Were the Japanese really after our carriers at Pearl?

tyrodtom said:

They didn't have to do what they did.
But if they wanted to continue on their present course, bringing all of Asia under the Co-Prosperity sphere by conquest, they had to get the oil to do it from somewhere.

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Go back a little. Well before Manchuria and China they solicited the British who were already there grabbing like there was no tomorrow to help them start-up their "flying machine program" (hey, what are these things?) and were turned down flat. They saw the handwriting on the wall back then.

VBF-13 said:

Go back a little. Well before Manchuria and China they solicited the British who were already there grabbing like there was no tomorrow to help them start-up their "flying machine program" (hey, what are these things?) and were turned down flat. They saw the handwriting on the wall back then.

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What are you talking about ???
In 1921 the British sent the Semphill mission to Japan, with 29 instructors to kick start Japanese naval aviation, they stayed 18 months and trained Japanese naval personnel, even assisted the Japanese in building their first aircraft carriers with plans of the HMS Argus.
That doesn't hardly meet the definition of being turned down flat.

tyrodtom said:

What are you talking about ???
In 1921 the British sent the Semphill mission to Japan, with 29 instructors to kick start Japanese naval aviation, they stayed 18 months and trained Japanese naval personnel, even assisted the Japanese in building their first aircraft carriers with plans of the HMS Argus.
That doesn't hardly meet the definition of being turned down flat.

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This is what I have in my file. If you're right, I stand corrected.

"THE FRENCH MISSION OF 1919

The Japanese Government saw the need for experienced instructors in its training program, and towards the end of 1918 approached Great Britain with a request for a military aviation mission to help in the organization and training of an efficient air force for their Army. The British were unable to accede to this request, and the French offered their services, which were accepted. On 15 January 1919 a French military mission of eighteen officers and twenty-two noncommissioned officers, headed by Colonel Faure, arrived in Japan. Although originally scheduled to stay for only four months, the mission remained for a much longer period because of the slow progress of the Japanese in learning to fly."

I think you're overstating Japanese backwardness in early aviation.
The IJAAF bought it's first aircraft , a Farman, in 1910.
When did the US Army buy it's first aircraft ? 1909 .
The company that became Nakajima Aircraft was first founded in 1918. And seem like I remember some use of aircraft by the Japanese over German concessions in, China , in WW1. And some use of ballons in the Russo-Japanese war. The Japanese weren't totally ignorant of aviation, just not as advanced as the western powers in the early 20's.

It is my understanding that BB's were the prime target while any CVs would have been a bonus (recognized mainly by IJN air staff as prime targets). despite being relatively air minded, IJN leadership (like its USN counterpart) was not yet convinced the CV would be the prime offensive weapon of the coming Pacific war. Similar in perspective to the USN, the IJN, for its part, looked to forestall the anticipated capital ship surface engagement somewhere in the western pacific that would arise in retaliation for any attack on the PI. That's seems a good rationale for investing in the building of 18" gunned Battleships. I believe that was accepted USN pre-war Naval War College doctrine.

There appears to have been ample time for a third wave. Kido Butai was approximately 2 hours transit time from PH. First wave hit around 8 AM second an hour later. I believe all aircraft recovered by about 11 AM. With a 4 hour round trip time to target and return and a ~2 hour rearming reorganization time, a third wave could have been launched and returned before dark, considering they would have only been working with one 'deck-load' of aircraft (half the air-wing, armed in the hanger, spotted on the flight deck and flown off as a unit, with rearming beginning on return of the first wave at about 10 AM). Wikipedia lists a variety of factors that made a third strike questionable from the IJN viewpoint including the landing of aircraft at night: Personally, I believe it was quite possible from a strictly time standpoint and that other considerations were persuasive in Nagumo declining the option.

Attack on Pearl Harbor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"Possible third wave
Several Japanese junior officers, including Mitsuo Fuchida and Minoru Genda, the chief architect of the attack, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo[nb 19] storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible;[80] and the captains of the other five carriers in the formation reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike.[81] Military historians have suggested the destruction of these would have hampered the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than loss of its battleships.[82] If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";[83] according to American Admiral Chester Nimitz, later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years."[84] Nagumo, however, decided to withdraw for several reasons:
1. American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.[85]
2. Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.[85]
3. The location of the American carriers remained unknown.
4. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.[85] Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.[86]
5. A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the (British) Royal Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.[87]
6. Weather had deteriorated notably since the first and second wave launching, and rough seas complicated takeoff and landing for a third wave attack.
7. The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.[88]
8. He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.[89]
9. Moreover, it was Japanese Navy practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.[90]

At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo.[89] In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.[91]"

I find reasons 3, 4, 6, 7 8 compelling, whereas reasons 1, 5 and 9 just don't seem that likely to me. Perhaps someone can tell me who are Steven Martin and Eric Groves and whether I have any reason to regard them as authorities on this subject? it seems difficult to imagine AAA being a serious deterrent at this stage of the war.

From: Pearl Harbor: USAAF Aircraft in the Territory of Hawaii

It seems the USAAF at PH post attack had about three dozen modern fighters (P-36 P-40) on hand and about a dozen bombers (mostly B-18s and A-20's). I think there were about 4 B-17s operational.

tyrodtom said:

I think you're overstating Japanese backwardness in early aviation.

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I'll accept that charge. My vocabulary did get a little away from me.

I may be wrong but I always had the understanding that the Japanese understood the value of naval airpower better than the Americans. This may also be wrong but it is my understanding that Yamato held the belief that the Pearl Harbour attack even if a tactical success would have been a strategic failure as it's inescapable consequences would have been war with the USA and the eventual defeat of Japan. Yamato believed the best such an attack would achieve was to gain a limited amount of time in which Japan would have the freedom to make the territorial gains it desired before America had the strength to oppose them. I understand that Yamato did not decide the policy of war with America and was left only with carrying out that policy. So in answer to the original question yes Yamato would have understood the importance of the American carriers and would have ordered them sunk in preference to the battleships. I wonder what the Japanese would have done differently had they had the benefit of hindsight?

pattle said:

I may be wrong but I always had the understanding that the Japanese understood the value of naval airpower better than the Americans. This may also be wrong but it is my understanding that Yamato held the belief that the Pearl Harbour attack even if a tactical success would have been a strategic failure as it's inescapable consequences would have been war with the USA and the eventual defeat of Japan. Yamato believed the best such an attack would achieve was to gain a limited amount of time in which Japan would have the freedom to make the territorial gains it desired before America had the strength to oppose them. I understand that Yamato did not decide the policy of war with America and was left only with carrying out that policy. So in answer to the original question yes Yamato would have understood the importance of the American carriers and would have ordered them sunk in preference to the battleships. I wonder what the Japanese would have done differently had they had the benefit of hindsight?

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I think there are two issues conflated in the above statement in bold typeface. The IJN was certainly much better operationally in their tactical use of the CV than the USN, especially in their employment for massed carrier strikes and in their ability to coordinate multi-carrier operations. They were well ahead of the USN in this regard which took years to catch up. But it also shared to a large extent the USN's prewar prejudices regarding the CV and the primacy of the battleship in the envisioned maritime campaign. It's a conundrum pointed out by a number of historians that the IJN who had brought CV doctrine and operational art to such an advanced state, kind of missed the next evolutionary step, perhaps because their dedicated BBs weren't lying on the bottom of Pearl Harbor or forced to stay in port due to their oil-guzzling engines during the first year of the war.

otherwise, I think your point about Yamamoto's reluctance is well taken. He understood the US industrial capacity well enough to appreciate the short time frame required to complete IJ objectives. It's been suggested here before that had IJ operated with as much efficiency or with as much foresight in phase 2 of its war plan it could have been a much longer war and a negotiated peace might have been achievable. I don't think it's fully appreciated today just how rapidly or thoroughly the allies were beaten by IJ during the first 4 months of 1942. In retrospect, the outcome in the Pacific appears so foreordained and inevitable.

oldcrowcv63 said:

I think there are two issues conflated in the above statement in bold typeface. The IJN was certainly much better operationally in their tactical use of the CV than the USN, especially in their employment for massed carrier strikes and in their ability to coordinate multi-carrier operations. They were well ahead of the USN in this regard which took years to catch up. But it also shared to a large extent the USN's prewar prejudices regarding the CV and the primacy of the battleship in the envisioned maritime campaign. It's a conundrum pointed out by a number of historians that the IJN who had brought CV doctrine and operational art to such an advanced state, kind of missed the next evolutionary step, perhaps because their dedicated BBs weren't lying on the bottom of Pearl Harbor or forced to stay in port due to their oil-guzzling engines during the first year of the war.

otherwise, I think your point about Yamamoto's reluctance is well taken. He understood the US industrial capacity well enough to appreciate the short time frame required to complete IJ objectives. It's been suggested here before that had IJ operated with as much efficiency or with as much foresight in phase 2 of its war plan it could have been a much longer war and a negotiated peace might have been achievable. I don't think it's fully appreciated today just how rapidly or thoroughly the allies were beaten by IJ during the first 4 months of 1942. In retrospect, the outcome in the Pacific appears so foreordained and inevitable.

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I understand what you are saying about things looking bad for the Allies in the early days of the war with Japan, what with the fall of Malaya and the Phillipines the Japanese must have seemed invincible, people must have been thinking where will this all end. I think with the rise of Nazi Germany the Americans had come to realise just how justified Pershing was in his disappointment in the lack of total and unconditional surrender at the end of the Great War and I think it was a lesson well learnt by all, but having said that you don't always get what you want. I also agree about the Japanese losing their way later in the war but at the time of the Pearl Harbour attack I feel confident Yamato knew to get the carriers first and that would have been his plan unless he was ordered to hit the battleships first?

Pat, I don't know what specific orders Yamamoto may have issued wrt prioritizing CV's vs BBs. All of the historical accounts I have read simply say that both navies anticipated any future confrontation to have ultimately resulted in BB vs BB confrontation to decide the issue. From that I extrapolate that BB's would have been strategically considered as worthy a target as a CV. I think it's a safe bet that had a USN carrier been sighted by any IJN aircrew, it would have achieved the dubious status of prime target. It didn't take an admiral to figure out where an airman's breakfast would be served the next morning and who could most quickly take it away. So if you ask which target would have priority in the sights of an aircrew. I'd have to say a CV wins hands down. But its my understanding that the battle fleet was the mission's prime target for the reason's given previously.

Despite the relative air mindedness of the IJN, it, like the USN, was still somewhat handicapped by the relatively junior status of its aviation arm leadership. Very few of the naval aviation pioneers in their respective services had both achieved flag rank and were influential. King and Halsey are not good examples, as both were considered by the brown shoe community as Johnny-Come-Lately's, who were relatively ignorant of the real needs of their air arm and, in the USN, proved to be very unrealistic in their assessments of its maturity or capability. To be fair, so were the crop of USN pioneers coming of senior age at the start of the war.

Old Crow, I am just an ordinary bloke in an ordinary job that is interested in the war and enjoys talking about it. As I am not a qualified historian my opinions are worth very little but it just seems to me that it would have been out of character for Yamamoto being such a strong believer in naval airpower not to have chosen to sink the carriers before the battleships if he was forced to choose between the two. The reason I think this is because Yamamoto accurately predicted how the war would turn out and was opposed to the building of the 2 massive super battleships which points towards his understanding that carriers were the new capital ships. Yamamoto's superiors who were more traditionalist and who still believed that a massive shootout between battleships would decide the war would naturally have chosen the battleships and may have instructed Yamamoto to prioritise on them.

Actually Pat, I think your view is supported by Yamato's reputed disappointment at missing the USN Pac fleet carriers as evidently reported in Kaigun, which I admit I have not read. Again the (potentially unreliable) simplicity of Wikipedia:

"As Yamamoto had planned, the First Air Fleet of six carriers commenced hostilities against the Americans on 7 December 1941, launching 353[15] aircraft against Pearl Harbor in two waves. The attack was a complete success according to the parameters of the mission which sought to sink at least four American battleships and prevent the U.S. Fleet from interfering in Japan's southward advance for at least six months. American aircraft carriers were also considered a choice target, but these were not in port at the time of the attack.

In the end, five American battleships were sunk, three were damaged, and eleven other cruisers, destroyers and auxiliaries were sunk or seriously damaged. The Japanese lost only 29 aircraft, while 74 were damaged from anti-aircraft fire from the ground. The damaged aircraft were disproportionately dive and torpedo bombers, seriously impacting available firepower to exploit the first two waves' success, so the commander of the First Air Fleet, Naval Lieutenant-General Chuichi Nagumo, withdrew. Yamamoto later lamented Nagumo's failure to seize the initiative to seek out and destroy the American carriers, absent from the harbor, or further bombard various strategically important facilities on Oahu. Nagumo had absolutely no idea where the American carriers might be, and remaining on station while his forces cast about looking for them ran the risk of his own forces being found first and attacked while his aircraft were absent searching. In any case, insufficient daylight remained after recovering the aircraft from the first two waves for the carriers to launch and recover a third before dark, and Nagumo's escorting destroyers lacked the fuel capacity for him to loiter long. Much has been made of Yamamoto's hindsight, but (in keeping with Japanese military tradition not to criticize the commander on the spot),[reference 16 is Kaigun] he did not punish Nagumo in any way for his withdrawal."

So was it just Yamamoto's educated hindsight to lament Nagumo's failure to find, engage and destroy the USN CVs? Logistically, Nagumo wasn't in a position to perform a search and destroy mission. It would seem Yamamoto didn't issue any specific orders regarding the primacy of CVs as targets, to the extent that failing to find them meant failure of the mission. Quite the contrary.

I think Meatloaf's basic assessment is accurate: "any capital warship was a priority target" and I expect had they been present, the Carriers would have been hit first and hardest, not because they defined success of the mission but because, like the Hawaiian airfields, they represented a potential threat for a relatively rapid counter attack.

Like you, I am not a historian, just another bloke, typical of our virtual family here who are (obsessively?) interested in WW2 history. To that extent, our two pennies have the same intrinsic value... that is: 2 one hundreths of a dollar (ignoring inflation). (Not sure how that works out in empire currency)

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