What airplane could have turned the tide of the war?

Barrett said:

Sidebar: discussion of the 262 as a potential game changer reminds me that tactics rather than hardware should be considered. I had Johannes Steinhoff on two symposia and, being a Gunnery Guy, asked him about the best way to tackle Viermots. Specifically, I asked if the GAF considered using the overhead gunnery run rather than the company-front 12 o'clock method. He said that the overhead was known to the GAF, and it had the advantage of (1) presenting a bigger target and (2) was far more difficult to defend against. But the Germans lacked the fuel and time to train large numbers of pilots in the overhead.

Told him that a late war interview with Jimmy Thach concluded that if the Luftwaffe had employed the USN overhead, daylight bombing likely would've ended in 43.

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Sorry for my ignorance, what does overhead gunnery mean in this context?
Is it the one as described here:
"The "overhead" was the most fun -- starting out 500 or more feet directly above the banner, rolling over and diving to a position astern (and a little above) of the banner before firing. "
Korean War Educator: Memoirs - Jack Parchen

Dimlee said:

Sorry for my ignorance, what does overhead gunnery mean in this context?
Is it the one as described here:
"The "overhead" was the most fun -- starting out 500 or more feet directly above the banner, rolling over and diving to a position astern (and a little above) of the banner before firing. "
Korean War Educator: Memoirs - Jack Parchen

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Dimlee,

It's my understanding that the overhead attack as described in the original post references an attack from above. I don't know if there is a minimum angle, however the shallower the attack the longer the trigger time you will have. Conversely, the longer trigger time the adversaries gunners have to shoot back.

I've said it before, but I don't understand why they didn't put a simple two inverted "staples" type gun sight in their fighters. Trigger on when the bombers wings fill the first staple, off trigger / pull up when the wings fill the second sight. It would have been an easy add to an illuminated sight.

In the Eagle we would practice similar attacks against bomber types with the added caveat of avoiding the tail gunners employment zone.

Cheers,
Biff

tomo pauk said:

Dave - seems like the P-36 was introduced in 1938, not 1936?

BTW, Wikipedia wants us to believe this cr@p about the P-36:
The lack of an engine supercharger was a serious handicap at high altitudes.

No supercharger?? Anyone care to edit that?

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They all first flew in 1935 - Hurricane: November 1935, P-36: May 1935, Bf109: May 1935 and all three were world class fighters at that point in time.

A stronger RAF in Malaya and Burma from summer 1941 would have done much to turn the war. Though it is not down to just one aircraft. Spitfires, Beaufighters, Beauforts and Wellingtons if properly deployed and led may stop Japan's drive into DEI, cutting off their oil supplies.

Yes, we have the benefit of hindsight, knowing that with the Germans distracted in Russia these aircraft can be sent to Malaya. We still need the RAF focused on North Africa, so we can't strip that campaign.

The problem I see in Germany's plans is of course the enemy and its Intelligence Branches. At the outbreak of war, the Luftwaffe had the biggest and quite possibly best photo reconnaissance capability of any air force. That it was of limited use to the Germans during the Battle of Britain is down to British radar and the system in place - aircraft that ventured into British airspace were shot down and recon aircraft regularly failed to return with that vital intel the Germans needed to determine how much damage they were doing during each raid. This was a big failure of the Germans as they had no real idea of what airfields had been destroyed nor what strength the RAF was at any given time during the war - they were denied crucial intel. Unfortunately, big heavy bombers were not going to help the Luftwaffe in this case if they have no idea exactly how much or little damage their last raid did.

Another thing about the Kamfgeschwader during the BoB is that they had the potential to be the most accurate bombing force in history up to that point with their adoption of the Knickebein and X' and Y-Gerat equipment - that they did not use this equipment for pinpoint raids on strategic targets instead of laying waste the interiors of cities - see Coventry and Warsaw - is a blessing for the British. Obviously, in time the British countered each of these measures before the Germans could use them effectively and strategically in what could have been a devastating blow against the UK. Policy change by the Germans could have made a vast difference, but again, without solving problem Number One above, using those advanced guidance systems would not have made much of a difference if it wasn't known exactly how much damage was being done.

The next big intel coup the British made was discovering Germany's jet fighter programme when it did. The He 280 was a designation that came to British attention as early as 1940 and the first evidence of the seriousness of the German jet threat was seen in recon images in 1942, when scorched marks were seen on airfields that had been made by Me 163 prototypes. That rocket fighter was the first German reaction propulsion hardware that the British had taken photos of. The existence of the Me 262 was known since 1943 as prototypes were photographed on the ground, long before production examples reached the units. This meant there was never going to be any Gotterdammerung of hoardes of jet fighters roaring into action against British and US bombers without the Allies knowing about their existence and doing something about it.

Germany fairly and squarely lost the intelligence war. German intel gathering in the UK was thwarted by the Double Cross System and gave the British a strategic edge in what information was provided to the Germans - Operation Fortitude in the lead up to Overlord, for example. Germany needs to change this intelligence discrepancy if she wants to win the war.

sorry missed quote, see below.

Admiral Beez said:

A stronger RAF in Malaya and Burma from summer 1941 would have done much to turn the war. Though it is not down to just one aircraft. Spitfires, Beaufighters, Beauforts and Wellingtons if properly deployed and led may stop Japan's drive into DEI, cutting off their oil supplies.

Yes, we have the benefit of hindsight, knowing that with the Germans distracted in Russia these aircraft can be sent to Malaya. We still need the RAF focused on North Africa, so we can't strip that campaign.

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Pretty much what I was trying to say but I do like your selection of aircraft. Biggles had the usefulness of the Beaufighter sorted out (Biggles in Borneo) I still reckon the Hawker Henley (not Hendon , as I said in my previous post, would have been an ideal unit in this imaginary situation.

Steve Hnz said:

Pretty much what I was trying to say but I do like your selection of aircraft. Biggles had the usefulness of the Beaufighter sorted out (Biggles in Borneo) I still reckon the Hawker Henley (not Hendon , as I said in my previous post, would have been an ideal unit in this imaginary situation.

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Hawker Henley is a good pick, and leaning towards second line service, meaning greater odds of availability. Its internal bomb bay makes it a nice CAS aircraft until the Vultee Vengeance is available in 1942/3.

I like the Wellington torpedo variant for Malaya for its dual fish load, heavy armament and robust construction. The IJAF's fighters are lightly armed and fragile.

Admiral Beez said:

Hawker Henley is a good pick, and leaning towards second line service, meaning greater odds of availability. Its internal bomb bay makes it a nice CAS aircraft until the Vultee Vengeance is available in 1942/3.

I like the Wellington torpedo variant for Malaya for its dual fish load, heavy armament and robust construction. The IJAF's fighters are lightly armed and fragile.

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Problem with the Henley was the opening mechanism for its bomb bay doors relied on rubber bunjay chords so was unreliable. The Fairey Battle was better because it used hydraulics to release the bombs. Same problem with the Brewster Bermuda.

For me, I'd go for a Bermuda without the bomb bay, able to carry either a torpedo or bomb underneath its fuselage and / or bombs under its wings which should have sped up development and a Henley without its bomb bay carrying a single under fuselage bomb with perhaps 8 0.303 in Browning m/c guns in its wings. The Bermuda already had good forward firing armament and a long range.

The Defiant as a night fighter if there was GCI, but there wasn't.

Not the Miles M20/2 because I'm not convinced that glued wooden fighters are reliable in the tropics, although they did work in non tropical Russia.

If the Indians could get their manufacturing act together fine, but they only succeeded in the sixties with the Folland Gnat and the ever so simple Mig 21.

The Boomerang if it could have got into production earlier.

I'd even have taken 30 enhanced Gladiators for bomber / transport escort. So Harrows built and used rather than Herefords..

Kevin J said:

Not the Miles M20/2 because I'm not convinced that glued wooden fighters are reliable in the tropics,

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How did the Mosquito fair in warmer climes? I think I recall reading of similar concerns. The DH. Hornet served throughout Malaya but IDK if that was of the same construction.

Admiral Beez said:

How did the Mosquito fair in warmer climes? I think I recall reading of similar concerns. The DH. Hornet served throughout Malaya but IDK if that was of the same construction.

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That was Post war after the glue problems had been sorted out.

Admiral Beez said:

How did the Mosquito fair in warmer climes? I think I recall reading of similar concerns. The DH. Hornet served throughout Malaya but IDK if that was of the same construction.

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Given the short design life of the aircraft, I'm not sure that glue delamination after 2 years would have been a problem.

I have always thought the Do-335 fell in this category. It wasn't the technology stretch that the 262 was. With resources and priority it could have been operational in 43

Fairey Barracuda, March-April 1942, British Pacific Fleet, Ceylon. Get it into service before its historical Jan 1943 (three years from first 1940 Flight is ridiculous). Pack them onto HMS Indomitable, Formidable and Hermes, take out Nagumo's carriers in night attacks. If Hermes can't operate the Barracuda then load her with Fulmars, put more Barracudas on the fast fleets.



It's a long shot, but if successful, there's no Battles of Coral Sea or Midway, and the USN enters summer 1942 with two more fleet carriers.

Admiral Beez said:

Fairey Barracuda, March-April 1942, British Pacific Fleet, Ceylon. Get it into service before its historical Jan 1943 (three years from first 1940 Flight is ridiculous). Pack them onto HMS Indomitable, Formidable and Hermes, take out Nagumo's carriers in night attacks. If Hermes can't operate the Barracuda then load her with Fulmars, put more Barracudas on the fast fleets.

View attachment 558821

It's a long shot, but if successful, there's no Battles of Coral Sea or Midway, and the USN enters summer 1942 with two more fleet carriers.

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Who needs a Barracuda in 1942 when you have the Fulmar II that can carry a 500 lb bomb under its fuselage. Send them out to dive bomb the carriers and put them out of action. Use the Albacores in a night attack to slow the IJN battleships down. Finally finish them off with 15 in gunfire.

Kevin J said:

Who needs a Barracuda in 1942 when you have the Fulmar II that can carry a 500 lb bomb under its fuselage. Send them out to dive bomb the carriers and put them out of action. Use the Albacores in a night attack to slow the IJN battleships down. Finally finish them off with 15 in gunfire.

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That would have been awesome, and a war changer. No Coral Sea, No Midway, and likely the beginning of the end for Japan.

Admiral Beez said:

That would have been awesome, and a war changer. No Coral Sea, No Midway, and likely the beginning of the end for Japan.

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Unfortunately the RN wasn't into deck parks, Fulmars as dive bombers or attacks in broad daylight. They preferred sneaking up on the enemy when he was asleep and lobbing a few torpedoes at them. They did use their Albacores as dive bombers during amphibious operations though as it wasn't just a torpedo bomber, but dive bomber also. The Swordfish was the better torpedo bomber.

Kevin J said:

Unfortunately the RN wasn't into deck parks, Fulmars as dive bombers or attacks in broad daylight. They preferred sneaking up on the enemy when he was asleep and lobbing a few torpedoes at them. They did use their Albacores as dive bombers during amphibious operations though as it wasn't just a torpedo bomber, but dive bomber also. The Swordfish was the better torpedo bomber.

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That's why I wanted earlier intro of the Barracuda. Nearly 100 mph faster and over 100 miles longer endurance than the Swordfish, with true dive bomber capability, the Barracuda could have won the day. It should have been the Swordfish's successor, not the Applecore.

Admiral Beez said:

That's why I wanted earlier intro of the Barracuda. Nearly 100 mph faster and over 100 miles longer endurance than the Swordfish, with true dive bomber capability, the Barracuda could have won the day. It should have been the Swordfish's successor, not the Applecore.

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Now me, I'd go for a Fulmar I with the Merlin VIII plus 16 lbs boost and under fuselage bomb in 1942 as the primary dive bomber and kept the Fulmar II for fighter recce and dive bombing. Maybe even a Fulmar III with the Merlin 32 later.

Admiral Beez said:

Fairey Barracuda, March-April 1942, British Pacific Fleet, Ceylon. Get it into service before its historical Jan 1943 (three years from first 1940 Flight is ridiculous). Pack them onto HMS Indomitable, Formidable and Hermes, take out Nagumo's carriers in night attacks. If Hermes can't operate the Barracuda then load her with Fulmars, put more Barracudas on the fast fleets.

View attachment 558821

It's a long shot, but if successful, there's no Battles of Coral Sea or Midway, and the USN enters summer 1942 with two more fleet carriers.

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All of that is far easier said than done, but this is a "What if" thread so I'm cool with it.

Don't know if you've seen this site but the RN came close to something like that in the early days of 1942:

Armoured Aircraft Carriers

Pilots and radar operators were in the planes warmed up ready to set out for a night strike on the IJN. It's a good read, in fact that whole site is rather well done and has tons of BPF info if you're interested.