What if allies would insist on fighting at Dunkirk for three months?

[rgallant]

Why would competent commander penny pack his airforce that way, you may no like the Germans and they were certainly no uber army as many want them to be but they were not morons.

They applied airpower like everything else, maximum strength to the attack. not 1 plane here 2 planes there.

As I understand it a staffel ran about 12 aircraft, so assume 25% down for what ever reason and we have nine so 2 flights of 4, I would expect that to be the minimum force tossed into an attack.

1939 German light bomber production (Ju87 and Ju88) was negligible. Only about 200 aircraft.

1940 German Light Bomber Production
German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
603 x Ju-87B
1,816 x Ju-88A.
...............................
2,419 for all of 1940. Approximately 1/3rd (production during Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr) would be operational by May 1940. Subtract requirements for Norway, training units etc. and I suspect Germany had only about 500 CAS aircraft available to support the 100 or so Heer divisions employed in the west during May 1940. 5 CAS aircraft per army division is hardly overwhelming air support.

 

[mikewint]

17 August 1940
Single-engined fighters 787
Twin-engined fighters 219
Night fighters 63
Fighter-bombers 119
Dive-bombers 294
Twin-engined bombers 960
Four-engined bombers 7
Long-range reconnaissance aircraft 185
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 135
Coastal aircraft 162
Transport aircraft 226
Total 3157

31 May 44
Single-engined fighters 1063
Twin-engined fighters 151
Night fighters 572
Fighter-bombers 278
Ground attack aircraft 352
Night harassment aircraft 305
Twin-engined bombers 841
Four-engined bombers 97
Long-range reconnaissance aircraft 153
Short-range and army cooperation aircraft 210
Coastal aircraft 123
Transport aircraft 719
Kampfgeschwader 200 (misc. aircraft} 65
Total 4928

From 1940 to 1944 the Luftwaffe had only grown by 1771 total aircraft. Yet Hitler chose to open a two front war. Too little spread too thin. The German forces were always under strength, they fielded what forces they could.

 

[Freebird]

1939 German light bomber production (Ju87 and Ju88) was negligible. Only about 200 aircraft.

1940 German Light Bomber Production
German aircraft production during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
603 x Ju-87B
1,816 x Ju-88A.
...............................
2,419 for all of 1940. Approximately 1/3rd (production during Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr) would be operational by May 1940. Subtract requirements for Norway, training units etc. and I suspect Germany had only about 500 CAS aircraft available to support the 100 or so Heer divisions employed in the west during May 1940. 5 CAS aircraft per army division is hardly overwhelming air support.

So you've estimated that there were 600 Ju88's, 200 Ju87's from Jan-May 1940 + 200 from 1939, or about 1,000 bombers.


Dave, you've badly underestimated the # of light bombers available.
They didn't only use Ju87's Ju88's for tactical support. The He111 Do17Z were much better suited for tactical use than similar British twin engine craft like the Wellington, Hampden Whitley bombers.
You also havn't taken into account production from 1936-1939
The actual numbers are much more than 500 available aircraft for tactical support

By 19 September 1938, the Luftwaffe had received 579 Dornier Do 17s. During 1939-1940, some 475 Dornier Do 17Z bombers, 100 Dornier Do 215s, an updated variant of the Do 17, were built.

Dornier Do 17 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

German production for the Luftwaffe amounted to 808 He 111s by September 1939. According to Heinkel's memoirs, a further 452 were built in 1939,

He111, 756 built in 1940, giving a total of about 1,750 by May 1940
Heinkel He 111 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

By 1 September 1939, 360 Ju 87 As and Bs had been built by the Junkers factories at Dessau and Weserflug factory in Bremen. By 30 June 1940 697 Ju 87 B-1s and 129 B-2s plus 105 R-1s and seven R-2s had been built.

Junkers Ju 87 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

the Bf 110 entered service in 1939 as the Bf 110C, powered by two 1100 hp (820 kw) DB 601A engines. Production was set up on a massive scale, and by the end of the year some 500 Bf 110s were flying operationally. Owing to the limited aerial opposition the Bf 110C was largely employed in the ground-support role. Production during 1940 had risen to 1,083 machines

Messerschmitt ME 110


So the actual number of aircraft would be by May 1940:
~1750 - He111
~1000 Do17Z
~600 Ju88's
~850 Ju87's
~850 Me110C's
+ some various other aircraft, Hs123, Ju86 etc

= By May 1940 the Germans had built some 5,000 bomber attack aircraft, excluding single seat fighters

 

[ivanotter]

The entire "blitz krieg" concept was to smash/capture the BEF. In that Germany failed.

Hitler wanted to attack in the west in October/November 1939. This would have been even more "fun" to speculate on as the BEF was not up to full strength in France.

Would that have 1) been posible? 2) succeeded?

Ivan

 

[mikewint]

Ivan, That "Blitzkreig" was a German operation concept in 1940 is not correct.
Rapid and decisive victories had been pursued by armies well before the Second World War. In the German wars of unification and First World War campaigns, the German General Staff had attempted Bewegungskrieg (Movement War), similar to the modern perception of "Blitzkrieg", with varying degrees of success. In the First World War these methods often succeeded in achieving tactical breakthroughs, but the operational exploitation took time as armies lacked motorisation, could not move quickly, and sometimes failed to achieve a decisive victory altogether. The development of tanks, aircraft, and more importantly, motorised infantry and artillery, enabled the Germans to implement these old methods again with new technology in 1940. The combustion engine solved the problem of operational level exploitation.

When dealing with "Blitzkrieg" as a concept, things become complicated. It is seen as an anomaly and there is no explicit reference to such strategy, operations or tactics in the German battle plans. There is no evidence in German military art, strategy or industrial preparation that points to the existence of a thought out "Blitzkrieg" tendency. Evidence suggests that the German Reich was preparing for a long sustained war of attrition, not a quick war of manouevre. Hitler's miscalculations in 1939 forced him into war before he was ready, and under these circumstances the German General Staff reverted to attempting to win a quick war, before the economic and material superiority of the Allies could make a difference, although this was not their original intention. It was only after the defeat of France in 1940, that the German military pursued a "Blitzkrieg"-kind of warfare to achieve its ambitions in Europe. German historian Karl-Heinz Frieser stated:

"The campaign in the west was not a planned campaign of conquest. Instead, it was an operational act of despair to get out of a desperate strategic situation. What is called "Blitzkrieg thinking" did not develop until after the campaign in the west. It was not the cause but rather the consequence of victory. Something that in May 1940, had come off successfully to everyone's surprise, was now to serve the implementation of Hitler's visions of conquest in the form of the secret success."

 

[ivanotter]

OK, well. I used the word Blitz krieg as the commom denominator, but you are probably right, it is not a new concept. WWI (late) saw the appearance of the storm troops, etc.

that said, refering to Len Deigthon;s book, the plan was to move rapidly and catch the BEF. That was not achieved.

Whether the manstein concept, in 1939, would have been a possibility or whether it would have been an improved Schliesen is a good question.

October/November is not good in Europe for war of movement; hence the generals balked at that idea.

 

[mikewint]

Ivan, forgive me if I sound pedantic but "catching the BEF" was never part of the German plan. Please read many of my earlier posts. The BEF comprised only 10% of the allied forces and was the least of the German worries. The only reason the Germans were able to cut France in half was due to Rommel and Guderian disobeying their orders. By 17 May, Rommel claimed to have taken 10,000 prisoners and suffered only 36 losses. Guderian was delighted with the fast advance, and encouraged his Corps, the XIX, and containing the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions to head for the channel, continuing until fuel was exhausted. However the success of his commanders on the ground began to have effects on Hitler who worried that the German advance was moving too fast. Halder recorded in his diary on May 17 that "Fuhrer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would pull the reins on us ... [he] keeps worrying about the south flank. He rages and screams that we are on the way to ruin the whole campaign." Through deception and different interpretations of orders to stop from Hitler and von Kleist, the commanders on the ground were able to ignore Hitler's attempts to stop the northern advance to the sea.
The only thing that prevented the German from trapping the BEF was the 23 May Halt order. On 23 May, Günther von Kluge proposed that the German Fourth Army, which was poised to continue the attack against the Allied forces at Dunkirk, should "halt and close up." Seeing the Allies were trapped in the city, Gerd von Rundstedt agreed with von Kluge. In the German Fourth Army diary it is recorded on 23 May "will, in the main, halt tomorrow [May 24] in accordance with Colonel-General von Rundstedt's order." General Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, disagreed with his colleagues and wanted to continue the attack against Dunkirk by putting the Fourth army under Bock. Bock was busy and Halder agreed with Von Rundstedt and with von Kluge to stop action against Dunkirk. The disagreement went to Hitler, who overruled Brauchitsch and agreed with stopping action against Dunkirk. Hitler's error wasn't in making the command to halt the German army but in allowing the orders already drawn up by the German generals to stand. It appears that Kleist also agreed with the halt order, which Hitler "rubber-stamped".

 

[ivanotter]

Give me a chance to read up on a few things before I talk from memory of reading some books, etc. I could make a total fool out of myself.

 

[mikewint]

Not trying to sound like an expert here because I'm far from that but you might check out this thread from the begining. No one was more surprised at their rapid success than the Germans. Which was due primarily to the very poor French military command. After the German invasion of Poland, the Supreme Commander of the French Army, Maurice Gamelin, suggested during that month that the Allies should take advantage of the fact that Germany was tied up in Poland by using the Low Countries as a spring board to attack Germany. This suggestion was not taken up by the French government.

Just after the 1 September 1939 invasion of Poland, French soldiers advanced along the Maginot Line 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) into the Saar which was called the Saar Offensive. France had employed 98 divisions (all but 28 of them reserve or fortress formations) and 2,500 tanks against German forces consisting of 43 divisions (32 of them reserves) and no tanks. They advanced until they met the then thin and undermanned Siegfried Line. The French army would easily have been able to penetrate the mere screen of German forces present had they continued with the offensive, but they preferred to force the Germans into the offensive role and withdrew to their own lines in October.
The entire Frence invasion could have easily been aborted long before it even began but the French and allied forces entered into the Phoney War period instead

 

[ivanotter]

A few comments:

Shirer's "The rise and fall of the third Reich" mentions that "Fall Gelb, as the operation was called, had been hastily concocted in the fall of 1939 by the Army High Command under the pressure of Hitler's order to launch the offensive in the West by mid-November".

Whether it was an improved Schlieffen or not, is a good point. However, the clear objective was the drive on the channel ports.

In mid-November, the full force of the BEF was not deployed as of yet.

Wiki:
""""""The First deployment was completed by 11 October 1939 at which point 158,000 men had been transported to France.[11] The "War Secretary" Leslie Hore-Belisha said "158,000 had been transported across the Channel within five weeks of the commencement of the present war. Convoys had averaged three each night and the B.E.F. had been transported intact without a single casualty to any of its personnel."

By 19 October the BEF had received 25,000 vehicles to complete the first deployment. The majority of the troops were stationed along the Franco-Belgian border and along the Maginot Line.

Over the next few months troops, materials and vehicles continued to arrive in France and Belgium and by 13 March 1940 the BEF had doubled in size to 316,000 men.[13] By May 1940 the BEF order of battle consisted of 10 infantry divisions in three corps (I, II, and III), 1st Army Tank Brigade, the BEF Air Component RAF detachment of about 500 aircraft and the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) long-range RAF force. These forces were led by the General Headquarters (GHQ) which consisted of men from Headquarters Troops (1st Battalion Welsh Guards, 9th Battalion The West Yorkshire Regiment and the 14th Battalion The Royal Fusiliers), the 1st Army Tank Brigade, 1st Light Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade and HQ Royal Artillery 5th Infantry Division."""""""

Shirer: "In the first phase of the campaign, at any rate, he (Hitler) planned not to knock out the French army but to roll it back and occupy the Channel coast, thus cutting off Britain from its ally".

Shirer: "At the end of November, the Allies added a scheme to rush General Henri Giraud's Seventh Army up the Channel coast to help the Dutch north of Antwerp in case the Netherlands was also attacked. Thus a German attempt to sweep through the Belgium – and perhaps Holland – to flank the Maginot line would be met very early in the game by the entire BEF, the bulk of the French Army, the 22 divisions of the Belgians and the ten divisions of the Dutch".

It was to avoid such a head-on clash and at the same to trap the British and French armies that would speed forward so far that Manstein proposed a radical change in Fall Gelb.""

Mike, I surely think that a part of it all was to trap the BEF from a military point of view. Now, it is possible that from a political point of view, Hitler changed it a bit.

On Blitz Krieg: Len Deighton: The word Blitz Krieg has been attributed to Hitler, Time magazine and Liddel Hart…..Lightning fast war had been an essential part of prussian military thinking since long before Bismarck.

Mike, I fully agree that the run-up to Blitz Krieg was coming from both the shock troops of WWI etc. and that the early Fall Gelb was rather pedestrian. Only with Manstein's ideas did the whole thing become feasible.

The question is then: Did Manstein envisages a situation where he could trap BEF? I believe so as the idea was the move to the Channel ports. Hitler may have seen this as ending the war, at least as far as UK was concerned.

THAT I think is the conclusion. Mansein gave Hitler the tool, Hitler saw the political possibilities of trapping the BEF.

Deighton: "Manstein provides three possible reasons for Hitler's decision to halt the tanks. First, he wanted to keep his armor intact for the coming battle in central france. Second, Goring deserved a chance. Third (less credible) Hitler believed that a compromise peace with the British would not be possible if he destroyed their army.

After the event Hitler himself gave many different reasons for this decision" extract: heavy rain of 26 and 27 May made the Flanders marshes. 28 may Guderian agreed to that. He said that infantry was more suited for that kind of battle.

In any event:

"It is difficult to believe that Hitler had evolved any strategic reason for sparing the BEF. As recently as 24 May, Hitler's directive No 13 had begun to be put into effect. "Next goal of operations is the annihilation of the French, British and Belgian forces….During this operation the task of the Luftwaffe is to break all enemy resistance in the encircled parts and to prevent the escape of the British forces across the Channel".

That should make it clear that the idea was to trap the BEF.

Now, again Deighton: And yet before we declare Plan Yellow to be the only successful blitzkrieg, it is worth looking at the declared objectives of that offensive. One stated aim was to engage and defeat the strongest possible part of the Allied armies. Hitler had specifically ordered the annihilation of the BEF and that it should be prevented from escaping across the Channel. The Germans had failed in that endeavor.

Comments?

The more fun question to ask really is:

If Hitler had carried out the attacks on France and belgium in November 1939 AND only a par to fthe BEF was in France, wold it have changed the outcome insofar as a peace with UK was concerned?

Could it have been pulled off in November 1939 as the plan at that time was far more modest? rather pedestrian really.

if Hitler had only managed to push back the french and not really getting to any war with the UK (BEF hardly there) what then? stalemate in Europe?

Ivan

 

[ivanotter]

...and I fully agree with your conclusions re the original thread.

Supply and other logistics would have been rather impossible, etc.

On German mobility: The panzers were impressive, but the German army was still very much horse and leg driven.

 

[mikewint]

Ivan, I'm not sure where you are headed with that post. Lets look back at history:
On 6 October, Hitler made a peace offer to both Western Powers. Even before they had had time to respond, on 9 October, he also formulated a new military policy in case their reply was negative: Führer-Anweisung N°6,
This plan was firmly based on the seemingly more realistic assumption that Germany's military strength would still have to be built up for several more years and that for the moment only limited objectives could be envisaged. They were aimed at improving Germany's ability to survive a long, protracted war in the west. Hitler ordered a conquest of the Low Countries to be executed at the shortest possible notice. This would stop France from occupying them first, and prevent Allied air power from threatening the vital German Ruhr area. It would also provide the basis for a successful long-term air and sea campaign against the United Kingdom. There was no mention in the Führer-Directive of any immediate consecutive attack to conquer the whole of France, although as much as possible of the border areas in northern France should be occupied.
While writing the directive, Hitler had assumed that such an attack could be initiated within a period of at most a few weeks, but the very day he issued it he was disabused of this illusion. It transpired that he had been misinformed about the true state of Germany's forces. The motorized units had to recover, repairing the damage to their vehicles incurred in the Polish campaign and further more ammunition stocks were largely depleted.
Franz Halder, the chief of staff of the German Army, presented the first plan for Fall Gelb on 19 October, the pre-war codename of plans for campaigns in the Low Countries: the Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb.
Aufmarschanweisung N°1 was based on an unimaginative frontal attack, sacrificing a projected half a million German soldiers to attain the limited goal of throwing the Allies back to the river Somme. Germany's strength for 1940 would then be spent; only in 1942 could the main attack against France begin.
On 29 October, Halder proposed a second operational plan, Aufmarschanweisung N°2, Fall Gelb, featuring a secondary attack on the Netherlands.
General Gerd von Rundstedt, the commander of Army Group A, disagreed with it. Its fundamental flaw was that it did not conform to the classic principles of the Bewegungskrieg, or "maneuver warfare" that had been the basis of German operations since the 19th century. A breakthrough would have to be accomplished that would result in the encirclement and destruction of the main body of Allied forces. The logical place to achieve this would be in the region of Sedan.
On 10 January, a German Messerschmitt Bf 108 made a forced landing at Maasmechelen, north of Maastricht, in Belgium. Among the occupants of the aircraft was a Luftwaffe major, Hellmuth Reinberger, who was carrying a copy of the latest version of Aufmarschanweisung N°2. Reinberger was unable to destroy the documents, which quickly fell into the hands of the Belgian intelligence services. On 30 January, Aufmarschanweisung N°3, Fall Gelb, was issued which essentially conformed to the earlier versions.
On 2 February, von Manstein's plan was brought to Hitler's attention. On 17 February, Hitler summoned von Manstein, General Rudolf Schmundt (the German Army's Chief of Personnel) and Alfred Jodl to attend a conference. Hitler sat and listened, abandoning his habits of interrupting and launching into monologues. In the end, he agreed to all of von Manstein's suggestions. The next day he ordered the plans to be changed in accordance with von Manstein's ideas. They appealed to Hitler mainly because they offered some real hope of victory. Hitler recognized the breakthrough at Sedan only in tactical terms, whereas von Manstein saw it as a means to an end. He envisaged an operation to the English Channel and the encirclement of the Allied armies in Belgium, which, if carried out correctly, could have a favorable strategic outcome.
Aufmarschanweisung N°4, Fall Gelb, was issued on 24 February. The bulk of the German officer corps was appalled by the plan, and they called Halder the "gravedigger of the Panzer force".
Even when adapted to more conventional methods, the new plan provoked a storm of protest from the majority of German generals. They thought it utterly irresponsible to create a concentration of forces in a position where they could not possibly be sufficiently supplied, while such inadequate supply routes as there were could easily be cut off by the French. If the Allies did not react as expected, the German offensive could end in catastrophe. Their objections were ignored. Halder argued that, as Germany's strategic position seemed hopeless anyway, even the slightest chance of a decisive victory outweighed the certainty of ultimate defeat implied by inaction.
Fast forward to 13 May, the German XIX Corps forced three crossings near Sedan, executed by the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer Divisions, reinforced by the elite Großdeutschland infantry regiment. Instead of slowly massing artillery as the French expected, the Germans concentrated most of their air power (as they lacked strong artillery forces) to smash a hole in a narrow sector of the French lines by carpet bombing and by dive bombing.
The disorder that had begun at Sedan spread down the French lines. At 19:00hrs on 13 May, the 295th regiment of 55th Infantry Division, holding the last prepared defensive line at the Bulson ridge, was panicked by the false rumor that German tanks were already behind its positions. It fled, creating a gap in the French defenses, before even a single German tank had crossed the river. This "Panic of Bulson" also involved the divisional artillery. The Germans had not attacked their position, and would not do so until 12 hours later, at 07:20 on 14 May. Still, the French had several hours to launch a counter offensive before the Germans consolidated the bridgeheads, but failed to attack soon enough.
Recognizing the gravity of the defeat at Sedan, General Gaston-Henri Billotte, commander of the First Army Group whose right flank pivoted on Sedan, urged that the bridges across the Meuse be destroyed by air attack. That day every available Allied light bomber was employed in an attempt to destroy the three bridges, but failed to hit them while suffering heavy losses. Some 44 percent of the Allies bomber strength was destroyed.
Heinz Guderian, the commander of the German XIXth Army Corps, had indicated on 12 May that he wanted to enlarge the bridgehead to at least 20 kilometers. His superior, Ewald von Kleist, ordered him on behalf of Hitler to limit his moves to a maximum of 8 kilometers before consolidation. On 14 May at 11:45, von Rundstedt confirmed this order, which implied that the tanks should now start to dig in. Guderian was able to get to von Kleist to agree to "reconnaissance in force", by threatening to resign. This vague terminology allowed Guderian to advance forward effectively ignoring von Kleist's order to halt.
On 15 May, in heavy fighting, Guderian's motorized infantry dispersed the reinforcements of the newly formed French Sixth Army in their assembly area west of Sedan, undercutting the southern flank of the French Ninth Army, which collapsed, and surrendered en masse. The 102nd Fortress Division, its flanks unsupported, was surrounded and destroyed on 15 May at Monthermé bridgehead by the 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions. The French Second Army had also been seriously mauled and had rendered itself impotent. The Ninth Army was giving way because they also did not have time to fortify their lines. Erwin Rommel had breached its defenses within 24 hours of its conception. This allowed the Rommel to break free with his 7th Panzer Division. Refusing to allow his division rest and advancing in light and darkness, the Ghost division advanced 30 miles (48 km) in just 24 hours.
On 23 May, Günther von Kluge proposed that the German Fourth Army, which was poised to continue the attack against the Allied forces at Dunkirk, should "halt and close up." Seeing the Allies were trapped in the city, von Rundstedt agreed with von Kluge. In the German Fourth Army diary it is recorded on 23 May "will, in the main, halt tomorrow [May 24] in accordance with Colonel-General von Rundstedt's order." General Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, disagreed with his colleagues and wanted to continue the attack against Dunkirk by putting the Fourth army under Bock. The disagreement went to Hitler, who overruled Brauchitsch and agreed with stopping action against Dunkirk.
Thus, I find no deliberate plan to isolate the BEF, nor any deliberate plan to conduct the war in the manner in which it actually happened. Due to several fortuitous circumstances and German officers disobeying their direct commanders the battle of France would have played out much differently as would Dunkirk had the Germans not halted for 3 days.

 

[ivanotter]

I think we might be heading for a common conclusion, Mike.

1) The concept of blitzkrieg was a development, not a revolution (I agree)

2) The first case yellow plans were not particular daring, more improved Schlieffen (faster moving right flank). I agree

3) Only late in the day did the Manstein plan get traction. I agree

4) The destruction of BEF or at least entrapment was an opportunitic chance, hatched in May. We cannot ignore fuhrer directive 13, spellign it out.

5) I can see that it was not the stated aim prior to the invasion (thansk Mike)

Is this a fair representation?

It just also shows one thing: Hitler did not have a "blue print" for the war, but was an opportunistic gambler in many ways.

Ivan

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... Hitler did not have a "blue print" for the war, but was an opportunistic gambler in many ways"

That more or less sums it up. On the other hand - the Mein Kampf writings were a blueprint of objectives - the racial superiority stuff.

MM

 

[ivanotter]

Michael, yes.

It is actually amazing that the only "blue print" was the ramblings in Mein Kampf.

Apparantly Raeder tried to show what could happen in a real geopolitical war, but his ideas were dismissed.

Compared to Brooke: First we stop them in N. Africa, then we open the med, saving us 1 million tons n transport. Then we invade Italy, getting some divisions busy, THEN we invade the continent.

it nearly came out like that.

what a difference. Churchill was probably just as opportunistic but had a better grasp of it all.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Churchill was probably just as opportunistic but had a better grasp of it all."

Certainly. He was probably the most experienced (rounded) politician-leader in WW2. Just yesterday I was looking at photos of him crossing the Rhine with Monty (albeit an uncontested section) in 1945, just before the British crossing. Ike had been by for a conference and when he left Churchill and Monty did a little recon (for the cameras and for morale). Seeing the pictures I was struck by just how "edgy" he was.

By contrast, Hitler was a WW1 runner and Stalin was a Georgian terrorist-bankrobber.

MM

 

[ivanotter]

Churchill was a charater of note. on one hand challenging his generals to think "out of the box" but still not overstepping the line. providing objectives, big picture etc, but maybe not really clear on it himself. Still doing a lot on the fly, probably.

opportunistic, but still listening.

Hitler was still fighting WWI I think. No real objectives and very pedestrian in the outlook. He was still figthing france, but I don;t think he got the idea that they could conquer France. Same with the UK.

I have an interesting book, Stalins' War, input from his generals. Different picture. The generals acknowledged his grasp of strategic situations.

Ruthless in the extreme.

There is another book, Alliance, showing how little Roosevelt actually cared for Churchill. Roosevelt comes out as extremely self-centered. The "special relationship" was a bit of a one-way street.

 

[mikewint]

Ivan, Ok, you open another can of worms here Good Old Winston Churchill, apologies ahead of time if I offend any one. Agreed he did a fantastic job in WWII but his record is hardly one to aspire to. Let's begin with WWI:
In 1914, young Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty. He was itching to get into WWI but it was primarily a land war. There had only been one major navel battle: Jutland. Before the Ottoman Empire had even entered the war, in October 1914, Churchill had ordered the naval bombardment of the Dardanelles. Like most British, Churchill considered the Turks to be inferior opponents with old munitions and guns that could not stand up to British firepower. In Feb. 1915 and again in March a combined British and French force sailed up the Dardanelles to bombard the Turkish defenses. The Turks easily push back the attack with British losses of 700 dead, 3 battleships sunk, and 3 others badly damaged. The vice admiral in charge of the attack told Churchill that he could not silence the forts without an infantry assault. And so was born the Gallipoli campaign.
General Ian Hamilton requested 150,000 troops Lord Kitchener allowed only half that number faced with the bloodbath on the western front. Only one veteran division, the 29th was sent. The Royal Naval division sent by Churchill was a hodgepodge of irregulars and marines. Green and untried volunteer soldiers from Australia and New Zealand 700 miles away in Egypt being trained to fight in France were co-opted.
In the predawn darkness of April 25 the landings began. At Helles the British delayed until 8AM and tried to land in broad daylight in front of Turkish guns dug in 50yds away. Of the first 200 troops only 21 made it to the beach. On V and W beaches 950 Lancashire Fusiliers landed. By nightfall 500 were dead and British losses equaled over 2000.
As to the ANZAC troops, they were to land at the Gaba Tepe headland; instead, they landed a mile further up the coast at what would be known as Anzac cove. By sheer force of will the ANZAC troops made it 1500 yards inland but a Turkish counter-attack drove them back. One Fifth of the ANZAC forces died that first day. Hamilton requested evacuation but was rejected by Churchill. Turkish, British, and ANZAC troops built trenches; sometimes only 10yds apart mostly out of corpses. By May 4 the Turks had lost 14,000 men and the ANZACs almost 10,000 men.
As the summer months wore on disease (flies drawn by the rotting corpses covered every surface), thirst, and lack of food took their toll. On Aug 6th in a last ditch attempt to break the stalemate the British landed troops further north at Suvla Bay. The Turks were caught completely off guard but Lieutenant General Stopford moved too slowly to exploit the landings and Turkish reinforcements made it to the high ground and the British were again stopped and the war of attrition continued. In the beginning of September, Hamilton again requested evacuation but Churchill removed him from command in October. Lord Kitchner visited in November and ordered the evacuation. Before this could begin, a massive rain and snow storm hit the battlefield. Hundreds more drowned in the shallow trenches that caved-in and flooded and thousands died of exposure, frostbite, and illness.
Churchill was held accountable for the debacle and lost his position in the War Cabinet and was excluded from the government.
Because of the conditions at the time casualties can only be estimated but most sources give:
British – 119,696 Australian – 26,094 New Zealand – 7571 Turkish – 218,000

 

[mikewint]

Churchill strikes again - At the end of WWI the British had effectively won the war in the mid-east using large forces from India and adventurers such as T.E. Lawrence. But, with Britain shattered by the loss of manpower and money from the European campaigns the ability and will to simply move in and claim the mid-east was lacking. Furthermore the Balfour Declaration in 1917 supporting Jewish claims for a sovereign state had angered many Arabs and many in the Colonial Office who were pro-Arab. Had the British realized that the rumored oil reserves in the region held the key to world power for the next century they might have acted differently.
Sir Mark Sykes, appointed by Lord Kitchener in 1915 as his personal representative to determine the future of the Mid-East worked tirelessly to establish British control of the region. His plan made sure that local leaders would be on the side of the British matching aspiring leaders to their ethnic regions. Unfortunately Sykes died suddenly in 1919 and Lloyd George could find no one to take on his position. Sadly he turned, in the end to the man who became Colonial Secretary in 1921, Winston Churchill.
Churchill had no time or patience for any of this. He wanted the army demobilized, Arab rebellions put down, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the route to India remain British, Syria-Lebanon left essentially to the French who refused to give up their colonial influence, and the rest of Arabia which had no particular value, dealt with as quickly as possible.
The British had take Baghdad in 1917 and set up a British protectorate. The British proved to be highly efficient tax-collectors and strong opposition arose. The Ottoman Turks had divided the region into three provinces along ethnic lines centered on Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra in an attempt to keep the warring Sunni and Shiite populations apart. Baghdad had a sizable Jewish and Assyrian Christian population plus the Kurds who strongly opposed the British. By 1920 they were in full revolt.
Churchill was not the least bit interested in working out what to do with whom: "I do not understand this squeamishness about the use of gas. I am strongly in favor of using poisoned gas against uncivilized tribes." Led by some young general poison gas was used regularly across the region to put down the revolt.
Wing Commander Harris (notable in later life for the firebombing of Dresden) also noted: "The Arab and Kurds now know what real bombing means. A full sized village can be wiped out within 45 minutes." Even in 1940 Churchill was buying huge stocks of chemical weapons for use in Germany. Churchill stated: "It is absurd to consider morality on this topic when everybody used it in the last war without a word of complaint from the moralists or Church"
In March 1921, Churchill held a 10-day conference in Cairo in which he handed over all of Arabia to local strongmen in return for their support of Britain, with no thought given to local population's ethnicity, religion, or desires. Ibn Saud was one such strongman. He was given the heart of Arabia to reinstate the House of Saud. Two Hashemite brothers from Mecca, Faisal and Abdullah were made kings of Iraq and Transjordan. The three former ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra were thrown into Iraq and the Kurds lured in with promises of self-rule. In order to create borders that could be easily protected for the two new kingdoms, the conference gave a large portion of Saudi Arabia (west of the Euphrates) to Iraq. In return Ibn Saud was given control of Kuwait.
So every time you look at today's Mid-East mess say thank you Winston. Rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iraq remains. Three times Iraq has laid claim to Kuwait, the last time leading to the Gulf War. Churchill's total lack of interest in laying down sensible borders resulted in the predicted conflict between the Shiites and Sunnis which was further complicated by the presence of the Kurds. The British imposition of a total outsider as king plus their failure to establish any proper governmental system led to a series of coups leading to Saddam Hussein and the second Gulf War.

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... He was probably the most experienced (rounded) politician-leader in WW2."

Do you have an alternative leader-candidate for this position, mikewint ...? That's MY claim and I stand by it. The only US candidates in recent times are Teddy Roosevelt and Ike. And Ike wasn't in THIS competition until after WW2.

Right man, right place, right time ... all the rest of it was just "preparation".


MM