My No was about the claim "Just a few M7s but I think these made a significant difference." There were 24 105mm guns in the artillery park, under 3% of total guns, so explain, backed by evidence like combat reports of the significant difference these 24 guns made instead of quoting technical specifications.
Sure, glad to help. The 24 105mm guns amounts to six (?) batteries of M7 priests. Unlike the vast majority of those 25 pounders, the 4.5 or 5.5 inch etc., these are self propelled howitzers. So they can be rapidly placed wherever they are needed. They can be used to target the most problematic enemy AT guns, especially the 88s, near the point of the spear during attacks. They can keep up with the tank columns and hit targets of opportunity that present themselves. That's why self propelled artillery was invented - to keep up with armored units.
So in terms of just the number of gun tubes it may seem insignificant, but in impact maybe a little more than 3%. That said, there were fewer than I thought, I admit.
If these really did make "a significant difference" the US army should have been about unstoppable.
If the Germans continued to (exclusively) use 1942 kit and to fight in the open desert, the M7 would have been quite dangerous for them, just as the M3 and M4 medium tanks also posed problems. Of course the Germans developed plenty of new kit and more than kept up in the arms race, including the development of their own self-propelled artillery, like the Wespe (self propelled 105mm howitzer) and the Hummel (self propelled 150mm howitzer) in 1943.
The British also obviously liked the idea of a self propelled howitzer and wanted one of their own, but the original British design the Bishop) which did see use during second El ALamen, was very slow, had limited elevation and challenging ... ergonomics. It was deemed inferior by the British themselves. It just took a bit longer for the British to field a good one (the Sexton, appearing in 1943) though it used the somewhat obsolescent 25 pounder.
Well you would not go far in the WWII German Army and have trouble in the US Tank Destroyer Corps. It is a weapon, then comes how it is used.
US Tank Destroyer corps worked a lot better with self propelled AT guns
Towed AT guns, especially small ones, can be brought along on attacks and be quickly deployed to help prevent counterattacks. And as Shortround6 noted, these could be used quite cleverly by armored columns (as was done by the Germans) to lure enemy units into ambushes, but a towed AT gun is not strictly speaking an offensive weapon in the same way that a tank or self propelled gun is.
My point was your claim of P-40K and M arriving in the desert in July 1942 which is wrong. No response except to post the October 1942 order of battle. Irrelevant to the July claim.
And in the 1980's they had things like Jaguars. Where is the evidence they P-40K and M were in the western desert in July 1942 as per the claim?
You are right, I was wrong - there do not seem to have any P-40K operating during 1st El Alamein or in July 1942.
Looking at the day to day operational history in Shores MAW volume two, the earliest I see Kittyhawk III in action is by October 1942. So my timeline is a little off.
Spitfire Mk V (145 Sqn) June (I see 601 Sqn by Sept, 92 Sqn by Oct)
Kittyhawk II and IIa (F and L) RAF 260, Sept 2 1942 (3 RAAF by Oct)
US 57th FG (64th and 66th FS) P-40F, also Sept 1 1943
Kittyhawk III Oct 8, 1842 with 250 Sqn RAF and 450 RAAF, 112 RAF by Oct 20, 3 RAAF by Oct 21) - this is just before 2nd El Alamein.
At this time 250, 450 and 112 RAF seem to be mainly or all Kittyhawk III (that is all that shows up in claims and losses), 3 RAAF seems to have a mix of I, II and III types. I think they were actually transitioning to the Mk II but there probably wasn't enough available yet.
260 RAF is all Kittyhawk II or IIa
US 57th FG, now all three squadrons, has P-40F or L, except one squadron has at least some P-40K
So prior to 2nd EL Al, that's three RAF units fully equipped with Kittyhawk III, one partially equipped.
One US squadron at least partially equipped with P-40K
One RAF and two US squadron equipped with Kittyhawk II / P-40F
At least three RAF squadrons flying Spitfire Mk V
Several other RAF units still flying Kittyhawk I or Hurricane IIB
5 SAAF is still flying Tomahawk IIB rather amazingly
So the impact of the newer US fighter types is being felt starting in September.
At least one squadron of Spitfires (145) are already there in June, but that is just one squadron in action until Sept.
The Spitfires were available already by 1st El Alamein, and the fighter tactics did change at this time (June-July), as did the engine modifications for the P-40s. I'll provide some evidence of that in a later post.
Arthur Tedder arrived in late 1941 (snip) Please read more before attempting the details report, particularly of the army.
It was a timeline, summarized so it doesn't go into legalistic detail. The big reorganization seems to have taken place in mid 1942 during a series of meetings headed by Tedder. By this time he seems to have had enough allies and support to get what he wanted done.
For the second time, Please provide the evidence for Air Forward Observers being around in July/August 1942.
Mate, you write extremely long posts and demand specific answers to a myriad of specific points (which are sometimes rather tangental to the actual discussion, though not in this case) and sprinkle in a lot of dismissive or demeaning comments, and then ignore when these are actually answered. Give us a minute to get down into the weeds.
So to answer this specific question as to the timing of forward air controllers (or their equivalent, I have a feeling there may be a lawyerly 'gotcha' in some kind of distinction in the specific terminology here so I'll be very careful with my words). Under Tedder, the DAF was shifting toward a more coherent system of coordination between air and ground forces of the 8th Army. Tedder put Arthur Coningham in charge of this specific aspect. They first developed "Forward Air Support Links" (FASL) which was more for airborne spotter aircraft to direct intelligence to ground forces (sometimes called "tentacles"). Then came the "Air Support Control' (ASC) system "which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. This system included what was at the time called a "Mobile Fighter Controller" who was assigned to a vehicle traveling with the army columns. This was the beginning of what came to be called Cab Ranks. This is sometimes credited to the Aussies, as you can see
here.
This is a direct quote
from the Wiki on Coningham:
"Faced with equipment shortages, a hostile desert environment, and superior enemy planes, Coningham's management system, through judicious deployment of his squadrons, gradually achieved air superiority in the North African campaign. In particular, Coningham developed the use of fighter-bombers, able to fight as fighter planes in the air or in bombing and strafing attacks of enemy ground targets. Coningham developed an efficient ground support system to keep planes flying, and a command and control system to allow ground observers to radio in air attacks. Coningham's Western Desert Air Force, in continuous air attacks of enemy ground targets, was instrumental in stopping the enemy offensive at El Alamein in July 1942. Coningham formed a close relationship with the new commander of the British Eighth Army, General Bernard Montgomery.[3] Montgomery and Coningham recognised the importance of joint operations. The air power doctrine devised by Coningham is the basis of modern joint operations doctrine. The dominance of the Allied air force was a critical factor in the British victory at the Second Battle of El Alamein in November 1942. Coningham's doctrine of tactical air power would reach its fruition in early 1943, when RAF and USAAF fighter-bombers and bombers attacked enemy land forces."
(bolded sections by me)
I am not missing your point I am watching you ignore problems with the evidence you bring forward, dates, actual results, from Tedder to P-40K to operation Oyster, to the 1942/43 Mosquito day raids, to the Axis supply position, various garrison strengths and so on.
No. You are wrong about the Mosquito and definitely missed the point, Tedders big reorganization on fighter tactics took place when I said it did - in mid 1942. The P-40K was a factor in Second El Alamein, and I was mistaken in the timeline since it wasn't available by July, but I never put my theory 100% on that one model of aircraft. Newer P-40 models, Spitfires and (as I said several times) new tactics are together what made the difference in fighter combat. Targeting Axis airfields with escorted bomber strikes made a bigger difference.
The most important specific fighter types on the Allied side in 1942 were the Spitfire V and Kittyhawk II / P-40F/L, because they allowed the Allied pilots to engage the Axis fighters at the altitude where they typically attacked.
Thanks for the label, zealot, fanatic = bad person, cannot be correct, denial for the sake of denial, can be safely ignored, look everyone read the label, put their for your reading convenience, ignore the information. Ignore the lack of support for your claims, I am the defective one, see the label helpfully attached.
Why don't we both attempt to be more charitable? You seem to have thrown a few epithets around yourself mate.
As for ignoring your statement, my answer was two parts. The first dealt with the claim "If the British still had Hurricanes (of whatever variant) and Blenheim bombers in mid 1942 they would have lost 1st El Alamein " which is clearly wrong because Rommel was stopped after 3 days. That is not dealt with. Instead the second part, the actual fighter data from the battle around 4 months later is the focus, except now it generic Alamein, maybe first, maybe second and from near the start there were more than Hurricanes and Blenheims in the RAF and still plenty of Hurricanes at Second Alamein which was the point of providing the figures.
See this to me is (charitably) a misunderstanding on your part. I never said that Hurricanes and Blenheims weren't in action past 1942 and I think you are well aware of that. My rather obvious point is that Hurricanes and Blenheims alone were not sufficient. It took the arrival better US fighters (Tomahawks and then Kittyhawks, especially once used with new fighter tactics) , Spitfires, and a bunch of mostly US strike aircraft (Boston, Maryland, Baltimore, B-25, B-17, and later B-24), plus some Beaufighters, to make the difference.
Is this first or second Alamein, in any case the answer is no. Rommel had put himself in an impossible position, army and air force.
The role of the air force:
No to the lost to put it mildly. And the decisive role is also an exaggeration.
No it isn't and I'm hardly the first to notice the significance of the DAF in both of these battles.
But obviously in a supporting role to airpower, how much more airpower would enable further reduction in this army equipment list but still give the win?
In June 1942 the axis supply line in North Africa was pushed to breaking point, like the US on in France in 1944 it shattered, creating all sort of secondary effects making the situation worse. Both armies found themselves unable to do much as a result and in the US case taking weeks to restore things.
One of the things you are missing is that the Axis supply lines were pushed to the breaking point in large part by the air power. They were losing 40% of their supplies going across the Med, and this only got worse, how much of that was to air power? We can dive into those numbers. Then they were losing another big chunk bringing supplies from ports to forward depots. Then more were being lost when those depots were hit.
As it was, both battles of El Alamein were hardly cakewalks. They were in fact pretty close. I don't know how much of the Axis supplies were lost to bombing ships, bombing trucks, bombing supply depots, but it's a fair bet that in aggregate it was a good deal more than half. So that is a significant effect already. Add to this that whereas in previous battles, the Germans had had a significant effect on Allied supplies and logistics, but that was now largely curtailed, you have another notch. Now consider that the Allies had become significantly more impact on the Tactical battlefield, both because they were now contesting the air superiority much more effectively (note the steadily increasing Luftwaffe fighter losses from mid 1942) and had their own answer to the deadly Stuka in the Hurricane and Kittyhawk fighter bombers, plus fast strike aircraft like the A-20. The fighter bombers in particular seem to have been quite accurate by WW2 standards, maybe not as much as a Stuka but there were many more of them.
The situation with the US army in 1944 was different, because they had air superiority. It was just a matter of shifting assets to other units and establishing better port facilities.
First day of first Alamein DAK 55 operational tanks, second day 37, third day 26. Luftwaffe support problematic, but apparently 8th Army plus the Desert Air Force with just Hurricanes and Blenheims would have been defeated.
yes, they would have. Glad you seem to have grasped my actual point there.
With just Hurricanes, fighter losses to the Allies would have bee much more severe, fighter operations would have been much more limited. Strikes would have been constrained to much shorter range (no deep hits to enemy supply lines, or much fewer - you could still do some maritime attacks with Wellingtons) and losses to strike aircraft would be much higher. Just look at the losses to Blenheims in the earlier months of the Desert War.
Previously the allied plan was to defeat DAK then the Italians, at first Alamein that became attack Italians, force Rommel to react. Also use mass artillery.
If mass artillery alone worked then WW1 would have been over a lot quicker.
The Luftwaffe had a major strength crisis at the end of 1941, half authorised bomber strength, half of which were serviceable for example. The army losses in the east meant the Luftwaffe found itself more and more confined to battlefield support, giving up on interdiction, in order to cover the lack of ground troops and firepower. That showed up in the Mediterranean as airpower was shuffled in, out and around. The accident rate made things worse, the dust in North Africa worse again.
My point in the original argument that started all this is that the Germans stopped being able to use their bombers, starting with the longer ranged operational / interdiction targets because they lacked an escort fighter and their early war bomber types were becoming vulnerable to the newer generations of Allied fighters, and therefore couldn't range freely behind the lines. The Anglo-American Allies did not have this problem however and were able to send escorted strikes to medium range targets (and as far as Benghazi by fall 1942).
The effectiveness of the Luftwaffe in the shorter ranged tactical role, once so decisive in France (Hannut, Arras), Russia, and for nearly a year in North Africa, was fading because the aging Ju 87, once so deadly in coordination with armored breakthroughs, was now becoming too vulnerable to Allied attacks.
Airfields in the desert largely consisted of graded ground and so were often called Landing Ground by the RAF, there were 70 between Daba Egypt and Gambut in Libya. Plenty of alternatives, like in France in 1941/42, if the Luftwaffe was able to move around to each, but Ultra was following them.
one of Tedders mid 1942 innovations which I have mentioned several times is the targeting of Axis airfields with air strikes especially by Baltimores and later B-25s and still later, B-24s. These were very effective, as you can see in the numbers in Shores, and there is no doubt that they destroyed more aircraft this way than in air combat, probably 3-5 times as many. I can cite some specific cases if needed.
The ground support job of the Luftwaffe was helped by the allies being more static, those defensive "boxes" in 1941/42, too far apart for effective mutual support, to be picked off if required. While the Italian units were also mostly static the allies were not after them as much, trying to hit the German units.
I'm sure weather, length of supply lines, better air bases on the Allied side etc. all had an impact in the outcome. So did the Allies outnumbering the Axis. But as noted already, both of these were fairly close battles. The Desert Air Force is what tipped it over into an Allied victory.
Of course they weren't "decisive" in the sense that the US naval aviation was in Midway. At Midway, almost all the damage was done exclusively by the aircraft. The surface ships didn't even get in contact unless you count submarines. But in a land battle, the aviation element was sometimes the tipping point, the key factor that made the difference.
And of course, being "Decisive" in mostly open desert and bare foothills is not quite the same as Italy with heavy mountainous terrain often covered in trees, with villages and towns and all kinds of other great places to hide. Terrain makes a difference in the use of air power.
the British were rather good at that. The 95mm was the CS weapon in the Centaur, Cromwell and later Churchills. The 3.7in (94mm) was the contraption used in the A9 and A10, perhaps(?) in a few A-13s. accounts differ. The 3in How was used in everything in-between and off shoots (Tetrarch and possible Daimler Armored cars). 
