Weather limitations in carrier aviation in the interwar and WWII eras (4 Viewers)

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The Wasp damage report (posted previously) suspects that only two torpedoes struck her.

According to USNI Proceedings, it was indeed three:

The Wasp had just taken in planes and all her gasoline lines were running when at 1442 she reached a position only 500 yards from I-19. The submarine fired four torpedoes, three of which hit the carrier in almost the same place, on the starboard side forward.


Note that if they're wrong and you're right, that only reinforces my point about torpedo vulnerability.
 
According to USNI Proceedings, it was indeed three:




Note that if they're wrong and you're right, that only reinforces my point about torpedo vulnerability.
By 'if you're right' I hope you mean the USN damage report.

To add to the damage report, here's Lundstrom's assessment:

"While circling the carrier, Ens. Millard "Red" Thrash, a VF-71 CAP pilot, looked goggle-eyed at "two water spouts rearing high above the superstructure; smoke and flame bursting out amidships."7​ The first torpedo slammed into the Wasp's starboard bow, ruptured aviation gasoline tanks, and let the sea into the five-inch gun handling room and powder magazines. A few seconds later the second fish struck the hull under the forward 1.1-inch gun mount just ahead of the island, tore open more aviation gasoline storage tanks, and flooded the bomb magazines. Twenty seconds later a third explosion traveled up the bomb elevator trunk and blew its armored hatch cover onto the flight deck. Gasoline vapor from leaking tanks triggered this blast, which many incorrectly thought came from another torpedo..."
 
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By 'if you're right' I hope you mean the USN damage report.

To add to the damage report, here's Lundstrom's assessment:

"While circling the carrier, Ens. Millard "Red" Thrash, a VF-71 CAP pilot, looked goggle-eyed at "two water spouts rearing high above the superstructure; smoke and flame bursting out amidships."7​ The first torpedo slammed into the Wasp's starboard bow, ruptured aviation gasoline tanks, and let the sea into the five-inch gun handling room and powder magazines. A few seconds later the second fish struck the hull under the forward 1.1-inch gun mount just ahead of the island, tore open more aviation gasoline storage tanks, and flooded the bomb magazines. Twenty seconds later a third explosion traveled up the bomb elevator trunk and blew its armored hatch cover onto the flight deck. Gasoline vapor from leaking tanks triggered this blast, which many incorrectly thought came from another torpedo..."

And eyewitness reports are surely always right?
 
And eyewitness reports are surely always right?
This is from the USN damage report:

"16. About 20 seconds after the torpedoes struck, a third
explosion - somewhat less severe - was felt. This was reported
by the Commanding Officer to have been a torpedo, but
it is believed to have been of internal origin inasmuch as
the flight deck cover to bomb elevator A-423-ET was blown
violently upward and flames appeared in the shaft. The cause
of this explosion is unknown, but possibly gasoline vapors
from the gasoline tank A-l3-Gas passed through the bomb magazine
and into the bomb elevator trunk A-7ll-ET where they
might have collected. Or possibly, they might have collected
in the bomb arming stations A-309-L and A-310-L. The explosion
was witnessed by a survivor who was on the first platform
deck in trunk A-6l9-T..
."
 
This was reported by the Commanding Officer to have been a torpedo, but
it is believed to have been of internal origin inasmuch as
the flight deck cover to bomb elevator A-423-ET was blown
violently upward and flames appeared in the shaft. The cause
of this explosion is unknown
, but possibly gasoline vapors
from the gasoline tank A-l3-Gas passed through the bomb magazine
and into the bomb elevator trunk A-7ll-ET where they
might have collected.

I've emphasized the crucial portion of your quote for you.
 
I've emphasized the crucial portion of your quote for you.
Wasp's sinking was analyzed, in detail, by the experts from BuShips, after a review of crew and external witness accounts and the probable survival characteristics of the ship with 2 or 3 torpedo hits. The fact the Wasp continued afloat until scuttled argues for 2 hits. In any event, you're arguing with the USN and Lundstrom, not with me.
 
The SBD-3 (1000hp at TO) didn't have the TO performance needed to operate successfully from most FAA carriers, even with fixed wings. Add another ~400lb for folding wings and things get even worse.

The RN operated the Blackburn Skua from carriers and it was not exactly overpowered - why not the SBD-3? SBDs were even successfully operated from short and slow escort carriers in the Atlantic.
 
In June 1943, Victorious engaged in a cross-decking exercise with Saratoga while in the South Pacific. 6 SBD-3 from Saratoga spent the final day of exercises on Victorious in case future emergencies required it.

Following these exercises, it was decided to operate Vic as a fighter carrier, and transfer the Avengers of 832 squadron to Saratoga during forthcoming operations.
 
The SBD-3 (1000hp at TO) didn't have the TO performance needed to operate successfully from most FAA carriers, even with fixed wings. Add another ~400lb for folding wings and things get even worse.
Why not?

Most early war RN carriers were about the same size as the USS Ranger (CV-4) and she operated SBDs without issue.
 
This article turned up on another site, published last year, that refutes the argument that the USN couldn't / wouldn't use Ranger in the Pacific.

Synopsis

Since World War Two, the USS Ranger (CV-4) has become perceived as incapable of combat in the Pacific Theater. Digitization has provided a new opportunity to examine its perception by commanders responsible for the carrier's employment. These records reveal that the common perception of the carrier stemmed from diplomatic necessity, from an overworked bureau uneager for additional projects, and from commands eager to acquire Ranger for non-combat duty. Ranger was considered by the US Navy as fit for combat in the Pacific Theater during WWII, but other requirements overrode the need for one additional combatant carrier in the Pacific.
This essay ignores the issue I have always found puzzling. If the Ranger was a fully capable fleet carrier why did the USN borrow Victorious? The effort to convert Victorious into a quasi USN fleet carrier was substantial. It spent a month in Norfolk being substantially modified to handle Avengers which it was incapable of landing at that time. As it turned out these modifications were not enough and in the end Victorious operated Wildcats only while its Avengers were transferred to Saratoga. In addition its communications systems were replaced with American equipment. After conversion it spent another month working up at Norfolk learning how to operate as a US carrier. It spent another 2 months in Pearl Harbor working up and getting further modifications to the arrestor gear to try to solve the Avenger's landing issues. It took 4 1/2 months to get Victorious combat capable. in the mean time a lot of Avengers had been lost in accidents, some fatal.
Ironically at the same time Victorious was in Norfolk, Ranger was also in Norfolk undergoing a refit and doing 2 ferry trips to Casablanca. Victorious sailed for the Pacific on February 31. Ranger was back in Norfolk on March 10 and embarked the 4th AG. After some training she set sail for Argentia Newfoundland arriving on April 4. I'm not sure exactly what Ranger did there for the next 3 months but I am sure the Royal Navy could have covered it particularly since they would have retained Victorious. In the meantime Victorious was still working up In in Pearl Harbor. Ranger could have completed her vital ferrying trips and still been in have been in Pearl Harbor at the beginning of May ready for action at the same time Victorious was. She could also have stayed in the Pacific all though 1943. There would have ben no need for Ranger to go to Scapa Flow as Victorious would be there.

The point is that it would have been far more expedient to send Ranger to the Pacific instead of Newfoundland. The simplest solution is usually the best.
The Ranger only participated in 2 actual combat missions in the entire war. There are a litany of excuses given as to why it was kept out of combat except for these two occasions but applying Occam's Razor the simplest explanation is that the USN did not have confidence in this ship as a combat vessel.
 

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