Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

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Although the B-29 is clearly not a Failure, I don't think it was necessary a success either. The B-29 was used extremely little in its intended role as a high altitude bomber. In the Pacific it was used mostly at low altitudes. In addition, I saw earlier a mention of the Norden Bomb Sight, but the Norden was plagued with problems, falsified test results, and was ridiculously expensive. LordHardThrasher explains the sight in his video on the bomb sight, and it sums it up in a more accurate and concise way than I could from memory. (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct...usg=AOvVaw10Q7s1rc00NK0BB3NwFTjx&opi=89978449)

The one main success of the B-29 in any role unique to it was only accomplished through the Modified Silverplate B-29s. People got very off topic earlier in the discussion, but really the B-29 wasn't extremely successful. It only stayed in service in the B-50 because of USAF's Top brass's dogmatic refusal to use the B47 or B36.
And even still, just because the B-29 was modified into the war ender in the pacific doesn't mean IT was a success. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a success of the Manhattan Project, not the ridiculously expensive and poorly utilized B-29.
To sum it up, The B-29 might have been the "most advanced" or "highest flying" but these advantages were underutilized, and then it is praised for the success of a less expensive and more historically impactful arms project, the Atom Bomb.

-Stannum
 
The Stannum Crusader said:
I'm not trying to put all the blame on the designers, but wouldn't it make sense to test how air works at high atlitudes before making designing something for that air?
Click to expand...

Winds don't behave the same way at the same altitude in different places of the world. USAAF assumed that the wing at 25,000 foot over Japan would behave the same as wind at 25,000 foot over Germany.

None of that undercuts the quality of the plane.
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
I'm not sure that ignorance of the jet stream should be laid at the feet of the B-29's designers.
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Jet stream was known. I posted this a little

Was the B-29 Superfortress a Failure?

You say it yourself:it was designed to do a job it couldnt do. Whatever the reason behind it. And a generation behind a Lancaster did not help the german cities very much. Now i am not ill mouthing the Superfort for a minute here. For the jetstream thing: jetstreams could, no should have been...
ww2aircraft.net
 

But was it known where the B-29 was used? Was the USAAF aware of Japanese jet streams? No.
 
Thumpalumpacus said:
But was it known where the B-29 was used? Was the USAAF aware of Japanese jet streams? No.
Click to expand...
They should have been. The knew what and in what region it was designed for.

The most costly project in the war en they did not ask a junior metrologist with a bit of knowledge to examine. For a project outspending the Manhatten project by considerable margin..

Besides that. Not performing or not being able for what is is designed to do what would you call that?

I have a dishwasher that does not wash dishes but does a goed job on laundry. It was designed to do 1 specific job. Washing dishes. Thats what bought it for.
 
The B-29 was planned to not only replace the B-17, but as a means to attack continental Europe in the event that Britain fell to Germany.

This concept was put forth before the U.S. was even at war.

As far as the "Jet Stream" goes (which was named by the Germans in1939, btw), it was known that such an event existed, but little was known about it's height, speed and behavior before 1940.

Even the Japanese, who were aware of it, didn't understand it well enough during Operation Fu-Go, which failed because the Jet Stream's favorable position was during Winter, when the U.S.'s Pacific Northwest was wet and not prone to fire.
 
The world was aware there could be strong winds in the upper atmosphere from the study of the Krakatoa eruption in 1883, pre WWII aviation confirmed this, wartime experience showed there could be strong winds aloft even at 20,000 feet or lower. What people did not know were the key details, like variable, seasonal, perennial, range of speeds, courses, heights, width, depth, connection to surface conditions and so on. To switch topics for the moment there was at least one wartime conference about radio in the tropics, what were the best frequencies, how they varied over the course of a day or year etc., most radio experience to 1939 was in the Northern Hemisphere temperate regions. WWII taught a lot of non military lessons. One late war bombing raid on eastern Germany managed to fly around a pressure system, largely giving the bombers a tail wind to and from the target, early in the war new weather effects were regularly logged.

The B-29 did not make it into combat service until June 1944 and even that meant not enough time to sort out problems new designs come with. In particular the engines. Entry into service required using it from India, so each bombing operation required three sorties, all with quick climbs, India to China, China to target, China to India. Operations out of the Mariana Islands started in November 1944. Operations over Japan did not have escorts until end May 1945. Like the other bombing campaigns it was very end loaded, operations from India ended in March 1945, 3,058 sorties airborne in 10 months, in April 1945 there were 3,497 sorties airborne, half way point for sorties flown was end May 1945, so the final 2.5 months of a 15.5 month campaign had just under half the 31,387 sorties airborne.

The evidence collected mostly during 1944 would have shown the B-29 mission of big formation high altitude visual day bombing had serious flaws, starting with the average bombing error went up faster than altitude did. The USSBS notes for 3 combat boxes the average error was 570 feet dropping from 10,000 feet, increasing to 830 feet at 20,000 feet to 1,605 feet at 29,000 feet. Fly at 10,000 feet and attack with 12 combat boxes and the average error was 760 feet, or the equivalent of 3 boxes attacking from around 18,000 feet. The altitude errors meant at 10,000 feet there was around a 200 foot difference between the results of the smallest formations and the largest, around a third more, at 29,000 feet the difference was around 100 feet, around 6% more. These of course are the results for visual bombing, other methods produced larger errors.

What is meant by the B-29, just the airframe? Like the Avro Manchester was considered a good airframe? Or is it the mission the airframe was originally specified to do, massed high altitude day visual bombing? The blind bombing system deployed on the B-29 was considered more accurate than H2X used in Europe.

B-29 success was compromised by the shortened development cycle, the initial bases, the distances from base to targets, the long warning times the Japanese usually had, the lack of fighter escorts, trying for higher bombing altitudes, the average weight of the HE bombs dropped (for both explosive effect and drift while falling), how late the campaign ramped up and the seemingly perennial high speed winds over Japan.

The B-29 mining operations are considered quite successful. The dropping of leaflets warning of an upcoming raid, then carrying out the raid was also successful. The bomb damage to the Japanese aviation industry had less effect than the disruption caused by dispersing production due to the threat of bombing. Does the B-29 deserve credit for being the threat?

There does not seem to have been any major problems with the B-29 airframe, the engines improved in 1945. The use of the B-29 became more effective as experience built up and more support, like escorts, became available. When it entered combat and in what state of development and in what numbers put severe limits on what it could achieve in WWII.

The USAAF Statistical digest tables 192 to 194 give details of B-29 operations, like XXI Bomber Command bombing raids, 3,545 sorties (1,855 in March 1945) attacked from less than 8,000 feet, 8,435 sorties from 8 to 15,000 feet, 10,204 sorties from 15 to 25,000 feet and 932 from over 25,000 feet (all by end February 1945). Monthly April to August 1945 average bombing altitude varied from 12,500 to 17,100 feet. The ability to fly over 25,000 feet was not used after February 1945 except for reconnaissance versions, at the same time the B-29 was not "mostly used" at low altitude. XXI bomber Command managed 50% visual attacks on primary targets, 30% non visual. As well as the bombing, there were 1,610 mining sorties.

If you consider the B-29 expensive consider the price of the B-36 or the B-47. B-50 production ended in Q4/1950, the first B-47A flew in June 1950, there were 10 built, first B-47B flown in April 1951.
 
Invariably, the second to the table reaps the richest rewards.
1 - I'm old enough to have traveled the country and crossed the Pacific in '48 in an unpressurized C-54/DC-4 and C-47s/DC-3s. Remember NO mass production pressurized large cabin preceded the B-29, and that alone made travel without the triggering stench of air sickness possible. (Note the B-32 gave up on pressurization early due to complexity)
2 - Recips had reached the end of their development range, and making the R3350 the reliable standard for two decades should be recognized, as well as nudging the often stalled and pushed aside development of turbines.
Those two points alone make the B-29 a corner turning success.

I find the jet stream discussion a laughable collection of information tidbits that are given the weight of "everyone shoulda known" as in those days of meteorology being a tiny field of study, with even worldwide AG government agencies relying on Farmer Almanac type record patterns. We were missing satellites, internet, and oceanographic impact.
Forecasting without mid ocean (all major seas!!!) observations was one step above Ouija Board science. Contrast with the D-Day weather risks, and a much smaller ocean.
 
Those are legitimately great reasons! I can't argue. But I can say that although massive successes were learned through the B-29, the purpose was to be a bomber, and I Think Boeing had already made a pressurized cabin passenger plane by then (as well as the Lockheed Constellation hubba hubba) but yes, the experience gained through the project was probably invaluable to some, but pressurized cabins weren't new.
-Stannum
 
The Boeing 307 had flown at the very end of 1938 and entered service in 1940.

Boeing 307 Stratoliner - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

But the Connie first flew in early Jan 1943, just over 3 months after the B-29.

The B-29 fuselage had 3 separate pressurised sections, the nose section forward of the bomb bay and the central fire control compartment aft of the bomb bay, which were linked by the pressurised tunnel, and finally the tail gunners compartment right aft.

I think everyone played around with pressurised aircraft in the early part of WW2. The Luftwaffe with Ju 86 variants. The RAF with the Wellington V/VI. At the bottom of this link you can see how the pressurised compartment was set into the geodetic aircraft structure.

View: https://dieselfutures.tumblr.com/post/183288231947/vickers-wellington-mk-v-vi-high-altitude
 
The best thing to come out of that project was the two stage Merlin engine.
 
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