Was timely Martlet license production possible?

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The reported top speed of the F3F was 264 mph, that of the Roc, 228 mph. The Skua is listed (Blackburn B-24 Skua | BAE Systems | International) as 225 mph in fighter configuration. The Roc is listed at 223 mph from Blackburn B-25 Roc | BAE Systems | International. Since it heavier than the Skua, with the same engine, I would expect it to be slower than the Skua. It compares rather badly with the F3F.

F3F-2 = 260mph at 17250ft
F3F-3 = 264 at 15200ft (data from Francillion)
What was the F3F-3's speed at ~7000ft? Might be a bit slower than at it's rated altitude?

The bulk of F3F production comprised the slightly slower F3F-2. There were only 28 F3F-3s built, and they were all delivered in late 1938 to mid 1939.

When fitted with the same prop the Roc had a nearly identical speed to the Skua (but the Skua was carrying a 500lb bomb).
 
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From where?
Before 1940 Carriers were assumed to operate beyond "reasonable" range of land based air power, which is perhaps a hundred or so miles* at best.
*Even assuming that a land based force could locate the carrier, then assemble and launch a strike.

The second sentence quoted assumes that enemy side is staffed by idiots.
The British bombers of the time were with range of 15+ times the 100 miles distance, so let's assume that enemy side is not just staffed by idiots, but assume the same for their design offices at aircraft-making companies?
 
The F3F compares fairly closely with the 253mph Gloster Gladiator which entered service in 1937.
The Skua was designed to be able to dive bomb, not as a pure fighter.

I'm referring to the Roc, not the Skua. According to the BAe website, the Roc was slower than the Skua when the latter was in fighter configuration, and both were 30+ mph slower than the Gladiator. While the Skua was primarily a dive bomber, the Roc was a fighter which was slower than the dive bomber serving alongside it in the same service and significantly slower than contemporary carrier-based biplane fighters.
 
The second sentence quoted assumes that enemy side is staffed by idiots.
The British bombers of the time were with range of 15+ times the 100 miles distance, so let's assume that enemy side is not just staffed by idiots, but assume the same for their design offices at aircraft-making companies?

As I stated the Skua was reasonably successful against Lufwaffe bombers and it even shot down a number of Ju88s.
 
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As I stated the Skua was reasonably successful against Lufwaffe bomber and it even shot down a number of Ju88s.

That shows that notion that RN cannot be possibly a target of the enemy bomber attack coming from land bases, as stated in post #79, was wrong.
 
I'm referring to the Roc, not the Skua. According to the BAe website, the Roc was slower than the Skua when the latter was in fighter configuration, and both were 30+ mph slower than the Gladiator. While the Skua was primarily a dive bomber, the Roc was a fighter which was slower than the dive bomber serving alongside it in the same service and significantly slower than contemporary carrier-based biplane fighters.

Naval combat typically occurred at lower altitude, often at the 8000ft level:

"I have done no fighting above 14,000 feet. It's been as close as 25 feet off the water. The average, I would say is in the neighbourhood of 8,000. I don't say that won't change, however, but I believe that the majority of it for some time to come will be below 20 000 feet." (Jimmy Thach interview 26 August 1942)

Hence the optimization of FAA aircraft for low altitude performance.
 
That shows that notion that RN cannot be possibly a target of the enemy bomber attack coming from land bases, as stated in post #79, was wrong.

I think the staff assumptions were that the bombers would not have a single seat fighter escort, and that any bombing attack would have to be preceded by recon flights. I don't think there was an assumption that bombers couldn't reach the fleet.
 
F3F-2 = 260mph at 17250ft
F3F-3 = 264 at 15200ft (data from Francillion)
What was the F3F-3's speed at ~7000ft? Might be a bit slower than at it's rated altitude?

The bulk of F3F production comprised the slightly slower F3F-2. There were only 28 F3F-3s built, and they were all delivered in late 1938 to mid 1939.

When fitted with the same prop the Roc had a nearly identical speed to the Skua (but the Skua was carrying a 500lb bomb).

As I wrote earlier, the BAe site listed the speed of the Skua in fighter configuration as 225 mph, and the Roc, no configuration given, as 223 mph.
 
I believe on the Skua the bomb was semi recessed, I don't know if this helped or hurt.

The other fighters are more than likely slower at 6000ft and under than at their rated altitudes. However the A5Ms rated altitude was only about 3000ft higher than the Skua's and that doesn't seem like enough difference to get rid of 40-50mph.
The Grumman F3Fs at least the -2 & -3 had tow rated altitudes as they had two speed superchargers, I have no doubt they were slower low down but they did have about an extra 100hp at the lower critical altitude than they did had the higher one. In fact the engine in the Grumman was rated at 850hp max continuous in low gear at 6000ft. If the pilot pushed for military or take-off power he might have an extra 100hp above that for a few minutes. Climb is about 50% better or more over the Skua even if the speeds are closer than the book figures appear.
 
I believe on the Skua the bomb was semi recessed, I don't know if this helped or hurt.

The other fighters are more than likely slower at 6000ft and under than at their rated altitudes. However the A5Ms rated altitude was only about 3000ft higher than the Skua's and that doesn't seem like enough difference to get rid of 40-50mph.
The Grumman F3Fs at least the -2 & -3 had tow rated altitudes as they had two speed superchargers, I have no doubt they were slower low down but they did have about an extra 100hp at the lower critical altitude than they did had the higher one. In fact the engine in the Grumman was rated at 850hp max continuous in low gear at 6000ft. If the pilot pushed for military or take-off power he might have an extra 100hp above that for a few minutes. Climb is about 50% better or more over the Skua even if the speeds are closer than the book figures appear.

We have the Skua at a probable ~230mph at ~7000ft. The F3F/A5M might be 20/30 mph faster, but we do have to consider their lesser armament and lack of folding wings. On the whole, the Skua is probably the more effective aircraft as a fleet defender (rather than a pure fighter), especially given it's versatility.

Also early war and pre-war USN stats have sometimes proven to be 'sexed up' and in service they could not meet their stated performance.
 
At 7,500 ft, the F3F-1 was reported capable of 231 mph (Grumman F3F) on 650 hp. I would be surprised if the F3F-2 and F3F-3, with 950 hp, were not somewhat faster.
 
The British seemed to have had an inordinate fondness for turreted fighters.

They did, and it didn't end with the Defiant either. In late 1940 a night fighter spec F.18/40 was altered to produce a turretted replacement for the Defiant. The spec went unfulfilled and De Havilland even built two turret fighter Mosquitoes and Bristol a turret armed Beaufighter, which was going to go into production, but was found to be slower than the Defiant. The fixed gun Mosquito became the answer, not before time, rather than the turreted night fighter.

It wasn't so much turret fighters as a concept that the Brits were oddly fascinated with, but the perceived advantage that the power turret offered air gunnery. In the mid 30s, the Brits requested that most new specifications for modern aircraft be fitted with the turret and indeed transports, bombers, flying boats and fighters wetre planned to have them because what they thought the turret could offer.

The turret fighter was a peculiar beast in that it was intended as a bomber destroyer, for operating against massed formations of bombers to break them up, while the single-seat fighters would go after the stragglers, so the two methods were to operate together. Set-piece manoeuvres were discussed, but WW2 put paid to any semblance of this rather staid way of looking at combat through an operations manual.

Why the navy insisted in the Roc is just weird; there was no real need for a turret fighter in the navy's playbook. There was probably some of that "well, since the RAF has one, we should too" going on. The Blackburn airframe was known to be slow even at operational training level and young trainee naval pilots gawped at these lumbering monstrosities the FAA had lined their ranks with.

Building the Roc as a turret fighter was a bad idea rather than building more Skuas,

Why not let BP run with their original idea of an interim front gun single-seat Defiant as a stop gap? Would have at least given the FAA a reasonable fighter, if not a high performing one? I fear politics enters into this one. BP had no experience at designing naval aircraft, whereas Blackburn had a long history of doing so and had positioned itself as the pre-eminent supplier of naval aircraft, aside from those damn Fairey splitters at Hayes...
 
On the whole, the Skua is probably the more effective aircraft as a fleet defender (rather than a pure fighter), especially given it's versatility.
I have to give the Skua some credit; when introduced in 1938 it was the first monoplane carrier dive bomber (two years before the SBD and Aichi D3A) and the first dive bomber with folding wings and retractible undercarriage. As a fleet fighter, in 1940 the competition was the FAA's own Sea Gladiator, plus the Grumman F3F and Mitsubishi A5M.
 
I have to give the Skua some credit; when introduced in 1938 it was the first monoplane carrier dive bomber (two years before the SBD and Aichi D3A) and the first dive bomber with folding wings and retractible undercarriage.

This is true, just like the FAA making decent work with ther Fulmar, although both types can very much be put in the category of you go to war with what you've got, not what you want. Mind you, the Skua was subject to that prevalent between the wars FAA requirement that its multi-seat aircraft should be multi-role. Oddly, only single-seaters had one specific role in the FAA.
 
This is true, just like the FAA making decent work with ther Fulmar, although both types can very much be put in the category of you go to war with what you've got, not what you want. Mind you, the Skua was subject to that prevalent between the wars FAA requirement that its multi-seat aircraft should be multi-role. Oddly, only single-seaters had one specific role in the FAA.
Outside of the Flycatcher, I believe every single-seat fighter that made it into regular FAA service (sorry Firebrand) until the Supermarine Attacker was based on a RAF model. Following in this tradition, when the Fury/Nimrod was replaced in both RAF and FAA service by the Gladiator, the next follow-on should have been the Hurricane for both services. It's hard not to think that some idiot in FAA procurement decided that "sharing RAF types just won't do anymore and we want something special just for us". If you're going to make something special, then license-build the Martlet or a Super Goblin.

The FAA would have done very well with the Sea Hurricane from the onset. Then the Skua could have been made as a pure dive bomber, likely with twice the bombload.
 
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I have to give the Skua some credit; when introduced in 1938 it was the first monoplane carrier dive bomber (two years before the SBD and Aichi D3A)
Not quite true. Northrop BT-1
NorthropBT_Oct1941_Miami.jpg

first flew in 1935, entered squadron service in 1938, I don't know what month. Only 55 built, it didn't handle very well but it did lead to the Dauntless.
 
the next follow-on should have been the Hurricane for both services.

The Sea-Hurricane was only ever intended as a stop-gap and in fact the first Hurris to go to sea were first operated by RAF crews, then FAA guys. These were the catapult fighters aboard CAM ships, although the Hurris were initially weary Mk.Is that had seen previous RAF squadron use. The FAA undertook trials with the Hurri as an interim carrier fighter simultaneously to the RAF unit training at Speke (overseen by the brilliant Louis Strange).

The Navy's idea was initially Sea-Spitfires.
 
The Sea-Hurricane was only ever intended as a stop-gap...The Navy's idea was initially Sea-Spitfires.
And given the tradition of shared fighter types from the Flycatcher onwards that makes total sense.... Nimrod/Fury to Sea Gladiator to Sea Hurricane to Sea Spitfire.

Why did the FAA divert from this on the Fulmar and Firefly? The Martlet's widespread use demonstrated what the FAA needed and that this two-seater divergence from shared RAF/FAA types was a dead-end. Not that the short ranged and weak kneed Seafire was ideal.
 
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Why did the FAA divert from this on the Fulmar and Firefly?

Change of priorities, I guess. As mentioned, the Fulmar was designed as another interim; a long range reconnaissance fighter designed to be catapulted, and the Firefly became its replacement by default, but even then the machinations behind the specs that produced the Firefly are convoluted and aslo resulted in a single-seat fighter spec, to which the Firebrand was ordered. The Firefly's origins are not so clear cut.

With the specs for the Fulmar and what eventually produced the Firefly the Admiralty went for multi-role fighters for the first time, but realised their mistake and changed their minds and went back to a single-seater requirement, after discussion behind the merits of such a thing compared to the two-seaters they had projected, but keeping a revised two-seater, which became the Firefly.
 
That shows that notion that RN cannot be possibly a target of the enemy bomber attack coming from land bases, as stated in post #79, was wrong.
I think the staff assumptions were that the bombers would not have a single seat fighter escort, and that any bombing attack would have to be preceded by recon flights. I don't think there was an assumption that bombers couldn't reach the fleet.

Thanks RCAFson for explaining my somewhat ambiguous answer. ;)
The RN & FAA weren't expecting to see much action in the Med, as it was well covered from Gibraltar, Cyprus, Malta, Crete, Corsica and French North Africa - and it's mainly a French problem anyways.

Carriers were expected to operate mainly in the North & South Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean, so possibly long range bomber attack as mentioned, but not escorted by high performance single seat fighters.
 

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