Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

As I understand this, could be wrong.

July 1st.................................103 Kittyhawks (1 and 1A) something as establishment drop from 178 to 112, but actual strength only dropped two planes, change in paper strength or wrong word?
Sept 1st ............................... 101 Kittyhawk Is, 11 Kittyhawk IIs (P-40Fs), 4 Kittyhawk IIIs (P-40Ks)
Oct 1st ...................................57 Kittyhawk Is, 19 Kittyhawk IIs (P-40Fs), 59 Kittyhawk IIIs (P-40Ks)

Trying again after spending some more time untangling the file. Air 22/268, Middle East Command Aircraft state, several pages per month, the file to find out how many Harvards, Valettas and other types were around as well as the combat forces. S.H.Q. Ismailia had a Do17 being returned to a Maintenance Unit for example. Unfortunately some months are missing, some pages are out of order and the number of squadrons is not given. Miscellaneous units include the PRU. Not all the combat units listed below were in the desert.

Strength as of 30 June, plus arrivals and losses for June
Hurricane Total establishment of 192 in the fighter and 54 in the Army Co-operation squadrons, 76 in the OTU's and 32 miscellaneous, total 354. Strength in the units 129 I and 185 II, total 324 of which 90 I and 126 II, total 216, were serviceable, there were another 144 I and 158 II in the repair system, arrivals 4 I and 73 II, losses 5 I and 37 II.
Kittyhawk. Total establishment 160 in the fighter squadrons and 18 miscellaneous, total 178, Strength in the units 103, of which 68 were serviceable. There were another 228 in the repair system, arrivals 55, losses 63.
Spitfire Total establishment 128 including miscellaneous, strength in the units 2 I and 34 V of which 21 V were serviceable. There were another 16 V in the repair system, arrivals 41 V, losses 5 V.
Tomahawk Total establishment of 32 in the fighter squadrons, 90 in the OTU's and 6 miscellaneous, total 128. Strength in the units 46 of which 25 were serviceable, there were another 237 in the repair system, arrivals none, losses 31.

Strength as of 30 September, plus arrivals and losses for September, training unit totals now separated
Hurricane Total establishment of 248 in the squadrons, Strength 64 I and 309 II, total 373 of which 40 I and 267 II, total 307, were serviceable, there were another 84 I and 206 II in the repair system, arrivals 1 I and 116 II, losses 8 I and 51 II.
Kittyhawk. Total establishment 112 in the squadrons, Strength 101 I, 13 II and 4 III, total 118, of which 95 I, 13 II and 4 III were serviceable, total 110. There were another 235 I, 9 I and 31 III in the repair system, all marks arrivals 74, losses 41.
Spitfire Total establishment 96 in the squadrons, strength 57 V of which 47 were serviceable. There were another 46 V in the repair system, arrivals 13 V, losses 19 V.
Tomahawk Total establishment of 64 in the fighter squadrons, Strength 21 of which 20 were serviceable, there were another 104 in the repair system, arrivals 2, losses 13.

Strength as of 31 October, plus arrivals and losses for October.
Hurricane Total establishment of 298 in the squadrons, Strength 47 I and 317 II, total 364 of which 35 I and 278 II, total 313, were serviceable, there were another 86 I and 314 II in the repair system, arrivals 2 I and 107 II, losses 38 II.
Kittyhawk. Total establishment 112 in the squadrons, Strength 47 I, 19 II and 59 III, total 125, of which 39 I, 13 II and 57 III were serviceable, total 109. There were another 257 I, 32 I and 18 III in the repair system, arrivals 1 I, 47 II, 67 III, losses 16 I, 2 II and 7 III.
Spitfire Total establishment 80 in the squadrons, strength 66 V of which 58 were serviceable. There were another 38 V in the repair system, arrivals 31 V, losses 12 V.
Tomahawk Total establishment of 34 in the fighter squadrons, Strength 19 of which 17 were serviceable, there were another 104 in the repair system, no arrivals, losses 4.

Air 22/401 is a daily tally of fighter sorties by type and mission, 39 columns of data for the October and November 1942 reports. As a control it has 1,748 P-40 sorties, the 9th Air Force Operations Summary says 1,829, there were 110 sweep sorties on 5 November by unknown aircraft types which easily accounts for the difference in the RAF and USAAF records. All up 15,692 sorties though the report total is given as 15,689. If you define the air battle dates as 24 October to 4 November, on those 12 days, 7,549 sorties.

Day sorties totals by mission
5,739 Sweep, 2,359 Bombing, 1,193 Strafing, 1,705 Shipping protection, 4,493 Bomber Escort, 185 Defensive/Rescue, 19 Anti Shipping, sorties by aircraft type 1,951 Spitfire, 4,845 Hurricane, 5,934 Kittyhawk, 819 Tomahawk, 227 Beaufighter, 58 Fulmar, 1,748 P-40. Hurricanes did the most sweeps, 2,137 sorties and almost all shipping protection 1,397 sorties, Kittyhawks the most escort, 2,228 sorties, bombing, 1,778 sorties and strafing, 462 sorties.

For all its obsolescence Tomahawk, 240 Sweep, 35 strafing, 40 Shipping protection, 504 escort sorties.

Night missions, 364 night offensive, 148 night defensive, 485 Hurricane, 27 Beaufighter. Not much mention of these in the histories.

British Archives AIR 20/1929 operational hours, Middle East.

Aircraft	Jan-42​	Feb-42​	Mar-42​	Apr-42​	May-42​	Jun-42​	Jul-42​	Aug-42​	Sep-42​	Oct-42​	Nov-42​
Baltimore	0​	0​	0​	0​	214​	420​	n/a	446​	737​	1508​	1115​
Beaufighter	442​	625​	967​	714​	652​	947​	n/a	1697​	1211​	1127​	927​
Beaufort	0​	82​	326​	312​	80​	347​	n/a	285​	28​	102​	24​
Blenheim	1535​	676​	388​	435​	304​	514​	n/a	960​	1038​	630​	600​
Bombay	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	n/a	217​	374​	566​	258​
Boston	0​	11​	91​	27​	63​	0​	n/a	0​	845​	737​	446​
Catalina	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	n/a	119​	529​	64​	27​
Fortress	30​	39​	0​	0​	0​	0​	n/a	0​	0​	0​	0​
Halifax	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	n/a	1093​	664​	335​	484​
Hudson	0​	0​	17​	28​	0​	275​	n/a	714​	939​	1265​	836​
Hurricane	2845​	1871​	1901​	2695​	2562​	3652​	n/a	3580​	4047​	4645​	4530​
Kittyhawk	769​	633​	879​	790​	1723​	3036​	n/a	1332​	1801​	4505​	4421​
Liberator	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	n/a	614​	921​	583​	649​
Marauder	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	n/a	0​	0​	8​	131​
Maryland	733​	585​	503​	465​	488​	430​	n/a	306​	264​	171​	88​
Spitfire	0​	0​	0​	240​	376​	1941​	n/a	3150​	2712​	1000​	1653​
Sunderland	209​	81​	191​	375​	314​	331​	n/a	643​	143​	130​	117​
Tomahawk	734​	63​	1074​	1167​	1077​	798​	n/a	408​	309​	597​	576​
Wellington	4566​	3983​	4539​	4126​	4630​	6360​	n/a	9188​	6268​	4998​	4611​
P.R.U.	87​	10​	20​	10​	197​	158​	n/a	214​	404​	160​	157​
Total	11950​	8659​	10896​	11384​	12680​	19209​	n/a	24966​	23234​	23131​	21650​
SEF Total	3614​	2504​	2780​	3725​	4661​	8629​	n/a	8062​	8560​	10150​	10604​

US archives Record Group 18 Entry 7 Box 5939, Ninth U.S. Air Force Operations Summary.

Type	Month	Feb-42​	Mar-42​	Apr-42​	May-42​	Jun-42​	Jul-42​	Aug-42​	Sep-42​	Oct-42​	Nov-42​
B-24	Missions	0​	0​	0​	0​	8​	22​	18​	25​	27​	25​
B-24	Sorties	0​	0​	0​	0​	70​	166​	180​	217​	280​	244​
B-24	Hours	0​	0​	0​	0​	454​	1576​	1531​	2103​	2529​	2546​
B-25	Missions	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	7​	14​	38​	17​
B-25	Sorties	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	71​	73​	299​	149​
B-25	Hours	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	233​	222​	467​	238​
P-40	Missions	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	1​	45​	81​	112​
P-40	Sorties	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	4​	286​	940​	889​
P-40	Hours	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	0​	5​	363​	1202​	1582​

 

[MikeMeech]

Thanks for that. What is reference 66? That is a rear services fuel consumption higher than I thought it would be.

Hi
Reference page below:

Mike

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

The Tomahawk IIB was still pretty good in late 1942, it wasn't as fast as a Kittyhawk at the higher boost settings, but it had one of the best climb rates of the P-40 family and was quite agile, with a bit lower wing loading. The main limitation was it had a bit less capacity for external fuel, as far as I know they never put the 75 gallon external tank on them and they didn't typically carry bombs. It was also not as heavily armed but the heavy machine guns it did have were in the nose, making them a bit more accurate.

The other thing about the Tomahawk is that it's unclear if they did any increased boost settings on these. It's a bit earlier version of the Allison and it may not have been safe to do so. It's possible that they did anyway, but I've never seen any evidence for it. So these may have been limited to about 340 mph, which is probably 40-50 mph slower than a Bf 109F-4.

That said they did seem to shoot down 109s with them pretty regularly, especially later in 1941 and early 1942. By mid to late 1942 (and into 1943) it was just the South Africans still flying these and I think in the less risky missions.

They were tough, like all the P-40s. This is a famous and rather intense photo of Australian Ace Clive Caldwell posing in front of his heavily shot up Tomahawk IIB on 29 August 1941, after a solo encounter with German Ace Werner Schröer and a wingman, both in Bf 109E-7s. Caldwells plane had over one hundred 7.92 bullet and five 20mm cannon shell hits, but he made it back. You can see the flat tire, fluid leaking out from behind the cockpit, and at least three of the 20mm cannon strikes on the right wing.

 

[nam72]

What were the key factors during the first and second battles of El Alamein? Was the stalemate in the first battle and British victory in the second due to Bernard Montgomery reigning in the tank commanders with their dreams of emulating the Light Brigade from the Crimean War? Or was it more the improvements in tactics and kit in the Desert Air Force (the former perhaps largely attributable to Air Marshal Arthur Tedder and some of his other colleagues), or was it down to improved kit for the ground forces like the M3 and M4 medium tanks and other new kit.

Or was it some combination of two or more of these factors. My main focus here is on the relevance of the Desert Air Force vs. the Luftwaffe. My premise is that the Luftwaffe, having dominated the skies for most of mid 1941 through mid 1942 (and contributed greatly to Axis victories in that period), started having some trouble with the British air forces in mid 1942 and that the British had acquired some abilities (through improving kit and tactics) that the Luftwaffe did not have. And that this, in turn, led to the downfall of the Luftwaffe in North Africa and the increasing efficacy of the DAF as a factor in the ground battles, followed swiftly by the demise of the Afrika Korps.

I don't know but I think the older diplomatic codes were changed by that time and Rommel couldn't read our mail anymore. That's what made him the so-called Desert Fox. Also,by that time the supply train was getting slim on most everything ..That's what made Malta such an important base.Just a thought.Interesting subject..

 

[MikeMeech]

Title of thread
"Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?"

First post

" My premise is that the Luftwaffe, having dominated the skies for most of mid 1941 through mid 1942 (and contributed greatly to Axis victories in that period), started having some trouble with the British air forces in mid 1942 and that the British had acquired some abilities (through improving kit and tactics) that the Luftwaffe did not have. And that this, in turn, led to the downfall of the Luftwaffe in North Africa and the increasing efficacy of the DAF as a factor in the ground battles, followed swiftly by the demise of the Afrika Korps."

Hi
I do not think that the Luftwaffe was dominating the skies throughout the period mid 1941 to mid 1942, an extract from Ehlers has the following:

We should also remember that during the first half of 1942 resources were heading to the Far East because of the Japanese attack, the Royal Navy was particularly weakened in the Eastern Med, but it also included air and land assets. This was still going on towards the end of the year, for example my father's unit thought they were going to North Africa, their advance party was already there, meanwhile the main body ended up in India with their desert kit.

Mike

 

[Shortround6]

Thank you.

I tried to put the origin posters words in "quotes" in the paragraph after the title. Maybe I need to use italics or something.

I am leaning more about the Desert war, In part because I ordered "Ehlers" book (E book edition) after you posted it. I am working my way through it.
So far Tedder's influence dates way early than has been given credit for in this thread and his boss in 1940-41 deserves great credit also for having set up many things, like the basic British Air Strategy in Med. There sure was NOT a flip of the switch when Tedder took over but a continuation and expansion of what had gone before.
There may have been bumps (still reading) so thank you for the latest excerpt

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'm going through compiling some numbers on air combat, I'll post something pretty soon, but maybe not tonight got a few other things going on.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

So here is what I mean when I say the Axis were dominating the skies, and I definitely think they were. I'm talking about losses in air combat, first and foremost, and losses on the ground from bombing too. Just talking about aircraft here.


This is from Shores MAW II, starting in April 1941 when J.G.27 arrived. I tried to do this with Vol 1 but it was too much of a pain in the ass with all the pages falling out.
I'm only showing losses (no claims) and only the days with significant (at least 2) losses on one side or another.
I'm counting missing or fail to return, 'crash landed' and 'shot down' as the same for simplicity. I'm not counting damaged unless over 60% or 'Badly damaged' or the plane crash-landed.

A couple of things I did notice in Vol 1 before I gave up-

This appears to be one of the most successful SAS raids: 21 Dec 1941 / 2 Ju 88, 8 CR 42 (SAS), 5 G.50 (SAS), 6 MC 200 (SAS), 2 Ca.311 (SAS), 1 SM 79 (SAS), Ca 164 (SAS)

Shores also mentions in Vol 1 that the Axis lost 203 aircraft destroyed due to ground action like capturing airfields. Although apparently these were mostly broken down planes which couldn't be flown away. Shores also said JG 27 was hampered by lack of fuel in 1941, and notes there were 83 Bf 109s (with 26 serviceable) Jan 15

This is all from MAW Vol2:

8 Feb 1942 4 Hurricane II, 5 Kittyhawk I
9 Feb 1942 2 Hurricane II / 1 He 111, 1 Ju 88A-4, 1 Bf 109F-4
10 Feb 1942 1 Hurricane II / 1 Bf 109F-4, 1 Bf 110E-3
12 Feb 1942 6 Hurricane II / 2 Ju 87
13 Feb 1942 5 Hurricane II / 1 Bf 109F-4, 1 Ju 88
14 Feb 1942 1 Hurricane / 3 MC 202, 3 MC 200 (big fight with 3 RAAF and 112 RAF kittyhawks)
15 Feb 1942 6 Kittyhawk I (Schulz and Marseille)
16 Feb 1942 1 Kittyhawk I, 1 Hurricane II
21 Feb 1942 3 Kittyhawk I / 1 Bf109F-4 (this was Caldwell shooting down Stahlschmidt)
22 Feb 1942 / 2 Ju 88, 1 Bf 109E-7
23 Feb 1942 2 Kittyhawk I
24 Feb 1942 2 Hurricane
25 Feb 1942 2 Blenheim IV / 1 BR 20 (accident)
27 Feb 1942 1 Boston III, 3 Hurricane II, 8 Kittyhawk 1 (2 strafed on ground) / 2 Bf109F-4, 1 MC.200
2 March 1942 3 Hurricane II, 1 Blenheim IV / 1 CR 42 (AA)
5 March 1942 1 Tomahawk IIb, 1 Albacore (shot down by Ju 88)/ 1 Ju 88
8 March 1942 1 Hurricane II / 6 MC.200 (massacred by Kittyhawks)
9 March 1942 1 Kittyhawk I, 1 Albacore, 1 Wellington
13 March 1942 2 Kittyhawk I (Otto Schulz)
14 March 1942 4 Kittyhawk I, 1 Hurricane / 1 MC.200 (MC.202 victories)
15 March 1942 1 Kittyhawk I / 1 Bf-108 (bombs), 2 MC 202, 4 MC 200 (SAS raid?)
16 March 1942 1 Hurricane, 1 Blenheim
17 March 1942 2 Blenehim
18 March 1942 1 Blenheim IV / 1 Bf 109F-4
19 March 1942 3 Hurricane IIc / 1 Bf 109E-7 (bombs)
20 March 1942 4 Kittyhawk I / 1 MC 202
21 March 1942 2 Boston III, 2 Kityhawk I, 3 Hurricane II, 1 Tomahawk IIb / 2 Bf109F-4, 1 Ju 87R-2, 2 CR.42 (SAS)
23 March 1942 3 Boston III, 3 Kittyhawk I / 2 Bf 109F-4 (one by bombs)
26 March 1942 2 Kittyhawk I, 1 Hurricane IIc / 1 Bf108 (engine failure), 1 Ju 87, 1 SM.79
27 March 1942 2 Tomahawk IIb, 2 Hurricane IIc, 1 Blenheim IV / 1 MC 202
28 March 1942 3 Kittyhawk / 5 BF 109F-4 (3 by bombs), 1 MC 200
30 March 1942 2 Blenheim IV (one to friendly fire)
1 April 1942 2 Hurricane IIc (one to accident)
2 April 1942 5 Hurricane II (one to bombs), 2 Kittyhawk I / 1 Bf 109F-4, 2 Ju 87
3 April 1942 2 Kittyhawk I, 1 Tomahawk IIb, 1 Hurricane IIb / 1 Bf 109F-4 (p-40), 1 MC 202 (p-40)
5 April 1942 3 Kittyhawk I (two from accidents), 1 Hurricane / 1 Ju 88D
6 April 1942 1 Kittyhawk I, 1 Hurricane / 1 SM.79
7 April 1942 4 Kittyhawk I (one engine failure)
9 April 1942 3 Huricane II
12 April 1942 5 Tomahawk IIb / 1 Ju 87
13 April 1942 2 Tomahawk IIb, 1 Kittyhawk (bombs) / 2 Bf 109F4 (P-40s), 1 MC 202
14 April 1942 / 1 Bf 109F, 1 MC 202
20 April 1942 3 Hurricane IIb, 1 Kittyhawk I
24 April 1942 1 Kittyhawk I, 1 Blenheim / 1 Bf 109E-7 (p-40s)
25 April 1942 5 Tomahwk IIb, 3 Kittyhawk I (one Hurricane 'DBR'?) / 4 Bf 109F-4, 1 Ju 87, 3 MC 200 (strafing)
3 May 1942 2 Hurricane IIb (accident)
7 May 1942 1 Kittyhawk (struck by lightning on the ground!) / 1 Bf 109F-4 (Stahlschmit by Edwards in p-40), 2 MC.200 (p-40s)
8 May 1942 1 Kittyhawk, 2 Hurricane
12 May 1942 1 Beaufighter IIc, 1 Kittyhawk I / 1 Bf 110, 1 Fi 156C-3
13 May 1942 2 Kittyhawk I
15 May 1942 1 Kittyhawk I, 2 Hurricane II
16 May 1942 5 Kittyhawk I, 1 Tomahawk IIb, 2 Hurricane
18 May 1942 3 Kittyhawk I, 1 Hurricane II (accident)
19 May 1942 2 Kittyhawk I
21 May 1942 1 Kittyhawk I (strafed), 1 Hurricane II / 1 Bf109F-4 (p-40s)
22 May 1942 7 Kittyhawk I, 1 Hurricane / 1 bf 109F-4 , 1 Bf 110E, 1 Ju 88, 2 MC 200 (bombs)
23 May 1942 3 Baltimore I, 5 Hurricane IIb, 1 Kittyhawk I / 1 Bf 109F-4, 2 Ju 88 (one by bombs), 1 Ju 87 (bombs)
25 May 1942 4 Hurricane, 1 Kityhawk I / 1 Bf 109F-4 (bombs) 3 MC 202 (bombs)

Allied Losses 8 Feb - 25 May 1942:
65 Hurricanes (I and II)
64 Kittyhawks
13 Tomahawks
1 Beaufighter
(143 fighters)

9 Blenheim
3 Baltimore
2 Albacore
1 Wellington

(15 bombers) - (158 Aircraft)

---------------------
Axis Losses 8 Feb - 25 May 1942:
27 Bf 109 (mostly F-4 with a few E)
3 Bf 110
10 MC 200
13 MC 202

(53 fighters)

9 Ju 87
9 Ju 88
2 SM.79
2 CR.42 (I grouped these with the bombers because they were being used as fighter bombers at this point)
1 BF 20

(23 bombers) -

2 Bf 108

(78 Aircraft)

So the Axis are 3-1 on fighters and 2-1 on overall aircraft, to all causes. Most losses were in air combat. Bombing and strafing losses still relatively low compared to what comes later.

This is not 100% of the losses because there are a few days with just 1 lost here or there. But this is 95% of it, enough to see the pattern.

I'll do some more of this tomorrow if people are interested.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This is all directly from Shores and several other people in this forum have this book, so it can be cross-checked. If I miscounted any of the totals don't crucify me, I'll just fix it accordingly.

 

[Timppa]

Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success. … The fact of British air superiority threw to the winds all the tactical rules which we had hitherto applied with such success. In every battle to come, the strength of the AngloAmerican air force was to be the deciding factor."
Erwin Rommel

 

[Timppa]

Anyone who has to fight, even with the most modern weapons, against an enemy in complete command of the air, fights like a savage against modern European troops, under the same handicaps and with the same chances of success. … The fact of British air superiority threw to the winds all the tactical rules which we had hitherto applied with such success. In every battle to come, the strength of the AngloAmerican air force was to be the deciding factor."
Erwin Rommel

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Reference page below:

Thanks for that. Now the plea, if anyone is in London with camera and time the AIR 20/7703 is the file with the high level reports, including the fuel situation, I only copied Goering conferences and Luftflotte 3 calendar from it. AIR 20/7704 has DAK war diary extracts, again I only copied the Luftflotte 3 material. And I have discovered my copy of Air 22/401 could do with some clearer pages.

Thematic Studies

Thematic Studies Airborne Forces Airborne Forces 32.3 MB Arnhem: The Air Reconnaissance Story 4.4 MB - Airfield Air Defence Since 1933 8.4 MB - Air Sea Rescue 22.9 MB Air Support

www.raf.mod.uk

The air support paper is a lot of the air force was right, and debates on how to do things, with what ifs like how much air opposition will there be and how much defensive effort will be needed. Page 95 of the report, page 116 in the PDF, does the history of Middle East system. The details of the experiments in Britain were used as well as local experience to come up with the system for Crusader in November 1941 via creating 253 wing. Then comes theory meeting reality. The problems of needing to provide bombers with escorts. Formations picking up last minute information from the divisional HQ involved and then reporting results. Corps HQ were part of the command and so the delays. It then jumps forward, no mention of Alamein. Page 197 of the PDF is Army Training Instruction no. 6 from 31 October 1941.

Shores also mentions in Vol 1 that the Axis lost 203 aircraft destroyed due to ground action like capturing airfields. Although apparently these were mostly broken down planes which couldn't be flown away. Shores also said JG 27 was hampered by lack of fuel in 1941, and notes there were 83 Bf 109s (with 26 serviceable) Jan 15

This is all from MAW Vol2:

8 Feb 1942 4 Hurricane II, 5 Kittyhawk I

I think you will need to recalculate. You have defined losses as actual losses plus damaged aircraft, the air forces separate the two and it is best to follow that. On 8 February 1942 Shores lists 1 Hurricane shot down, 3 crash landed, 1 damaged, 4 Kittyhawk shot down, 1 crash landed. Crash landed can cover a wide variety of problems. The large number of axis aircraft that were abandoned shows the spare parts problems, it appears a higher percentage of combat damaged axis aircraft in the desert never flew again compared with allied.

Air 22/401 has "spreadsheets" of loss data. I am confident Shores et.al. will have different and probably better loss data but the file should still be reasonable. On the 8th February 1942 it records 1 Hurricane and 4 Kittyhawk lost to enemy action.

The Hurricanes listed in Shores, Z4800, Egyptian air force in October 1941, F/Sgt Peter Cyril HARGREAVES (774047) was in Z4000, it was lost. Z5069 was finally SOC in March 1944, it is listed twice in Shores, for Z5312 if you go to 11 July 1942 losses it appears again, this time it was not repaired.

In all of the following note some more fighters were lost but listed under reconnaissance. In February 1942 the DAF Single Engined fighters flew 2,504 hours, say 1,300 sorties, and lost 46 to enemy action, about 3.5%, in March 2,780 hours, say 1,400 sorties, losing 36 to enemy action, 2.6%, April 3,725 hours, say 1,900 sorties, 45 losses, 2.4%, May 4,661 hours, so around 2,400 sorties, 84 losses, 3.5%, but what would rally grab the attention was the concentration of the losses in the final 4 days of May.

In July the Desert Air Force lost single engine 117 fighters to enemy action, add the 36 Wellingtons lost on night raids and that is 153 out of 186 combat losses. This is similar to the make up of the 187 combat losses in June. And again, August losses 56 fighters, 20 Wellingtons out of 108 losses.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

This has been discussed before during similar analysis.

On February 8, 3 of the 4 Hurricanes were shot down and strafed. The other 'shot down with pilot PoW'. The one Kittyhawk which crash landed had it's "tail shot away".

More notable is that with all those British losses, the Germans didn't lose any on that day.

You can use your own criteria as to what counts as loss. My feeling is that if the aircraft goes down (can no longer fly) or is destroyed on the ground, then it counts. You need some way to determine which side is winning the air war since that is the point under debate right now.

If you try to go by what may or may not be repairable you end up in a much more complex kind of analysis, but a lot of the heavily damaged aircraft were not repaired for one reason or another. Some were cannibalized for parts, some destroyed in subsequent bombing or strafing, some left behind when they moved bases etc. etc. Some were eventually repaired of course but if it's put out of action for months I think that counts.

The important thing IMO is to compare like with like. Same criteria for Axis as for the Allies. And either way, I don't believe the ratios will change.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

One thing I would note that is different between 1941 and 1942 in the air war - with the Kittyhawk and Hurricane II you see a lot fewer KiA and more pilots actually surviving being shot down and making it back to base one way or another (or at least being captured and surviving as a PoW).

 

[Shortround6]

We do have a problem with methodology.

Right now the criteria is which air force shot down more opposing aircraft.
It ignores everything else.
Bombs dropped on enemy air fields,
Bombs dropped on enemy truck convoys.
Bombs/torpedoes dropped on enemy ships.
Bombs/mines dropped on enemy ports (and/or the Suez Canal)
Haven't even gotten into direct combat support

Number of recon missions flown.

If one side is flying 3 times the missions (or 3 times the hours?) it is going to suffer more losses, but it may be doing more damage to the the enemy to justify the losses.

with the Kittyhawk and Hurricane II you see a lot fewer KiA and more pilots actually surviving being shot down and making it back to base one way or another (or at least being captured and surviving as a PoW).

For the British the LRDG (and other recon groups) got better at finding bailed out pilots and crew over 1941 and 1942.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

We do have a problem with methodology.

Right now the criteria is which air force shot down more opposing aircraft.
It ignores everything else.
Bombs dropped on enemy air fields,

Well, first of all, you have to break the discussion / analysis down into coherent elements. Right now this is just the beginning of an attempt to show the pattern of who was winning the air combats. The issue of 'who owned the sky'. I am suggesting for example that a single sortie in which you lose 7 fighters from the same squadron is an unacceptable rate of loss.

I also do by the way count aircraft destroyed by bombs or ground forces on their airfields, up to the point I've covered so far (late May 1942) it isn't that significant yet, but that will change.

I of course agree there is more to it than that in terms of the efficacy of air power. Once we have some clarity on this issue of who was winning the air combat, who was taking losses that were causing problems, and when (if at all) that ratio changed (because this was one of my major points going back several pages in this thread and the one it branched out from) then I want to pivot to looking at the losses inflicted against the ground forces by each air force, and we can see if, when, and how that changed over the course of the war.

Bombs dropped on enemy truck convoys.
Bombs/torpedoes dropped on enemy ships.
Bombs/mines dropped on enemy ports (and/or the Suez Canal)
Haven't even gotten into direct combat support

Number of recon missions flown.

Right, all coming. TacR was a big problem for the DAF still by mid 1942 (rate of losses was astronomically high)

If one side is flying 3 times the missions (or 3 times the hours?) it is going to suffer more losses, but it may be doing more damage to the the enemy to justify the losses.


For the British the LRDG (and other recon groups) got better at finding bailed out pilots and crew over 1941 and 1942.

It's also apparent that more pilots were surviving being shot down. For the Germans this was already the case. I will start noting the number of KiA on each day in my next batch of numbers.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

We do have a problem with methodology.

Right now the criteria is which air force shot down more opposing aircraft.
It ignores everything else.
Bombs dropped on enemy air fields,
Bombs dropped on enemy truck convoys.
Bombs/torpedoes dropped on enemy ships.
Bombs/mines dropped on enemy ports (and/or the Suez Canal)
Haven't even gotten into direct combat support

Number of recon missions flown.

If one side is flying 3 times the missions (or 3 times the hours?) it is going to suffer more losses, but it may be doing more damage to the the enemy to justify the losses.

This is true but if we try to discuss all of this simultaneously, especially given that not everybody is going to do so coherently or on the level, it's just going to go in circles and nothing is going to emerge out of it except empty argument.

To make sense of all the data, IMO you have to start by breaking it into manageable pieces, then you can put it back together and see the big picture. Obviously it's quite complex.

 

[Shortround6]

According to at least one account the British "owned the sky" in 1940-41 in that they could do what they wanted to do (stop supplies, bomb air fields, get recon photos and so on) pretty much most of the time and the Luftwaffe could/would not. The Luftwaffe did a lot of damage but they were not stopping British resupply as much as they needed to or performing recon or some of the other jobs. (protecting their own ship convoys)
The British may have been loosing more planes in aerial combat but they had them to loose (at times) The Luftwaffe could stop the British some days but not every day.
The Italians and Germans in 1940-41 were loosing more aircraft on the ground than in the air. The Axis had more fuel shortages and so on.

 

[EwenS]

It is also worthwhile remembering that, when considering whether or not an aircraft was "lost", that the RAF operated an extensive Repair and Salvage organisation in North Africa. From an article in The RAF Historical Journal issue 51

"Under Air Vice Marshall Graham Dawson, the Desert Air Force had developed a highly effective Service-manned network of forward Maintenance Units with thirteen mobile Repair Sections and twelve mobile Salvage sections. Behind these were a further three mobile Salvage Sections and six mobile Repair sections for heavy bombers. This spider's web of units, criss-crossing the desert, was supported by secure, dispersed depots around Cairo."

The earliest of these units had formed in June 1940. What couldn't be repaired / rebuilt became a very useful source of spares for other aircraft.

Here is a photo of one convoy of recovered aircraft. Hurricanes were really easy to break down for recovery.

ROYAL AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 1939-1943

And even the odd enemy aircraft

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

According to at least one account the British "owned the sky" in 1940-41 in that they could do what they wanted to do (stop supplies, bomb air fields, get recon photos and so on) pretty much most of the time and the Luftwaffe could/would not. The Luftwaffe did a lot of damage but they were not stopping British resupply as much as they needed to or performing recon or some of the other jobs. (protecting their own ship convoys)

I would actually agree with this to a large extent. The Axis air powers, especially the Luftwaffe, focused mainly on attacking enemy fighters in the optimal circumstances for them the Luftwaffe. This is partly because they wanted to glorify their best pilots (the 'experten') and the whole concept fed into their ideology of superiority. The Luftwaffe, being invented in the 30s, was much more influenced by Nazi ideology than some other branches of the German armed forces.

But it's also partly what they had to do, they were outnumbered, they were low on fuel most of the time, they had relatively few pilots available at this time. They had lost too many in the BoB. So they needed to be efficient. The Bf 109 wasn't so good in sustained dogfighting type combat against the Allied types, so they didn't like to mix it up with Allied escort fighters, or (especially) to fly close escort themselves. Instead they prowled around looking for ideal victims for surprise attacks from above, or just hit and run attacks from above where they had maximum advantage.

Attacking bombers was almost always also very dangerous because it was difficult to do without taking some return fire from defensive gunners, which contributed to a steady drip of attrition. The most effective Axis fighters (Bf 109 and MC 202) and bombers (Stukas) also lacked the range to do what I've been calling 'operational' strikes. The Ju 88s had sufficient range but by 1942, they really were starting to need an escort to operate with acceptable losses over land. So the Luftwaffe was already becoming limited in what they could do against ground targets, though they could still sometimes be quite effective at short range or with carefully planned surprise attacks.

Whether the reasons were pragmatic or vainglorious though doesn't matter so much, in the sense that there was clearly an issue in which the Luftwaffe focused on victories against Allied fighters, which you can see in the numbers, and at least somewhat neglected their primary mission of supporting their own ground forces. This actually created significant tension between air and ground forces on the Axis side (and also to some extent between German and Italian, and between Axis fighter and bomber units).

The Allies did the opposite almost, focusing on the ground support and somewhat neglecting fighter tactics and fighter combat (and kit).

The problem is, the Allied bombers weren't really that effective up to mid 1942. We can look at this more closely once we establish the point about air combat. And neglecting fighter strategy was taking a heavy toll on their air units, as was the superiority of the Axis types. Much of this was corrected starting largely in mid 1942.

The British may have been loosing more planes in aerial combat but they had them to loose (at times) The Luftwaffe could stop the British some days but not every day.
The Italians and Germans in 1940-41 were loosing more aircraft on the ground than in the air. The Axis had more fuel shortages and so on.

All of this is true to an extent. But the Axis was still able to blunt Allied air attacks and prevent the Allies from doing the effective longer ranged strikes. Even when the bombers weren't shot down they often had to eject their bombs and run for home when their fighter cover was annihilated.