and for nearly a year in North Africa, was fading because the aging Ju 87, once so deadly in coordination with armored breakthroughs, was now becoming too vulnerable to Allied attacks.

Airfields in the desert largely consisted of graded ground and so were often called Landing Ground by the RAF, there were 70 between Daba Egypt and Gambut in Libya. Plenty of alternatives, like in France in 1941/42, if the Luftwaffe was able to move around to each, but Ultra was following them.

one of Tedders mid 1942 innovations which I have mentioned several times is the targeting of Axis airfields with air strikes especially by Baltimores and later B-25s and still later, B-24s. These were very effective, as you can see in the numbers in Shores, and there is no doubt that they destroyed more aircraft this way than in air combat, probably 3-5 times as many. I can cite some specific cases if needed.

The ground support job of the Luftwaffe was helped by the allies being more static, those defensive "boxes" in 1941/42, too far apart for effective mutual support, to be picked off if required. While the Italian units were also mostly static the allies were not after them as much, trying to hit the German units.

I'm sure weather, length of supply lines, better air bases on the Allied side etc. all had an impact in the outcome. So did the Allies outnumbering the Axis. But as noted already, both of these were fairly close battles. The Desert Air Force is what tipped it over into an Allied victory.

Of course they weren't "decisive" in the sense that the US naval aviation was in Midway. At Midway, almost all the damage was done exclusively by the aircraft. The surface ships didn't even get in contact unless you count submarines. But in a land battle, the aviation element was sometimes the tipping point, the key factor that made the difference.

And of course, being "Decisive" in mostly open desert and bare foothills is not quite the same as Italy with heavy mountainous terrain often covered in trees, with villages and towns and all kinds of other great places to hide. Terrain makes a difference in the use of air power.

 

[SaparotRob]

The Hummel was my favorite piece in the board game "Panzer Blitz ".

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

mea culpa, I actually have both Panzer Blitz and Panzer Leader on my bookshelf which i can see from here. Sadly both pretty flawed games but I had a lot of fun with them back in the day, now have them basically just for nostalgia.

The best one I remember for the Russian front was the operational level game Panzer Gruppe Guderian, which I loved because it was (by the standards of these games) relatively simple and had this billiant conceit that you didn't know how good the Soviet units were until they were engaged. They were just question marks until you flip them. Do you have a t-35 tank unit or a t-34 tank unit? Surprise!

Need to find a copy of that somewhere, though I don't really know anyone around town to play one of these with any more.