Did the medium bombers continue their missions?
Were the heavy bombers grounded or did they divert to less protected targets? Perhaps support the mediums.
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Yes, the bombers did get through but the loss rate was unsustainable and led to the suspension of strategic bombing until the arrival of long range escort fighters.
Did the medium bombers continue their missions?
Were the heavy bombers grounded or did they divert to less protected targets? Perhaps support the mediums.
I think the answer is a bit more nuanced than simply saying that heavy bombers weren't grounded and the workload shifted to medium bombers. Here is how I understand the strategic air campaign in 1943 leading into 1944. (since the many of the members of the forum have better knowledge on this topic, I encourage your corrections)Did the medium bombers continue their missions?
Were the heavy bombers grounded or did they divert to less protected targets? Perhaps support the mediums.
Wow. That's good stuff.I think the answer is a bit more nuanced than simply saying that heavy bombers weren't grounded and the workload shifted to medium bombers. Here is how I understand the strategic air campaign in 1943 leading into 1944. (since the many of the members of the forum have better knowledge on this topic, I encourage your corrections)
1) The opening strategic bombing campaign was built on a theory that heavily armed bomber formations would overwhelm defensive fighter forces and be able to carry out a campaign to cripple a country's war industry and force surrender. As soon as the USAAF had placed a sufficient number of bombers in England they began to test this theory. As the USAAF gained experience executing this campaign there was a transition to ever longer missions that began to leave the umbrella of GB based fighter cover. Ultimately in September/October the 8th Air Force carried out a series of raids in Germany intended to cripple what was seen as a weakness in the industrial supply chain - ball bearing production. These raids were disasters for USAAF with the loss of over 30% of aircraft, including crews as well as additional wounded. Following these raids, the USAAF suspended all raids that exceeded the limits of fighter coverage.
2) Following what was perceived to be a defeat, USAAF reassessed its approach to strategic bombing and used the end of 1943 to:
a. Build infrastructure - Its often forgotten that the growth in USAAF presence in England also included one of the largest building campaigns of the 20th century including a whole string of airfields, fueling depots, repair shops etc to support its efforts.
b. Grow the bomber force
c. Grow the fighter force - especially aircraft capable of escorting the entire duration of an air assault
d. Build competency - This was crucial to the future success of the air campaign. In addition to losses in the face of the Luftwaffe, the air force had to learn how to manage large coordinated air assaults. This was done through a series of raids largely over France that targeted U-Boat pens, French factories contributing to the Nazi war effort, and shipping chokepoints. These were limited objective missions, but were really for building skill in the air and organizational competency.
3) While USAAF was reformulating its strategy and tactics, the Luftwaffe was also studying the air campaign of 1943 and reorganizing itself to better combat future air assaults. This included relocating fighters dedicated to attacking the bomber stream further east out of range of existing escort aircraft. Importantly, the Luftwaffe increased the potency of "bomber destroyers" by adding heavy cannons to several aircraft types. (Me 110, FW 190A) A key point in the LW plan to attacking bomber streams was the expectation that they would not face opposing bomber escorts. (see the chart attached below regarding escort range)
4) Having gained competency and the availability of new aircraft capable of long range escort, USAAF set a new priority, the destruction of the Luftwaffe rather than the destruction of industry. Officially titled Operation Argument, but commonly called "Big Week" the campaign to establish air superiority over Europe was conducted at the end of February 1944 and lasted through March, although the critical dates are 2/20 - 2/25. Anecdotally, I had a relative who was ground support then who called it the Air Corps D-Day. Big Week consisted of a series of raids intended to force the Luftwaffe to engage the bomber stream and more importantly, longer range escort fighters. Earlier in this thread, someone posted kill percentages for Big Week breaking down Mustangs vs Thunderbolts vs Lightings. The relatively higher kill percentage by Mustangs makes sense when you consider that these raids were of a distance where only the Mustang was escorting and the Luftwaffe was flying "bomber destroyers" that had so much added armaments as to lose their ability to dogfight. The Mustang was a huge surprise to the LW and the calculation that you could operate overloaded fighters against bombers without opposition was a major miscalculation.
The success of Big Week then allowed for the combined USAAF/RAF to transition to the Transport Plan and the assault on western Europe in preparation of D-Day.
5) You asked about medium bombers in Europe and from what I can tell, the numbers were fairly limited in GB until late in 1943. It appears from the unit histories that I have been able to track down that the majority of MB's were assigned to the MTO until November/December. Then, in late 1943 and especially in early 1944, there is a huge increase in the number of medium bomber groups based in England. This makes sense as they would have a significant role in the Transport Plan, but not in the strategic bombing campaign. It also makes sense from an infrastructure standpoint as you will also need new air bases for medium bombing groups and you need time to establish that infrastructure.
Thats a long response to give better context to the question about the suspension of heavy bombing in 1943.
View attachment 584794
View attachment 584795
Remember that the P47 - M was the test mule for the Chrysler Hemi Head aircraft engine. In that configuration to ran 504 mph. I am not sure of the feet at which this was done but OMG what a plane. Imagine the compression problems and supersonic propeller issuesAre you sure about those speed numbers davidicus? Didnm't think the Thunderbolt held a candle to the Mustang. Sure is a big plane.
Remember that the P47 - M was the test mule for the Chrysler Hemi Head aircraft engine. In that configuration to ran 504 mph. I am not sure of the feet at which this was done but OMG what a plane. Imagine the compression problems and supersonic propeller issues
It did - slightly, but what is the difference between 8 and 81/2 hours in the cockpit for a combat mission or 1/2 to 45 minutes on a max ferry mission?Agreed
From what I remember the P-47N had more range than all of them...
Good synopsis - couple of comments. The impetus to assign 8th AF top priority for new deployments of P-38 came immediately at the end of Blitz Week - July 1943.. you can trace the beginning of the end to 'The Bomber will always get through' mantra. That date also points to serious discussion among AAF-HQ planners to re-evaluate the new P-51B-1 for consideration to re-allocate from committed TAC deployments to 8th AF. July 1943 also marked the top priority push to install more internal fuel in P-51B, P-38H/J and P-47D.I think the answer is a bit more nuanced than simply saying that heavy bombers weren't grounded and the workload shifted to medium bombers. Here is how I understand the strategic air campaign in 1943 leading into 1944. (since the many of the members of the forum have better knowledge on this topic, I encourage your corrections)
1) The opening strategic bombing campaign was built on a theory that heavily armed bomber formations would overwhelm defensive fighter forces and be able to carry out a campaign to cripple a country's war industry and force surrender. As soon as the USAAF had placed a sufficient number of bombers in England they began to test this theory. As the USAAF gained experience executing this campaign there was a transition to ever longer missions that began to leave the umbrella of GB based fighter cover. Ultimately in September/October the 8th Air Force carried out a series of raids in Germany intended to cripple what was seen as a weakness in the industrial supply chain - ball bearing production. These raids were disasters for USAAF with the loss of over 30% of aircraft, including crews as well as additional wounded. Following these raids, the USAAF suspended all raids that exceeded the limits of fighter coverage.
2) Following what was perceived to be a defeat, USAAF reassessed its approach to strategic bombing and used the end of 1943 to:
a. Build infrastructure - Its often forgotten that the growth in USAAF presence in England also included one of the largest building campaigns of the 20th century including a whole string of airfields, fueling depots, repair shops etc to support its efforts.
b. Grow the bomber force
c. Grow the fighter force - especially aircraft capable of escorting the entire duration of an air assault
d. Build competency - This was crucial to the future success of the air campaign. In addition to losses in the face of the Luftwaffe, the air force had to learn how to manage large coordinated air assaults. This was done through a series of raids largely over France that targeted U-Boat pens, French factories contributing to the Nazi war effort, and shipping chokepoints. These were limited objective missions, but were really for building skill in the air and organizational competency.
3) While USAAF was reformulating its strategy and tactics, the Luftwaffe was also studying the air campaign of 1943 and reorganizing itself to better combat future air assaults. This included relocating fighters dedicated to attacking the bomber stream further east out of range of existing escort aircraft. Importantly, the Luftwaffe increased the potency of "bomber destroyers" by adding heavy cannons to several aircraft types. (Me 110, FW 190A) A key point in the LW plan to attacking bomber streams was the expectation that they would not face opposing bomber escorts. (see the chart attached below regarding escort range)
4) Having gained competency and the availability of new aircraft capable of long range escort, USAAF set a new priority, the destruction of the Luftwaffe rather than the destruction of industry. Officially titled Operation Argument, but commonly called "Big Week" the campaign to establish air superiority over Europe was conducted at the end of February 1944 and lasted through March, although the critical dates are 2/20 - 2/25. Anecdotally, I had a relative who was ground support then who called it the Air Corps D-Day. Big Week consisted of a series of raids intended to force the Luftwaffe to engage the bomber stream and more importantly, longer range escort fighters. Earlier in this thread, someone posted kill percentages for Big Week breaking down Mustangs vs Thunderbolts vs Lightings. The relatively higher kill percentage by Mustangs makes sense when you consider that these raids were of a distance where only the Mustang was escorting and the Luftwaffe was flying "bomber destroyers" that had so much added armaments as to lose their ability to dogfight. The Mustang was a huge surprise to the LW and the calculation that you could operate overloaded fighters against bombers without opposition was a major miscalculation.
The success of Big Week then allowed for the combined USAAF/RAF to transition to the Transport Plan and the assault on western Europe in preparation of D-Day.
5) You asked about medium bombers in Europe and from what I can tell, the numbers were fairly limited in GB until late in 1943. It appears from the unit histories that I have been able to track down that the majority of MB's were assigned to the MTO until November/December. Then, in late 1943 and especially in early 1944, there is a huge increase in the number of medium bomber groups based in England. This makes sense as they would have a significant role in the Transport Plan, but not in the strategic bombing campaign. It also makes sense from an infrastructure standpoint as you will also need new air bases for medium bombing groups and you need time to establish that infrastructure.
Thats a long response to give better context to the question about the suspension of heavy bombing in 1943.
View attachment 584794
View attachment 584795
The video I posted in a thread says the P-47 could have escorted the heavies on the Schweinfurt raid.
USAAF Worldwide Operations Chronology, USAAF Combat Operations 1941 - 1945
Strategic operations didn't stop for the 8th AF in late '43.
Thank you for this, Drgondog! I appreciate the added depth and clarity.Good synopsis - couple of comments. The impetus to assign 8th AF top priority for new deployments of P-38 came immediately at the end of Blitz Week - July 1943.. you can trace the beginning of the end to 'The Bomber will always get through' mantra. That date also points to serious discussion among AAF-HQ planners to re-evaluate the new P-51B-1 for consideration to re-allocate from committed TAC deployments to 8th AF. July 1943 also marked the top priority push to install more internal fuel in P-51B, P-38H/J and P-47D.
Post Schweinfurt, 8th AF was forced to re-evaluate tactics and absolute requirement for escorts to and from the target - but only the 55th FG was operational and the 20th would not emerge UK based training until late November/early December - the same time the new 354th FG Mustangs. The 8th also formed a training cadre for night bombing in concert with RAF - but IMO that was a 'bone' thrown to pacify Churchill and Harris in a politically sensitive time for Roosevelt. The AAF could NEVER have shifted ops to night bombing based on existing training and the pipeline of day bombing trained replacements - if shutting down daylight ops ever was mandated.
The combat radius charts are simply incorrect in more instances than correct. Neither the P-51 w/75 gal external or P-38J with 150 gal internals - but no 85 gal fuse tank or 55 gal LE tanks - were capable of escort to Berlin. Big Week saw the first intro of the additional combat radius availed by the increased internal fuel for the P-38J and P-51B-1, C-1, B-5s now in ETO and depot modified with the kits. The P-47D-25 was not at 56, 78, 353 or 356FG until May-June in squadron level quantity.
The combined 'deal killers' for deep daylight strikes November/December 1943 were inadequate fighter escort range of the P-47D, inadequate force in the two P-38/single P-51B FGs, the abysmal Europe weather and cloud cover forcing radar bombing in lieu of precision bombing, and last but not least replenishment of bomber forces and trained crews. Strikes were made to Bremen and Wilhelmshaven and Hamburg and Nantes, etc because adequate radar signature of the water gave hope that some bombs would actually land on the target and was good H2S/X pathfinder training for the future.
Even when the B-26 Marauder ops began in May 1943, the targets were tactical and never into Germany IIRC. All were France/lowlands airbases, bridges, electrical power plants, etc and usually escorted by RAF, then 9th AF P-47s beginning late 1943 - also used extensively as decoys to confuse the LW regarding track of main stream and target possibilities - nearly always a feint over water and never actually making landfall in that role.
That was a nice summary.
"the P-47 could have" if somebody had given the Bomber Mafia an offer they couldn't refuse...
...or is this "could have" simply wrong? What were the abilities/limitations at the time of the Schweinfurt raids, Tomo?
A great post. The link proves what many suspected, the UK was actually just a huge aircraft carrier. There are five within walking distance of my home and it has missed out at least one. It also shows the parlous state of German defences even at that time in 1943. The distance travelled by fighters from Rostok and Bremen is greater than the distance that Battle of Britain squadrons were sent away from the battle to rest and recover, in normal battle terms they should be considered as reserves.Just a couple follow up items. Here is link to a really cool map showing all of the air bases in the UK during the war.
Map of WW2 operational airfields in the UK
and for comparison: a flight plan of the Schweinfurt Raid and then a January 1944 precursor raid to Big Week illustrating the impact of the longer range P-47, P-38, and P-51. As you can see, the farthest reach is covered only by P-51's which was also the time when the LW would have planned on being able to attack an unescorted bomber stream.
View attachment 584801
View attachment 584802
It seems that the P47H only flew for a total of 18 hours before a porp failure grounded it. There is no evidence of it performing anywhere near expectations. That being said here is an interesting home movie of a flight of the P47H shot by a Chrysler engineer.The XP-47H had the Chrysler IV-2220.
The actual performance of the aircraft is suspect.
"One of my sources (Green) says that during flight trails, one of the XP-47Hs actually attained a speed of 490 mph in level flight. However, another one (Wagner) says that the Chrysler engine failed to deliver the promised power output, and that the maximum speed attained during tests was only 414 mph at 30,000 feet,"
Republic XP-47H Thunderbolt
The XP-47J was said to have a top speed of over 500mph. It was a lightened airframe with altered aerodynamics, noticeably around the engine cowling and air duct intakes.
https://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=1727
The P-47M was a limited production model, of which 130 were built. These were based on the P-47D, with an updated more powerful (and less reliable) R-2800. It had a top speed of 470mph.
The P-47N was the one with all the range, based on the P-47M but with a new wing incorporating fuel tanks. That had a top speed of around 460mph.
Regarding the "Chrysler Hemi Head aircraft engine", the basic combustion chamber had been developed by Sam Heron working for the USAAC Engineering Division in the late 1920s. This was part of the "hyper" engine program that led to the Continental IV-1430 and Lycoming O-1230 and H-2470.