Was Operation Pedestal a greater Axis air attack than any faced by the USN in 1942?

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Very interesting indeed, these early engagements are fascinating to me. Some of the fighting in Thailand got pretty wild too.

I thought it was interesting that the Chinese still had some I-153s and I-16s as late as 1943. It seems like an I-16/24 or /30 with a pair of 20mm ShVAK cannon, a pair of fast-firing 7.62mm ShKAS machine guns, and capacity to carry six RS-82 rockets. SS tanks and armor might be a nice option for the RAF at that point, assuming they don't want Kittyhawks.

Considering that the Mohawk IV was able to cope, an I-16 might actually be a fairly good weapon against Ki-43s, assuming well trained pilots. The only drawback compared to a Hurricane really being the tricky handling. Apparently they had two speed superchargers too.

Maybe open cockpit wouldn't be so great in the rain, though I think they had a closed cockpit option.
 
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Where is your evidence for that statement?

In June 1945 there were 3 Hurricane squadrons left in ACSEA - 11, 20 & 28, with the latter in the FR role for which there was no alternative until the Spitfire FR.XIVe began to arrive. The first of those was already in the process of converting to the Spitfire FR.XIVe. The other pair converted to the same type around Sept/Oct. Some RIAF squadrons were also still equipped but were part of India Command and deployed mostly on the NW Frontier IIRC.

Spitfire XIVe only began to arrive in India around April 1945 with only 3 squadrons re-equipped before the war ended (including 1 ex Hurricane squadron).

Many Hurricane squadrons converted to the P-47D from May1944 (deliveries to India only began in Jan 1944).10 squadrons so equipped by June 1945 (up from the initially planned 8). But deliveries were limited with the last of 826 delivered in June 1945 (some went to OTUs in the ME). In the early months the promised allocations were frequently not being met.

45 squadron replaced its Vengeance dive bombers for Mosquitos in Feb 1944.

P-51D were delivered to India in 1945 but held in MU pending decisions about the composition of Tiger Force (which in the end was not to have a long range fighter component). So none were issued to squadrons in India. Prior to that NWE and the Med had priority for Mustang deliveries.
 

My evidence is Shores Bloody Shambles vol III, page 397

The very first unit he mentions is 906 Wing, then 28 Squadron, flying Hurricane IIc and IV, at Mingaladon (Burma).

Then 910 Wing, 42 Squadron, flying Hurricane IIc, at Dalbumgarh (India).

On page 398 he shows another Hurricane squadron (20 RAF) flying IId and IV as a ground attack unit.

This is all for 30 June 1945, as I just now double checked and verified.

On 12 December 1944 he lists the following Hurricane units (pages 394-395):

1 IAF - Hurricane IIc
42, 60 Sqn RAF - Hurricane IIc
11 Sqn RAF- Hurricane IIc
34, 113 Sqn RAF - Hurricane IIc
9 IAF - Hurricane IIc
2 IAF - Hurricane IIc
4 IAF - Hurricane IIc

So in all I count 5 RAF and 4 IAF units flying Hurricanes, plus another (20 RAF) flying Hurricane IId and IV as fighter-bomber / attack planes, for 6 RAF total. He also shows 7 flying Thunderbolts, 5 flying Spit VIII, 3 flying Beaufighter X, and one P-38 sqn (459 FS) which I think is a US unit flying with the British as part of 224 Group, 902 wing. Then US 10th AF with 4 x P-47, 3 x P38 sqns.

I don't claim to be an expert on RAF deployments, but if these make you angry, I say take it up with Christopher Shores.
 
None of which addresses your statement

"British officers in India who were reluctant to replace the Hurricane, esepcailly with foreign types."
 
EwenS said:
None of which addresses your statement

"British officers in India who were reluctant to replace the Hurricane, esepcailly with foreign types."
Click to expand...

Jeez Ewen, lighten up. That too is from Shores, mentioned several times, and discussed previously by others in the same threads you have been participating in.

As just one example, super RAF and Hurricane patriot RCAFson posted the following excerpt here, from Shores. This was from May 1943. I will quote the relevant passage (bold by me):

"There is no doubt that the Hurricane is not up to the job." His original text added: "… and we must have Spitfires." While accepting the report, before it was circulated Williams deleted these latter words, explaining: "That's true, and both you and I know it, but we must never let the boys suspect it – it would destroy morale." He did not seem to credit the pilots with the wit to have worked this out for themselves. Richey however, later learned that the AOC-in-C, India, Sir Richard Peirse, had refused Spitfires on the grounds that the Hurricane was better for the job – apparently because its stronger and wider undercarriage was better for jungle strips. Richey suspected that the advice for this view could well have come from Williams originally. "

The rest of this same passage, which gets into the dog-fighting vs hit and run tactics, makes it abundantly clear that the Hurricane pilots unit leaders did know about proper strategy, eg: "We won't dog-fight. We will only attack from above, diving and firing a short burst before climbing again. If we are caught out and are below the Japs or at their level we will immediately take steps to reverse this situation by diving away and climbing up again before attacking. We will defeat the Japs by cleverness."

I don't think you can say there is a marked improvement of outcomes in Hurricane vs Ki-43 (or other IJN fighters) encounters from that point onward though. In fact I'll dig up some examples and post them later.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
The rest of this same passage, which gets into the dog-fighting vs hit and run tactics, makes it abundantly clear that the Hurricane pilots unit leaders did know about proper strategy ...
Click to expand...

Why did Richey feel the need to address this in his memo (and received pushback on this very point) if the RAF unit leaders were fighting the Japanese fighters properly?
 
Greyman said:
Why did Richey feel the need to address this in his memo (and received pushback on this very point) if the RAF unit leaders were fighting the Japanese fighters properly?
Click to expand...

Well, I personally don't know the details, so I can only speculate. I don't get from that passage though that the issue he got in trouble was hit and run tactics, but rather more due to the (correct, in my view) suggestion that the Hurricane wasn't "up to the job" as he put it.

The reaction by Air Commander of 224 group ("Why doesn't he show us how to do it") may not necessarily reflect any anger at the advocacy of hit and run tactics per se, so much as the the implication by a pilot who just arrived in Theater a month before, that they were not already using these tactics.

However, seeing how clearly he (Wing Commander Richey) articulated them in his "Loose Minute" brief, at the very least we can say that both unit leaders of, and individual pilots in the Hurricane units were well aware of the "Hit and Run" tactics from that point, i.e. May 1943, onward.

I'll see going forward if I notice any evidence that they had figured it out prior to that. But I very much suspect they did. Considering that the Americans were using it successfully since Dec 1941, and the whole issue had undergone a famously ugly denouement in the Australian service in Spring of 1942, culminating with the death of the heroic and much loved pilot and 75 Sqn leader at Port Morseby in April 1942, not to mention the fairly bitter combat experience by the RAF in the Theater, I suspect understanding of the issue was already widespread by that point at the latest.
 

I find it interesting that Richey's word is taken at face value.

This is from Wikipedia, with all the usual caveats...but it rather contradicts the perception that Peirse would refuse any more modern type over Hurricanes (I bolded a section that might explain the difference of opinions):

In March 1943 Peirse was appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief RAF India and in November 1943 he was made Allied Air Commander in Chief, South-East Asia.[1] He oversaw the building of his command from a small demoralised and poorly organised force with a collection of obsolescent aircraft into a powerful force with a three to one numerical superiority over the enemy. Although seen as somewhat aloof, he fought fiercely to bring the structure and resources needed for his command and was seen to make an able contribution to the higher direction of the war in the South East Asian theatre.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
The Spitfire V did about equal with the Ki-43 as far as i can tell (a closer reading of Shores Vol III will help verify this)
Click to expand...
Here are Spitfire Mk.Vc claims (destroyed) against Ki-43's (from Listemann's vol.3)

136 sqn
26-12-43 2x Ki-43
31-12-43 3x Ki-43
15-1-44 5x "Zero" most likely Ki-43's
20-1-44 5x Ki-43
6 Spitfires lost to Ki-43's


607 sqn
15-1-44 6x Ki-43
20-1-44 2x Ki-43
22-2-44 1x" Zero"
2 Spitfires lost to Ki-43's


615 sqn
26-12-43 1x Ki-43
9-2-44 1x "Zero"
17-6-44 2x Ki-43
4 Spitfires lost to Ki-43's

Total - 28 Ki-43's/ 12 Spitfire Mk.Vc
Not sure of his sources (none listed in the book) but would be interesting to compare them to Shores and match up actual Japanese losses.
 

Excellent, I can check these against the Ki-43 Aces book (and Shores) tomorrow to see how many of them match. Given the typical overclaiming rates, the ratio was as I was previously suggesting, probably about even.

Just to be clear on Shores, in Bloody Shambles he's not quite as thorough as in the MAW series, and he doesn't always clearly match up claims to actual losses (or their lack). But I'll see what we get, I'm sure there will be several matches for these.
 
buffnut453 said:
This is from Wikipedia, with all the usual caveats...but it rather contradicts the perception that Peirse would refuse any more modern type over Hurricanes (I bolded a section that might explain the difference of opinions):
Click to expand...

It's possible that ACM Peirce wasn't quite buying what AVM Williams was saying and made moves for Spitfires right away.

From A Critical Analysis of the Royal Air Force Air Superiority Campaign in India, Burma and Malaya, 1941-1945 - Peter Norman Preston-Hough

Richey submitted his report to the Fighter Operations H.Q. in Delhi and soon after, Williams told Richey, "Paul we're getting Spits! How would you like to take command of the first Wing?" (Norman) Franks wrote:

As far as Paul was concerned, he had helped, by whatever means, to get Spitfires to the fighter pilots in India/Burma and they started to arrive in October 1943.​

There is obviously a disparity in this account as by the time Richey had submitted his report in May Spitfires were en route to the theatre although there is no evidence to disprove Richey's reports helped promote future acquisition of this valuable aircraft.
 

That would make sense. Peirse wasn't an idiot. We must also recognize that discussions between two senior officers may be very different from the formal action they took. It's also worth bearing in mind that the perspective of a Wg Cdr will differ from that of an ACM...and rightly so. The former is focused on tactics while the latter should be focused on strategy.
 
The key bit is though gents, clearly some of the senior RAF officers wanted to just stick with Hurricanes, and there was some kind of struggle to grasp that they indeed, were not cutting it.

And that is the point I was making, which was so sharply challenged by Ewen for whatever reason.

The legend that the Hurricanes were just fine is one I have seen printed in post-war books from the 60s etc. which claim that the Hurricane was at parity with the Ki-43 (and the Zero!), or that heavy losses were due to their being caught while doing the necessary but difficult work of Close Air Support (a claim I saw repeated in this forum). Neither of which appear to be true.
 
Wild_Bill_Kelso said:
The key bit is though gents, clearly some of the senior RAF officers wanted to just stick with Hurricanes, and there was some kind of struggle to grasp that they indeed, were not cutting it.
Click to expand...

I don't know that we can make such a broad statement. Do we have anything, other than Richey's word, that Peirse refused Spitfires? Richey was a Wg Cdr at the squadron level. He wasn't working in the HQ and was unlikely to be party to the efforts taken to up-equip the Command. Again, if Hurricanes were deemed suitable, why were so many squadrons re-equipped by P-47s and Spitfires?

One factor that must be considered is the simple fact that Burma was a low-priority theatre. Peirse may well have been jumping up and down to get more modern types but if London didn't release them, there wasn't much more he could do. As it was, it seems he did build an effective force, even though it was bottom of the priority pile.
 
Even if this is the only such account that I've heard, which it isn't, (there was apparently a good bit of grousing about Hurricanes in Burma over the long years they were employed there, this is just one example that was very recently posted to this forum, with a source I and many others here also have, so convenient to refer to), then we would somehow have to assume that this guy Richey is lying about the whole debate. Do you have any particular reason to believe he's a liar other than you just don't like the narrative Shores was describing?

I don't think they necessarily had to wait until 1944 or 1945 to replace all their Hurricanes (which they ultimately, never completely did) just because London didn't want to send Spitfire VIIIs. There were plenty of Spit Vs available and they were much better than a Hurricane for contending with the JAAF. They could have used P-40s which were fairly plentiful by 1943, and were clearly also better able to contend with the requirements of combat in the Theater. The Thunderbolts were a reasonable option too but they seem to have been available much later (and I suspect, had a good bit longer and dense maintenance / logistics trail).

There is sort of a vicious cycle at work here of - "why did they make so many Hurricanes so late in the war", with "why were they still using them in Burma long after they were clearly obsolete?" I guess they used Hurricanes because they had so many, because they kept making them because... they needed them in Burma and India. I suspect the pilots would have been a lot happier in Spitfire Vs, Kittyhawks, or even something like Beaufighters until more Spit VIIIs and Thunderbolts were available.
 
The Americans might have been even willing to give the RAF some Mustangs for Burma - the merlin engined type. They brought in quite a few themselves eventually.
 

I'm not saying Richey was a liar. I'm simply stating that his perspective was very different from that of Peirse.



I never said anything about Spit VIIIs. I said Burma was a low priority for EVERYTHING. There's a reason it's known as the "Forgotten War." London set priorities for ALL assets of every kind going into the operational theatres. Burma was bottom of the pile. Providing any more modern aircraft earlier would require a change of those priorities. If there were so many excess resources available, where would you take them from to re-equip the Hurricane units in Burma?



Correlation does not mean causation. Hurricane orders were being cancelled/reduced from mid-1943 onwards, so it's not like Hurricane production was proceeding at full pelt. it's also worth considering the differing conditions over time. I can entirely agree that Hurricane production went on for too long. Also, in an ideal world, the Hurricanes in Burma would have been replaced earlier. However, the world isn't an ideal place. Decisions must be made based on priorities and the finite resources available.

The only other explanation is that senior RAF leaders didn't care for the lives of their men and glibly persisted with types that were entirely unsuited. That simply doesn't work for me, not least because those same leaders had operational missions to achieve. If the assets available couldn't achieve the required missions, then we'd lose the war. Ok...that's a stretch but my point should be self-evident. If better types were available, I think it highly unlikely that they'd be refused without solid reasons. And perhaps--just perhaps--the concerns about Spitfire fragility were valid given the state of airfields in the theatre in 1942-43.

It's easy to Monday-morning-quarterback decisions from WW2. However, the men on the spot weren't, as a rule, idiots. Things that seem inexplicable to us might have been based on the very best knowledge and insight available at the time.
 
One reason that the Spitfire arrived late in Australia and Burma was the fact that the USAAF in the ETO/MTO had priority for delivery of the Mk V and MkVIII:


also see:

Why does the 'Suffolk Spitfire' boast a USAAF scheme?

When the United States Army Air Forces entered the war in Europe, Spitfires appeared adorned with stars and bars. Darren Harbar reveals why and details their operations with the 309th Fighter Squadron in North Africa
www.key.aero
 
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Great point. Like I said...priorities!
 

Ok looking these up now
 
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