Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Another option if things are desperate,. Avro Lincoln, first prototype first flight 9 June 1944, first production example in December 1944, all up 46 mark I and 10 mark II built to end May 1945, did not have the B-29 altitude performance but did have a longer range than the Lancaster.

Consolidated P4Y [NX21731], was it flying in 1939 with a pair of R-3350?

The monitoring of the fall out from the Krakatoa eruption showed there were strong winds in the upper atmosphere, and there were various reports pre WWII but it was not until post WWII the key data was determined. Like if they were seasonal, the average speeds, altitudes and so on.

Despatch on War Operations by Arthur Harris. Appendix J paragraph 48, 49.

"A radio technique was developed shortly before and during the war by which both winds and temperatures to levels beyond the troposphere were determined independent of cloud. This not only gave the meteorologist new and fairly plentiful data to great heights but also threw light on the general structure and circulation of the atmosphere. Perhaps one of the most striking early results was that wind velocities well over 200 miles per hour could exist at high altitude.

Brief mention may be made here of some advance in the science of meteorology during the war. An advance in the forecasting of fog has already been mentioned. The biggest step forward, however, came from the enhanced knowledge of the circulation in the upper atmosphere derived from a study of the new observational data obtained from high levels."

A Luftwaffe report noted for one raid into eastern Germany late in the war the route was around a pressure system, ensuring tail winds to and from the target. How much of this was planning is unknown. In contrast the early war period saw new weather effects being logged on a regular basis.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Armed with Chadwick's assurances, Ramsey returned to Los Alamos and briefed Parsons on the suitability of the Lancaster as a Thin Man carrier. At this stage the AAF had not been included in Manhattan discussions, but the project's commander-in-chief Maj Gen Leslie Groves soon approached his equivalent within the AAF, Gen Henry H. 'Hap' Arnold. Groves was assured of AAF support, under the proviso that the AAF should provide the delivery platform and its crew. When the possibility of the Lancaster was put to them, both rejected it, insisting on the only American option: the B-29."

End of story!

 

[Macandy]

It was politically unconscionable to NOT use a USAAF bomber!

 

[SaparotRob]

You are all forgetting just how much better looking the B-29 is.

 

[Snautzer01]

You are all forgetting just how much better looking the B-29 is.

It is a sweet & slick looking beaut isnt it? Like a girl waayy, wayyyyyy out of your league.
On the other hand the Lancaster is the guy who will clear a bar for you, just because someone talked trash to you and he took offence. Kind of old school Millwall supporter.

 

[Snautzer01]

It was politically unconscionable to NOT use a USAAF bomber!

Perhaps but do read this thread. It is not only politics but just plain old hardware.
If it does not fit, it cant. More simple as that it does not get.

 

[Macandy]

You are all forgetting just how much better looking the B-29 is.

Not only better looking, but a far better war fighting machine in all respects.

Having been in a Lancaster, its a terrible place to be even in light summer clothes, in high altitude clothing - ugh!
I was surprised to see a series of hooks by the rear door - 'what them?'
The crew hung up their chutes on them as there wasn't enough room to get about the plane with them on.

 

[pbehn]

You are all forgetting just how much better looking the B-29 is.

As with the Spitfire, the only real consideration. All this talk of load and range, height and speed is complete baloney like "spanwise lift distribution" it just shows desperation.

 

[SaparotRob]

So few understand.

 

[SplitRz]

The Stirling, Lancaster and Halifax were capable of many things, but delivering a strategic effect wasn't one of them.
It wasn't until late 44 that the RAF had enough heavies to thrown neigh on 1,000 a time at a target, but they still lacked the abuklity to deal knock out blows..

When B San came calling - whole Japanese cities died.

Eh?

None of those three are tactical bombers. So what are they then?

What term would you use to describe nocturnal area bombing *other* than strategic?

I'm not getting into the rights or wrongs of the area bombing campaign, but cities like Hamburg suffered very much the same fate as those in Japan.

And yes, it was more costly in aircrew and machines. But its intent was pretty much indivisible from the rationale for using the A-bomb. The area bombing campaign delivered a strategic effect. Maybe not to the extent that Harris imagined, but a very sizeable one, never the less.

 

[pbehn]

Eh?

You're at it *again*.....?!

None of those three are tactical bombers. So what are they then?

What term would you use to describe nocturnal area bombing *other* than strategic?

I'm not getting into the rights or wrongs of the area bombing campaign, but cities like Hamburg suffered very much the same fate as those in Japan. No, it wasn't done in a single blow. And yes, it was more costly in aircrew and machines. But its intent was pretty much indivisible from the rationale for using the A-bomb. The area bombing campaign delivered a strategic effect. Maybe not to the extent that Harris imagined, but a very sizeable one, never the less.

It is all hindsight, Hitler would not surrender under any circumstances and had no care what happened to Germany or anyone in it. If Japan had the same fruitcake in charge there were enough others like him to make the US keep dropping bombs until the USA got sick of it themselves. Fire bombing Tokyo didnt end the war as firebombing Hamburg didnt, they did reduce the enemy's ability to fight though.

 

[SplitRz]

It is all hindsight, Hitler would not surrender under any circumstances and had no care what happened to Germany or anyone in it. If Japan had the same fruitcake in charge there were enough others like him to make the US keep dropping bombs until the USA got sick of it themselves. Fire bombing Tokyo didnt end the war as firebombing Hamburg didnt, they did reduce the enemy's ability to fight though.

Indeed.

That Hiroshima *wasn't* a knock-out blow in and of itself, proves that the will might have been there to fight on.

As I remember, the Japanese initially thought that the Americans couldn't possibly deliver another bomb of the same power in quick succession, necessitating the second drop.

Again, with hindsight, there seems to be some ambiguity as to how many more A-bombs the allies had ready to continue the campaign. Some sources suggest one, others between three and five available within the next three or four months.

 

[pbehn]

Indeed.

That Hiroshima *wasn't* a knock-out blow in and of itself, proves that the will might have been there to fight on.

As I remember, the Japanese initially thought that the Americans couldn't possibly deliver another bomb of the same power in quick succession, necessitating the second drop.

Again, with hindsight, there seems to be some ambiguity as to how many more A-bombs the allies had ready to continue the campaign. Some sources suggest one, others between three and five available within the next three or four months.

From what I read it was around 2 per month. The whole concept of strategic bombing depended on the idea that an opponent in a hopeless situation would give up. The idea that an opponent wouldnt give up and no means to make him surrender existed was never considered. There have been discussions here of when Hitlers situation became hopeless, some say from the start, or from 1940 when UK didnt surrender, or 1941 when Moscow wasnt taken, then the USA entering the war, Stalingrad, Kursk but it didnt matter, because the one person that mattered didnt care and the loyal few around him kept it like that. It defied all logic, and still does.

 

[EwenS]

Again, with hindsight, there seems to be some ambiguity as to how many more A-bombs the allies had ready to continue the campaign. Some sources suggest one, others between three and five available within the next three or four months.

I don't think that there was any ambiguity. One more ready by about 19th Aug plus a production schedule laid out in Maj Gen Groves memo of 30 July. See para 4.

Atomic Bomb: Decision -- Bomb Production Schedule, July 30, 1945

The Manhattan Project could make atomic bombs at an ever-increasing rate

www.dannen.com

 

[special ed]

I point out to those modern folks who find the Bomb abhorrent, that without the Emperor making the decision to save his people, the island invasions schedule would have continued into 1947. The Japanese preparations for invasion included single shot 12 Gauge pipe guns for old men , boys and girls with knives and spears. With more younger draftees from the U.S., the mental duress for them would be greater when they must kill those the same age as their younger brothers and sisters. Without the Emperor's order, we could have insurgents even today.

 

[GrauGeist]

An interesting bit of history that gets overlooked, regarding the Atomic bombings:
In the days after the attack, the Japanese mobilized it's fleet of suicide attack boats to assist in evacuating the injured.

 

[mstennes]

The Thin Man (gun type) was a British design but for what ever reason (I can't remember the exact reason now) it was deemed to have design errors and was redesigned into the Little Boy which also was a gun type. While the Thin Man would have fit into the Lancaster, it was also deemed to have to short of a range. I posted earlier that the RAF was working in flight refueling but was deemed to risky for the atomic mission.

The Silverplate -29's did have bomb bay modifications to allow 100% inflight access to the bomb, but the engines and cooling were extensively modified and some notes were taken from what was being done to-29's flying missions already and that was the remove all the defensive weapons except the tail guns.

My dad flew -29's in the pacific and had a live hate relationship with them. He said losses were also from running out of fuel, engine fires on take off as well. The standard procedure if you lost a engine on take off was not go around, but get over the ocean drop your bombs and ditch.

He also talked about the overheating issues being so bad this is what prompted the removal of the guns to lighten the load. He also said they could be a nightmare flying in formation as the flight engineer was constantly working the controls to increase or decrease the inlets to keep them from overheating.

If you research the issues with the -29's you will see what a huge portion of the Silverplate mods were as they had to be addressed before any nuclear weapons could safely be carried on them.

 

[nuuumannn]

In Oct 1943 Chadwick was in Canada overseeing Lancaster production there. The article then goes on -

"While there, Ramsey went to meet him. During their discussions, Ramsey produced illustrations of bomb casings of both kinds, gun-type and implosion type, and - without revealing their unique nature - asked whether a Lancaster could potentially carry them. Chadwick, somewhat intrigued, didn't ask either, but assured Ramsey that it could.

Armed with Chadwick's assurances, Ramsey returned to Los Alamos and briefed Parsons on the suitability of the Lancaster as a Thin Man carrier. At this stage the AAF had not been included in Manhattan discussions, but the project's commander-in-chief Maj Gen Leslie Groves soon approached his equivalent within the AAF, Gen Henry H. 'Hap' Arnold. Groves was assured of AAF support, under the proviso that the AAF should provide the delivery platform and its crew. When the possibility of the Lancaster was put to them, both rejected it, insisting on the only American option: the B-29."

There was a debate over the exact transaction that went on between Chadwick and Ramsey on this forum when my article was first published and a few stated that because Chadwick had assured Ramsey that the Lanc could carry the shapes, it was a given it could carry the Fat Man bomb and thus perform the mission, whose diameter suspended below the aircraft would have produced severe aerodynamic disadvantages to the operational parameters. The problems with this is that Chadwick had no idea of what the shapes were meant to represent (he was not on the secret list), nor is there any evidence that he was given parameters representing mission information, and significantly, nor do we know exactly what it was that Chadwick was shown. There's no evidence that exact weapon dimensions and weight and so forth were offered, only rough estimates, so drawing conclusions from this is sketchy to say the least.

They did use the Lancasters heavy bomb release mechanism though.

I think Dave (Graugeist) already mentioned this. The British bomb carrier fitted to Lancasters for carriage of the Tall Boy was used following a failure of the multiple pick-up points during an airborne trial of Thin Man aboard the B-29 converted to carry it, which damaged the aircraft. It made sense to have one carry point.

 

[nuuumannn]

The Thin Man (gun type) was a British design but for what ever reason (I can't remember the exact reason now) it was deemed to have design errors and was redesigned into the Little Boy which also was a gun type.

The concept of the gun type weapon was the work of US born physicist Robert Serber, who was brought into the Manhattan Project by Oppenheimer (Serber was also the origin of the bombs' names, their shape dictated them - see my post above). The work on designing the bomb's physical characteristics was done jointly, but the proximity fuse and subsequent supply of the barrel for the Thin Man were done by William 'Deak' Parsons, as he was a navy man and got his contacts through the service to build the barrel. The navy carried out the first ballistics trials for Thin Man, dropping scale dummies, which were known as the Sewer Pipe Bomb from a US Navy Grumman Avenger at Dahlgren, Virginia. As for the decision to discard Thin Man for Little Boy, I mention this in my post above - the plutonium refined at the Hanford site was unstable and work had been done on U235, which was less stable, but meant that the gun needn't be as long, which effectively killed the Thin Man bomb because of its 17-foot length.

 

[nuuumannn]

I posted earlier that the RAF was working in flight refueling but was deemed to risky for the atomic mission.

The RAF in-flight refuelling efforts had nothing to do with the atom bomb project. This was to aid the RAF's Tiger Force; its effort to supply bombers against Japan in the final months of the war once the war ended in Europe. Tiger Force was not going to be ready at least until the very end of 1945, but the atom bombs put an end to its use. It's worth noting that the Lancaster was never seriously considered for the mission, not by the Americans and no evidence exists the British put anything into place to support it. As mentioned above, the Lancaster was suggested as the only aircraft that could carry the Thin Man internally of existing bombers back in 1943. It was not stated anywhere that it was under consideration for the mission. This suggestion in a paper by Ramsey in 1943 has subsequently morphed into a desire to use it as the carrier aircraft through the magic of the internet, which is entirely fictitious. The Americans were adamant that the carrier aircraft was going to be the B-29 from the outset, despite whatever discussions Ramsey had with Chadwick. Ramsey did propose that Lancasters be used for trials owing to the lack of B-29s in 1943, but this was turned down and not actioned. Subsequent supply of the Silverplate B-29s negated this at any rate.