Was the self defending bomber really a failure? (1 Viewer)

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But you can't just call both 'discredited' as if equally. Plenty of evidence shows bomber credits were much more overstated than fighter credits. Enemy fighter losses to US bombers in WWII era were usually in range of 5-25% of the bomber 'destroyed' credits; enemy losses to US fighters generally in range of 25-75% of fighter 'destroyed' credits.

In early Pacific it's often easy to see bomber results v Japanese fighters without US fighters around, and with quite complete and detailed Japanese records, and you're talking single digit to 10% accuracy of credits or claims (it wasn't so formal then) by USAAF bombers. For USAAF fighters v Japanse fighters the USAAF claims were like 25-30% accurate.

In late ETO it seemed that USAAF fighter claim accuracy had improved substantially, as high as maybe 75% but no apparent major increase in bomber claim accuracy. But it's very hard to count comprehensively in the ETO, it was so large and some many overlapping combats involving fighters and bombers. In the Korean War it's again easy to count and B-29 claims were around 10% accurate, F-86 claims around 75% accurate. B-29 claims over Japan in unescorted raids were more like 25% accurate, but that was with 'advantage' of suicide rammer fighters whose destruction was obvious.

In USAAF stats digest I added up USAAF fighter credits in ETO/MTO as 9398, heavy bomber credits as 9276, virtually the same, so a reasonably estimate would be that US fighters actually downed several times as many Axis a/c as US bombers did in those theaters, and it would be similar for Pacific, attrition of Axis fighter forces was by US (and other Allied) fighters, not bombers by and large.

Joe
 
20/20 hindsight builds the most suitable equipment. My Pop was a B-17, P-47 and P-51 pilot, in that order. For reasons of mission requirements, the airplanes and their suitability to them, he had various likes and dislikes for each airplane.

He never understood why Boeing didn't increase the load capacity of the B-17 to make it a more effective bomber. In the event a few bombers actually hit their intended targets, which was more of an occasion than a rule, the extra tonnage on-target would speak for itself. He didn't completely agree that the defensive armament was justifiable, considering the afore-mentioned, where a crew of 10 men (and their possible loss) ruled in favor of a more effective offensive weapon. He said the trade-off between a greater bomb load vs a large crew and defensive weapons seemed short-sighted. He often cited his own gun crew's inability to hit the broad side of a barn from inside it. He went on to mention that he and his co-pilot could have done the nav/radio operator's jobs. Conversely, he talked about other pilots who wanted as many engines and gunners as they could get on one airplane to ensure their own chances of survival. So, it would seem there was a conflict between those who wanted a weapon that would knock out a target on one trip vs those who preferred to sacrifice effectiveness for personal safety. Which one serves the best interest of shortening a conflict seems obvious.
He thought the B-17 was a good airplane but short on effectiveness. Actually, he called it either a transport, or a bomber depending on whether they hit the target or not. Oh yea, he also said he froze his assets off in that plane and they could have made provisions for some creature comforts.
 
Even though I would defend the reasoning of the heavy bomber as a concept, I do agree that the fast light attack bomber might be a better option. Though this doesnt prove anything, consider this......a B-17, with a crew of ten, and four engines , can deliver 8000 lbs of bombs, and might shoot down an enemy aircraft if its lucky. I forget the loss ratio for an unescorted B-17 raidbut it was not uncommon to lose 8-10% of the force in a single raid. The raids on Schweinfurt lost 60 bombers out of 240 despatched from memory. I dont know the speed of a B-17 fully loaded, but its going to be well below 300 knots....say 280 knots (Ill stand corrected when someone who does know speaks up)

Now compare that to the much discussed Mosquito Bomber, two engines, two crew and a bombload to Berlin of 4000 lbs, no armament, more lightky built than a B-17, and a loaded speed exceeding 370 knots. There will be no bomber related kills, but conversely there will be roughly 2.5 Mosquitoes flying for every 1 B-17, and more to the point the attrition rate for the bomber force would drop from an average of about 5% per raid, to just over 2% per raid....this is importatnt, because it means the strike force would expand 2.5 times faster than with a classic heavy bomber inventory.....the US would have commenced its offensive in August 1943 with about 1200 twins instead of the 400 (roughly) Heavies that she did start the battle with. Moreover, by all accounts the Mosquito was a precision bomber, with a high percentage of hits on target.

The problem with high speed bomber concept, is that it can be made radpidly obsolete by simply increasing the speed of the defending fighters, transforming those high speed Mosquito types into the flying targets like the Blenheim in a short space of time
 

Substituting defensive guns for more bombload i can agree with. For more altitude? No, the altitude was already too. ensure decent hit probability.

Still, if the former is considered, I would ask was the amount of bombs dropped ever considered too low? There's two possibilities to increase bombload: More planes or more offensive load per plane. Clearly the US seemed to favor increasing the number of planes. Some individual crews may see their plane's load as too low, but the question really is, was the combined bombload of the attacking force sufficient.

Regarding a substitution for light fast bombers such as the Mosquito. I like the concept of the fast bomber and I like the Mosquito as a plane. But its advantage of being hard to detect would be compromised if you send in huge numbers. Germans would also adjust their defenses and so on.
 
Forgive me if I have misread the arguments here but I think it is being argued that guns should be deleted on heavy bombers?

I think for a comparison you could do worse than compare the Lancaster to the Lancastrian. With all guns removed and streamlined fairings over the nose and tail to disguise it as a proper transport it was still slower than a mk 1 Hurricane, I don't think this would been a good idea for the bomber force. I think Parsifals Mosquito idea works much better, until the Do 335 and Me 262 appear. DH did design a Jet Mosquito though so as a what if scenario this may have been produced if the demand was great enough
 
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The self defending bomber concept was a failure.

The Idea started in the 20s-30s as a theory and was reinforced by some war games with unrealistic conditions.

When the interceptors were armed with a pair of rifle caliber machine guns they had trouble inflicting damage on the target aircraft. When each bomber gunner station had either a single or TWIN rifle caliber machine gun it looked like the bomber could carry firepower equal to the interceptors. This disregards the difficulty of accurately aiming a a manually powered gun mounting in a moving plane.

In some cases in the early-mid 30s the bombers were as fast or faster than the fighters which also argued in favor of the bombers.

When the fighters began to be armed with 4 machine guns or better the problem of fitting enough machine guns in any one gun position on the bomber began to rear it's head. And the idea of comparing a single bomber to a single fighter seems to occupied peoples minds rather than multiple fighters engaging a single bomber or just the bombers on on side of a formation.

The power turret upped the bombers firepower, both in accuracy and in the number/size of the weapons one gunner could control but by this time the better fighters were carrying 6-12 rifle caliber machine guns, or 4-8 heavy machine guns or multiple cannon. The fire power advantage not only stayed with the fighters, it was increasing.

Couple the fire power advantage with the increasing performance advantage of the fighters and the overall defensive advantage of early warning systems (radar vrs binoculars and sound listing devices) to vector interceptors onto incoming raids with more economy of force than in the early 30s and the whole idea of unescorted self defending bombers starts to fall apart.
 
A bunch of things flawed there.

Do the math to and from target (England to Berlin). You have to factor in weather conditions, fuel burn and time over target to determine if the Mossie could carry 4000 pounds to Berlin. In a strategic role you're stretching the performance and range of the aircraft. In any one of the heavies including the B-17, there was "wiggle room" with regards to bomb load and performance based on weather conditions. Additionally how are you going to deploy your bombs? Drop them at high altitude in a mass formation? Being unarmed you're still setting yourself up for intercept and I don't think any crew would want to be in an unarmed bomber. Go low and you'll have to contend with flack.

A B-17 could take a 6,000 pound bomb load 2500 miles. I think you'll find most Mosquitoes carried a 2000 pound bomb load (the b MK IV). Even with 4000 pounds of bombs you're still looking at 1500 miles max.

The Mosquito was a great tactical weapon but its roles as a strategic bomber is questionable for a number of reasons.
 
Parsifal 280 knts (~520 km/h) are far away from cruise speed maybe you want talk of miles? (and 280 mph (~450 km/h) for cruise it's high )

p.s. also the 370 kntos (~685 km/h) for loaded Mosquito it's too high (and loaded with a 4000 lbs cookie!)
 
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The usual load of the BIV was 2000 lbs when bombing Berlin, which they did quite regularly. Later Bomber Command deemed the BIVs were best used as Pathfinders, due to their exceptionally low loss rates and high speed. Not all BIVs were so converted

With a 907 KG Bombload, the BIV had a listed range of 1960 km. Carrying that load the type could still travel in excess of 350mph. Later the principal Bomber was the BVI, with an extra 500HP per engine (roughly), the types performance increased to a range of 2390 KM with a bombload of 1814 kg, with a top speed of of around 370 mph (with the bom strapped in) and a cruising speed of 260 mph.

Mosquitoes were used across the whole spectrum of the range, Long range Fighter bomber, Night Fighter, precision strategic bomber, Pathfinder, Tactical Bomber, to name just some....to put it into the category of "Tactical Bomber" is to deny the type of one of its greatest strengths....as far as accuracy goes, I would say it was one of the most accurate bombers in the inventory, judging by its role as a ppathfinder, and as a point attack bomber. To say it was questionable as a strategic bomber is akin to ordering the tide to change.....its a historical fact they were used as straight strategic bombers...not enough to make much difference, but strategically (in the usual sense) nevertheless. It couldnt flatten whole city blocks like a B-17 formation, but then it didnt need to.....it could hit the target more accurately (by all accounts) and therefore could achieve surgically what the Heavies needed to do with sheer brute force.

I dont get the argtument about their vulnerability, to be honest. From all that Ive read, they boasted the lowest loss rate of any type in BC, despite being given some of the toughest assignements, and often operating unescorted by day, in skies infested with enemy fighters.....I dont understnad how you can say they were vulnerable based on that sort of record to be honest....
 

It wasn't (at least for US) until the B-29 arrived with all computing gunsights AND higher cruise speed and great altitude that the defensive firepower became a significant factor - but the 29 switched to night and low/medium level and the question became moot.

I agree with you primary points and all of Shortround's..

In 1935-1938 the B-17 was cabable of defense against the typical fighter in other nation's inventories... it lost that advantage with Me 109F and beyond performance fighters and tactics evolved to reduce the ability of many bombers to concentrate fire on few fighters.

I question any bomber's ability to defend itself against front line fighters in 1943 to the end of the war.. the Mosquito could make interception difficult but one a firing solution was achieved it was mostly toast.

Two choices for strategic bombing - daylight with escort(capable escort) or night in confusing streams and each had its limitations relative to precision and efficiency.
 

The Mosquito did go in low and successfully attack targets in daylight (see "Low Attack" covering operations by 105 and 139 Sqns) despite flak - the German gunners simply didn't have time to react to a fleeting target coming in at low level.

B-17 could carry a greater bomb load but how many of those bombs actually hit the target? Post war studies indicate that 90% of bombs dropped failed to get within (if memory serves) 10 miles of the target. The whole concept of low-level Mosquito operations was to place the bombs on target with a reasonable degree of precision - certainly greater than could be achieved from medium or high altitudes, even despite the much-vaunted Norden bomb sight.
 
All good, but if nothing but Mosquitoes fulfilled the daylight strategic bomber campaign you're still suffering losses and you're still not carrying the bomb load of the B-17 and especially the B-24 to Berlin

Do you statistics to back that up????
You made my point. The strategic concept was to flatten city blocks, factories etc. As far as a precision strike, the Mossie was the perfect weapon.
They had very low losses but they were not invincible. Do you think a pathfinder force operating at altitude in the daylight would have fared any better on a bombing run through flack while waiting for the lead plane to acquire target and then giving the order to release bombs? They would have presented a smaller target, but I doubt the crews would have had any comfort knowing that for 30 or 40 seconds they had to just "sit there" in their "hot rod" while it lumbered along at 180 knots (the speed required for a precision drop) through a field of flack.
 
I think the figure is closer to 60%.

There is no doubt about the effectivness of the Mossie at low level, but you were putting one or two bombs on one or two targets of a given size. What happens when you want to flatten a factory that stretches a mile or two or 10 city blocks?
 
The typical bomb load to Berlin was less than 5000lb.

Berlin on 9 March 1944, 361 B-17s despatched, 332 credited
with attacking, average bomb load 4,630 pounds.

Berlin on 22 March 1944, 474 B-17s and 214 B-24s despatched
621 bombers credited with attacking Berlin, average bomb load
4,425 pounds (around 80 bombers attacked other targets, including
32 the Berlin/Basdorf industrial area)

Berlin on 29 April 1944, 446 B-17s and 233 B-24s despatched,
581 bombers credited with attacking Berlin, average bomb load
4,900 pounds.

Berlin on 7 May 1944, 600 B-17s despatched, 525 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load 4,810 pounds. The
B-24s sent to Osnabruck average bomb load 5,435 pounds.

Berlin on 8 May 1944, 500 B-17s despatched, 384 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load 4,765 pounds. The
B-24s sent to Brunswick average bomb load 4,790 pounds.

Berlin on 19 May 1944, 588 B-17s despatched, 493 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load 4,325 pounds. The
B-24s sent to Brunswick average bomb load 5,710 pounds,
or around 1,000 pounds more than 11 days earlier.

Berlin on 24 May 1944, 616 B-17s despatched, 459 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load 4,500 pounds.

Berlin on 21 June 1944, 866 B-17s and 366 B-24s despatched,
to many targets, 560 bombers credited with attacking Berlin,
average bomb load 4,900 pounds.

Berlin on 3 February 1945, 1,093 B-17s despatched, 934 credited
with attacking Berlin, average bomb load 4,890 pounds
 
Trying to compare an aircraft like the Mossie to the B-17 to me is trivial. Why? They were two different kinds of aircraft for two different kinds of missions. In my opinion, Joe has it right here.
 
BOMBING ACCURACY
With less than 5/10ths cloud coverage an average B-17 Group could be expected to place 32.4% of its bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point when aiming visually.

The average B-24 Group under the same conditions could be expected to place 30.4% of its bombs within 1000 feet of the aiming point.

One box of bombers could contain from 3 to 18 planes. Formations with a three plane frontage could be expected to be 45% more accurate than formations with a nine plane frontage. A six bomber front would be only about 10% more accurate than a 9 bomber front.

The percentage of boxes which could be expected to place at least 10% of their load within 1000 feet of the aiming point depends upon how many other boxes passed over the target beforehand.

ORDER OF BOXES PERCENTAGE
1st 82%
2nd 60%
3rd 48%
4th 47%
5th 30%
 

I stated that incorrectly. I didn't intend to imply that the "discredit" was equal. Confirmation criteria was much more difficult for the fighters, and more trustworthy.

However, at 25%, this would account for 2319 fighters shot down which would not have happened if the planes were unarmed. Not a a insubstantial number.
 
FLYBOYJ said:
There is no doubt about the effectivness of the Mossie at low level, but you were putting one or two bombs on one or two targets of a given size. What happens when you want to flatten a factory that stretches a mile or two or 10 city blocks?
Click to expand...


Send more Mossies. Completly destroying factories isnt very economical. Laying waste to key components will do the job quite nicely. Like cruise missile strikes

However. Strategy chosen was what it was. Formed on the idea of the 30's they went for it and only tweaked it a bit to get to victory.
 

The problem is that "officially" bombers were aiming at strategic facilities (factories, railyards etc) that were pinpoint targets but lack of accuracy and precision meant, inevitably, bombs were splattered all over the countryside/conurbation.

Your quote of 60% may be more accurate than my memory (which gets worse with each passing year...oooops! Another one just went by - say goodbye to more brain cells). However, I'd like to see the source, per another post, for the claim that 30% of a bomb group's munitions would land within 1000ft of a target. Sorry, but I just don't buy those figures given that the entire group would drop in unison when the lead bomb aimer dropped his load. There is a compression problem here in getting the aircraft close enough together to ensure the bombs hit the target (unless your target is the entire metropolitan Berlin area).

I think the discussion has diverged slightly from the merits, or otherwise, of self-protection for bombers into the broader topic of strategic bombers -vs- tactical bombers (because, in the 1940s, this equated to defended -vs- undefended aircraft). Inevitably, strategic bombing in total war meant flattening anything that contributed to the enemy's war effort, and this happened to align quite neatly with the inability of 1940s technology to achieve the required levels of precision and accuracy. However, in terms of delivering a combat effect, the "drop and hope" strategic bombing offensive was very costly in terms of personnel and aircraft lost, bombs wasted being thrown into fields, and collateral damage inflicted on areas surrounding "targets".

However, the ultimate question (on this thread) is not about how many bombs an aircraft could carry (B-17 or Mosquito), but rather whether the concept of the self-defending bomber fighting its way to and from a target was a success or failure. Based on evidence, the answer has to be a failure.
 
Snautzer01 said:
Send more Mossies. Completly destroying factories isnt very economical. Laying waste to key components will do the job quite nicely. Like cruise missile strikes.
Click to expand...
Even with the use of a precision bomber like the Mossie, you didn't have the luxury to destroy "key components." The only way to get to a major target was to ensure total and utter destruction.

buffnut453 said:
The problem is that "officially" bombers were aiming at strategic facilities (factories, railyards etc) that were pinpoint targets but lack of accuracy and precision meant, inevitably, bombs were splattered all over the countryside/conurbation.
Click to expand...
They did, but how big do you think factories and railyards are? read below...



And toward the end of the war that's exactly what many of the raids were doing. I think you fail to realize how much land an aircraft factory or an oil refinery makes up. Additionally you have to remember that sometimes targets were hit in waves to ensure total destruction of the target. The flight of bombers would be adjusted to ensure that bombs from all flights within the formation put their bombs on the target, or so that was the plan.
buffnut453 said:
Based on evidence, the answer has to be a failure.
Click to expand...

In the end I'd have to agree.
 
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