What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?

[mikewint]

As far as naval support is concerned, Six British and three French destroyers were sunk, along with nine large boats. In addition, 19 destroyers were damaged. Over 200 of the Allied sea craft were sunk, with an equal number damaged. The Royal Navy claimed the destruction of 35 Luftwaffe aircraft from ship's gunfire during the period of May 27 to June 1, and damage to another 21 aircraft.Winston Churchill revealed in his volumes on World War II that the Royal Air Force played a most important role protecting the retreating troops from the Luftwaffe. Churchill also said that the sand on the beach softened the explosions from the German bombs. "Between 26 May and 4 June the RAF flew a total of 4,822 sorties over Dunkirk, losing just over 100 aircraft in the fighting." The bad weather that kept the Luftwaffe grounded for much of operation also kept losses from being higher than they were. The RAF claimed 262 Luftwaffe aircraft destroyed over Dunkirk. The RAF lost 177 aircraft from all causes from May 26 to June 4, while the Luftwaffe lost 240 aircraft, on the Western Front, from all causes during the same time frame. Fighter losses, from units based in France and the UK from May 10 to June 4 was 432, while total RAF losses from all causes during all of May and June was 959, of which 477 were fighters.
Major ships lost: The Royal Navy's most significant losses in the operation were six destroyers:
Grafton, sunk by U-62 on 29 May;
Grenade, sunk by air attack off the east pier at Dunkirk on 29 May;
Wakeful, sunk by a torpedo from the Schnellboot (E-boat) S-30 on 29 May;
Basilisk, Havant and Keith, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.
The French Navy lost three destroyers:
Bourrasque, mined off Nieuport on 30 May;
Sirocco, sunk by the Schnellboote S-23 and S-26 on 31 May;
Le Foudroyant, sunk by air attack off the beaches on 1 June.

 

[donkeyking]

Thanks Mike, your information is very appreciated

 

[davebender]

The BoB would happen over Dunkirk rather then over England. The RAF won't have the advantage of ground based radar and Me-109s won't arrive in the battle area low on fuel.

 

[mikewint]

Dave, I miss your point on that post. The advantage would be to the Germans and the RAF would have lost the very things that allowed them to win the BoB.
The British, plain and simple chose to cut their losses and extricate their troops. Churchill did order a return to remove some French troops which were repatriated and within a couple of week became POWs anyway

 

[davebender]

I wouldn't go that far. I think the odds would be even if Britain employs a bit of military common sense during the BEF retreat.

If Britain intends to retain a bridgehead on the channel coast it should be at Calais rather then Dunkirk. That way Britain has airfields located within about 30 miles. Luftwaffe airfields won't be located any closer to the seaport.

 

[who were the allies]

From 26 May 1940–4 June 1940, allies evacuated 330,000 of 400,000 from Dunkirk. Whatever it is not a bad result from the current point view. But in evacuation, allies had to abandon huge heavy weapons and equipment. These troops couldn't fight again in short time because of without these weapons. At last French government surrendered on 14 June 1940 after 10 days Dunkirk evacuation.

My question is whether there is a better option. What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?

Could they insist for 3 month around Dunkirk like the battle of Anzio?

If they insist for 3 months in Dunkirk, could France stand longer?

Is there other better choices than evacuation of Dunkirk?

Thanks

Donkeyking

Who pray tell were the "allies" in 1940? France was resolved to surrender Russia had a non aggression pact and the United States was resolved to find out which way the wind was blowing. Who exactly were the "allies" who would keep a conflict going for 3 months?

At the time of Dunkerque the "Allies" were Britain and its commonwealth France was suing for surrender before the Nazis crossed the border.

 

[donkeyking]

The BoB would happen over Dunkirk rather then over England. The RAF won't have the advantage of ground based radar and Me-109s won't arrive in the battle area low on fuel.

Dave
Of course, They wouldn't get help of chain home radars, it would be an main disadvantage. But if allies were still in Dunkirk, Luftwaffe couldn't move their air base to the north of France as BOB. Their air base would be still in Germany. When Luftwaffe had come to Dunkirk from Germany, they would still be low on fuel as BOB.

The secondly, French planes would join RAF to continue to fight.

By the way, some French coast(include Dunkirk) could be covered by chain home in 1940 summer. They could provide high altitude service.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

Who pray tell were the "allies" in 1940? France was resolved to surrender Russia had a non aggression pact and the United States was resolved to find out which way the wind was blowing. Who exactly were the "allies" who would keep a conflict going for 3 months?

At the time of Dunkerque the "Allies" were Britain and its commonwealth France was suing for surrender before the Nazis crossed the border.

Care to explain then, how on Earth did 92,000+ French soldiers get killed between May 10 and June 24 of that year?

 

[Shortround6]

Care to explain then, how on Earth did 92,000+ French soldiers get killed between May 10 and June 24 of that year?

traffic accidents?


Just kidding. The French troops were let down and sacrificed by their leaders to no purpose. Poor weapons, poor tactical concepts, poor leadership, poor command decisions. 10 years or more of bad high command came home with a vengeance in less than 7 weeks. And it came on the poor soldiers who lost their lives trying to delay the Germans to give their officers time to come up with a plan. There were exceptions but on average the high command seemed incapable of planning lunch let alone dealing with a fast paced battle or campaign.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

traffic accidents?


Just kidding. The French troops were let down and sacrificed by their leaders to no purpose. Poor weapons, poor tactical concepts, poor leadership, poor command decisions. 10 years or more of bad high command came home with a vengeance in less than 7 weeks. And it came on the poor soldiers who lost their lives trying to delay the Germans to give their officers time to come up with a plan. There were exceptions but on average the high command seemed incapable of planning lunch let alone dealing with a fast paced battle or campaign.

You realize that the above is an equally apt and accurate description of the BEF in 1940 as well?

Nevertheless, I'm more interested in the sources for who were the allies incredible display of historical illiteracy.

 

[davebender]

if allies were still in Dunkirk, Luftwaffe couldn't move their air base to the north of France as BOB

If the Allies attempt to hold Dunkirk that's where German air attacks will take place. Not over England. The Luftwaffe would establish forward airfields just out of artillery range from the Dunkirk perimeter.

 

[mikewint]

Field Marshal The Rt. Hon. John Standish Surtees Prendergast Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort, VC, GCB, CBE, DSO Two Bars, MVO, MC was a pretty decent officer.
As Chief of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.), Lord Gort advocated the primacy of building a land army and defending France and the Low Countries over Imperial defence after France had said she would not be able on her own to defend herself against a German attack.
On 2 December 1938 Gort submitted a report on the readiness of the British Army. He observed that Germany, as a result of the acquisition of Czechoslovakia, was in a stronger position than the previous year and that as a result of the government's decision in 1937 to create a "general purpose" army, Britain lacked the necessary forces for the defence of France.
On 21 December Gort recommended to the Chiefs of Staff that Britain would need to help France defend Holland and Belgium and that for that purpose the British Army needed complete equipment for four Regular army infantry divisions and two mobile armoured divisions, with the Territorial army armed with training equipment and then war equipment for four divisions
Following the Phony War, the 1940 German breakthrough in the Ardennes split the Allied forces and communications between the British Expeditionary Force and the French broke down, and on 25 May 1940 Gort took the unilateral decision to abandon his orders for a southward attack by his forces. Gort's command position was difficult, serving under French high, theatre, and army group command while also being responsible to London. Withdrawing northwards, the BEF together with many French soldiers were evacuated during the Battle of Dunkirk.
Gort is credited by some as reacting efficiently to the crisis and saving the British Expeditionary Force. Others hold a more critical view of Gort's leadership in 1940, seeing his decision not to join the French in organising a large scale counter-attack as defeatist. Yet Gort had seen and worked under the miserable French leadership. Personally I think that under the circumstances he was correct in saving his own troops

 

[davebender]

The British Government should have given this some thought before signing a military alliance with France.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

The British, plain and simple chose to cut their losses and extricate their troops. Churchill did order a return to remove some French troops which were repatriated and within a couple of week became POWs anyway

One of the dirty little secrets regarding the evacuated French troops was that they were disarmed upon their arrival in England, either at Dover or Ramsgate. Most elected to return to France because the battle was still on and they fully expected to see more action. Unfortunately, when they were returned (Mostly to Cherbourg) their weapons had not been returned to them, thus they landed without a single weapon among them, though I've read that some of their officers had their service pistols after managing to hide them from british confiscation parties.

Three excellent books I have touch on this little known episode:
"Lightning War, Blitzkrieg in the West,1940" by Ronald e. Powaski
"The Fall of France" by Julian Jackson
"Dunkerque 26 Mai-4 juin 1940 - La Bataille des Dunes" by Eric Lefevre
(on page 109 of this book, there is a photo of British troops disarming the newly arrived French troops, and another photo of a few British military police examing a large stack of confiscated French rifles.)

From "Allied Armour of World War Two" by Ian V. Hogg, has indicated that the missing French weapons were instead sent to Scotland where they were later issued to exiled Polish troops for training.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

French 7th Army was well equipped with armor and motorized infantry. If they couldn't contain a German secondary attack while operating on excellent defensive terrain then the situation was hopeless. How could the BEF expect to make a stand at Dunkirk or anywhere else?

Giraud's 7th Armee actually made good headway into Holland and several serious and sharp engagements occured there. Research by historian David Lehman shows the French troops/tanks engaged from the 7th Arm. to on tough actions, particularly in Breda, and made good use of the terrain as well. The problem lay in constant German air support, combined with the fact that there were few modern AA betteries within both French and BEF forces. German tactical airpower ruled the day, and by the end of that day it savagely mauled major elements of the Allied forces. This was a doctrinal failure on both the part of the French and British.

The British Government should have given this some thought before signing a military alliance with France.

Without that military alliance, France could (perhaps should?) have stay out of declaring war on Germany altogether. Disregarding whatever mutual policy both France and UK had with Poland, the UK declared war on Germany first, France followed the day after. Time is what the French military needed to become more evenly matched in terms of military and industrial output, so can be inclined to say that allowing the UK to go it alone for while may have been beneficial?

Personally speaking, the biggest mistake French military planners made just before the outbreak of war, was to assume they had allies, and forget the UK altogether.

 

[Arsenal VG-33]

Gort is credited by some as reacting efficiently to the crisis and saving the British Expeditionary Force. Others hold a more critical view of Gort's leadership in 1940, seeing his decision not to join the French in organising a large scale counter-attack as defeatist. Yet Gort had seen and worked under the miserable French leadership. Personally I think that under the circumstances he was correct in saving his own troops

Gort has the benefit of three things:

1-There was admittedly poor leadership from the French high command that was for the most part completely caught out of balance due to outdated doctrine.

2-German doctrine completely caught the BEF caught out of balance due to outdated doctrine.

3- Because of points 1 and 2, Gort (and much of the BEF command for that matter) managed to pass the blame of his own failures onto the French.

His role in withdrawing and evacuating the BEF can be seen, in hindsight, as a good thing in saving the BEF, but what is inexcusable, was that by the time the Admiralty had informed hi that the BEF would be withdrawn, Gort told his French counterparts that there was the "possibility" of such action, though he fully well knew what he inteded to do. This allows Gort the fail-safe arguement by stating that he had given warning to the French command while not actually stating that it was going to happen. Gort was a porfessional soldier with a long career, so why the break of protocol? I believe that Gort's decision to not come fully clean was clearly intended to force the French and perhaps even the remaining Belgian in protecting his withdrawal. More than a few European historians suspect this may have been the motive. The fact is, for much of the entire Dunkirk withdrawal and evacuation, from Lille to Dunkirk, almost the entire defensive rearguard and perimeter was held by the French, often conveniently omitted from myth which became Dunkirk. Without that rearguard, everything would have failed.

In this respect, I feel Gort should be roundly criticized.

 

[Freebird]

Oh lordy, where to start on this thread.

Why was the BEF in Belgium on May 10th, 1940 if that battle was already lost?

That was the plan that was developed to pivot forward and defend Belgium, the Dyle/Meuse line is much more defensible than the French/Belgian border.
Sadly, the Belgians tried to remain neutral until the last minute, which prevented proper defensive preparations at the Dyle line.

If the battle was already lost (due to poor deployment preparations) the British didn't know that until it was too late to do anything about it.

They should have relocated to someplace they could do some good.

Not unless they had magic carpets to make the relocation.
The major river bridges were blown or captured, rail ships under Luftwaffe attack, and the roads in Belgium Northern France were clogged with refugees fleeing westward.
They couldn't get into Holland even if they wanted to.

The Dutch fought a hard but hopeless battle. The Netherlands is excellent defensive terrain.

Not against Luftwaffe attack

Move the BEF to Holland and the Dutch have a chance to prevail. Operation Market-Garden in reverse. In this case you need to hold the Port of Rotterdam.

Not without those magic carpets mentioned earlier.
Rotterdam would be useless without air superiority, which they didn't have.

The first, allied navy can support their army. The British and France has a lot of battleships and cruisers, and they have a lot of huge guns which are much bigger and more effiective than WW I type "siege" artillery. The other important thing is these navy guns dosn't have logistic problem like guns on land.

The battleships would be sitting ducks to the u-boats, which couldn't be protected unless the Allies have control of the channel, which they don't.

Also battleships do have logistical problems, barrel wear shortage of HE ammo.

The second, German tanks were light in 1940 and not good to break through heavy defencing areas. And then BEF were very good at defencing.

The third, every effort would be paid if they had stood for three months in Dunkirk.[/quote]

They would have been short on supplies and crushed by superior German firepower.
What then?

French wouldn't feel they were abandoned by British, they would continue to fight.

Debatable. Maybe not

 

[Freebird]

German tactical airpower ruled the day, and by the end of that day it savagely mauled major elements of the Allied forces. This was a doctrinal failure on both the part of the French and British.

correct.

Personally speaking, the biggest mistake French military planners made just before the outbreak of war, was to assume they had allies, and forget the UK altogether.

Agreed, no country should completely depend on another, best to have alternate plans if things change.

Just as it was a huge mistake for the British to depend on the America's naval power to defeat the Japanese in 1941, which they were unable to do.

 

[davebender]

1939 German light bomber production (Ju87 and Ju88) was negligible. Only about 200 aircraft.

1940 German Light Bomber Production
German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
603 x Ju-87B
1,816 x Ju-88A.
...............................
2,419 for all of 1940. Approximately 1/3rd (production during Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr) would be operational by May 1940. Subtract requirements for Norway, training units etc. and I suspect Germany had only about 500 CAS aircraft available to support the 100 or so Heer divisions employed in the west during May 1940. 5 CAS aircraft per army division is hardly overwhelming air support.

 

[mikewint]

The quantity of the Allied troops was fine. The quality was not. Britain and France had been largely unprepared for war, and the training of their conscript armies was abysmal. In Britain, ammunition shortages had the notorious result of each recruit being allowed only five rounds in total for rifle training. The French conscripts were more badly trained still. Fortunately, the small British Expeditionary Force had many professional troops rather than recent conscripts.
By contrast, the Germans side had had much more intensive and elaborate training. Accurate, full-scale mockups of crucial fortifications were built in Germany, and troops rehearsed their attacks until perfect.
Their first great mistake was relying on the Maginot line, the highly fortified border between France and Germany. In the first world war it would have been impregnable. In the second world war, concentrated attack eventually breached it, but more significantly, the Germans attacked first through Belgium and Holland instead, rendering it not just worthless but a handicap, as it required large numbers of French troops to occupy it.
The second great mistake was the attempted defense of Holland and Belgium. Relying on neutrality to protect them, the Low Countries had not heavily fortified their frontiers, and did not allow Allied troops to enter, even for reconnaissance, until actually invaded. "He who defends everything, defends nothing" was Frederick the Great's famous saying, but this concept was ignored. British and French troops abandoned their defenses on the French-Belgian borders and advanced into Belgium, with the intention of resisting the German Panzer divisions in unfortified, open, unfamiliar territory.
Thus the scene was set for the great disaster. Poorly trained troops, many of whom had fired only five shots in their lives, commanded by officers using obsolete tactics, stationed in inadequate defenses in unfamiliar territory; prepared to defend themselves against the combined firepower of the Panzer divisions and the Luftwaffe.
With the benefit of hindsight, it's always easy to look back and declare authoritatively what should have been done, especially since your ideas will never actually be tested by the enemy. In the case of the Battle of France, because the armored assault tactics were new, it was not clear how to defend against them.
In 1940 it was not clear that air superiority would be such a decisive factor in a ground conflict. It was expected that strategic bombing would be more effective than it was. It was not known that urban areas could provide effective resistance to tank assaults, as happened in Stalingrad. The critical weakness of paratroop attacks, that they are vulnerable during and immediately after their descent, was not certain. The importance of fortifying positions all around, rather than relying on a line that faces one way only, was underestimated. The potential of radio communications, and the inability of traditional couriers to cope with rapidly moving fronts, were not accepted.
When faced with the first effective use of new tactics by an enemy, it is easy to be appalled in hindsight that they were not anticipated. In practice, it takes time and experience to develop and deploy defenses. In the Second World War neither Poland, Belgium, Holland, France nor Russia, were at first able to resist the combination of armored divisions and air superiority. With fewer mistakes, the German attack could have been made more costly for them, and the battle more protracted. However, without the crucial factor of experience, it is doubtful that the final outcome of the Battle of France could ever have been different.

On the 22nd of June France surrendered to the Germans. Fighting continued for a few days before dying out. German casualties were only 27,000 dead, 100,000 wounded. French military casualties about 100,000 dead, 200,000 wounded. Worse was to come for the French: about 400,000 civilians would die in bombings and in forced-labor camps under the German occupation, and another 100,000 military would die during and after the liberation. In the cruelest cut of all, 1,147 French sailors would be killed by their British allies at Mers-El-Kebir on the 3rd of July, when the British decided they would destroy the French fleet themselves, rather than risk it falling into German hands.

Armour:
In May 1940 France had over 3,000 tanks, and in terms of numbers, quality and firepower they were generally superior to those employed by the Germans. Tactically, however, the French were definitely inferior, and with one or two exceptions the handling of this valuable force was uninspired and wasteful. The basic armoured unit was the tank battalion, comprising a staff, three tank companies and a reserve company (in all, some 45 to 60 tanks). There were 39 tank battalions in 1940 and for tactical purposes they were twinned to form tank battalion groups. At the outbreak of war only five battalions had received the latest tanks (the Somua S-35 and Char B-1 models) while the rest still retained a variety of modern and semi-obsolete types. In addition to the battalion groups there were also 11 independent tank companies.
Between January and May 1940, four reserve armoured divisions were formed and placed at the disposal of the General Headquarters. These divisions absorbed a number of the above-mentioned tank battalions and companies. Armoured fighting vehicles were also to be found in the cavalry divisions undergoing mechanisation, in five light cavalry divisions which were also still not completely mechanised, and in the reconnaissance groups. All these formations combined horsed cavalry, motor-cycle troops, armoured cars, tanks, and infantry mounted in cross-country vehicles.

French Air Force
The Air Force had suffered considerable neglect between the wars, and its performance in 1940, with machines which were in general much inferior to those of the enemy, was not impressive. Indeed, according to French sources, only 420 modern fighters and 31 heavy bombers were serviceable when the Germans struck in May.
Total French front line strength on 10 May 1940 was 1,604 aircraft (764 fighters, 260 bombers, 180 reconaissance planes, 400 liaison aircrafts).
Total strenght of the French Air Force together with Aviation Colonaile: 1,200 fighters, 800 reconaissance planes, 1,300 bombers.