What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

[GrauGeist]

This is good but how are students going to understand this whole picture if they don't understand "the process" and not search archives to SEE was was ACTUALLY written by the decision makers of the day?

Again, forget Caidin - he was entertaining but in many cases, putting it bluntly a big liar!!!

Have you read "The Fork Tailed Devil"? He blatantly lied about an episode with a captured P-38 being operated by the Italians and about the destruction of P-38s in Korea just before the Korean War started. To me, unless his work is vetted against other sources, it's ALL suspect!

I suspect the "Caidinism" behind the Italian P-38 had a grain of truth that he built into a legend.
Yes, the captured Italian P-38 shot down a single bomber (flown by Col. Tondi, not some mythical Lt. Rossi), no it didn't operate as bait - due to lack of proper fuel, the P-38 was soon grounded.

Also, around the time of the P-38's capture, the Italians were testing a prototype by Savoia-Marchetti, the SM.91 which was similar to the P-38 and led to reported "sightings". The SM.91 reportedly never saw combat (except for being mistaken for a P-38 by an attacking MC.202) although there was a possibility it may have been tested against Allied bombers on one occasion. It never went into production and was later destroyed on the ground during an Allied bombing raid.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

So do I have to burn all my copies written by him? I have that one and two more and I do recall the Italian-operated P-38 factoid.

I wouldn't burn them, maybe strategically place them by the toilet to be used for entertainment reading or for emergency purposes!

I'm suggesting that we consider the most likely uses of the Internet, now that so many students are being homeschooled. Caidin is in the libraries, but like most WW2 books, no longer widely read. Interest in WW2 planes is nearly nonexistent among schoolkids; the fact that they were still on cereal boxes played a large part in my youthful interest.

Agree but be advised that there is still a wealth on knowledge on the internet and the source of information grows yearly. Look on this site, we have a library of flight manuals that would have been impossible to attain in one place say 30 years ago

I'm suggesting the Mosquito as an entry point since it allows many related topics to be brought in, but then we have to consider Bowman's book as the most likely available sourcebook. Researching archives is only something college kids might do if forced. They are much more likely to view a video first such as the one on HistoryNet that I mentioned and the scintillating Timeline treatment, "The Luftwaffe's Nightmare." Any discussion bending off one of the topics raised there stands a chance of being researched.

I think that's a good approach as long as they know that there are more detailed recourses available to them to do further research (if the interest is there)

 

[Snautzer01]

So do I have to burn all my copies written by him? I

Caitlin? , No burning but put it on the comic pile. As, i think you said so, you were teacher once, should very well understand this. In the land of the blind etc... we are not blind anymore. In fact some if us are better informed then those guys in tears long gone.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I suspect the "Caidinism" behind the Italian P-38 had a grain of truth that he built into a legend.
Yes, the captured Italian P-38 shot down a single bomber (flown by Col. Tondi, not some mythical Lt. Rossi), no it didn't operate as bait - due to lack of proper fuel, the P-38 was soon grounded.

Oh, he had a historical basis for his stories but really laid on the bovine fecal matter beyond that. Lt. Rossi, Gina, a YB-40....

 

[special ed]

Today, authors write historical novels. Caiden fits that mold. For instance, in the back of "The Forked Devil" after the end, there is an after piece where a long overdue P-38 returns at chow time and disintegrates in the air above hundreds of men. It is not mentioned in any other books or unit histories I have read.

 

[Donald Johnson]

Your last paragraph in my opinion is correct for ETO/MTO and existing German defense strategy. As to Doctrine drive Capability?

I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight. Perhaps a 'Big, Fast Mosquito' in performance and tasking lo level bombing with outstanding results.

Could the Mosquito have been tasked for low level incendiary attacks in ETO with similar results? Iffy based on comparing German defenses and fire fighting and night fighter capability versus Japan.

I submit that if a Doctrine of maximum military disruption was paramount, the Mosquito would have been the most likely beneficiary. Recognizing the lack of available bombers, I'm suggesting that all available should have been specifically targeted for pinpoint raids with none doing nuisance or civilian-directed bombing. Perhaps that was mostly the case, and my argument is moot.

Of course we're looking through hindsight now, but my research would be mostly directed toward the thinking of that period considering what was available. That would be my focus in the classroom. There seem to have been contemporary Mosquito proponents ignored, Elliott Roosevelt being one of them. Why? We could have produced some of the damn things.

 

[SaparotRob]

Your last paragraph in my opinion is correct for ETO/MTO and existing German defense strategy. As to Doctrine drive Capability?

I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight. Perhaps a 'Big, Fast Mosquito' in performance and tasking lo level bombing with outstanding results.

Could the Mosquito have been tasked for low level incendiary attacks in ETO with similar results? Iffy based on comparing German defenses and fire fighting and night fighter capability versus Japan.

We need an insightfull award. I never would have thought of the B-29 performing the role of a "Big, Fast Mosquito". You're right.

 

[SaparotRob]

Doctrine is based on what you know, or think you know (to get into known unknowns territory) But things change quickly, for example when did anyone in the USA "bomber mafia" become aware of RADAR and specifically Dowdings system combined with Chain Home? Even those in the RAF who knew about it couldnt be sure it would work. The CH system only started to be installed in 1938 and you have to be actually shown the Dowding system in operation to understand it. This completely changed ideas on attack and defence. On a different subject, who prior to 1940 considered the possibility of France Belgium Netherlands Denmark and Norway being in German hands in 10 weeks and Germany being allied with Italy. Just with those two events, introduction of RADAR CaC and Germany suddenly controlling Western Europe put almost all planning on the scrap heap of history, as did "blitzkrieg" itself.

Again, an "insightful" would be nice.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

There seem to have been contemporary Mosquito proponents ignored, Elliott Roosevelt being one of them. Why? We could have produced some of the damn things.

Again, why ignored? Again for starters, no serious contract or offer to contractors to build these things under a licensing agreement. As mentioned, the Mosquito of 1941 was a lot different from the Mosquito of 1943 or 1944. Arnold saw the demonstration in April 1941, there wasn't an inkling of thought of the US mounting a massive bombing campaign over Europe during that time, we were not in the war and it would seem the P-38 could do everything the Mosquito can do. As we go through this discussion more, if Arnold was really that serious about the Mosquito, he could have requested it's production, sought a licensing agreement and asked for funding. That never happened. In reality he asked 5 companies "whatcha think?"

 

[pbehn]

I'm suggesting the Mosquito as an entry point since it allows many related topics to be brought in, but then we have to consider Bowman's book as the most likely available sourcebook. Researching archives is only something college kids might do if forced. They are much more likely to view a video first such as the one on HistoryNet that I mentioned and the scintillating Timeline treatment, "The Luftwaffe's Nightmare." Any discussion bending off one of the topics raised there stands a chance of being researched.

You could pose the question "Why did two aircraft (Mosquito and P-51)ordered in 1940 by the British have few friends to start with were kept alive by being produced for a role they were never designed for, come to be in demand by both UK and USA forces in 1944 for roles that didnt exist in 1940". The short answer is no one knows what the future holds, the long answer can be as long and involved as you like.

 

[SaparotRob]

As long as the BBC was mentioned, are Laura Travellyan(?) and Katty Kay the same person?

 

[GrauGeist]

As mentioned, the Mosquito of 1941 was a lot different from the Mosquito of 1943 or 1944. Arnold saw the demonstration in April 1941, there wasn't an inkling of thought of the US mounting a massive bombing campaign over Europe during that time, we were not in the war and it would seemed the P-38 could do everything the Mosquito can do.

Plus, at that time, the US had the A-20, B-25 and B-26.
It was also evaluating the B-23 plus had the option of the Martin A-22 & A-30.

Why did it need another twin-enguned bomber?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I would draw your attention to a leader that carefully examined the deficiency of results achieved by the B-29 bombing and target strategy as framed by "Doctrine' - and changed the Game to transform the B-29 into a long range low altitude, individual routes and altitudes instead of close formations performed by B-17/B-24/B-26 to bomb by Norden/Sperry computing bombsight.

As an aside, I've read that when XXI Bomber Command launched the Tokyo firebombing they had the pathfinders inscribe a large "X", in incendiaries, crossing near the center of the city, as the aiming-point.

Can you or anyone else tell me if this is apocryphal BS, or is there a kernel of truth in the matter? It sounds pretty synthetic and after-the-fact to me, but I've read it several times from different authors.

I don't want to derail this thread, but I'm curious and figure if there's an answer I can find it here.

 

[pbehn]

Again, an "insightful" would be nice.

That is the sort of stuff that interests me. I was watching a documentary about Bletchley Park last night, not the usual stuff about Turing and Enigma but about the Lorenz. The Lorenz machine was incredibly complicated, with 1.6 million billion combinations. To crack it should have been impossible, it would need an operator to do something like transmit the same message of 4,000 characters twice in the same "key" and these two messages to be given to a mathematical genius (Bill Tutte) who figured out the workings of two of the rotors just by using paper, the working of the other rotors were figured out by people like Turing but to actually decode in a useful timeframe needed a computer, just by coincidence on the same team at Bletchley was Tommy Flowers a electrical engineer, who saw the mechanical solution that had been tried and said "I can do that purely by electrical means", then the computer was born. I have read the story before, but it was in part narrated by a man who worked on the team (in the same office as Tutte). It is hard to believe those people and those events happened by pure coincidence. Luck, good and bad played a major part in these events.

 

[pbehn]

Why did it need another twin-enguned bomber?

They didn't, but as soon as they got involved with the British they developed an almost unnatural obsession with the weather.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Plus, at that time, the US had the A-20, B-25 and B-26.
It was also evaluating the B-23 plus had the option of the Martin A-22 & A-30.

Why did it need another twin-enguned bomber?

Especially one (although being fast) carried no guns.

 

[Shortround6]

What was the target radius as a function of cruise speed, fuel load out, and altitude - with a 2000 pound or 2x1000 pound bombs. How does it compare to B-17 5000 pound or B-24 6000 pound payload strike at Brux or Posnan?

Shorter question than above. Was there ever critical mass of the proposed Mosquito type to prosecute a strategic bombing campaign in partnership to USSTAF, assuming that it Was mission capable?

To go with the above, assuming the decision had been made in 1941 or very early 1942 to significantly expand Mosquito production (the American option) what was the target radius as a function of cruise speed, fuel load out, and altitude - with a 2000 pound or 2x1000 pound bombs with the engines of late 1941/1942?

The Merlin XX started at 9lbs boost and was quickly changed to 12lb boost, US Merlins ,(that is to say Packards in US service) stayed at 9lbs for quite some time.
In British service the Merlin 21 (actual Mosquito engine) was rerated to 14lbs in low supercharger and 16lbs in high supercharger. The Merlin 25 was allowed 18lbs boost in both high and low supercharger.

The Packard Merlin V-1650-1 single stage was rated at 9lbs boost for combat and 12lbs for take-off and 1300hp.
The Merlin 33 (Packard Built Merin 23, for Canadian Mosquitos) ) was rated at 14lbs for take-off and 1400hp.
The RR built Merlin 25 was rated at 1610hp for take-off at 18lb of boost.

30 minute climb and max cruise (rich) was the same for all engines.

Max cruise weak mixture did change. Merlin 21 was 2650 rpm at 4lbs and Merlin 23 was 2650rpm 7lbs boost.

Forgetting the two stage Merlins for the moment the Mosquito gained about 23% in take off power in just a few years. It gained over a thousand pounds in max gross weight which allowed the higher bomb loads with full or nearly full tanks.

What Arnold saw and had plans for was not the Mosquito of late 1943/44.

I would note that while American bombers gained weight, some times a lot, they seldom gained power.

 

[drgondog]

As an aside, I've read that when XXI Bomber Command launched the Tokyo firebombing they had the pathfinders inscribe a large "X", in incendiaries, crossing near the center of the city, as the aiming-point.

Can you or anyone else tell me if this is apocryphal BS, or is there a kernel of truth in the matter? It sounds pretty synthetic and after-the-fact to me, but I've read it several times from different authors.

I don't want to derail this thread, but I'm curious and figure if there's an answer I can find it here.

I don't believe so for two reasons - LeMay spends considerable space in his book about the details of the first mission on March 9. Among the details were extensive training in the use of radar for deployment against cities near the coast. Secondly, he makes no mention of a Pathfinder for the first mission.

General Power led the strike and leMay's narrative was that Tokyo Bay was such a good radar signature, that Power marked the IP from the edge, took a heading, counted the second and dropped the first bombs. Power was leading the 73BW in the van of about 150 B-29s strung out at 9,000 feet (IIRC). It would make sense to use Pathfinders for inland targets for poorer radar signatures - but Tokyo, Nagoya, and many industrialized cities were on the coast.

 

[pbehn]

The sort of raid being proposed in part is what the Lancaster did on its first major mission to the Augsburg engine plant. 12 aircraft used, 7 shot down and 5 badly damaged, no major damage to the actual production in the plant. Augsburg raid - Wikipedia Maybe its possible to argue that mosquitos would have been less vulnerable but it would be hard to argue that losses and damage sustained could be sustainable, especially if that became known as your normal strategy.

 

[drgondog]

I submit that if a Doctrine of maximum military disruption was paramount, the Mosquito would have been the most likely beneficiary. Recognizing the lack of available bombers, I'm suggesting that all available should have been specifically targeted for pinpoint raids with none doing nuisance or civilian-directed bombing. Perhaps that was mostly the case, and my argument is moot.

The Major issue with your thesis is that Strategic Doctrine in the US in 1940/41 was codified or airpower in two primary modes - One Long range bombardment with aircraft that were fast (competitive with existing interceptors at 25,000 feet) and capable of carrying a heavy bomb load to targets 600+ miles from base. Two - Battlefield air supremacy via attack bombers and fighters to interdict lines of supply as well as CAS.

The B-29 and B-36 evolved as critical procurement priorities when ultra log range was contemplated and deemed crucial should England fall.

At that point in time, the Norden was producing excellent accuracy at the bomb ranges in California and Nevada. Precision bombing was planned for. ETO weather and combat conditions were the primary factors reducing bombing accuracy.

The Plans were based on US R&D, Procurement and Production - not deemed feasible or practical to jointly plan and procure with Great Britain as a partner.

Of course we're looking through hindsight now, but my research would be mostly directed toward the thinking of that period considering what was available. That would be my focus in the classroom. There seem to have been contemporary Mosquito proponents ignored, Elliott Roosevelt being one of them. Why? We could have produced some of the damn things.

Mentioning Elliott Roosevelt as a 'person of interest' as a trusted consultant to AAC/AAF War Plans is rather a stretch. Arnold did have Roosevelt's trust and it was well placed. FDR wasn't taking counsel on aircraft selection from Elliott Roosevelt.

Arnold can be faulted for making mistakes but he was crucial in organizing superior civilian thought leaders for R&D ideas and input. It is impossible to speculate on another US Army individual with the same vision and executive ability to grow an AAC from a banana republic staffed air force to the greatest Airpower on earth from 1940 to 1944.

IMO his single biggest blind spot was support for Oliver Echols leading Materiel Command responsibility for R&D, Procurement and Operational Testing in the 1938 through 1942.