Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

[nuuumannn]

Another option if things are desperate,. Avro Lincoln, first prototype first flight 9 June 1944, first production example in December 1944, all up 46 mark I and 10 mark II built to end May 1945, did not have the B-29 altitude performance but did have a longer range than the Lancaster.

There's a whole thread on this. Let's not forget that the Lincoln first entered RAF service in August 1945, three bombers were supplied to 57 Sqn at East Kirkby. Hardly enough time for preparation. I'd suggest going through the thread on this forum but be careful not to step in the brown stuff on your way through it...

It was politically unconscionable to NOT use a USAAF bomber!

Yes indeed. When Groves first discussed it with Arnold, he insisted that if the USAAF is involved, it be a US aircraft right from the outset. The Lancaster was never in the running.

You are all forgetting just how much better looking the B-29 is.

Yes! You can have bacon, my friend!

 

[nuuumannn]

Not only better looking, but a far better war fighting machine in all respects.

Agree. While I too have clambered aboard a Lancaster for that special experience (on a few occasions, I enjoyed cranking those gun turrets around! Been aboard a B-17 too) the B-29 was far superior to everything else at the time, and this is what people forget about it. It was such a big leap in capability that it changed the game. There had been bombers before that could fly as high as it, there had been bombers that could fly as fast as it, there had been bombers that could carry its warload and bombers that could fly further, and there had been pressurised bombers and bombers fitted with remotely operated gun turrets, but no bomber combined all of these facets into one workable airframe, until the B-29. In the Lancaster's favour though, was its Merlins - far more reliable than the B-29's Duplex Cyclones.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Thin Man (gun type) was a British design but for what ever reason (I can't remember the exact reason now)

To add to this, perhaps you mean the Maud Report, which was British? This basically confirmed that the process of nuclear fission that was created by splitting atoms, which led to a chain reaction could be used as a weapon. This was wholeheartedly embraced within the Manhattan Project and gave it extra impetus. This led to a meeting called by Oppenheimer that gathered the cache of scientists together with the aim of designing a practicable weapon, which is when Robert Serber outlined the gun type proposal. Although executed in the United States, which was the best place to do it because of the need for secrecy and isolation, as well as a bigger resource pool than anywhere else, the Manhattan Project was a truly international effort. There were scientists from all over the world, including those from as far afield as New Zealand, and it took full advantage of the European Fascist regimes' racist policies that drove many of the best and brightest scientists away.

 

[Macandy]

Eh?

None of those three are tactical bombers. So what are they then?

What term would you use to describe nocturnal area bombing *other* than strategic?

I'm not getting into the rights or wrongs of the area bombing campaign, but cities like Hamburg suffered very much the same fate as those in Japan.

And yes, it was more costly in aircrew and machines. But its intent was pretty much indivisible from the rationale for using the A-bomb. The area bombing campaign delivered a strategic effect. Maybe not to the extent that Harris imagined, but a very sizeable one, never the less.

They were de facto medium bombers - they lacked the range and bomb load to be strategic weapons and even an RAF maximum effort couldn't smash a city

True Strategic effect is 300 bombers going after the enemies capital, and in one raid, burning out 16 square miles of the city, killing 125,000 people and making a million homeless for just 14 losses, many of these from the huge thermal updrafts.
By fall 1945, there USAAF had pretty much run out of targets in Japan and was throwing bombers at ever smaller towns and literally wiping them out.

 

[pbehn]

They were de facto medium bombers - they lacked the range and bomb load to be strategic weapons and even an RAF maximum effort couldn't smash a city

True Strategic effect is 300 bombers going after the enemies capital, and in one raid, burning out 16 square miles of the city, killing 125,000 people and making a million homeless for just 14 losses, many of these from the huge thermal updrafts.
By fall 1945, there USAAF had pretty much run out of targets in Japan and was throwing bombers at ever smaller towns and literally wiping them out.

That is pure hindsight, your 300 bombers wouldnt set fire to 16 square miles of any European or US Capital, and would suffer such losses that it was never repeated again. Tokyo was made largely of wood how many capital cities were made of wood? You mean the USA's most expensive weapon programme was to set fire to wood, that is true genius, however I believe there was more to it. May I respectfully point out that burning the enemy's wooden capital didnt end the war.

 

[EwenS]

They were de facto medium bombers - they lacked the range and bomb load to be strategic weapons and even an RAF maximum effort couldn't smash a city

True Strategic effect is 300 bombers going after the enemies capital, and in one raid, burning out 16 square miles of the city, killing 125,000 people and making a million homeless for just 14 losses, many of these from the huge thermal updrafts.
By fall 1945, there USAAF had pretty much run out of targets in Japan and was throwing bombers at ever smaller towns and literally wiping them out.

Which ignores a number of significant differences between the targets in Japan and Germany.

Buildings in Europe were largely constructed of brick and stone with solid roofs. Much more difficult to make burn without first breaking down walls and roofs to let the incendiaries inside to do their work. Hence the mixed loads favoured by Bomber Command. And Bomber Command raids could produce firestorms. One of the biggest in Hamburg in July 1943, Operation Gomorrah. The difference in construction is demonstrated by what was left.

Bombing of Hamburg in World War II - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

On the other hand Japanese houses were built of timber & paper. Many fewer brick & stone structures. That is why many photos of burnt out Japanese towns and cities show only the brick fireplaces and chimneys remaining. Much easier to burn out completely. Here is Tokyo immediately post war.

Bombing of Tokyo - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

And let's not forget that these successful fire raids on Japanese cities occurred after the decision to bomb at night from lower altitudes. XXI Bomber Command had flown 6 missions in Jan/Feb 1945 where incendiaries exceeded HE, 3 against engine factories and 3 against cities. Of the latter, 2 were at night and all at 22,000-30,000 feet. All were deemed unsuccessful.

And the first low level night incendiary raid to Tokyo on 9/10 March 1945 was the very first time XX AF actually was able to put 300+ aircraft over a target due to the arrival of a third Bomb Wing in that AF, the 314th BW. That mission and the ones that followed, saw a significant increase in bomb loads able to be carried by each aircraft (they were increased from an average of 3 tons to 6.5 tons) due to the lower altitude and reduced gun armament.

Looking through the data I have, it is striking that of all the 331 missions flown by XXI Bomber Command from the Marianas, only 15 involved more than 300 aircraft.

By the end of the first 5 urban area attacks between 9 & 19 March 1945, XXI Bomber Command was running out of incendiary bombs and both flight and ground crews were exhausted by the pace of operations. Success or failure of incendiary missions depended on the following factors in order of importance:-

Pattern density - 0.3 tons of M-69 incendiaries per acre was necessary, but could not guarantee success.
Area density - concentration of bomb loads, their location and how accurately they were delivered.
Type of bomb - the M-69 proved best.
Time - compression of time and concentration in space, to allow individual fires to merge and prevent firefighters gaining control.
Surface winds - helped spread fires.
Precipitation - proved less of a problem than anticipated.

 

[pbehn]

Which ignores a number of significant differences between the targets in Japan and Germany.

Buildings in Europe were largely constructed of brick and stone with solid roofs.

Even within that description which is largely true, cities had other differences. Old cities especially ports like Hamburg had lots of buildings close together, while more modern cities like Berlin had large boulevards and park spaces. An attack which worked well on Hamburg didnt on Berlin.

 

[GrauGeist]

Many cities with older quarters were likely to burn, like London and Chongqin.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

They were de facto medium bombers - they lacked the range and bomb load to be strategic weapons and even an RAF maximum effort couldn't smash a city

True Strategic effect is 300 bombers going after the enemies capital, and in one raid, burning out 16 square miles of the city, killing 125,000 people and making a million homeless for just 14 losses, many of these from the huge thermal updrafts.
By fall 1945, there USAAF had pretty much run out of targets in Japan and was throwing bombers at ever smaller towns and literally wiping them out.

I'd say14,000 lbs payload per plane is pretty darn strategic when you've got raids from 400-800 bombers. Granted that none could do what the B-29 did, but as P pbehn points out the target circumstances were much different. All the same, Bomber Command torched more than a few German cities and those bombers and their crews were integral to the accomplishments.

They were not in any sense of the phrase "medium bombers". The B-29 was not the Only True Scotsman, it was simply much better than the others. They were still strategic in usage and capability compared to the capabilities of the medium bombers of the day.

 

[EwenS]

They were de facto medium bombers - they lacked the range ......

The spec for the B-29 called for a very long range bomber with a range of c5,000 miles with a 2,000lb bomb load.

But the distances involved in the European airwar were far less than the Pacific where the B-29 was eventually used. So why design and build a bomber for something that wasn't required?

London to Berlin - 600 miles
Marianas to Tokyo - 1,500 miles

Until thoughts turned to sending bombers to the Pacific in 1944 the RAF didn't need a bomber with the range of a B-29.

 

[SplitRz]

They were de facto medium bombers - they lacked the range and bomb load to be strategic weapons and even an RAF maximum effort couldn't smash a city

'De facto' medium bombers.... Even though they carried more bombs as far as just about any contemporary aircraft when they went into service?

Not for the first time, your elastic definitions seem more like personal assertions made to back up an earlier questionable generalisation.

Here's Wikis definition of a Strategic Bomber...

"A strategic bomber is a medium- to long-range penetration bomber aircraft designed to drop large amounts of air-to-ground weaponry onto a distant target for the purposes of debilitating the enemy's capacity to wage war. Unlike tactical bombers, penetrators, fighter-bombers, and attack aircraft, which are used in air interdiction operations to attack enemy combatants and military equipment, strategic bombers are designed to fly into enemy territory to destroy strategic targets (e.g., infrastructure, logistics, military installations, factories, etc.)."

Britannica.com says -

"Strategic bombing, approach to aerial bombardment designed to destroy a country's ability to wage war by demoralizing civilians and targeting features of an enemy's infrastructure—such as factories, railways, and refineries—that are essential for the production and supply of war materials."

Definitions.net says -

"Strategic bombing is a military strategy used in total war with the goal of defeating the enemy by destroying its morale or its economic ability to produce and transport materiel to the theatres of military operations, or both. It is a systematically organized and executed attack from the air which can utilize strategic bombers, long- or medium-range missiles, or nuclear-armed fighter-bomber aircraft to attack targets deemed vital to the enemy's war-making capability. One of the strategies of war is to demoralize the enemy, so that peace or surrender becomes preferable to continuing the conflict. Strategic bombing has been used to this end."

I could go on but its getting boring. But I have yet to find mention of the magic McCandy range statistic that earns the distinction of when a bomber dropping ordinance to achieve the above objective becomes 'de facto strategic'. Nor can I find a statistic or metric giving a minimum bombload, or a defined minimum level of annihilation.

As for the potential effects of these apparently non strategic medium bombers that couldn't smash a city...?

Memories of the Hamburg Raid - History Learning Site

"Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary that the devastation caused at Hamburg was so great that it was the first time that he had considered a negotiated peace with the Allies – regardless of his public stance of defiance. The Gestapo and other forms of internal security were put on full alert to ensure that as little as was possible about the destruction of Hamburg leaked out to the German public at large."

... how far down this rabbit hole do you want to continue?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The spec for the B-29 called for a very long range bomber with a range of c5,000 miles with a 2,000lb bomb load.

But the distances involved in the European airwar were far less than the Pacific where the B-29 was eventually used. So why design and build a bomber for something that wasn't required?

London to Berlin - 600 miles
Marianas to Tokyo - 1,500 miles

Until thoughts turned to sending bombers to the Pacific in 1944 the RAF didn't need a bomber with the range of a B-29.

Right -- the RAF needed bombers for its mission at hand and didn't have a lot of money to blue-sky designs. The Brits didn't have the money to throw at a problem like America did, so they had to perforce stay focused -- and whether we're talking bombers or fighters, they did a great job of producing what was needed in (generally) good time for it to be useful.

Even the Stirling, the least of the lot, was far superior to any medium bomber for range and payload, so calling it a "medium bomber" is nonsense. I'd love a medium that could haul six tons of bombs 650 miles radius.

 

[SaparotRob]

Does anyone know the "climb to cockpit" time for the Sterling?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Does anyone know the "climb to cockpit" time for the Sterling?

I don't have that answer, but I believe the crew had to don oxygen gear before starting that trek.

 

[pbehn]

Does anyone know the "climb to cockpit" time for the Sterling?

It usually involved a game of snooker in the billiard room so it was quite a while.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

It usually involved a game of snooker in the billiard room so it was quite a while.

Relief stations were built into the ladders, right?

 

[GrauGeist]

I'd also suggest that at the time that Britain was designing their medium/heavy bombers, continental Europe was it's main priority.

The Pacific and it's Commonwealth would be a secondary concern and of no consequence if Britain was not able to defend and save the UK.

 

[nuuumannn]

I'd also suggest that at the time that Britain was designing their medium/heavy bombers, continental Europe was it's main priority.

The Pacific and it's Commonwealth would be a secondary concern and of no consequence if Britain was not able to defend and save the UK.

Exactly. It's like during the Cold War, Britain didn't need big gas guzzling ICBMs with massive range; the Soviet Union was just over there. When it came to the crunch, American citizens had time to hide under a table, say a few "Hail Marys" and kiss their *sses goodbye, whereas British citizens only had time to shrug their shoulders and complain about the weather one last time...

 

[pbehn]

I'd also suggest that at the time that Britain was designing their medium/heavy bombers, continental Europe was it's main priority.

The Pacific and it's Commonwealth would be a secondary concern and of no consequence if Britain was not able to defend and save the UK.

The Stirling was supposed to be able to carry people and cargo as well as bombs, for work in the commonwealth but not a Pacific theatre where Japan had taken a huge amount of territory. Designed to do everything, it was pretty useless at anything.

 

[SplitRz]

The Stirling was supposed to be able to carry people and cargo as well as bombs, for work in the commonwealth but not a Pacific theatre where Japan had taken a huge amount of territory. Designed to do everything, it was pretty useless at anything.

Other sources may beg to differ on some of that?

Bomber specs

"The 1936 bomber specifications (B.12/36 and P.13/36) stated:

Consideration is to be given in design for fitting a light removable form of seating for the maximum number of personnel that can be accommodated within the fuselage when the aircraft is being used for reinforcing Overseas Commands.

This was certainly not demanding provision for troop carrying. Seating was to be fitted in the fuselage, not that the fuselage was to be designed to take seating. Moreover, it referred to the need to transport RAF ground crew to RAF Overseas Commands — a concomitant of the introduction of a reinforcement range into bomber requirements. Significantly, only after the 1936 bomber specifications had been issued did the Air Staff investigate using them as transports, and proposed a provisional allocation of funds for a new transport in case this was not possible. But when this proposition was discussed it was decided that one of the bombers 'must' be used as a transport. In a later lecture to the Higher Commanders' Course the point was made that these bombers 'will have all the necessary cabin space, lift capacity and range to fulfil the bomber transport primary role and its secondary functions as well'. Nevertheless, the lecturer noted that 'by reason of the multiplicity of internal installations in the fuselage the troops may not enjoy the same degree of comfort available in present types'. Indeed, when Bomber Command officers inspected the mock-up of the Supermarine design to B.12/36, far from finding accommodation for fully armed troops, they were concerned as to whether there was adequate room for the crew. They reported that headroom throughout the fuselage was restricted, and that even the captain and navigator did not have room to stand. Clearly a troop carrying requirement did not dominate — or even influence — the design of RAF bombers."

Surely the Stirling was most knackered by the limitation of its wingspan to 100ft, and the sub-divided bomb-bay and wing cells?