What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

[Deleted member 68059]

You're refuting historical perspectives using modern sources, but it's difficult to comprehend the point of view of an earlier time. The official strategy of both sides in the European war was to stop the enemy's production by "unhousing" the factory workers. The fact that the workers themselves may have been incinerated in the process was viewed as a secondary concern. Public acceptance was gained by propaganda that dehumanized the foreigner.

A change in weapons wouldn't have necessarily changed the strategy; a more accurate weapon could still have been used to to bomb civilians more accurately.

If I`ve interpreted you correctly, I`m not very sure about your first point, there were debates in the British Parliament during the war itself on the whole topic of if it was morally tenable to bomb civilian areas, this is not a new area of debate which was only explored by modern novelists and anti-war activists. Some of those very much against the whole idea on a logical basis included Sir Henry Tizard, Churchills chief scientific advisor. (his main argument was more orientated towards the fact he believed such bombing didn't achieve the results that the resources put into it justified, in these discussions Tizard (with a level of irony off the charts) was opposed by Lindemann, who was a friend of Churchill - who was born in Baden-Baden, Germany- of all places...).

Some details of this are available to read about here:

When Does Personality Make a Difference? Lord Cherwell and the Area Bombing of Germany on JSTOR

"Frederick Lindemann", somewhat amusingly, was 'redesignated' as "Lord Cherwell" in 1941. Sucessfully obfuscating his birth history, (oops did I say that? )

 

[tomo pauk]

Two posts ( #235 in this thread, and another from another thread) reported for pushing the apologia for the Nazi Germany aggression and crimes.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The tragedy was that it Dresden had been targeted from February 13th 1945 onwards when the Reich was already cut in half by the allies.

This is incorrect. The Americans and Soviets didn't meet up on the Elbe until the last week of April 1945.

 

[wuzak]

I'm skeptical that radar, Gee-H and Oboe were capable of precision target feature attacks at night by Mosquitos but willing to be schooled. Until then, the important case for strategic bombing for Mosquito points to low level attacks in daylight, as singles or perhaps flights.

The USAAF requested the use of OBOE and GEE-H, so it can't have all been bad!

That was provided to me by the late Edgar Brooks some years ago.

These were mostly used for target marking by Mosquitoes. The main bomber force would then aim for, or between, those markers.

As I understand it, OBOE and GEE-H had accuracy comparable to daylight visual aiming.

The limitation with these systems vs visual aiming was range. Though the British did experiment with a repeater aircraft to extend the range.

Assuming without argument that Schweinfurt represents maximum effective range with 2x500 pound bombs internally, and two external 100UKgal tanks, what does that translate to for TAS at low level for maximum range penetrations? The P-51B/D TAS was reduced 45mph TAS with 110gal externals at 5000 feet at Normal Power (46" @2700 RPM). For P-51D clean, at Normal Power, the TAS at 5000 feet was 323 mph, with 110's that reduces to 278mph during tank augmented Penetration. For 25000 feet TAS for max range was 281mph TAS.

The external tanks normally used were 50UKG.

The calculations I made years ago were based on a Mk.IV with 4 x 500lb bombs.

At 6,000ft the Mk.IV was capable of 340mph at 9psi boost, 95% of maximum load, fitted with ejector exhausts but without wing tanks.

Wuzak, how does 'range' for B.XVI with either one 4,000lb HC or 4x500 internally and 2x110UKgal translate to Combat Radius, taking into account running at high boost for 20 minutes, and a 20 minute reserve for weather? IMO this question is one of the two critical questions related to comparing Mosquito as alternative to B-17/25 for Combined Bomber Offensive. As you pointed out, the numbers actually produced in 1943 severely binds the practical selection of Mosquito to replace Lancaster or B-17/24.

I don't have enough information to answer that, other than it was at least to Berlin - around 600 miles radius.

The second critical question is 'escapability/vulnerability' of the Mosquito when required to spool up from max range cruise settings, accelerate and escape a stern chase. That question 'lead in' was introduced above by the Combat Radius considerations of 20 minutes of max power. As a practical matter, if attacked inbound, the Mossie must not only run faster - but also extend far enough for pursuit to lose sight and be able to turn back and evade re-engagement. Inbound engagement points to dropping externals, dropping bomb load and accelerated flight with full internal fuel load. What do yo believe that max speed of B.XVI is at 5000 feet for full internal (fuel) load?

I don't have any performance numbers for the B.XVI, but the B.IX was similar had had a speed of around 345mph @ 5,000ft with two 500lb bombs under the wing at 95% of take-off weight, with +18psi boost. With +21 psi boost the top speed jumps to 365mph.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mosquito/lr495-b-level.jpg

If a low altitude mission was deemed the best, the high altitude 70 series Merlins could have been replaced by the mid-altitude Merlin 66s, equivalent to the V-1650-7.

 

[drgondog]

The USAAF requested the use of OBOE and GEE-H, so it can't have all been bad!

View attachment 623187

That was provided to me by the late Edgar Brooks some years ago.

These were mostly used for target marking by Mosquitoes. The main bomber force would then aim for, or between, those markers.

As I understand it, OBOE and GEE-H had accuracy comparable to daylight visual aiming.

The limitation with these systems vs visual aiming was range. Though the British did experiment with a repeater aircraft to extend the range.





The external tanks normally used were 50UKG.

The calculations I made years ago were based on a Mk.IV with 4 x 500lb bombs.

At 6,000ft the Mk.IV was capable of 340mph at 9psi boost, 95% of maximum load, fitted with ejector exhausts but without wing tanks.

Mosquito B. Mk XX KB.328 Level Speed Performance Trials (wwiiaircraftperformance.org) While not definitive the Mk XX as tested with 4x500lb internally and 2x50UK gal tanks externally, cruised at (2650RPM and 7# boost) 302mph@4000 feet. If our scenario is 'low level' for surprise I suspect a 4K entry is max for 'reasonable obscurity'?

For Mk IX I can't read the value for 4K at weak cruise of 4# Boost but at 10,000 it is 300TAS with same bomb load but no external fuel. Extrapolated t 4K altitude the Cruise speed ~ 280mph or less

I don't have enough information to answer that, other than it was at least to Berlin - around 600 miles radius.

This is a key question to be answered. Can't imagine a Mosquito with 2000 pound internal bomb load and 50 gal external tanks getting anywhere near Berlin at either 12# or 18# boost... as a Combat Radius for planning purposes when escape from pursuit is anticipated. That said, if Combat radius was 600 miles at 12# Boost, then this Mosquito would be tough to catch with Fw 190. At 4# it would be in dire straights from diving stern attack.

I don't have any performance numbers for the B.XVI, but the B.IX was similar had had a speed of around 345mph @ 5,000ft with two 500lb bombs under the wing at 95% of take-off weight, with +18psi boost. With +21 psi boost the top speed jumps to 365mph.

Can't get to Berlin at 18# boost for cruise. Probably difficult to reach Frankfurt.

http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/mosquito/lr495-b-level.jpg

If a low altitude mission was deemed the best, the high altitude 70 series Merlins could have been replaced by the mid-altitude Merlin 66s, equivalent to the V-1650-7.

The key to making a case for Mosquito as a strategic bomber providing same as or better target efficiency, based on your summaries, tend to not work for high altitude solution. Much more visibility inbound during daylight and much less precision targeting capability for straight and level bomb aiming at night (or day).

8th AF wanted Oboe and Gee simply because they (8th 15th using H2X, etc) were ineffective through overcast throughout the war. That said I am skeptical that it would be very effective vs small critical targets with 100 bombers, much less 1 or several. I have no idea regarding operational issues for 'in trail' passes for large numbers of Mosquitos to achieve a shotgun effect - but why is that useful?

For the above reasons I'm prepared to accept some feasibility for flight size intrusions bombing visually at low level in decent weather - but attacking targets within combat radius at high speed seem to be the most survivable and potentially efficient - given operational availability in summer/fall of 1943. I see no feasibility against large target complexes like Ball Bearing or aircraft engine assembly targets in bad weather at low level with any size force. That said neither RAF nor AAF heavy bombers in large formations were very efficient in similar weather conditions.

It seems the next step to keep the analysis open is to dig up Combat Radius capability at rich and weak Cruise boost to extend Radius to Maximium possible target inclusions.

Given that the P-51D with 269USgal internal and 2x75USgal had a Combat Radius of 700mi at 25K and 750mi at 10K - with a much cleaner airfcraft and 419 gal per engine - The Mosquito IX should be close but how close? The question of attack tactics is also open.

 

[yulzari]

Folk seem to have missed the issue that one would not use B17s in the same way as Mosquitos. And vice versa. If Mosquitos were used in lieu of B17s then the doctrine for targeting would also alter to suit So comparing OTL sorties is of limited in value.

Using ridiculous extremes to make the point, you would not use DH4s in the same way as B52s.

 

[Donald Johnson]

Thought I would touch on this, as it makes a fantastic point about how the retelling of propaganda continues to permeate history through the ages.
Prior to the Allied bombing of Dresden, no one cared much about it. It was no more medieval or cultural than Cologne or other older German cities. However, the morning after the first bombing raid, Goebbels (minister of bullshit) issued a press release stating that Dresden was nothing more than an unarmed cultural center and the "hundreds of thousands" of casualties were criminal.
This has been parroted through countless books, websites and other media to this day.
In actuality, Dresden was a crossroads of several highways and railroads. At the time of the bombing, Dresden was packed with refugees plus elements of Wehrmact and SS units retreating from the Red Army's advance.
Additionally, Dresden was a command and control center for the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht. There were headquarters in the city for the afore-mentioned as well as regional government offices and a headquarters (and prison) for the Gestapo.
There was a large railyard in the city and on the outskirts were two Luftwaffe fighter fields, a flight school, a material command airfield and an airfield used by bomber groups.
In the end, after years of official reviews and inquests, the official death toll was 86,000, many of which were refugees plus Wehrmacht/SS soldiers caught in the open.

In contrast, the fire bombing of Tokyo killed well over 120 thousand and displaced almost 1.5 million civilians. The casualties of Tokyo well exceed the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

So in the end, this points to the need to be careful about what you see/read on the internet, because often times, things are not what they seem.

This seems to be a legitimate defense of that raid except that the horrific firebombing is definitely a civilian targeting, hoping to get military targets as well. Again, pinpoint attacks on those objectives may have spared the rest of the civilians. But this is a legitimate debate topic with questions as to exactly what terrorism is and when it is ever appropriate to target civilians. Dismissing it as mere "propaganda" serves only to extend to the debate. My purpose here is to explore what drives such decisions:

>>Air Chief Marshal Arthur "Bomber" Harris, head of Britain's Royal Air Force Bomber Command, had a special desire to wipe every major German city off the map, even though it was plainly obvious that targets were becoming fewer, and the end of the war was just weeks away.<<

Right or Wrong: Why the Fire Bombing of Dresden Is Still Debated Today

That Churchill felt compelled to mention it is also germane:

>>Some have questioned the military value of Dresden. Even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed doubts immediately after the attack.


"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed," he wrote in a memo.

"The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing."

Dresden: The World War Two bombing 75 years on

I really like using the BBC as a classroom source as it tends to minimize bias in its reporting.

As a side note, the racist nature of this debate can be discussed in that yes, Japanese cities were wiped out in this nature, but was it less outrageous since they were Asians? This leads into a discussion of whether a German city would have ever been nuked. There were clearly inequities in considering the people of each theatre even by historians.

 

[buffnut453]

Folk seem to have missed the issue that one would not use B17s in the same way as Mosquitos. And vice versa. If Mosquitos were used in lieu of B17s then the doctrine for targeting would also alter to suit So comparing OTL sorties is of limited in value.

Using ridiculous extremes to make the point, you would not use DH4s in the same way as B52s.

Agreed...that's precisely why the continual rehashing of which aircraft could carry more or more varied loads is frustrating. The entire reason the strategic bomber force had to carry such large loads is because so few of the bombs actually hit the target.

For the USAAF, part of the problem is the implicit bias that the 8th AF was actually conducting precision bombing. Yes, that may have been the stated aim but reality was nowhere close to that, for reasons explained previously (box formation size, bombing when the lead aircraft drops, overcast weather etc).

The simple fact that B-17s were flying with incendiaries is, itself, tantamount to admitting that the USAAF wasn't precision bombing. Incendiaries aren't aerodynamic and, because of their small weight, are more susceptible to changing air currents during the descent. These combined factors meant that the spread of incendiaries was likely far broader than that of 500lb or 1000lb bombs. Also, any resulting fire could expand in all sorts of unexpected directions...again, hardly "precision bombing."

Bottom line is that a larger force of Mosquitos conducting low-level daylight attacks would have suffered far greater attrition than was the case given their actual wartime record. That said, and per my earlier post, the greater accuracy derived from low-level delivery would actually increase the number of targets that could be attacked for a given quantity of airframes. With careful planning and coordination, it should be possible for such raids to present significant challenges to the German defences, albeit (as acknowledged) with higher loss rates than the 0.5% commonly quoted for the Mosquito.

All that said, as I've noted previously, there's no way either the RAF or the USAAF would consider the Mosquito for strategic purposes because it didn't align with existing doctrine or pre-war experience. At the end of the day, doctrine drives capability. The observation that the 1941 Mosquito hadn't demonstrated its worth is also entirely valid. The timeline has to be right for a decision to be made, and the earliest that the Mosquito as a bomber showed that was probably 1943, by which time the entire US war machine devoted to strategic bombing was in-place, and hence impossible to change.

 

[SaparotRob]

I like watching BBC news for precisely the same reason. Whether it is or isn't biased I'm not sure. It seems more even handed when reporting American stories.

 

[Donald Johnson]

Bottom line is that a larger force of Mosquitos conducting low-level daylight attacks would have suffered far greater attrition than was the case given their actual wartime record. That said, and per my earlier post, the greater accuracy derived from low-level delivery would actually increase the number of targets that could be attacked for a given quantity of airframes. With careful planning and coordination, it should be possible for such raids to present significant challenges to the German defences, albeit (as acknowledged) with higher loss rates than the 0.5% commonly quoted for the Mosquito.

All that said, as I've noted previously, there's no way either the RAF or the USAAF would consider the Mosquito for strategic purposes because it didn't align with existing doctrine or pre-war experience. At the end of the day, doctrine drives capability. The observation that the 1941 Mosquito hadn't demonstrated its worth is also entirely valid. The timeline has to be right for a decision to be made, and the earliest that the Mosquito as a bomber showed that was probably 1943, by which time the entire US war machine devoted to strategic bombing was in-place, and hence impossible to change.

This is the crux of this debate, and addresses my question most directly. Doctrine is what makes it most appropriate since that has to be more widely understood if we are to have civilian control of the military.

 

[Donald Johnson]

I like watching BBC news for precisely the same reason. Whether it is or isn't biased I'm not sure. It seems more even handed when reporting American stories.

It's thorough, factual, and written clearly. Of course it contains some biasing and propaganda, but less than those supporting particular corporate interests. I wish I could say the same about NPR/PBS.

 

[pbehn]

One thing frequently overlooked is the level of air pollution in WW2, a precision raid on steel plants or in the area of steel plants or even populated areas just wasnt possible because you frequently couldnt see it. Also it is only the first few aircraft that have a clear view.

 

[SaparotRob]

It's thorough, factual, and written clearly. Of course it contains some biasing and propaganda, but less than those supporting particular corporate interests. I wish I could say the same about NPR/PBS.

Contrary to the opinion of many, I think PBS is quite even handed and factual whether PBS likes the facts or not.

 

[pbehn]

This is the crux of this debate, and addresses my question most directly. Doctrine is what makes it most appropriate since that has to be more widely understood if we are to have civilian control of the military.

Doctrine is based on what you know, or think you know (to get into known unknowns territory) But things change quickly, for example when did anyone in the USA "bomber mafia" become aware of RADAR and specifically Dowdings system combined with Chain Home? Even those in the RAF who knew about it couldnt be sure it would work. The CH system only started to be installed in 1938 and you have to be actually shown the Dowding system in operation to understand it. This completely changed ideas on attack and defence. On a different subject, who prior to 1940 considered the possibility of France Belgium Netherlands Denmark and Norway being in German hands in 10 weeks and Germany being allied with Italy. Just with those two events, introduction of RADAR CaC and Germany suddenly controlling Western Europe put almost all planning on the scrap heap of history, as did "blitzkrieg" itself.

 

[Donald Johnson]

Hi Donald,

One last try before I give up on you.

Please, as a teacher, you must understand the differences between secondary sources and primary research.

Second, stop confusing strategic bombing with tactical bombing. You talk about Mosquito bombers taking out Crossbow sites - NO MOSQUITO BOMBERS ATTACKED V-1 SITES! The aircraft were Mosquito fighter bombers, which trained for and excelled at tactical missions. More FB.VIs were built than any other variant. However, FB.VIs didn't attack strategic targets.

The Eighth Air Force did a terrible job against tactical targets - they concentrated on, and trained for, strategic objectives. Their record against tactical targets was so poor that Eisenhower took away their tactical aircraft (A-20s and B-26s) and created the Ninth Air Force to improve tactical support prior to Overlord. And the B-25s were all RAF aircraft - again, none of the tactical bombers performed long-range daylight strategic missions.

You have a point of view, an opinion, that you'd like us to recognize and accept. But your point of view is not based on a solid study of the evidence - you shouldn't be surprised that so many disagree with you. Sit down with Craven and Cate for a month and get a better, albeit secondary, understanding of the AAF's air war from 1941-45.

Cheers,



Dana

Much of what you posted here has not been heretofore available to me, steeped on Caidin and Jablonski as I am. But I do maintain part of my argument is still valid, that which suggests that decisions made then on who and what to bomb yet reverberate as our procurement procedures which are heavily criticized. My objective is to make at least part of this process accessible to students and you don't do that by suggesting they search archives. They have to have motivation, and an unresolved argument that may apply to a current political reality just might do that.

Contrary to the opinion of many, I think PBS is quite even handed and factual whether PBS likes the facts or not.

My problem with PBS is with at least two of its reporters, Judy Woodruff and Lisa DeJardins tend push an agenda. I expect more objectivity from anchors; even Mediacheck rates them as somewhat Left-center and "high", not "very high" on factuality. BBC America is not immune to that either. I've noticed l non-objective personal opinions in that anchor's comments as well.

NPR does better in that its interviews are longer, therefore less prone to interviewer slant. They will also correct themselves when they get it wrong.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Much of what you posted here has not been heretofore available to me, steeped on Caidin and Jablonski as I am. But I do maintain part of my argument is still valid, that which suggests that decisions made then on who and what to bomb yet reverberate as our procurement procedures which are heavily criticized. My objective is to make at least part of this process accessible to students and you don't do that by suggesting they search archives. They have to have motivation, and an unresolved argument that may apply to a current political reality just might do that.

This is good but how are students going to understand this whole picture if they don't understand "the process" and not search archives to SEE was was ACTUALLY written by the decision makers of the day?

Again, forget Caidin - he was entertaining but in many cases, putting it bluntly a big liar!!!

Have you read "The Fork Tailed Devil"? He blatantly lied about an episode with a captured P-38 being operated by the Italians and about the destruction of P-38s in Korea just before the Korean War started. To me, unless his work is vetted against other sources, it's ALL suspect!

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Have you read "The Fork Tailed Devil"? He blatantly lied about an episode with a captured P-38 being operated by the Italians and about the destruction of P-38s in Korea just before the Korean War started. To me, unless his work is vetted against other sources, it's ALL suspect!

I remember reading those two claims and throwing the book down in contempt. Those two whoppers forever ruined him as a credible source of anything, for me (it was the first book of his I'd read as an adult with a few decades of reading and study, the others I read as a kid in the 70s). Ten wasted dollars.

This was even before I'd learnt of his claims of possessing the psychic power of telekinesis. The boy could shovel the bovine fecal matter with the worst of 'em.

 

[Donald Johnson]

This is good but how are students going to understand this whole picture if they don't understand "the process" and not search archives to SEE was was ACTUALLY written by the decision makers of the day?

Again, forget Caidin - he was entertaining but in many cases, putting it bluntly a big liar!!!

Have you read "The Fork Tailed Devil"? He blatantly lied about an episode with a captured P-38 being operated by the Italians and about the destruction of P-38s in Korea just before the Korean War started. To me, unless his work is vetted against other sources, it's ALL suspect!

So do I have to burn all my copies written by him? I have that one and two more and I do recall the Italian-operated P-38 factoid.

I'm suggesting that we consider the most likely uses of the Internet, now that so many students are being homeschooled. Caidin is in the libraries, but like most WW2 books, no longer widely read. Interest in WW2 planes is nearly nonexistent among schoolkids; the fact that they were still on cereal boxes played a large part in my youthful interest.

I'm suggesting the Mosquito as an entry point since it allows many related topics to be brought in, but then we have to consider Bowman's book as the most likely available sourcebook. Researching archives is only something college kids might do if forced. They are much more likely to view a video first such as the one on HistoryNet that I mentioned and the scintillating Timeline treatment, "The Luftwaffe's Nightmare." Any discussion bending off one of the topics raised there stands a chance of being researched.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Let's see if your students can raise the objections you've found in this thread, right?

 

[drgondog]

Agreed...that's precisely why the continual rehashing of which aircraft could carry more or more varied loads is frustrating. The entire reason the strategic bomber force had to carry such large loads is because so few of the bombs actually hit the target.

Agreed

For the USAAF, part of the problem is the implicit bias that the 8th AF was actually conducting precision bombing. Yes, that may have been the stated aim but reality was nowhere close to that, for reasons explained previously (box formation size, bombing when the lead aircraft drops, overcast weather etc).

Not quite. The doctrine, aircraft, training and execution was built around computing bombsights, based on 'what we had to fight with' when the wars started. The option to daylight, strategic strikes was night area bombing - with even less precision - at least in 1942-1943, when we were compelled to fight with what the procurement and production base gave us. All subsequent changes to 1940-41 AWPD evolved as 'Lessons Learned'. There was NEVER a practical opportunity to change in the ETO to ANY other strategy to dismantle German war production.

This particular post series is all about a.) the science fiction scenario that suitable Mosquitos were available in 1942, b.) could be deployed in a more efficient fashion that B-17, c.) had a production priority for both training and airplanes to re-populate losses.

The simple answer is 'interesting, tell me more, be specific'. Your turn?


All that said, as I've noted previously, there's no way either the RAF or the USAAF would consider the Mosquito for strategic purposes because it didn't align with existing doctrine or pre-war experience. At the end of the day, doctrine drives capability. The observation that the 1941 Mosquito hadn't demonstrated its worth is also entirely valid. The timeline has to be right for a decision to be made, and the earliest that the Mosquito as a bomber showed that was probably 1943, by which time the entire US war machine devoted to strategic bombing was in-place, and hence impossible to change.

Your last paragraph in my opinion is correct for ETO/MTO and existing German defense strategy. As to Doctrine drive Capability?

I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight. Perhaps a 'Big, Fast Mosquito' in performance and tasking lo level bombing with outstanding results.

Could the Mosquito have been tasked for low level incendiary attacks in ETO with similar results? Iffy based on comparing German defenses and fire fighting and night fighter capability versus Japan.