What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

[Koopernic]

snip




Unfortunately the Mosquito was not equipped to carry 2 x 1,000lb bombs until late in the war.

Tests were done with an early Mosquito fitted with a single 1,000lb GP bomb and two 500lb MC bombs. The single 1,000lb GP (British) bomb had roughly the same explosive filling as a single 500lb MC.

The 1,000lb MC was larger in diameter than the 1,000lb GP bomb, and probably could not be used in the same way.

When the bulged bomb bay was employed, in early 1944, a single 1,000lb MC bomb could be fitted on the rack used for the 4,000lb HC or MC bombs. Though it was usually a 1,000lb Target Indicator carried, which was the same size and shape as the 1,000lb MC.

627 squadron, IIRC, adapted a twin carrier which allowed two 1,000lb TIs to be carried.

Thanks, that puts the Me 410 supposedly poor bomb bay capacity into context. It could carry 2 x 250kg (2 x 550lbs internally) but if 2 x 500kg (2 x 1100lbs) of SC500kg was carried the bomb bay doors were ajar. Armour piercing bombs didn't have this issue. Sorry for the sidebar.

The solution was the specially designed SB1000/410 bomb, an oval shaped 'parachute bomb'. (The parachute was tiny, only about few inches, it served to replace fins and slowed descent enough to stop the explosives from spilling out on impact prior to detonation).

The Mosquito might have used a similar bomb. The RAF did use parachute bombs early in the war.

snip
That said, the advantage of the Mosquito over a P-47 or P-38 carrying 2,000lbs of bombs was range and speed.

The Mosquito bomb sight was common with most of Bomber Command - CSBS in the early war, and the Mk.XIV in the second half of the war.

The Mk.XIV was built in the US as the Sperry T1.

There were studies into the use of the CSBS and Norden, and comparisons with visual aiming at low level by the pilot.

The Mosquito did not work well with the Norden, as it was not as stable as that sight required. Using the Norden would be a death sentence for Mosquitoes, as the requirement for straight, level flight on the lead up to target was far greater than the Mk.XIV required.

I suspect that test had some problems with the way the Norden was set up because the results were really inconceivably poor. The Norden could probably have been modified.

Nevertheless the Mk.XIV or T1 was an excellent bomb sight that was used post war in the V bomber force, generally using radar rather than optical input. It's weakness in not being able to estimate wind drift was solved by using speed from the inertial guidance system which was updated from radar, doppler radar.

This raises another problem. The Mosquito did not carry H2S radar (or the improved H2X the US developed). Perhaps something could have been developed to fit. It certainly couldn't fit something like the EAGLE radar used on the B-29.

 

[Dana Bell]

....This raises another problem. The Mosquito did not carry H2S radar (or the improved H2X the US developed). Perhaps something could have been developed to fit. It certainly couldn't fit something like the EAGLE radar used on the B-29.

Hi Koopernic,

Minor point - RAF Mosquitos generally didn't carry or use H2S/H2X operationally, though they certainly tested the rig. I suspect the added weight limited the payload, but I really don't know.

AAF Mosquitos used H2X operationally, but for making radar maps to guide bombers. There was no thought to carrying bombs in these aircraft, since bombing wasn't their mission.

Cheers,



Dana

 

[Koopernic]

Hi Koopernic,

Minor point - RAF Mosquitos generally didn't carry or use H2S/H2X operationally, though they certainly tested the rig. I suspect the added weight limited the payload, but I really don't know.

AAF Mosquitos used H2X operationally, but for making radar maps to guide bombers. There was no thought to carrying bombs in these aircraft, since bombing wasn't their mission.

View attachment 623272

Cheers,



Dana

You learn something every day: Mosquito with H2S

 

[pbehn]

That was fascinating - thanks for digging that up. Knowing more of the back story is a big help to understanding why decisions were made.

In light of that, I acknowledge that there was a debate about area bombing back then, but the pro-area bombing side still won the debate for several years. That debate would never happen today - there would be no question that bombing civilians would be immoral. Now we know that it didn't destroy morale (far from it) and didn't bring industrial production to a halt - and it might never have, no matter how it was conducted. About the only thing that area bombing accomplished was to force the German fighters into the skies, where they could be shot down, preventing them from being used to defend against the ground campaign. Now we can debate whether that was worth the civilian lives lost, whether there was another way of gutting the Luftwaffe, or whether those responsible for the strategy would be heroes or criminals today - but our judgement is suspect, since we're not being bombed, our way of life is not being threatened, and a generation of our young men and women is not being called up to be sent off to war.

I think this is unfair and largely untrue. Germany didnt actually fully mobilise for war until 1942/43. There was a planned massive increase in steel and armament production which didnt materialise because of the bombing of the Ruhr and other areas. After the bombing of Hamburg Speer thought that 7 such raids could cripple the German industrial capacity, the reality is there werent 7 Hamburgs in Germany. The effort put into anti aircraft defence was huge in manpower and material, half of the 88mm guns and ammunition produced went into home defence, not the eastern front or Normandy. Many strategies and ideas for winning the war by bombing overestimated the abilities to hit things and underestimated a country's ability and determination to carry on by repairing damage or finding another way to do something, or even just doing without. When the war became desperate there was precious little difference between military and civilian, women and children were fighting on the front line.

 

[pbehn]

It was American meteorologist James Stagg observing in Canada, Greenland, and Iceland who predicted the D-Day June 6 opening, the Germans did not think the weather would break and went to bed.

The Weather Forecast That Saved D-Day

Returning to this I found this link, the people concerned were all in UK in various bodies advising Eisenhower the information came from bodies in places all over the North Atlantics and Europe. It is a good read, and illustrates the problems faced, not only for D-Day but for US operations in UK prior to that it contains this quote "
According to Yates, General Henry "Hap" Arnold, chief of the AAF, personally told him about the Eighth Air Force and his future assignment to USSTAF before he left Washington: "Their bombers are getting weathered out. They can't get back in. They have lost more bombers that can't get back in than they have lost to enemy fire. There is something wrong with the weather service over there. I told Tooey [General Spaatz] that I was going to send the best weathermen in the Air Force … I want you to organize a group of any forecasters you want … and take them over and report to Tooey Spaatz and do it in two weeks."


Its a good read. D-Day: How Did the Allies Know the Weather Would Be Right?

 

[Zipper730]

Just like the Brits, sending pastries instead of high explosives!

But wow was it some devastating pastry! It might have been a pastry, but it was 'da bomb!

Some have questioned the military value of Dresden. Even British Prime Minister Winston Churchill expressed doubts immediately after the attack.

"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed," he wrote in a memo.

"The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing."

Churchill ordered the bombing of Dresden. Though he said it was aimed at hampering military movements, when RAF personnel suggested using the tactical air-forces, he re-iterated his desire to bomb Dresden (and possibly several other urban centers off the map as well) anyway. Basically, he figured their morale was near the breaking point, so he figured if they're down, hit 'em real hard and they'll probably crack.

He basically threw Bomber Command under the bus: He realized, that Dresden was starting to promote unease in the upper-circles of society, so he decided to distance himself from it. I should also point out that he didn't immediately send a letter to Harris after this, it was sent 3/28 if I recall right.

By that point Dresden had been bombed at least three times (2/13-14 which was a double raid by the RAF, followed by a raid by the USAAF on 2/14 and 2/15); Pforhzeim (2/24-25) and Wurzburg (3/16-17) were also wiped off the map as well.

As a side note, the racist nature of this debate can be discussed in that yes, Japanese cities were wiped out in this nature, but was it less outrageous since they were Asians?

There was a book I read called "Wings of Judgement", and it included a comment by General Haywood Hansel, that said something to the effect that there was some sort of unwritten rule that the Japanese were viewed as subhuman.

That said, there was generally little issue about bombing civilian populations from a morality based standpoint (there was one General, who's name was Charles Cabell, who said he couldn't imagine how world peace could be furthered by killing more women and children, when floated a proposal for bombing Berlin off the map -- I'm paraphrasing here), it was mostly based on looking bad while doing it (the USAAF had largely cultivated public opinion throughout the years).

This leads into a discussion of whether a German city would have ever been nuked.

Yes, it would have. Paul W. Tibbets (then Colonel, later Brigadier General) had specifically said the plan was to nuke both Germany and Japan simultaneously.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Folks - I don't want to see this go into "moral politics," please somewhat stay on course. Thank you.

 

[GrauGeist]

Let's keep in mind that Dresden was not a "free city" or a "neutral cultural center".
This is propaganda issued by Goebbels himself directly after the first raid.
As stated before, Dresden was a government seat for that district.
It was a major highway crossroads and it had a substantial railyard/hub for the region. There was also river traffic to be considered.
It had headquarters for Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht command and had half a dozen airfields around the city's outskirts.
At the time of the bombings, the roads in and around Dresden were jammed with retreating Wehrmacht and SS armored units, infantry and Panzergrenadier units.
Unfortunately, it was also crowded with refugees also fleeing the advance of the Red Army.
The point being, is that there was a large concentration of Germany military (Wehrmacht, Luftwaffe and SS) in and around the city at the time. The city was a legitimate target.

 

[Donald Johnson]

You learn something every day: Mosquito with H2S

View attachment 623326

Vance Chipman was show down on a

You learn something every day: Mosquito with H2S

View attachment 623326

Hi Koopernic,

Minor point - RAF Mosquitos generally didn't carry or use H2S/H2X operationally, though they certainly tested the rig. I suspect the added weight limited the payload, but I really don't know.

AAF Mosquitos used H2X operationally, but for making radar maps to guide bombers. There was no thought to carrying bombs in these aircraft, since bombing wasn't their mission.

View attachment 623272

Cheers,



Dana

Regarding your picture:

>>NS538 one of 654th Bombardment Squadrons five "Mickey ships" and was the USAAF's H2-X equipped prototype. Crashed after an mid air explosion on the 8th Sept 1944 with the loss of the crew F/O Russell C Whitmer (pilot) USAAF and MSgt Raymond C Armstrong (nav) USAAF.<<

654th Bomb Squadron | American Air Museum in Britain

My SO's Uncle Vance Chipman crashed on a Mosquito Mickey Mission over Schweinfurt after being hit with AA fire.

>>However there was an Achilles Heel... it was neither Mickey nor Mossie but the complex photographic equipment required to capture the screen images with consistency and acceptable quality. The overall performance achieved on these radarscope runs was no doubt a focal point in the arguments when—with the losses of planes and crews rising—no less a person than U.S. President's son Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, under advisement from his officers, reportedly pressed for this project to be ended. He was unsuccessful. My research shows that this project involved no more than 12 Mosquitos, all of them allotted to this one squadron at Watton after being fitted with H2X at Alconbury. After the overshoot on 12 May 1944, writing-off the first of them, worse was to come: the next was lost on active service, brought down by a night-fighter on one of these radarscope photography missions to a target in Germany, the two-man crew becoming the first fatalities of the Mickey project. Two more Mickey Mossies were destroyed over enemy territory, one in unknown circumstances—the pilot perhaps blinded by searchlights before spiralling to the ground—and the other known to have fallen victim to flak, resulting in a third fatality and three prisoners-of-war. Flying accidents in training caused four deaths in two further write-offs. The seventh and final write-off was the result of an accident during take-off. According to the book, An Accounting of the 25th Bomb Group, Taylor Publishing Company, Dallas, Texas, USA, with data compiled and chronicled by George R Sesler, Headquarters Sq., 25th Bomb Group, some 132 Mickey missions were carried out with as many as 96 of those 132 missions having been deemed failures—mostly because the photographic equipment failed or because, when the photographs were assessed for suitability, they were judged to be unacceptable. On Sesler's figures, obtaining "acceptable, highpriority bomb-approach ground scans" to 36 strategic targets "deep inside the Axis powers" meant a 27 per cent success rate for the project, though it cost the lives of two pilots and one navigator (another pilot and two navigators becoming prisoners-of-war) in addition to three aircraft. By the time the war in Europe ended, just five of the twelve Mickey Mossies remained fit for purpose, though changing requirements meant that four had been moved already from their originally intended ground-scanning duties and assigned instead to the OSS for intelligence activities. <<

http://usaf-nav-history.com/dr0114.pdf

 

[Koopernic]

I think this is unfair and largely untrue. Germany didnt actually fully mobilise for war until 1942/43. There was a planned massive increase in steel and armament production which didnt materialise because of the bombing of the Ruhr and other areas. After the bombing of Hamburg Speer thought that 7 such raids could cripple the German industrial capacity, the reality is there werent 7 Hamburgs in Germany. The effort put into anti aircraft defence was huge in manpower and material, half of the 88mm guns and ammunition produced went into home defence, not the eastern front or Normandy. Many strategies and ideas for winning the war by bombing overestimated the abilities to hit things and underestimated a country's ability and determination to carry on by repairing damage or finding another way to do something, or even just doing without. When the war became desperate there was precious little difference between military and civilian, women and children were fighting on the front line.

"Germany didn't mobilise for war till 1942/43". Its long been known to be incorrect but was thoroughly dismissed by Tooze. The upswing in production that occurred after 1942 and was particularly noticeable in 43 had to do with the long term investment in factories, plant and automation coming to fruition. Factories, Presses, Casting, Modified designs suited to these techniques, cranes, jigs etc. If you want to stop production you have to destroy that equipment and area bombing doesn't often do that. Many of these factories were 'new built' and not in the geometric centre of a city which was a typical target of Area Bombing.

Whatever Area Bombing that happened in the Ruhr its claimed success can't be judged without considering that most of the Ruhr Region was within range of Oboe blind bombing technique which was slightly more accurate than x-geraet. The radar horizon from a 100m tall tower to a Oboe equipped aircraft at 9000m/29,500ft is 437km and so Oboe stations at say Great Yarmouth and Dover would cover all of the Ruhr. Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Bonn.

I notice that in 1941/42 a great many German technical programmes failed to meet their deadlines because they were overly ambitious designs certainly in aviation there is the Me 210/410, He 177 to that we can add Panther tank (which went from design to combat service in 1 year) so delays in steel production might be explained by other means.

In terms of getting on topic and in terms of Mosquitos versus B-17. Latter versions of Oboe were able to guide multiple aircraft so so no doubt waves of 50 Mosquitos (or heavy bomber) with 2000lbs of bombs could cause massive damage to a factory or plant and the surrounding infrastructure.

The 8.8cm FLAK 37 would have been completely useless.

 

[GrauGeist]

The 8.8cm FLAK 37 would have been completely useless.

However, the Flak 30, Flak 38 and especially the FlakVierling 38 were extremely successful in taking out low altitude aircraft.

 

[Donald Johnson]

However, the Flak 30, Flak 38 and especially the FlakVierling 38 were extremely successful in taking out low altitude aircraft.

Really? Against a 400 mph Mossie or a slower Mitchell?

>>The Flakvierling 38 was a quadruple-mounted 20mm FlaK 38 developed to address the original gun's slow rate of fire against fast moving aircraft during World War II. Using two foot pedals, a seated gunner could fire from two or four barrels in semi-automatic or fully-automatic modes. Used on a wide variety of vehicles, such as the Opel Blitz or even on top of submarines, the Flakvierling 38 firing at maximum speed could achieve a fire rate of up to 1,400 rounds per minute. However, seeing as each barrel used its own ammunition box with a total of 20 rounds per barrel, the rate of fire was reduced to 800 rounds per minute and required the ammunition box on each of the four guns to be changed every six seconds, making it just barely effective enough to remain in use through the end of World War II.

Specifications:

• Caliber: 20 mm
• Maximum range: 2,200 m (2,406 yards)
• Rate of fire: 800 rounds/min
• Weight: 450 kg (992 lbs)
• Total length: 4.08 m (13 ft)

 

[wuzak]

Whatever Area Bombing that happened in the Ruhr its claimed success can't be judged without considering that most of the Ruhr Region was within range of Oboe blind bombing technique which was slightly more accurate than x-geraet. The radar horizon from a 100m tall tower to a Oboe equipped aircraft at 9000m/29,500ft is 437km and so Oboe stations at say Great Yarmouth and Dover would cover all of the Ruhr. Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Bonn.

Which is why Mosquitoes were required for pathfinder duties.

Lancasters could only get to an altitude of 22,000-24,000ft, which restricted the range of the Obo system. B.IV Mosquitoes could fly at 30,000ft to 35,000ft, extending the range of the system.

 

[wuzak]

The Mosquito did not carry H2S radar (or the improved H2X the US developed). Perhaps something could have been developed to fit. It certainly couldn't fit something like the EAGLE radar used on the B-29.

The H2X was described by the British as a "hybrid".

I believe because ASV radar was using 3cm before H2S and H2X were.

 

[GrauGeist]

Really? Against a 400 mph Mossie or a slower Mitchell?

>>The Flakvierling 38 was a quadruple-mounted 20mm FlaK 38 developed to address the original gun's slow rate of fire against fast moving aircraft during World War II. Using two foot pedals, a seated gunner could fire from two or four barrels in semi-automatic or fully-automatic modes. Used on a wide variety of vehicles, such as the Opel Blitz or even on top of submarines, the Flakvierling 38 firing at maximum speed could achieve a fire rate of up to 1,400 rounds per minute. However, seeing as each barrel used its own ammunition box with a total of 20 rounds per barrel, the rate of fire was reduced to 800 rounds per minute and required the ammunition box on each of the four guns to be changed every six seconds, making it just barely effective enough to remain in use through the end of World War II.

Specifications:

• Caliber: 20 mm
• Maximum range: 2,200 m (2,406 yards)
• Rate of fire: 800 rounds/min
• Weight: 450 kg (992 lbs)
• Total length: 4.08 m (13 ft)

Yes, really.

They were best known for defenses where enemy aircraft would be in a low altitude position and accounted for a good many Allied aircraft.
The Luftwaffe had layered flak defenses and the 20mm flak defenses were effective in low altitude suppression.
Additionally, the Luftwaffe also fielded the "Wirblewind" which was a quad Flak 38 mounted on a PzKfw MK.IV chassis as a mobile flak battery.

As an aside, all flak operations were overseen by the Luftwaffe, not the Wehrmacht.

 

[Snautzer01]

And dont forget the mobil dedicated flak trains and ships popping up as a nasty suprise. And the radar guided the batteries. Radar systems: Würzburg, Allied etc.

 

[buffnut453]

And yet the Mosquitos and Beaufighters of Coastal Command directly, and successfully, attacked flak ships and vessels in defended harbours from 1943 onwards and at low altitude, right in the sweet spot of the Flak 38.

The first image below shows Beaufighters attacking the flak ship Mosel.

Now, the Coastal Command Mossies were variants of the FB Mk VI rather than the straight bomber version. However, it seems to me that the losses sustained by the fast twins of Coastal Command weren't horrendous...and they were diving right into the defending fire of German ships.

One other observation is that Germany could never produce enough Flak 38s to meet demand. Now, perhaps with continued low-level attacks, the production of the Flak 38 would be prioritized ahead of the 88mm flak guns....but I'm not convinced the job for the defenders would be as simple as contributors on this thread would have us believe.

 

[buffnut453]

And, just 'cos...here's some Pathe footage of Banff Wing Mossies charging into the fray:

 

[GrauGeist]

Let's just think about the bolded part for a moment:

Two more Mickey Mossies were destroyed over enemy territory, one in unknown circumstances—the pilot perhaps blinded by searchlights before spiralling to the ground—and the other known to have fallen victim to flak, resulting in a third fatality and three prisoners-of-war.

I am willing to bet it was not 12.8 or 8.8 cm flak batteries...

 

[Koopernic]

But wow was it some devastating pastry! It might have been a pastry, but it was 'da bomb!

There was a book I read called "Wings of Judgement", and it included a comment by General Haywood Hansel, that said something to the effect that there was some sort of unwritten rule that the Japanese were viewed as subhuman.
.

My gut feeling is that there may be some truth to that but then anti-German propaganda from WW1 onward had also been very savage and the typical German could be viewed as subhuman as well.

Cooler minds fortunately often prevailed on all sides.

US secretary of State/War Stimson opposed the nuclear bombing of Kyoto on the basis of its temples and heritage values. He had honeymooned there. Stinson also opposed the Morgenthau plan, essentially a 40% starvation plan if you do the maths. Stimson got dragged into the Internment of Japanese Americans, something he clearly would rather not be involved with apart from his job. When some on the Eagle radar development team called the radar "EHB" Every House in Berlin calmer saner minds stepped in an named it Eagle. The Eagle was a very precise ground mapping radar far superior to H2S or H2X so EHB kind of contradicted its claim to precision.

The main problem on the Eastern Front was that the Soviet Union did not Participate in the Hague and Geneva conventions which left everything to whatever rules each army had which were often easily over ruled as situations arose. Constable's biography of Erich Hartmann contains in incident where a Russian Airman Officer that had been captured was allowed to wonder the Luftwaffe airfield on his own recognisance, observing maintenance operations for a few days before he was shipped of to a POW camp where god know what happened. That was the habit they had till pressure came to make the rules be ignored. It was incidentally Tsar Nicholas who had gotten the ball rolling on what became the Hague conventions by proposing that an international treaty was required.

The rules work however imperfectly. Both sides have to participate. I'm no expert here but I do not believe the Japanese Government participated in the Hague Conventions on Conduct of Land warfare or the Geneva Conventions. They certainly did not have a great reputation and one command even managed to murder German missionaries in Indonesia.

One of the good things that a came out of cold war rivalry and the battle between communism and freedom was that each side started to treat the vanquished more decently. Things were better in Eastern Germany than Western Germany until it was noticed the Communists were winning over Hearts and Minds. Even Stimson had to reframe his opposition to the nuclear bombing of Kyoto to Roosevelt in terms that argued that the bitterness an act such as Bombing Kyoto would do would drive the Japanese into the communist camp.

Churchill may have wanted to bomb Dresden but at Yalta when Stalin Seriously said (reframed as a faux Joke) that they should execute all German officers (they'd done this to Polish officers) after the war Roosevelt (who was physically sick and probably dying) joked along with it but Churchill saw through it and rejected it stridently.