Glider
Captain
First time I heard anyone trying to blame the 2nd Gulf War on Churchill
What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?
- Thread starter donkeyking
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RabidAlien
1st Lieutenant
That region has been at war with itself for thousands of years. The only effect Churchill might've had would be to stir up the embers and toss a little kerosene on the flames. Had he done nothing, there would still be conflicts over there today.
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
Correct in every way on Churchill. A character of note.
Also remember he was a new subaltern in the battle at Omdurman (sorry for the spelling), the last cavalry attack.
After that, as any good gentleman, he resigned his commission to become a journalists and went off to South Africa for the 1899-1902 stuff.
and at the Rheine, he made sure they all had a lot of coffee (or booze more likely) before visiting the siegfried line. Brooke guessed it, yes, Churchill had a leak on the siegfried line!
All of that said, without Chruchill to probe and prod his generals, they may have fought a more "classic" war and might just have stuffed it up, at least into a stalemate. He was a thinker after all.
Churchill also had a hand in the invention of the tanks. At that time the navy had its motor division (sic!) with armoured cars. When the army got all toffee nosed on the tanks, Churchill pushed it through as a navy project, until such time as other's could run with it.
I think he was good at delegating things but also keeping important stuff himself.
His major advantage could have been to see what was important and what was urgent.
Iraq turned out to be a mess, haunting us to this day.
He probably solved more problems than he created, but that is not to say that he did not have some massive mess-up's here and there. Strangely enough, not because of not acting. That he surely did.
And he came of good stock, his (great * x) grandfather was Mallborough
Also remember he was a new subaltern in the battle at Omdurman (sorry for the spelling), the last cavalry attack.
After that, as any good gentleman, he resigned his commission to become a journalists and went off to South Africa for the 1899-1902 stuff.
and at the Rheine, he made sure they all had a lot of coffee (or booze more likely) before visiting the siegfried line. Brooke guessed it, yes, Churchill had a leak on the siegfried line!
All of that said, without Chruchill to probe and prod his generals, they may have fought a more "classic" war and might just have stuffed it up, at least into a stalemate. He was a thinker after all.
Churchill also had a hand in the invention of the tanks. At that time the navy had its motor division (sic!) with armoured cars. When the army got all toffee nosed on the tanks, Churchill pushed it through as a navy project, until such time as other's could run with it.
I think he was good at delegating things but also keeping important stuff himself.
His major advantage could have been to see what was important and what was urgent.
Iraq turned out to be a mess, haunting us to this day.
He probably solved more problems than he created, but that is not to say that he did not have some massive mess-up's here and there. Strangely enough, not because of not acting. That he surely did.
And he came of good stock, his (great * x) grandfather was Mallborough
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
On Iraq, etc: Yes, they have been fighting there for some years prior to Chruchill. His solution might have worked if he had separated the Kurds out, etc. But that is probably another different thread and more a WHAT IF thing
mikewint
Captain
MichaelM - as to WWII I would tend to agree with you though I also find that historical events create vacuums which in turn can create personalities to step into those vacuums.
Churchill was certainly a colorful individual whose quotes are legend. He was also a product of his times when the British Empire was remaking the world into England.
The Mideast has always been a powder keg but willy-nilly drawing borders forcing incompatible elements together under some non-local strongman is a recipe for disaster which carries over into our own time.
Churchill was certainly a colorful individual whose quotes are legend. He was also a product of his times when the British Empire was remaking the world into England.
The Mideast has always been a powder keg but willy-nilly drawing borders forcing incompatible elements together under some non-local strongman is a recipe for disaster which carries over into our own time.
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
Back to the thread:
Whether they would liek to fight n for another 3 months, Doubtful if it would be possible at all.
Ivan
Whether they would liek to fight n for another 3 months, Doubtful if it would be possible at all.
Ivan
mikewint
Captain
Ivan, I think you and I are in almost total agreement. With the aging French leadership in charge and the BEF allowing them to lead there is no hope. Further more without the 3 day halt order the BEF AND their equipment would have been lost.
Could the allied forces have won? Again yes but only with a total change of tactics starting with the battle of the Saar
Could the allied forces have won? Again yes but only with a total change of tactics starting with the battle of the Saar
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
Mike, I think it is as close to agreement as anything.
I agree that Hitler only late in the day (directive 13) thought about crushing the BEF.
He could only have been stopped with the Saar's offensive.
Mike, what is your opinion if Hitler had invaded in October/November as he had wanted to? BEF not fully deployed and the wheather a bit foul in W. Europe?
How well could he have deployed the troops from Poland? Logistics? did they have enough supplies for another campaign?
Also, at that time it was an improved Schlieffen, not Manstein's concept.
Ivan.
I agree that Hitler only late in the day (directive 13) thought about crushing the BEF.
He could only have been stopped with the Saar's offensive.
Mike, what is your opinion if Hitler had invaded in October/November as he had wanted to? BEF not fully deployed and the wheather a bit foul in W. Europe?
How well could he have deployed the troops from Poland? Logistics? did they have enough supplies for another campaign?
Also, at that time it was an improved Schlieffen, not Manstein's concept.
Ivan.
mikewint
Captain
The Schlieffen Plan was the German General Staff's early 20th century overall strategic plan for victory in a possible future war where it might find itself fighting on two fronts: France to the west and Russia to the east. The First World War later became such a war with both a Western Front and an Eastern Front. The plan took advantage of expected differences in the three countries' speed in preparing for war. In short, it was the German plan to avoid a two-front war by concentrating their troops in the west, quickly defeating the French and then, if necessary, rushing those troops by rail to the east to face the Russians before they had time to mobilize fully.
The idea of the plan was to win the two-front war by first quickly beating France again in the west – the plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris and 42 for the capitulation of France – before the "Russian Steamroller" would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia. The plan depended on Germany's ability to quickly mobilize troops and invade France before France could fully mobilize its troops to defend itself, and then to turn on Russia, seen as the slowest of the three to mobilize, before the Russians were ready.
Following the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. He made two major modifications:
1. He pulled significant numbers of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine, and the forces at the Russian border.
2. He decided not to enter through the Netherlands, instead sending troops through Belgium and Luxembourg only.
Moltke's weakening of the German right, the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia, all contributed to the failure of the German army to break through the Allied forces at the Marne. Without that breakthrough, the plan was destroyed.
Moltke also chose to send 80,000 more men to the east to assist with the Russian invasion against the advisement of General Ludendorff (two days before the reinforcements arrived the Germans had destroyed the Russians at Tannenberg). Ultimately Moltke reassigned 250,000 men (an entire army's worth) from the right-wing assault before finally abandoning the Schlieffen Plan. Repulsed by the left wing of Moltke's forces near Sarrebourg, the French retreated to the hills around the city of Nancy. Rather than sweeping around them and enveloping the French armies and Paris itself from the east, Moltke opted to directly attack their reinforced positions around Nancy which ended in an unmitigated failure.
The Germans had seriously underestimated a number of factors:
1. Belgian resistance: Although the Belgian army was only a tenth the size of the German army, it still delayed the Germans for nearly a month,
2. The effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force: The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was small, numbering only 75,000 at the start of the war. The British were almost annihilated several times, but they managed to delay the Germans long enough for French and British reinforcements to arrive. While the BEF was forced into retreat throughout the month of August, it provided enough resistance against the German First Army under Alexander von Kluck to help induce the German general to break off the Plan. Instead, von Kluck turned south-east towards Compiègne, showing his flank to the Garrison of Paris under Gallieni, making possible the "Miracle of the Marne".
3. The speed of Russian mobilization: The Russians moved faster than expected, gaining ground in Eastern Prussia more quickly than the Germans had planned for. This caused the Germans to pull even more men from their main force, in order to reinforce the Eastern Front. This proved counterproductive, since the forces pulled from the Western Front were still in transit during the German victory at Tannenberg where the German 8th Army destroyed the Russian 2nd and eventually the Russian 1st Army. While on the weakened Western front battles were being lost for Germany.
4. The French railway system: Because of the delays caused by the British and Belgians, the French had more time to transfer troops from the border to Alsace-Lorraine. The Germans greatly underestimated how well they would be able to do this, especially with the extra time they were granted by the slowing of the German forces. By the time the Germans got into France, the French were there waiting for them.
5. Logistical shortcomings: Schlieffen does not appear to have devoted much attention to logistics when he evolved his great Plan. He well understood the difficulties likely to be encountered, but made no systematic effort to solve them. Had he done so, he might well have reached the conclusion that the operation was impracticable. Even if the battle of the Marne gone in Germany's favor, there is every reason to believe that the advance would have petered out. The prime factors would have been the inability of the railheads to keep up with the advance, the lack of fodder, and sheer exhaustion. The Schlieffen Plan was logistically impracticable.
The idea of the plan was to win the two-front war by first quickly beating France again in the west – the plan scheduled 39 days for the fall of Paris and 42 for the capitulation of France – before the "Russian Steamroller" would be able to mobilize and descend upon East Prussia. The plan depended on Germany's ability to quickly mobilize troops and invade France before France could fully mobilize its troops to defend itself, and then to turn on Russia, seen as the slowest of the three to mobilize, before the Russians were ready.
Following the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke became the German chief of staff. He disagreed with at least some of the Schlieffen Plan, thinking it to be too risky. He made two major modifications:
1. He pulled significant numbers of troops away from the main force entering France from the north, in order to fortify the forces in Alsace-Lorraine, and the forces at the Russian border.
2. He decided not to enter through the Netherlands, instead sending troops through Belgium and Luxembourg only.
Moltke's weakening of the German right, the defense of Alsace-Lorraine, and the transfer of three army corps and one cavalry division from the western front to help contain the Russian advance into East Prussia, all contributed to the failure of the German army to break through the Allied forces at the Marne. Without that breakthrough, the plan was destroyed.
Moltke also chose to send 80,000 more men to the east to assist with the Russian invasion against the advisement of General Ludendorff (two days before the reinforcements arrived the Germans had destroyed the Russians at Tannenberg). Ultimately Moltke reassigned 250,000 men (an entire army's worth) from the right-wing assault before finally abandoning the Schlieffen Plan. Repulsed by the left wing of Moltke's forces near Sarrebourg, the French retreated to the hills around the city of Nancy. Rather than sweeping around them and enveloping the French armies and Paris itself from the east, Moltke opted to directly attack their reinforced positions around Nancy which ended in an unmitigated failure.
The Germans had seriously underestimated a number of factors:
1. Belgian resistance: Although the Belgian army was only a tenth the size of the German army, it still delayed the Germans for nearly a month,
2. The effectiveness of the British Expeditionary Force: The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was small, numbering only 75,000 at the start of the war. The British were almost annihilated several times, but they managed to delay the Germans long enough for French and British reinforcements to arrive. While the BEF was forced into retreat throughout the month of August, it provided enough resistance against the German First Army under Alexander von Kluck to help induce the German general to break off the Plan. Instead, von Kluck turned south-east towards Compiègne, showing his flank to the Garrison of Paris under Gallieni, making possible the "Miracle of the Marne".
3. The speed of Russian mobilization: The Russians moved faster than expected, gaining ground in Eastern Prussia more quickly than the Germans had planned for. This caused the Germans to pull even more men from their main force, in order to reinforce the Eastern Front. This proved counterproductive, since the forces pulled from the Western Front were still in transit during the German victory at Tannenberg where the German 8th Army destroyed the Russian 2nd and eventually the Russian 1st Army. While on the weakened Western front battles were being lost for Germany.
4. The French railway system: Because of the delays caused by the British and Belgians, the French had more time to transfer troops from the border to Alsace-Lorraine. The Germans greatly underestimated how well they would be able to do this, especially with the extra time they were granted by the slowing of the German forces. By the time the Germans got into France, the French were there waiting for them.
5. Logistical shortcomings: Schlieffen does not appear to have devoted much attention to logistics when he evolved his great Plan. He well understood the difficulties likely to be encountered, but made no systematic effort to solve them. Had he done so, he might well have reached the conclusion that the operation was impracticable. Even if the battle of the Marne gone in Germany's favor, there is every reason to believe that the advance would have petered out. The prime factors would have been the inability of the railheads to keep up with the advance, the lack of fodder, and sheer exhaustion. The Schlieffen Plan was logistically impracticable.
mikewint
Captain
As to your second question:
After the Polish campaign the Germans were in no position to invade anything. Hitler had badly underestimated the Allied response to his and Russia's invasion of Poland. He had not expected a declaration of War by the allied forces. While he had prepared for that possibility and prepared for it, that plan could not be implemented as he had also been deceived by his Generals as to the state of German troops at the end of the Polish invasion.
German casualties (8082 to 10572 killed, 27,278 to 30322 wounded and 3404 to 5029 missing) were very low compare to Polish casualties. The Germans lost some 993 to 1000 armored fighting vehicles (mainly destroyed by anti-tank guns), 370 to 400 artillery pieces, 697 to 1300 airplanes (damaged and destroyed) along with 11000 motor vehicles. According to the German sources only 89 PzKpfw I, 83 PzKpfw II, 26 PzKpfw III, 19 PzKpfw IV, 5 command tanks, 7 PzKpfw 35(t) and 7 PzKpfw 38(t) were completely lost. In addition, the Polish Navy sank 2 destroyers, 2 minelayers (some sources state that only one vessel was sunk) and damaged numerous other vessels including the SMS Schleswig-Holstein a pre-dreadnought battleship that had fired the first shots of WWII when it fired upon the Polish fortress at Westerplatte.
Some 70000 to 120000 Polish soldiers escaped to Hungary and Romania, 20000 to Latvia and Lithuania, majority eventually making their way west to continue fighting under General Wladyslaw Sikorski. On September 30th, Polish Government in Exile was established in Paris.
In general, the Polish Campaign proved to be a very challenging campaign for the Germans. It demonstrated the speed and power possessed by Panzers and Panzer Divisions. It also demonstrated that the time of large armies made up of foot-infantry and cavalry was over. At the same time, it provided Germans with real experience of using armor in combat conditions. Germans also learned that tanks were not suited for combat in build up areas (e.g. heavy losses suffered in Warsaw) as well as that well organized anti-tank defenses are very dangerous. The Polish Campaign also proved that PzKpfw I and II were unsuitable to be used as frontline combat tanks and should be completely replaced with heavier PzKpfw III and IV. During the course of the campaign, Light Divisions proved to be unsuccessful being to weak to perform the tasks of either regular infantry or motorized infantry.
Thus the German's desperately need time to regroup, repair and rearm. The allied forces gave them that time: The Phony War period
After the Polish campaign the Germans were in no position to invade anything. Hitler had badly underestimated the Allied response to his and Russia's invasion of Poland. He had not expected a declaration of War by the allied forces. While he had prepared for that possibility and prepared for it, that plan could not be implemented as he had also been deceived by his Generals as to the state of German troops at the end of the Polish invasion.
German casualties (8082 to 10572 killed, 27,278 to 30322 wounded and 3404 to 5029 missing) were very low compare to Polish casualties. The Germans lost some 993 to 1000 armored fighting vehicles (mainly destroyed by anti-tank guns), 370 to 400 artillery pieces, 697 to 1300 airplanes (damaged and destroyed) along with 11000 motor vehicles. According to the German sources only 89 PzKpfw I, 83 PzKpfw II, 26 PzKpfw III, 19 PzKpfw IV, 5 command tanks, 7 PzKpfw 35(t) and 7 PzKpfw 38(t) were completely lost. In addition, the Polish Navy sank 2 destroyers, 2 minelayers (some sources state that only one vessel was sunk) and damaged numerous other vessels including the SMS Schleswig-Holstein a pre-dreadnought battleship that had fired the first shots of WWII when it fired upon the Polish fortress at Westerplatte.
Some 70000 to 120000 Polish soldiers escaped to Hungary and Romania, 20000 to Latvia and Lithuania, majority eventually making their way west to continue fighting under General Wladyslaw Sikorski. On September 30th, Polish Government in Exile was established in Paris.
In general, the Polish Campaign proved to be a very challenging campaign for the Germans. It demonstrated the speed and power possessed by Panzers and Panzer Divisions. It also demonstrated that the time of large armies made up of foot-infantry and cavalry was over. At the same time, it provided Germans with real experience of using armor in combat conditions. Germans also learned that tanks were not suited for combat in build up areas (e.g. heavy losses suffered in Warsaw) as well as that well organized anti-tank defenses are very dangerous. The Polish Campaign also proved that PzKpfw I and II were unsuitable to be used as frontline combat tanks and should be completely replaced with heavier PzKpfw III and IV. During the course of the campaign, Light Divisions proved to be unsuccessful being to weak to perform the tasks of either regular infantry or motorized infantry.
Thus the German's desperately need time to regroup, repair and rearm. The allied forces gave them that time: The Phony War period
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ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
Mike,
it would also be my initial take on a french campaign in October/November 1939.
On the Schlieffen plan: I believe tat Schlieffen on his death bed begged them to keep the right wing strong. Exactly what Moltke did not do.
I also read somewhere that the centre and the right of the right wing would have had to march distances that simply could not be achieved for the plan to be a success.
On the polish campaign: I have the numbers somewhere, but the amount of armour vs foot soldiers (horse as well), was apparantly surprisingly small. I have some numbers somewhere.
Have you got a take on that as well?
the period of the "sitz krieg" instead of "blitz krieg" Phoney war), well, did france actually do anything to improve anything?
After all, BEF increased from some 120,000 to some 350,00 (thereabouts).
I also perceive that the German generals appreciated the pause to assess the Polish campaign.
HOWEVER, if they had attacked immediately, what kind of resistance would they have met?
If it was just an improved Schlieffen, disaster again (IMO)
Manstein's plan in 1939: ?
Not so sure on this one.
Comments anybody?
Ivan
it would also be my initial take on a french campaign in October/November 1939.
On the Schlieffen plan: I believe tat Schlieffen on his death bed begged them to keep the right wing strong. Exactly what Moltke did not do.
I also read somewhere that the centre and the right of the right wing would have had to march distances that simply could not be achieved for the plan to be a success.
On the polish campaign: I have the numbers somewhere, but the amount of armour vs foot soldiers (horse as well), was apparantly surprisingly small. I have some numbers somewhere.
Have you got a take on that as well?
the period of the "sitz krieg" instead of "blitz krieg" Phoney war), well, did france actually do anything to improve anything?
After all, BEF increased from some 120,000 to some 350,00 (thereabouts).
I also perceive that the German generals appreciated the pause to assess the Polish campaign.
HOWEVER, if they had attacked immediately, what kind of resistance would they have met?
If it was just an improved Schlieffen, disaster again (IMO)
Manstein's plan in 1939: ?
Not so sure on this one.
Comments anybody?
Ivan
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
All,
I wrote a nice little "what if.." on the alternate history web site:
Nuclear war in Southern Africa
Now, I don't want to turn this into another alternate history web site, and the story plays out in the 1986/7.
Obviously, SA having the bomb. They (sort of) said that it would be used if anybody threatened the republic (Cuba via Angola and SW Africa/Namibia).
I wrote a little scenario where I only changed a few things from the actual history.
Would anybody be interested in giving it some fair comments?
I have attached it as a zip folder.
Advise? should I put it up here? is it worth reading?
I am obviously very proud of it.
Ivan
I wrote a nice little "what if.." on the alternate history web site:
Nuclear war in Southern Africa
Now, I don't want to turn this into another alternate history web site, and the story plays out in the 1986/7.
Obviously, SA having the bomb. They (sort of) said that it would be used if anybody threatened the republic (Cuba via Angola and SW Africa/Namibia).
I wrote a little scenario where I only changed a few things from the actual history.
Would anybody be interested in giving it some fair comments?
I have attached it as a zip folder.
Advise? should I put it up here? is it worth reading?
I am obviously very proud of it.
Ivan
mikewint
Captain
Ivan, again not sure where you are going with this. Check my post #70 the Germans were in no position to attack anyone after the Polish campaign. However back to the initial invasion.
The German forces for the invasion of Poland with the codename Fall Weiss were divided into Army Group North (consisting of the German 3rd and 4th armies) and Army Group South (consisting of the German 8th, 10th, and 14th armies, and the Slovakian Army Group Bernolak
.Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland's 1; Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland's 30; Germany four motorized divisions compared to none in Poland; Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland's eleven.
In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.
According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the French army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after mobilization started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the German lines and were to probe the German defenses. On the fifteenth day of the mobilization (that is on September 16), the French army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The preemptive mobilization was started in France on August 26 and on September 1 full mobilization was declared.
Due to a low birthrate, which had declined during World War I and the Great Depression, France had a severe manpower shortage relative to its total population, which was barely ½ that of Germany. To compensate, France had mobilized about ⅓ of the male population between the ages of 20 and 45, bringing the strength of its armed forces to 5,000,000. Only 2,240,000 of these served in army units in the north. The British contributed a total strength of 897,000 men in 1939, rising to 1,650,000 by June 1940. In May, it numbered only 500,000 men, including reserves. Dutch and Belgian manpower reserves amounted to 400,000 and 650,000 respectively.
A French offensive in the Rhine valley began on September 7, four days after France declared war on Germany. Then, the Wehrmacht was occupied in the attack on Poland, and the French soldiers enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage along the border with Germany. However, the French did not take any action that was able to assist the Poles. Eleven French divisions advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken against weak German opposition. The French army had advanced to a depth of eight kilometres and captured about 20 villages evacuated by the German army, without any resistance. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory. The attack did not result in any diversion of German troops.
On September 12, the Anglo French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop "not closer than 1 kilometer" from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions were in contact with the enemy, and that French advances had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland General Louis Faury informed the Polish chief of staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phony War had begun.
The German forces for the invasion of Poland with the codename Fall Weiss were divided into Army Group North (consisting of the German 3rd and 4th armies) and Army Group South (consisting of the German 8th, 10th, and 14th armies, and the Slovakian Army Group Bernolak
.Germany had 11 tank divisions compared to Poland's 1; Germany had 40 infantry divisions compared to Poland's 30; Germany four motorized divisions compared to none in Poland; Germany had one cavalry brigade compared to Poland's eleven.
In terms of air power, the Germans had 850 bombers and dive-bombers and 400 fighters. The Polish Air Force numbered 210 bombers and 150 fighters – though many of these were obsolete and clearly no match for the modern Luftwaffe that destroyed the Polish Air Force within two days of the first attack.
According to the Franco-Polish military convention, the French army was to start preparations for the major offensive three days after mobilization started. The French forces were to effectively gain control over the area between the French border and the German lines and were to probe the German defenses. On the fifteenth day of the mobilization (that is on September 16), the French army was to start a full-scale assault on Germany. The preemptive mobilization was started in France on August 26 and on September 1 full mobilization was declared.
Due to a low birthrate, which had declined during World War I and the Great Depression, France had a severe manpower shortage relative to its total population, which was barely ½ that of Germany. To compensate, France had mobilized about ⅓ of the male population between the ages of 20 and 45, bringing the strength of its armed forces to 5,000,000. Only 2,240,000 of these served in army units in the north. The British contributed a total strength of 897,000 men in 1939, rising to 1,650,000 by June 1940. In May, it numbered only 500,000 men, including reserves. Dutch and Belgian manpower reserves amounted to 400,000 and 650,000 respectively.
A French offensive in the Rhine valley began on September 7, four days after France declared war on Germany. Then, the Wehrmacht was occupied in the attack on Poland, and the French soldiers enjoyed a decisive numerical advantage along the border with Germany. However, the French did not take any action that was able to assist the Poles. Eleven French divisions advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken against weak German opposition. The French army had advanced to a depth of eight kilometres and captured about 20 villages evacuated by the German army, without any resistance. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory. The attack did not result in any diversion of German troops.
On September 12, the Anglo French Supreme War Council gathered for the first time at Abbeville in France. It was decided that all offensive actions were to be halted immediately. Maurice Gamelin ordered his troops to stop "not closer than 1 kilometer" from the German positions along the Siegfried Line. Poland was not notified of this decision. Instead, Gamelin informed Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły that half of his divisions were in contact with the enemy, and that French advances had forced the Wehrmacht to withdraw at least six divisions from Poland. The following day the commander of the French Military Mission to Poland General Louis Faury informed the Polish chief of staff, General Wacław Stachiewicz that the planned major offensive on the western front had to be postponed from September 17 to September 20. At the same time, French divisions were ordered to retreat to their barracks along the Maginot Line. The Phony War had begun.
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
My point exactly Mike,
The French offensive was not particular fantastic. It might have been, but it wasn't. BEF was only starting to deploy.
Were the forces in the west too few and to badly led to have offered serious resistance even if the depleted German army should fall on them?
THAT I am not too sure on.
Ivan
PS: Did you read my alternative time line?
The French offensive was not particular fantastic. It might have been, but it wasn't. BEF was only starting to deploy.
Were the forces in the west too few and to badly led to have offered serious resistance even if the depleted German army should fall on them?
THAT I am not too sure on.
Ivan
PS: Did you read my alternative time line?
mikewint
Captain
Ivan, when you state "French offensive" I'm assuming you are speaking of the Saar Offensive. Simply put, On 7 September Eleven French divisions advanced along a 32 km line near Saarbrücken against weak German opposition. The French army had advanced to a depth of eight kilometers and captured about 20 villages evacuated by the German army, without any resistance. However, the half-hearted offensive was halted after France seized the Warndt Forest, three square miles of heavily-mined German territory.
As to your second question In fact, the allied forces were, on paper, far superior to their German opponents There were 117 French divisions in total, of which 104 divisions (including 11 in reserve) were for the defense of the north. The British Army contributed only 13 divisions, three of which had not been organized when the campaign began. Some 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions were also a part of the Allied order of battle. British artillery strength amounted to 1,280 guns. Belgium fielded 1,338 and the Dutch, 656. France had 10,700 pieces. This made a total of around 14,000 artillery pieces. Although the Dutch, British and Belgians had barely any amour, the French had a powerful force of 3,254 tanks.
The French Army was of mixed quality. It had in its order of battle some formidable units, particularly the light and heavy armored divisions (DCR and DLM), and several professional infantry divisions. However, a lot of divisions were composed of reserve soldiers, above 30 years old, and were ill-equipped. A serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-air artillery, mobile anti-tank artillery and radio communication systems. This was despite the efforts of Gamelin to produce mobile artillery units. French anti-tank guns were better than their German counter-parts, being able to destroy any German tank, including the Panzer IV, but some units, particularly in the Sedan area where the main German amour attack took place, were ill-equipped and composed of reserve soldiers. The French had the most powerful tanks in the world in 1940, with the Somua S35 Cavalry tank and the Renault B1bis Heavy tank, both being able to destroy all German tanks with their 47mm gun, and also being able to resist shots from German tanks and AT guns thanks to their thicker amour. Unfortunately, the French armored divisions did not have air support as the Germans did, and many French tanks were destroyed by German Stukas, or, even worse, ran out of fuel during combat. Unfortunately for the French, in 1940, French military theoreticians still considered tanks as infantry support.
In operational terms, the French did not seem to give much thought to armored units as offensive weapons. Although some people, such as Colonel de Gaulle, tried to convince French High Command, during the 1930s, of the necessity to form amour divisions supported by aviation and infantry, military conservatism prevented these "new ideas" from emerging. French High Command was still obsessed with holding the front like in 1914-1918. The state of training was also unbalanced, with the majority of personnel trained only to man static fortifications. Little training for mobile actions was carried out between September 1939 and May 1940.
Germany had mobilized 4,200,000 men for the Army, 1,000,000 for the Luftwaffe, 180,000 for the Kriegsmarine, and 100,000 of the Waffen-SS. When consideration is made for those in Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Army had 3,000,000 men available for the offensive on 10 May 1940. These manpower reserves were formed into 157 divisions. Of these, 135 were earmarked for the offensive, including 42 reserve divisions. Thus just 93 divisions began the offensive.
The German forces in the West in May and June deployed some 2,439 tanks and 7,378 artillery guns, including materiel reserves committed. In 1939–40, 45% of the army was 40-years-old, and 50% of all the soldiers had just a few weeks training. The German Army, contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, was not fully motorized. Just 10% of the Army was motorized in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorized forces. Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.
Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".
So could this German Army continue after being mauled in Poland into the face of fresh Allied divisions? Highly unlikely
As to your second question In fact, the allied forces were, on paper, far superior to their German opponents There were 117 French divisions in total, of which 104 divisions (including 11 in reserve) were for the defense of the north. The British Army contributed only 13 divisions, three of which had not been organized when the campaign began. Some 22 Belgian and 10 Dutch divisions were also a part of the Allied order of battle. British artillery strength amounted to 1,280 guns. Belgium fielded 1,338 and the Dutch, 656. France had 10,700 pieces. This made a total of around 14,000 artillery pieces. Although the Dutch, British and Belgians had barely any amour, the French had a powerful force of 3,254 tanks.
The French Army was of mixed quality. It had in its order of battle some formidable units, particularly the light and heavy armored divisions (DCR and DLM), and several professional infantry divisions. However, a lot of divisions were composed of reserve soldiers, above 30 years old, and were ill-equipped. A serious qualitative deficiency was a lack of anti-air artillery, mobile anti-tank artillery and radio communication systems. This was despite the efforts of Gamelin to produce mobile artillery units. French anti-tank guns were better than their German counter-parts, being able to destroy any German tank, including the Panzer IV, but some units, particularly in the Sedan area where the main German amour attack took place, were ill-equipped and composed of reserve soldiers. The French had the most powerful tanks in the world in 1940, with the Somua S35 Cavalry tank and the Renault B1bis Heavy tank, both being able to destroy all German tanks with their 47mm gun, and also being able to resist shots from German tanks and AT guns thanks to their thicker amour. Unfortunately, the French armored divisions did not have air support as the Germans did, and many French tanks were destroyed by German Stukas, or, even worse, ran out of fuel during combat. Unfortunately for the French, in 1940, French military theoreticians still considered tanks as infantry support.
In operational terms, the French did not seem to give much thought to armored units as offensive weapons. Although some people, such as Colonel de Gaulle, tried to convince French High Command, during the 1930s, of the necessity to form amour divisions supported by aviation and infantry, military conservatism prevented these "new ideas" from emerging. French High Command was still obsessed with holding the front like in 1914-1918. The state of training was also unbalanced, with the majority of personnel trained only to man static fortifications. Little training for mobile actions was carried out between September 1939 and May 1940.
Germany had mobilized 4,200,000 men for the Army, 1,000,000 for the Luftwaffe, 180,000 for the Kriegsmarine, and 100,000 of the Waffen-SS. When consideration is made for those in Poland, Denmark and Norway, the Army had 3,000,000 men available for the offensive on 10 May 1940. These manpower reserves were formed into 157 divisions. Of these, 135 were earmarked for the offensive, including 42 reserve divisions. Thus just 93 divisions began the offensive.
The German forces in the West in May and June deployed some 2,439 tanks and 7,378 artillery guns, including materiel reserves committed. In 1939–40, 45% of the army was 40-years-old, and 50% of all the soldiers had just a few weeks training. The German Army, contrary to what the blitzkrieg legend suggests, was not fully motorized. Just 10% of the Army was motorized in 1940 and could muster only 120,000 vehicles compared to the 300,000 of the French Army. The British also had an "enviable" contingent of motorized forces. Most of the German logistical tail consisted of horse-drawn vehicles.
Only 50% of the German divisions available in 1940 were combat ready, often being more poorly equipped than their equivalents in the British and French Armies, or even as well as the German Army of 1914. In the spring of 1940, the German army was semi-modern. A small number of the best equipped and "elite divisions were offset by many second and third rate divisions".
So could this German Army continue after being mauled in Poland into the face of fresh Allied divisions? Highly unlikely
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
Mike,
I also think it would be a "dead-end" if Germany attacked in October/November 1939.
Even the wheather was against it. No wonder the German generals balked at that idea.
That said, Could superior "grip" and battle methodology have "won the day"? any chance at all?
Ivan
I also think it would be a "dead-end" if Germany attacked in October/November 1939.
Even the wheather was against it. No wonder the German generals balked at that idea.
That said, Could superior "grip" and battle methodology have "won the day"? any chance at all?
Ivan
parsifal
Colonel
The ability of the BEF and the Fr 1st and 7th armies to mount an effective defence around the channel Ports is really a micro study of the wider problems faced by the Allies in 1940. The defenders were afflicted by a number of issues that in reality made any defence against modern tactics impossible.
So much has been written about that campaign in 1940, and about the reasons for defeat, yet much of this analysis is still flawed in my opinion. The reasons for defeat are perhaps more easily understood, if we look at the reasons for german success, since many of the reasons for victory, have, as their fip side, the reasons for the allied defeat.
I think the key to the German success was their grasp of modern tactical doctrine, which just happened to also be married to a good operational plan (the Ardennes offensive). In direct contrast to this was the French concept and planning. Their plans were weak, because they overestimated the terrain effects of the Ardennes, and failed to take into account the manpower limitations of their frontline forces. Exacerbating this was the French concept of the "continuous line", a tactical concept just waiting to be defeated by mobile tactics and formations. The French did intend to undertake offensive operations, but their concept of offensive warfare was linked to the concepts of warfare that applied in 1918, and not 1940.
What exacerbated all this was that whereas the Germans in their mobile formations (and to an extent even their leg Infantry formations) had grasped and were implementing all arms warfare the allies (both the British and the French) had failed to do so. Whereas the German military operations, in particular the co-ordination between the ground and air assets were highly co-ordinated in the German experience, in the Allied experience, this was nearly non-existent. Moreover this took a long time for the allies to correct….long after the end of the campaign.
What the allies could do, was to fight a static war of attrition. Whilst the battle remained fluid, and the allies clung to outmoded concepts of war, the Germans were always going to achieve the upper hand, both strategically and tactically. On those few occasions where in the early part of the war when the allies were not strung out in thin lines with dispersed and disconnected forces, they were quite effective in defence, such as the defence put up in front of Calais, and in 1941, in front of Tobruk.
Moreover, it was the French who worked out part of the equation in mounting a successful defence. They worked out how Infantry should behave when confronted with a mobile armoured opponent. Rather than attempt suicidal withdrawals to the next "defensive position", under Weygand, they realized, forlornly and far too late, that the best defence for the infantry was to stay put. Dig in. hedgehog, continue to resist, and await relief and restoration of the line by the defences own mobiole armoured reserves. But in 1940, the allies never possessed the combined arms formations, built around their armour, with the necessary skills to mount a successful counterattack. The allies lacked the necessary ingredients to do this until much later….the training, the leadership, the equipment, the management. The Russians successfully combined armoured reserves with god Infantry tactics, in their defences around Kursk, the so called Pakfronts. The British used similar concept somewhat less successfully at Alamein….they called the defensive element Hedgehogs.
In 1940, there was no possibility of the allies successfully defending their enclave, because they lacked the defensive doctrine and the counterattack capability to do so. If the allies had hung around, they would have lost the manpower as well as the machinery of war. And from there they would have lost the war…..
So much has been written about that campaign in 1940, and about the reasons for defeat, yet much of this analysis is still flawed in my opinion. The reasons for defeat are perhaps more easily understood, if we look at the reasons for german success, since many of the reasons for victory, have, as their fip side, the reasons for the allied defeat.
I think the key to the German success was their grasp of modern tactical doctrine, which just happened to also be married to a good operational plan (the Ardennes offensive). In direct contrast to this was the French concept and planning. Their plans were weak, because they overestimated the terrain effects of the Ardennes, and failed to take into account the manpower limitations of their frontline forces. Exacerbating this was the French concept of the "continuous line", a tactical concept just waiting to be defeated by mobile tactics and formations. The French did intend to undertake offensive operations, but their concept of offensive warfare was linked to the concepts of warfare that applied in 1918, and not 1940.
What exacerbated all this was that whereas the Germans in their mobile formations (and to an extent even their leg Infantry formations) had grasped and were implementing all arms warfare the allies (both the British and the French) had failed to do so. Whereas the German military operations, in particular the co-ordination between the ground and air assets were highly co-ordinated in the German experience, in the Allied experience, this was nearly non-existent. Moreover this took a long time for the allies to correct….long after the end of the campaign.
What the allies could do, was to fight a static war of attrition. Whilst the battle remained fluid, and the allies clung to outmoded concepts of war, the Germans were always going to achieve the upper hand, both strategically and tactically. On those few occasions where in the early part of the war when the allies were not strung out in thin lines with dispersed and disconnected forces, they were quite effective in defence, such as the defence put up in front of Calais, and in 1941, in front of Tobruk.
Moreover, it was the French who worked out part of the equation in mounting a successful defence. They worked out how Infantry should behave when confronted with a mobile armoured opponent. Rather than attempt suicidal withdrawals to the next "defensive position", under Weygand, they realized, forlornly and far too late, that the best defence for the infantry was to stay put. Dig in. hedgehog, continue to resist, and await relief and restoration of the line by the defences own mobiole armoured reserves. But in 1940, the allies never possessed the combined arms formations, built around their armour, with the necessary skills to mount a successful counterattack. The allies lacked the necessary ingredients to do this until much later….the training, the leadership, the equipment, the management. The Russians successfully combined armoured reserves with god Infantry tactics, in their defences around Kursk, the so called Pakfronts. The British used similar concept somewhat less successfully at Alamein….they called the defensive element Hedgehogs.
In 1940, there was no possibility of the allies successfully defending their enclave, because they lacked the defensive doctrine and the counterattack capability to do so. If the allies had hung around, they would have lost the manpower as well as the machinery of war. And from there they would have lost the war…..
mikewint
Captain
Parsifal, pretty much total agreement. If the French had actually mounted the Saar chapaign I think things would have gotten pretty hot for the Germans and Poland might not have fallen. The German high command was also not much different than its French counterparts and had also expected a long drawn out war. Had a few German Generals like Rommel and Guderian not ingored their orders Dunkirk would probably not occured. The Germans were as much surprised by their quick victories as the allies.
What is even more surprising is that the whole concept of a mobile war, the indirect approach was pioneered by Liddell Hart an Englishman after WWI
What is even more surprising is that the whole concept of a mobile war, the indirect approach was pioneered by Liddell Hart an Englishman after WWI
parsifal
Colonel
Whether the French could have mounted a successful offensive in the Saar in 1939 is a difficult question. On the one hand its very hard to justify their inaction, since this played into german planning to a tee. However there were a number of factors that make mounting such an attack very difficult to justify from a French perspective at the time.
Some of the issues worth looking at…..
The borders between France and her bohemian neighbours had been redrawn in 1815 after waterloo and had heavily disadvantaged the French, to deter any French aggression through that location. It was, up to that time an historical invasion point into southern Germany. The redrawn frontiers meant the Germans held all the high ground in the region, and greatly facilitated German defensive arrangements.
At the outbreak of the war, the French had the largest peacetime army, the equivalent of about 20-25 Divs. However this was largely irrelevant, as all the belligerents immediately implemented their mobilization plans. Unfortunately the German mobilization had started, in secret, some time before the war broke out, and in any even was more efficient than any of its opponents. I have read that German mobilization was largely completed by the end of September, whereas, the french were still mobilizing into November. For the record, the british did not complete their pre-war mobilization until January 1940, and it was not a general call up a occurred in Germany and France.
At the outbreak of the war, fully 10 Divs of the French army were serving overseas in her empire. The French did not dare to pull these troops out without replacement (and these formations contained the best manpower and equipment of the French army). The majority of the rest were merely cadres for the 84 divs in the mobilization army….only about 5 divs were at the frontier, and nearly all of these were serving as fortress troops….in other words immobile. Contrary to many postwar accounts the French at the very beginning were outnumbered by the germans in the Alsace area….about 9-11 landswehr divs faced about 5 fortress divs. If the French had committed their interior cadre formations to the battle, they still would have needed to wait about 3 weeks to deploy, and they would have lost most of their irreplaceable regulars….those men who provided the cadres for the citizen call up….the fillers needed to flesh out these cadres. This would have destroyed the French army.
So, the equation does not look good. The French at short notice might have ben able to scrape together 5 mobile Infantry regiments for an immediate attack, by combing out the regiments from their fortified regions. They would have initially faced perhaps 6-8 German Infantry regiments. However, whereas the germans could pull in reserves from adjoining sectors, the French could not, since their other frontier forces lacked any mobility, and they had no interior reserves really. And the germans were defending behind rivers and on hilltops. Tactically, the French had no mines, no mine detection equipment, were short of barbed wire, and telegraphs, had no radios….their tank formations lacked mobile maintenance capability and their supply system was heavily linked to railheads, of which there were none through the Saar gap ,
Some of the issues worth looking at…..
The borders between France and her bohemian neighbours had been redrawn in 1815 after waterloo and had heavily disadvantaged the French, to deter any French aggression through that location. It was, up to that time an historical invasion point into southern Germany. The redrawn frontiers meant the Germans held all the high ground in the region, and greatly facilitated German defensive arrangements.
At the outbreak of the war, the French had the largest peacetime army, the equivalent of about 20-25 Divs. However this was largely irrelevant, as all the belligerents immediately implemented their mobilization plans. Unfortunately the German mobilization had started, in secret, some time before the war broke out, and in any even was more efficient than any of its opponents. I have read that German mobilization was largely completed by the end of September, whereas, the french were still mobilizing into November. For the record, the british did not complete their pre-war mobilization until January 1940, and it was not a general call up a occurred in Germany and France.
At the outbreak of the war, fully 10 Divs of the French army were serving overseas in her empire. The French did not dare to pull these troops out without replacement (and these formations contained the best manpower and equipment of the French army). The majority of the rest were merely cadres for the 84 divs in the mobilization army….only about 5 divs were at the frontier, and nearly all of these were serving as fortress troops….in other words immobile. Contrary to many postwar accounts the French at the very beginning were outnumbered by the germans in the Alsace area….about 9-11 landswehr divs faced about 5 fortress divs. If the French had committed their interior cadre formations to the battle, they still would have needed to wait about 3 weeks to deploy, and they would have lost most of their irreplaceable regulars….those men who provided the cadres for the citizen call up….the fillers needed to flesh out these cadres. This would have destroyed the French army.
So, the equation does not look good. The French at short notice might have ben able to scrape together 5 mobile Infantry regiments for an immediate attack, by combing out the regiments from their fortified regions. They would have initially faced perhaps 6-8 German Infantry regiments. However, whereas the germans could pull in reserves from adjoining sectors, the French could not, since their other frontier forces lacked any mobility, and they had no interior reserves really. And the germans were defending behind rivers and on hilltops. Tactically, the French had no mines, no mine detection equipment, were short of barbed wire, and telegraphs, had no radios….their tank formations lacked mobile maintenance capability and their supply system was heavily linked to railheads, of which there were none through the Saar gap ,
ivanotter
Airman 1st Class
Parsifal Mike:
Good comments. I think we have beaten this to death in any way, shape and form now.
I thought the French had more troops for the Saar. Thanks for that insight all.
Ivan
Good comments. I think we have beaten this to death in any way, shape and form now.
I thought the French had more troops for the Saar. Thanks for that insight all.
Ivan
