Was Air Power decisive in the two battles of El Alamein?

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Bill, there's a difference between "tail shot off" and "tail shot up", c',mon now. If your tail is "shot off", a three-pointer ain't going to give the pic you posted in reply. If your tail is "shot off" you're getting one hell of a prang. The plane in your pic clearly had a controlled landing, but the tail is still clearly on.

In short, this is a form of equivocation.

It's incredible to me how you or anyone else can read what is written in Shores, see that photo, and not understand the painfully obvious correlation.

When a crew chief, or a mechanic writes an entry on a form reporting battle damage in the field, it's not War and Peace. He's not writing a coroners autopsy report about every damaged aircraft. He's not a lawyer writing a legal contract, and he aint writing in meticulous detail for the benefit of people 80 years in the future who want to know precisely what he meant in some forum argument on the internet. He had a very demanding job and a lot of work to do. If he saw damage like in the photo I posted, I think "Tail shot off" is a reasonable approximation, in my opinion.

That said, it doesn't matter what I think, and it's not my job to defend what Christopher Shores wrote in his book, or whatever the soldier of 1942 wrote that Shores or one of his collaborators transcribed. Shores does get into some detail about what his sources are, if you have a bone to pick with it, by all means reach out to him or double check them.

I really don't know (or care) precisely how much damage that plane suffered. All I know is what is written in the source, and that per the criteria I was counting, it was a 'loss' because it crash landed. The extent of the damage or when or if it was repaired is irrelevant to which side was dominating the air.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

If interested the photo of the aircraft you posted was FT928 OK-L a Kittyhawk IV flown by SQNLDR Doyle of 450 SQN. The damage came from AA fire and the incident was the 18th April 1945 - The ORB states "......... the CO was very badly shot up and did a magnificent job in returning safely to base with two holes in the fuel tanks, one main plane root shattered and empennage tractically (think this is supposed to be practically) shot away". This was reported in the records as CAT 2, the aircraft was later repaired and returned to the SQN as the clipped-wing Kittyhawk. I suppose understanding the verbology in the ORB's is helpful here, Shot away means parts loose (smaller parts missing) and/or well ventilated but still attached, Shot off far more terminal.

For the aircraft on the 8th Feb , I believe Chris used the verbage from the 540 (Summary of events) which states "The Tail plane of SGT Curtis' machine was shot away and he returned to Gambut", the 541 (Detail of Work Carried Out) is far clearer and stats "SGT Curtis; a/c received a damage tailplane and he returned to Gambut" (both the 540 and 541 are parts of the ORB).

Well that pretty well seems to explain it and is basically what I assumed. Shores also mentions it "crash landed" so he must have gotten that from somewhere.

A thought to the loss criteria for the Desert Air Force - could always use the CAT system that most of the ORB's used. Might take a little extra work, but that would make it easier, logical, factual and easy to obtain/work out (just a thought). From the ORB's these were normally logged as 3 Categories (not the official CAT system which was much more convoluted), basically CAT 1 - Repairable at Unit (normally repaired within 24hours), CAT 2 - Repairable at MU/BU (repairable 2-5 days normally although if border line could be a few weeks), or CAT III - Write Off (some CAT III's were brought back on charge after extensive repairs but the SQN would never know this). In my experience most SQN ORB's and OPSUMS use this method as do the Form 78's (for the Middle East aircraft (Aircraft record card)), the Form 1180 (accident reports), as do the WG ORB's and a number of other publications and records (also makes far easier tracking).

I assume (I know bad), that the Luftwaffe used a similar scheme with their % of damage, at a certain % the aircraft would be out of the fight and only repairable by a repair element not the Unit. I have very limited Luftwaffe data, but just in case I'll have a look for any data on the 8th. As to the ground losses you are interested in, this may in fact be incredibly difficult to accurately portray, as you have the front moving, and anything not removed would have been lost, so how was it reported???. I'm not even going to speculate here, not my field of expertise, someone with far more understanding of German records, and loss reporting will need to answer me thinks

Buz

That's a reasonable approach, and I certainly don't mind if someone else counts them up that way (focusing on Cat III or shot down, missing etc.). I am not sure that Shores includes that in every entry in his books, I know I have seen it, (and the German equivalent, which goes by percentage of damage) but I'm not sure if it's on every entry.

For my purposes I consider a crash landed aircraft worthy of counting. So long as you are consistent, what difference does it make? Instead of 20 pages of arguing by now we could have three sets of data based on 3 different filtering criteria and have a lot better sense of what we are actually talking about, IMO.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Bill, there's a difference between "tail shot off" and "tail shot up", c',mon now. If your tail is "shot off",

it looks like the field report said "Shot away" - where do you put that on your spectrum?

in short, this is a form of equivocation.

It definitely isn't.

 

[Buz101]

Bill

Do you only want the El Alamien time, there is limited to my extra ORB holdings

Buz

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Bill

Do you only want the El Alamien time, there is limited to my extra ORB holdings

Buz

I'm not sure I follow you 100%.

But for this discussion, I was trying to compare losses on both sides basically for the whole year leading up to the end of Second El Alamein.

I started posting some data from Shores, through May, but then it bogged down into arguments about the precise legal meaning of 'tail shot off' or something.

 

[Buz101]

I can cover the P-40's for the whole year, I can cover some of the Hurricane and Spitfire (well from thw time they arrived anyhow) Units for the year as well (I have copies of the ORB's) rest I only have data for the El Alamein time frame. Do you want the data?

 

[Buz101]

Thank you Buz!

Mike

Not found anything in the ORBs specifically that states the aircraft were being over boosted or being set at 60 plus ", nor could I find anything in what limited engineering details I have saying engines were being set or allowed to go to 60 plus in a official capacity.

That said I did find notes, in other information, of Pilots using low to mid 50's in Mar 1942 etc (AP 2014A - Pilot's notes The Kittyhawk I aeroplane calls for a max of 42" for no more than 5 min for Emergency Power) - so they were doing it pretty early

Incidentally the AVG were doing the same in early 1942 with -33 engines - however i strongly recommend you don't ever say this to a AVGophile, or you'll get hung, draw, quartered, flogged, sworn at, banished from all facebook groups, forums, then you'll be sent to hell and cancelled all in 20 mins - Trust me on this. Just remember their engines were poor quality, made from rejected parts and you'll be fine, the engine issues the AVG suffered had nothing to do with hot humid conditions and running almost double the boost recommended).

Also found some other information from Jan 42 of a Pilot max boosting an aircraft, use of 52" to disengage combat in Mar 42, grounding an entire Squadron for over boost checks in early April 1942, as well as many other occasions of over boosting (where it's stated in " (such as "I used 52" of boost to disengage" etc) or just stated as Max Boost/Over boost what ever that is. One particular entry from a diary stated the Pilot eased the Throttle to 54" (Oct 1942) - how does one ease the throttle to 54" - what was he at before???, so certainly the boosts used were well up there.

Engine failures and engine changes were really a thing in North Africa, bearing failures and rod failures being the most common, sometimes the aircraft recovered to an airfield, sometimes not and crashed..........a sample squadron shows that engine failures or engine replacements for the months of Mar/Aug amount to 21 occasions, not including the number of sorties lost for engine issues. Between the use of boost over the recommended amount, and the environmental factors, engines didn't last long, and even rebuilt ones were poor at times (badly rebuilt)

Not sure if this is the answer you are looking for.

Buz

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It's incredible to me how you or anyone else can read what is written in Shores, see that photo, and not understand the painfully obvious correlation.

I'll make it easy for you, then: that tail is still on the plane. Describing that as "shot off" is so inaccurate that it clutters rather than clarifies the conversation.

Words matter, and so do the pics presented to support them.

it looks like the field report said "Shot away" - where do you put that on your spectrum?

The surfaces are shot away, but that tail is not.

It definitely isn't.

You're a writer too, aren't you? You should know and appreciate the value of precise language. The word "off" has a specific meaning. Applying it to the tail in your picture falls outside that meaning and is most certainly equivocation.

I started posting some data from Shores, through May, but then it bogged down into arguments about the precise legal meaning of 'tail shot off' or something.

Hardly surprising when you try to support that statement with a picture of a plane with its tail still on. Own your mistake already. Just admit it and move on.

 

[Shortround6]

Buz

I would note that a test -33 engine (in the test house, zero ram) gave;
1440hp at 52in at about 3500ft. (or 1400hp from 1000ft to 5500ft.
1500hp at 54in at about 2500ft (or 1480hp from sea level to 4000ft)

The -39 engine should be about the same.
As 'evidence' the test chart for the -33 shows 1150hp at 42in at just about 11,500ft.
The -73 engine had a few supercharger tweaks, new manifolds(?), and quite possibly back fire screens taken out and gave 1150hp at about 2in less pressure than the -39 engine. This depends on source or date of information.

edit. These are power results on a graph. NOT recommended or allowable settings.
The Graph is dated 18-5-39.
The Allison was down graded in the middle of 1940 while upgrades were done to ensure the engines would meet the life expectancy/150 hour test number.

They knew what they could get out of it for power, the question was how get the power and have the engines survive. Major upgrades in late 1940 and early 1941 and a further improvement to the Crankshaft at the end of 1941.

 

[Mike Williams]

Mike

Not found anything in the ORBs specifically that states the aircraft were being over boosted or being set at 60 plus ", nor could I find anything in what limited engineering details I have saying engines were being set or allowed to go to 60 plus in a official capacity.

That said I did find notes, in other information, of Pilots using low to mid 50's in Mar 1942 etc (AP 2014A - Pilot's notes The Kittyhawk I aeroplane calls for a max of 42" for no more than 5 min for Emergency Power) - so they were doing it pretty early

Incidentally the AVG were doing the same in early 1942 with -33 engines - however i strongly recommend you don't ever say this to a AVGophile, or you'll get hung, draw, quartered, flogged, sworn at, banished from all facebook groups, forums, then you'll be sent to hell and cancelled all in 20 mins - Trust me on this. Just remember their engines were poor quality, made from rejected parts and you'll be fine, the engine issues the AVG suffered had nothing to do with hot humid conditions and running almost double the boost recommended).

Also found some other information from Jan 42 of a Pilot max boosting an aircraft, use of 52" to disengage combat in Mar 42, grounding an entire Squadron for over boost checks in early April 1942, as well as many other occasions of over boosting (where it's stated in " (such as "I used 52" of boost to disengage" etc) or just stated as Max Boost/Over boost what ever that is. One particular entry from a diary stated the Pilot eased the Throttle to 54" (Oct 1942) - how does one ease the throttle to 54" - what was he at before???, so certainly the boosts used were well up there.

Engine failures and engine changes were really a thing in North Africa, bearing failures and rod failures being the most common, sometimes the aircraft recovered to an airfield, sometimes not and crashed..........a sample squadron shows that engine failures or engine replacements for the months of Mar/Aug amount to 21 occasions, not including the number of sorties lost for engine issues. Between the use of boost over the recommended amount, and the environmental factors, engines didn't last long, and even rebuilt ones were poor at times (badly rebuilt)

Not sure if this is the answer you are looking for.

Buz

Thank you Buz, that's just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I was reading through some combat reports and ORBs last night but didn't find much on engine settings yet. Interesting reading, nonetheless.

Fwiw, the Specific Engine Flight Chart dated Dec. 18, 1942 for a P-40-E with V-1710-39 lists 56" boost for War Emergency, the Specific Engine Flight Chart dated Dec. 18, 1942 for a P-40-K with V-1710-73 lists 60" boost for War Emergency, while the Specific Engine Flight Chart dated Dec. 18, 1942 for a P-40-M with V-1710-81 lists 57" boost War Emergency. In that context, the 66" boost noted in the Allison Division memo doesn't seem like such a terrible stretch for these engines in late 1942, although the memo does go into some detail regarding their rationale behind the adoption of the engine limitations at that point in time.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

"Partly" shot off was what I see in that photo, which I'm sure is of a different aircraft. "Tail shot off" comes from records used by Shores. Do you think he made it up? ...
The one you are looking at obviously isn't precisely the same one Shores used but obviously describes the same incident and condition.

As people may remember some time ago I suggested looking up the 3 RAAF squadron records at the Australian Archives as they can be read online, page 595. What follows is a step by step way to do this. The archives have a lot of documents available to read online about WWII aircraft and operations worth taking a look at, plus showing the format of documents authors like Shores deal with.

Session expired | RecordSearch | National Archives of Australia

take the offer to search as guest. Keywords: 3 squadron history sheets - on the results page look for Series no. A9186 control symbol 8 barcode 1158595. Click on the pages symbol, jump to page 595, see the report that Sgt. Curtis' a/c received a damaged tailplane and he returned to Gambut. If you then go to page 596 you will see the aircraft, AK665 as per Buz, being used again. If you want to download the whole thing as a PDF click on Item title on the results page then click on the PDF option and wait.

So aircraft landed with damaged tailplane = Shores tail shot away crash landed = Kelso loss. Given these definitions we now need to be assured the Shores list contains all damage that is light enough to be unit repaired in a couple of days with their return landings described as crash landings and perhaps things like wings shot away, or engine shot away and so on. Thanks to Buz for clarifying air force terminology, shot away = holed but still with aircraft, unlike the usual definition of away = off.

This a journey to find the evidence to arrive at the conclusion that was started with, the in journey entertainment is how and how often the standard techniques are used to modify and ignore what does not fit.

If you have the numbers, post them. I encouraged you to do that right out of the gate. Just state your criteria and use the same criteria for both sides, I think you will find the same ratio of about 3-1 in favor of the Axis in the range of dates I used.

I actually use the air force criteria, not mine and as stated some of the allied records are hard to read and I do not have complete axis ones, as I keep stating the Shores list is a good one, it is the misuse that is the problem.

I don't know how many times I have to point this out, especially since you say you have the book.

Previously I was accused of not having the book and so am a horrible person, an explanation was requested of how it was known what books I had, instead we pivot to I have the book and so am a horrible person. Sort of summarises the situation quite well, conclusion fixed, evidence altered. Again what you need to do is explain the thought processes involved in coming to the conclusion I did not have the book, add where the conspiracy and assumptions about my assumptions came from.

Yes, I believe ALL THE ALLIED FIGHTER PILOTS TOTALLY MISSED on that day.

Thanks for confirming the Shores list is considered accurate down to all aircraft with minor damage on both sides, simply put unlikely and that becomes worse when some of the actual entries for lightly damaged are upgraded to lost.

I have yet to see any evidence from any of your posts that Shores missed any records of German fighters shot down or damaged on that day. Did you find some?

Firstly I asked if all the allied pilots missed, I know their kill claims are exaggerated. As a lesson in logic, if Shores did not include any lightly damaged how am I supposed to without detailed access to Axis records and the time to read them? That's right, you have announced that is too large a task for this forum, is that except for those who object to your counts? Now consider as has been pointed out how often lightly damaged aircraft make the records that survive. You want them consistently over months, consistently described as well.

In post 216, you said: "we have a Canadian historian highlighting the Canadian input." This seems to me to imply bias.

Bias is over highlighting or over claiming the input. Seek bias and ye shall find it.

You feel that Shores isn't honest and seem to me to be implying that he has a pro Axis bias or that he embellishes data.

You cast plenty of aspersions against me over minor errors in my posts that I've acknowledged when pointed out, but you have made just as many errors, even gone way out on a limb on some of them, and don't admit it when it's pointed out to you.

You even seem to imply in several of your posts some kind of bias by historians against the ground commanders or the ground war in favor of air power.

I like the editorial, so fact free. "Minor" errors, "acknowledged" = mostly move on, my errors are declared bigger, brighter better (because I try harder?) and the idea the above accusation of error is the actual error is going to be ignored. Notice the difference in amounts of data provided, like spreadsheets and import figures. Deciding the air force was decisive can be interpreted as a big bias against the ground commanders by the way using your logic.

I see a lot of conspiratorial insinuations and complaints when there is no way to overturn the data.

I am sure you do, since you are correct in your own mind challengers must be defective, and just how much data have you presented beyond your total of your interpretation of Shores' interpretation of aircraft loss records? Overturning the data requires data to overturn.

I'm not sure precisely how important the M7s were at El Alamein but I do think an SP gun is different from a towed artillery gun, and the M7 is clearly much better than a 25 pounder. I would like to look into the data if we ever get to that point.

You may go back and read what you wrote, you were sure enough back then, despite having zero information.

So which of you books supports the claim the air force saved the ground forces in Battleaxe from total annihilation?

Where is your count of the number of times "often" the allied escorts were annihilated forcing the bombers to eject their bombs? Is everything to do with a response annihilated?

So what? Boston III and Baltimore III were both in action at El Alamein, which is something you seem to be trying to evade. Both were markedly superior bombers than the Blenheim IV, were considerably faster, carried more bombs and the Baltimore III had much better armament to boot. You just don't want to admit you were wrong.

Apparently me pointing out I was wrong, I thought the Baltimore turret came in the IIIA, not III, plus providing the import figures, including Bostons a while ago, and the squadron equipment, mostly Baltimore I and II, is evading the error and not admitting I was wrong. By the way what other mark of Boston bomber did the RAF operate before around 1944? Is the failure because it was all Boston III back then, no need for a mark number?

Other items.

208 squadron is reported as using Tomahawks April to September 1942. 40 SAAF squadron is reported as having Tomahawks March to September/October 1942, reported present in September, gone in November.

The bombs dropped in the following are probably short tons as it is a US translation.

Air 20/5774 Extracts from FliegerFuhrer Afrika War Diary, About 30 minutes of quick looks, rather than reading everything.

Losses 25 May to 1 June 1942, 4 Bf109, 4 Bf110, 5 Ju87, 1 Ju88, sorties 1,435 Bf109, 207 Bf110, 576 Ju87, 103 Ju88, 1 He111, kill claims 73 fighters, 2 Wellingtons.

Bir Hacheim operations to 8 June 1942, 460 bomber (Ju87/Ju88/Bf110), 570 Bf109 escort sorties, as of 10 June 580 Ju87, 126 Ju88, 44 Bf110, 722 Bf109 sorties. (on 10 June 124 Ju87 and 76 Ju88, 130.4 tons of bombs.) Looks like the intensive bombing began on 2 June, major ground attack from 8 June, garrison pulled out pre dawn 11 June, 2,700 out of 3,600 making allied lines.

14 June Operations 390 sorties, 81.3 tons of bombs, 2 Ju87, 2 Bf109 lost, 1 Bf109 badly damaged. 15 June 209 sorties, 1 Bf109 and 1 Ju87 lost. 16 June 198 sorties, 8 tons of bombs, 1 Bf109 emergency landing in friendly territory, 9 Curtiss shot down plus 2 more fighters destroyed by strafing. 20 June Tobruk, 580 sorties plus 177 Italian, 2 Ju87 damaged in a collision, 1 Bf110 emergency landing and caught fire. A Luftwaffe detachment placed under DAK successfully defeated the (German) 580th reconnaissance battalion.

26 June, 29 kills claimed

28 June message from DAK stating no air support required timed 1155 received 1632. Message from DAK timed 1205 received 1920.

1 July sandstorms scrubbed the morning missions, and indeed all day, StG 3 reports overnight bombing damaged a considerable number of aircraft.

2 July sand storms and 4 to 8/10 cloud hampering operations.

3 July Luftwaffe reconnaissance and army position reports not tallying, the third attack wave lost 4 Ju87, fourth wave cancelled, DAK has been given a reply to its complaint of inadequate air support.

4 July, 22 fighters and 18 dive bombers available, limiting missions to 4 per day.

17 July JG27 pilots flying 5 to 6 times a day.

24 July bombing the previous night damaged 18 Bf109, expected back in 1 to 2 days, air operations list 4 destroyed, 5 badly damaged.

27 July allied fighter squadrons 8 using HF and 12 VHF. Night armoured car raid on airfield Qasaba-West, 5 Ju87, 3 Ju88, 2 Junkers hospital aircraft destroyed, 7 Ju87, 3 Ju88, 1 Me110 badly damaged, 2 Ju87 slightly damaged.

1 August fuel supply down to 76 cubic metres (front line?). Actual inventory 4 cubic metres in drums and 303 in tanks at Tobruk, 99.5 cubic metres at airfields, all B7 grade.

26 May to 26 July total Aircraft
destroyed or over 60% damage
enemy \ not enemy
66 \ 26 Bf109
6 \ 2 Bf109 reconnaissance
17 \ 2 Bf110
8 \ 1 Bf110 reconnaissance
1 \ 0 Ju88
3 \ 0 Ju88 reconnaissance
53 \ 3 Ju87
3 \ 0 Fi-156
157 \ 34 Total

Under 60% damaged
enemy \ not enemy
25 \ 18 Bf109
1 \ 9 Bf109 reconnaissance
5 \ 6 Bf110
2 \ 0 Bf110 reconnaissance
0 \ 2 Ju88
0 \ 2 Ju88 reconnaissance
0 \ 6 Ju87
0 \ 3 Fi-156
0 \ 1 Other, Me-11?
33 \ 47 Total

Strength 26 May 1942
130 Bf109
17 Bf109 reconnaissance
28 Bf110
7 Bf110 reconnaissance
13 Ju88
11 Ju88 reconnaissance
56 Ju87
7 Fi-156
1 He110
270 Total

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

first row is losses 26 May to 7 July

Date

Sorties

Tons

Kills

Losses

type

Bomber

Dive

SEF

TEF

Rcn

Liaison

Total

Bombs

Bomb

Ftr

Total

Bomber

Dive

SEF

TEF

Liaison

Total

26/5-7/7

565​

2156​

5470​

598​

449​

22​

9260​

1857.74​

7​

290​

297​

3​

30​

41​

11​

3​

88​

8-Jul-42​

51​

123​

11​

185​

10.30​

3​

3​

1​

1​

2​

9-Jul-42​

33​

120​

7​

160​

13.65​

1​

1​

0​

10-Jul-42​

20​

34​

147​

12​

213​

40.45​

16​

16​

2​

3​

1​

6​

11-Jul-42​

24​

55​

178​

8​

1​

266​

56.00​

6​

6​

1​

3​

1​

5​

12-Jul-42​

50​

3​

8​

61​

1.60​

2​

2​

1​

1​

13-Jul-42​

25​

48​

157​

11​

241​

53.55​

9​

9​

1​

1​

14-Jul-42​

17​

73​

127​

9​

226​

54.55​

4​

4​

1​

1​

15-Jul-42​

29​

128​

148​

14​

319​

107.40​

1​

1​

1​

1​

16-Jul-42​

25​

84​

142​

11​

262​

65.95​

4​

4​

0​

17-Jul-42​

33​

52​

166​

11​

12​

274​

67.20​

9​

9​

0​

18-Jul-42​

19​

11​

115​

1​

8​

154​

29.10​

0​

0​

19-Jul-42​

61​

136​

8​

205​

28.40​

7​

7​

1​

3​

3​

7​

20-Jul-42​

90​

90​

0.60​

7​

7​

0​

21-Jul-42​

81​

9​

90​

9​

9​

2​

2​

22-Jul-42​

12​

95​

160​

8​

275​

43.45​

6​

6​

0​

23-Jul-42​

12​

73​

112​

8​

205​

48.20​

7​

7​

1​

1​

24-Jul-42​

72​

6​

78​

2​

7​

9​

4​

1​

5​

25-Jul-42​

5​

84​

6​

8​

103​

1​

1​

0​

26-Jul-42​

32​

4​

36​

0​

0​

781​

2959​

7710​

619​

611​

23​

12703​

2478.14​

10​

388​

398​

8​

35​

60​

14​

3​

120​

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I'll make it easy for you, then: that tail is still on the plane. Describing that as "shot off" is so inaccurate that it clutters rather than clarifies the conversation.

Words matter, and so do the pics presented to support them.

They were not my words, it was published in a book by Christopher Shores. I'm not his editor. How about this for a maxim:

Historical Data Matters. Don't try so hard to fight it.

And (I guess you somehow missed this?) the unit history said "tail shot away". So take it up with the crew chief or the officer that wrote that. Because obviously if there was no tail at all the aircraft would have crashed.

The surfaces are shot away, but that tail is not.

Again, take that up with the fellow who wrote it!

You're a writer too, aren't you? You should know and appreciate the value of precise language. The word "off" has a specific meaning. Applying it to the tail in your picture falls outside that meaning and is most certainly equivocation.

Only to the painfully literal minded. That photo was just an attempt to explain what the historical record probably reflected.

Hardly surprising when you try to support that statement with a picture of a plane with its tail still on. Own your mistake already. Just admit it and move on.

Trying to explain the historical record that some of you struggle to grasp. Keep in mind, I didn't invent the phrase 'tail shot off'. Or 'tail shot away'. The photo was to help you and one other guy (that I know of) understand something which I think is obvious to most people reading the thread. It isn't defending anything I wrote, and I god damn sure as hell didn't make any mistake here. You should take your own advice.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

I would note that a test -33 engine (in the test house, zero ram) gave;
1440hp at 52in at about 3500ft. (or 1400hp from 1000ft to 5500ft.
1500hp at 54in at about 2500ft (or 1480hp from sea level to 4000ft)

The -39 engine should be about the same.
As 'evidence' the test chart for the -33 shows 1150hp at 42in at just about 11,500ft.
The -73 engine had a few supercharger tweaks, new manifolds(?), and quite possibly back fire screens taken out and gave 1150hp at about 2in less pressure than the -39 engine. This depends on source or date of information.

edit. These are power results on a graph. NOT recommended or allowable settings.
The Graph is dated 18-5-39.
The Allison was down graded in the middle of 1940 while upgrades were done to ensure the engines would meet the life expectancy/150 hour test number.

They knew what they could get out of it for power, the question was how get the power and have the engines survive. Major upgrades in late 1940 and early 1941 and a further improvement to the Crankshaft at the end of 1941.

Also to the crank case and bearings some time in 1941 IIRC

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Thank you Buz, that's just the kind of thing I was thinking of. I was reading through some combat reports and ORBs last night but didn't find much on engine settings yet. Interesting reading, nonetheless.

Fwiw, the Specific Engine Flight Chart dated Dec. 18, 1942 for a P-40-E with V-1710-39 lists 56" boost for War Emergency, the Specific Engine Flight Chart dated Dec. 18, 1942 for a P-40-K with V-1710-73 lists 60" boost for War Emergency, while the Specific Engine Flight Chart dated Dec. 18, 1942 for a P-40-M with V-1710-81 lists 57" boost War Emergency. In that context, the 66" boost noted in the Allison Division memo doesn't seem like such a terrible stretch for these engines in late 1942, although the memo does go into some detail regarding their rationale behind the adoption of the engine limitations at that point in time.

They were concerned with pilots boosting up to 70" and in particular if that was done with the newer engines coming out (for the P-40M and N) which had a different supercharger ratio for higher altitude which would burn out at the higher settings. I believe in the memo they agreed to an unofficial limit of 60"

 

[Shortround6]

Also to the crank case and bearings some time in 1941 IIRC

It seems like Allison was doing the refit program in 1940 and finished it in early 1941. 277 (?)engines refitted/rebuilt, it was done at the factory.
It also appears that it was done to US Army engines only and only the -33 engines. Late production -33 engines and ALL -39s had the improved parts.
However there is no mention of the British Tomahawks getting any of their engines rebuilt or any modifications to their engines.
AVG engines are in a different catagory, they were neither US engines or British engines. While it is true they were made out of "rejected" parts, in many ways they were actually hand built engines with parts brought up to specifications with inserts for threaded holes to repair thread damage or crank bearings plated and reground to bring them to tolerance.
The engines were not assembled using poorly fitted parts.
Where the AVG engines fell in the production que may affect which parts they got, but it is quite possible they got some of the old crankcases.

BUT, each engine had to be run on a test stand for the standard number of run-in hours, disassembles (at least partially) reassembled, and then packed and shipped to Curtiss or sent out as spares.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

So aircraft landed with damaged tailplane = Shores tail shot away crash landed = Kelso loss.

According to the data which was just posted here, the term was "tail shot away".

Aircraft crash landed with "tail shot away" according to the historical record = Sinclair outraged = casts baseless aspersions on Kelso.... over and over and over again

In the words of a cartoon fish woman, Let it go...

Given these definitions we now need to be assured the Shores list contains all damage that is light enough to be unit repaired in a couple of days with their return landings described as crash landings and perhaps things like wings shot away, or engine shot away and so on. Thanks to Buz for clarifying air force terminology, shot away = holed but still with aircraft, unlike the usual definition of away = off.

I see this as, as someone else accused me, 'equivocation' not actually admitting you were wrong.

Previously I was accused of not having the book and so am a horrible person, an explanation was requested of how it was known what books I had, instead we pivot to I have the book and so am a horrible person. Sort of summarises the situation quite well, conclusion fixed, evidence altered. Again what you need to do is explain the thought processes involved in coming to the conclusion I did not have the book, add where the conspiracy and assumptions about my assumptions came from.

I damn sure never altered any evidence. I asked you if you had the book because it was hard to believe that someone who had it could draw the conclusions you have done.

Thanks for confirming the Shores list is considered accurate down to all aircraft with minor damage on both sides, simply put unlikely and that becomes worse when some of the actual entries for lightly damaged are upgraded to lost.

I don't think Shores ever intended to do that, (all he really does is transcribe what the records say) and I don't think it matters vis a vis the discussion going on here (the role of Air Power at 2nd El Alamein), and yes I think all the Allied pilots missed that day.

Firstly I asked if all the allied pilots missed, I know their kill claims are exaggerated. As a lesson in logic, if Shores did not include any lightly damaged how am I supposed to without detailed access to Axis records and the time to read them? That's right, you have announced that is too large a task for this forum, is that except for those who object to your counts? Now consider as has been pointed out how often lightly damaged aircraft make the records that survive. You want them consistently over months, consistently described as well.

Since we both agree that Shores is mostly accurate, why not just accept his records and move on? It's either that or prove him wrong. If you don't have the time or resources to access the Axis records, you aren't alone. This is why Shores sells so many books. He provides this data, translated into English, conveniently listed side by side with the Allied loss data.

Turgid grumbling, insults and accusations don't actually reveal anything or enlighten anybody. I'm glad you are finally starting to post some pertinent data... I think.

Bias is over highlighting or over claiming the input. Seek bias and ye shall find it.

So you admit you thought the video was biased because Canadian.

I am sure you do, since you are correct in your own mind challengers must be defective, and just how much data have you presented beyond your total of your interpretation of Shores' interpretation of aircraft loss records? Overturning the data requires data to overturn.

So far, Shores data is contested, chiefly by you, so it's been one step forward, two steps back. But quite a lot of other data has been posted in the thread which supports my point, especially the book excerpts.

You may go back and read what you wrote, you were sure enough back then, despite having zero information.

On the contrary, I knew the M7 and 105mm howitzer were used in the battle. And I knew the M7 is far more effective than a 25 pounder. I have read that they played an important role, I'm looking forward to exploring the details of that, if we ever get that far.

So which of you books supports the claim the air force saved the ground forces in Battleaxe from total annihilation?

Where is your count of the number of times "often" the allied escorts were annihilated forcing the bombers to eject their bombs? Is everything to do with a response annihilated?

There are many examples of this in Shores, but I suspect when I post them I'll be accused of missing phantasms of minor damage to Axis planes that Shores missed, or baffling statements from the unit records which will be transformed into malfeasance by Shores or by myself...

But the data is there if you can stand to look at it.

Apparently me pointing out I was wrong, I thought the Baltimore turret came in the IIIA, not III, plus providing the import figures, including Bostons a while ago, and the squadron equipment, mostly Baltimore I and II, is evading the error and not admitting I was wrong. By the way what other mark of Boston bomber did the RAF operate before around 1944? Is the failure because it was all Boston III back then, no need for a mark number?

Other items.

208 squadron is reported as using Tomahawks April to September 1942. 40 SAAF squadron is reported as having Tomahawks March to September/October 1942, reported present in September, gone in November.

The bombs dropped in the following are probably short tons as it is a US translation.

Air 20/5774 Extracts from FliegerFuhrer Afrika War Diary, About 30 minutes of quick looks, rather than reading everything.

Losses 25 May to 1 June 1942, 4 Bf109, 4 Bf110, 5 Ju87, 1 Ju88, sorties 1,435 Bf109, 207 Bf110, 576 Ju87, 103 Ju88, 1 He111, kill claims 73 fighters, 2 Wellingtons.

Bir Hacheim operations to 8 June 1942, 460 bomber (Ju87/Ju88/Bf110), 570 Bf109 escort sorties, as of 10 June 580 Ju87, 126 Ju88, 44 Bf110, 722 Bf109 sorties. (on 10 June 124 Ju87 and 76 Ju88, 130.4 tons of bombs.) Looks like the intensive bombing began on 2 June, major ground attack from 8 June, garrison pulled out pre dawn 11 June, 2,700 out of 3,600 making allied lines.

14 June Operations 390 sorties, 81.3 tons of bombs, 2 Ju87, 2 Bf109 lost, 1 Bf109 badly damaged. 15 June 209 sorties, 1 Bf109 and 1 Ju87 lost. 16 June 198 sorties, 8 tons of bombs, 1 Bf109 emergency landing in friendly territory, 9 Curtiss shot down plus 2 more fighters destroyed by strafing. 20 June Tobruk, 580 sorties plus 177 Italian, 2 Ju87 damaged in a collision, 1 Bf110 emergency landing and caught fire. A Luftwaffe detachment placed under DAK successfully defeated the (German) 580th reconnaissance battalion.

26 June, 29 kills claimed

28 June message from DAK stating no air support required timed 1155 received 1632. Message from DAK timed 1205 received 1920.

1 July sandstorms scrubbed the morning missions, and indeed all day, StG 3 reports overnight bombing damaged a considerable number of aircraft.

2 July sand storms and 4 to 8/10 cloud hampering operations.

3 July Luftwaffe reconnaissance and army position reports not tallying, the third attack wave lost 4 Ju87, fourth wave cancelled, DAK has been given a reply to its complaint of inadequate air support.

4 July, 22 fighters and 18 dive bombers available, limiting missions to 4 per day.

17 July JG27 pilots flying 5 to 6 times a day.

24 July bombing the previous night damaged 18 Bf109, expected back in 1 to 2 days, air operations list 4 destroyed, 5 badly damaged.

27 July allied fighter squadrons 8 using HF and 12 VHF. Night armoured car raid on airfield Qasaba-West, 5 Ju87, 3 Ju88, 2 Junkers hospital aircraft destroyed, 7 Ju87, 3 Ju88, 1 Me110 badly damaged, 2 Ju87 slightly damaged.

1 August fuel supply down to 76 cubic metres (front line?). Actual inventory 4 cubic metres in drums and 303 in tanks at Tobruk, 99.5 cubic metres at airfields, all B7 grade.

26 May to 26 July total Aircraft
destroyed or over 60% damage
enemy \ not enemy
66 \ 26 Bf109
6 \ 2 Bf109 reconnaissance
17 \ 2 Bf110
8 \ 1 Bf110 reconnaissance
1 \ 0 Ju88
3 \ 0 Ju88 reconnaissance
53 \ 3 Ju87
3 \ 0 Fi-156
157 \ 34 Total

Under 60% damaged
enemy \ not enemy
25 \ 18 Bf109
1 \ 9 Bf109 reconnaissance
5 \ 6 Bf110
2 \ 0 Bf110 reconnaissance
0 \ 2 Ju88
0 \ 2 Ju88 reconnaissance
0 \ 6 Ju87
0 \ 3 Fi-156
0 \ 1 Other, Me-11?
33 \ 47 Total

Strength 26 May 1942
130 Bf109
17 Bf109 reconnaissance
28 Bf110
7 Bf110 reconnaissance
13 Ju88
11 Ju88 reconnaissance
56 Ju87
7 Fi-156
1 He110
270 Total

So what is the ratio of lost Allied to lost Axis aircraft in that time period according to your count?

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

It seems like Allison was doing the refit program in 1940 and finished it in early 1941. 277 (?)engines refitted/rebuilt, it was done at the factory.
It also appears that it was done to US Army engines only and only the -33 engines. Late production -33 engines and ALL -39s had the improved parts.
However there is no mention of the British Tomahawks getting any of their engines rebuilt or any modifications to their engines.
AVG engines are in a different catagory, they were neither US engines or British engines. While it is true they were made out of "rejected" parts, in many ways they were actually hand built engines with parts brought up to specifications with inserts for threaded holes to repair thread damage or crank bearings plated and reground to bring them to tolerance.
The engines were not assembled using poorly fitted parts.
Where the AVG engines fell in the production que may affect which parts they got, but it is quite possible they got some of the old crankcases.

BUT, each engine had to be run on a test stand for the standard number of run-in hours, disassembles (at least partially) reassembled, and then packed and shipped to Curtiss or sent out as spares.

There were several batches of strengthening improvements to the V-1710

V-1710-C (includes the -33) "These engines received heavier crankcases, a stronger crankshaft, SAE #50 propeller shaft, and Bendix pressure carburetors" I think this version still had the 'plain' crankshaft.
V-1710-F / F3R (includes the -39) "These engines had either a six or twelve weight crankshaft, revised vibration dampeners that combined to allow higher engine speeds, SAE #50 propeller shaft, and higher horsepower ratings." I think this was the 'shot peened' crank shaft
V-1710 / F4R (includes the -73) these got the Indium plated silver / lead bearings and the nitrided crank shaft.

My understanding is that the later V-1710s (midway through F3R production?) all got the 12 weight crank shafts as well, which worked better at higher RPM.

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

Mike

Not found anything in the ORBs specifically that states the aircraft were being over boosted or being set at 60 plus ", nor could I find anything in what limited engineering details I have saying engines were being set or allowed to go to 60 plus in a official capacity.

That said I did find notes, in other information, of Pilots using low to mid 50's in Mar 1942 etc (AP 2014A - Pilot's notes The Kittyhawk I aeroplane calls for a max of 42" for no more than 5 min for Emergency Power) - so they were doing it pretty early

Thanks this is quite useful.

Incidentally the AVG were doing the same in early 1942 with -33 engines - however i strongly recommend you don't ever say this to a AVGophile, or you'll get hung, draw, quartered, flogged, sworn at, banished from all facebook groups, forums, then you'll be sent to hell and cancelled all in 20 mins - Trust me on this.

I know the feeling

Just remember their engines were poor quality, made from rejected parts and you'll be fine, the engine issues the AVG suffered had nothing to do with hot humid conditions and running almost double the boost recommended).

Also found some other information from Jan 42 of a Pilot max boosting an aircraft, use of 52" to disengage combat in Mar 42, grounding an entire Squadron for over boost checks in early April 1942, as well as many other occasions of over boosting (where it's stated in " (such as "I used 52" of boost to disengage" etc) or just stated as Max Boost/Over boost what ever that is. One particular entry from a diary stated the Pilot eased the Throttle to 54" (Oct 1942) - how does one ease the throttle to 54" - what was he at before???, so certainly the boosts used were well up there.

There is an excerpt that was posted in this forum somewhere from one of Osprey books by Carl Molesworth, I think the P-40 in the MTO,or theP-40 vs 109 one, where the pilot wrote in a letter to his family about a close call he had in a combat where he was boosting between 50 - and 60" Hg ,though he was in the 57th FG so it could have been either a P-40F or K.

Engine failures and engine changes were really a thing in North Africa, bearing failures and rod failures being the most common, sometimes the aircraft recovered to an airfield, sometimes not and crashed..........a sample squadron shows that engine failures or engine replacements for the months of Mar/Aug amount to 21 occasions, not including the number of sorties lost for engine issues. Between the use of boost over the recommended amount, and the environmental factors, engines didn't last long, and even rebuilt ones were poor at times (badly rebuilt)

This is also very interesting and useful data, and perhaps helps explain where they strengthened the bearings

Not sure if this is the answer you are looking for.

Buz

All very helpful data thanks

 

[Wild_Bill_Kelso]

first row is losses 26 May to 7 July

Date

Sorties

Tons

Kills

Losses

type

Bomber

Dive

SEF

TEF

Rcn

Liaison

Total

Bombs

Bomb

Ftr

Total

Bomber

Dive

SEF

TEF

Liaison

Total

26/5-7/7

565​

2156​

5470​

598​

449​

22​

9260​

1857.74​

7​

290​

297​

3​

30​

41​

11​

3​

88​

8-Jul-42​

51​

123​

11​

185​

10.30​

3​

3​

1​

1​

2​

9-Jul-42​

33​

120​

7​

160​

13.65​

1​

1​

0​

10-Jul-42​

20​

34​

147​

12​

213​

40.45​

16​

16​

2​

3​

1​

6​

11-Jul-42​

24​

55​

178​

8​

1​

266​

56.00​

6​

6​

1​

3​

1​

5​

12-Jul-42​

50​

3​

8​

61​

1.60​

2​

2​

1​

1​

13-Jul-42​

25​

48​

157​

11​

241​

53.55​

9​

9​

1​

1​

14-Jul-42​

17​

73​

127​

9​

226​

54.55​

4​

4​

1​

1​

15-Jul-42​

29​

128​

148​

14​

319​

107.40​

1​

1​

1​

1​

16-Jul-42​

25​

84​

142​

11​

262​

65.95​

4​

4​

0​

17-Jul-42​

33​

52​

166​

11​

12​

274​

67.20​

9​

9​

0​

18-Jul-42​

19​

11​

115​

1​

8​

154​

29.10​

0​

0​

19-Jul-42​

61​

136​

8​

205​

28.40​

7​

7​

1​

3​

3​

7​

20-Jul-42​

90​

90​

0.60​

7​

7​

0​

21-Jul-42​

81​

9​

90​

9​

9​

2​

2​

22-Jul-42​

12​

95​

160​

8​

275​

43.45​

6​

6​

0​

23-Jul-42​

12​

73​

112​

8​

205​

48.20​

7​

7​

1​

1​

24-Jul-42​

72​

6​

78​

2​

7​

9​

4​

1​

5​

25-Jul-42​

5​

84​

6​

8​

103​

1​

1​

0​

26-Jul-42​

32​

4​

36​

0​

0​

781​

2959​

7710​

619​

611​

23​

12703​

2478.14​

10​

388​

398​

8​

35​

60​

14​

3​

120​

So when you say 'kills', does this refer to claims? And is that 398 fighter losses or 'kills'? what do the 388 and 398 numbers represent and what is the 120? Did you count the Axis losses?