What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

[Koopernic]

And yet the Mosquitos and Beaufighters of Coastal Command directly, and successfully, attacked flak ships and vessels in defended harbours from 1943 onwards and at low altitude, right in the sweet spot of the Flak 38.

The first image below shows Beaufighters attacking the flak ship Mosel.

View attachment 623426

View attachment 623427


Now, the Coastal Command Mossies were variants of the FB Mk VI rather than the straight bomber version. However, it seems to me that the losses sustained by the fast twins of Coastal Command weren't horrendous...and they were diving right into the defending fire of German ships.

One other observation is that Germany could never produce enough Flak 38s to meet demand. Now, perhaps with continued low-level attacks, the production of the Flak 38 would be prioritized ahead of the 88mm flak guns....but I'm not convinced the job for the defenders would be as simple as contributors on this thread would have us believe.

I don't think Mosel could be termed a FLAK ship. She was a 10 knot trawler impressed as a mine sweeper and a light escort given a few 20mm FLAK guns.

One reason FLAK works is because the FLAK guns are either hidden and well camouflaged and hard to see. That didn't apply to Mosel.
Mosel certainly wasn't hidden and furthermore she wasn't dug in and sand bagged as FLAK often would be, more or less fully exposed.
One reason air power works is that a large number of aircraft can turn up and saturate your defences. That's clearly happening to Mosel. The only compensation was camouflage and armoured or bunkered protection.

I do know that post D-day RAF fighters did initially attack FLAK but stopped when the operation became too expensive as the FLAK would win too often.

The C30 and C38 20mm guns had good ballistics but the limitations were well understood and 3.7cm guns were already in development.

The problem with the 3.7cm FLAK 37 (the 37 is the 1937 acceptance into service) seems to have been weight (1.55 tons combat weight) and Rate of Fire (160 rpm).
When the 3.7cm FLAK 43 came in the weight dropped to 1.2 tons and Rate of Fire increased to 250 with 8 round clips keep practical rate at 160.

The weight seems to have been an issue as it created all sorts of logistical problems hence the ongoing use of the 2.0cm quad FLAK.

German trawler V 1605 Mosel
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Mosel under attack by Canadian aircraft
History

Nazi Germany Namesake:Moselle RiverLaid down:1937Commissioned:September 1939 Fate:Sunk by aircraft on 15 October 1944 General characteristics Class and type:
Fishing Trawler (1937-1939) Minesweeper (1939-1940)
Vorpostenboot (1940-1944)Tonnage:427 tonsLength:49.7 m (163 ft 1 in)Beam:8.1 m (26 ft 7 in)Draft:3.8 m (12 ft 6 in)Speed:10 knots
The V 1605 Mosel, previously known as the M-1903, was a German trawler, minesweeper, and Vorpostenboot throughout World War II.
History
The Mosel was laid down as a fishing trawler in 1937 in Bremerhaven for the civilian Hans Kunkel. Two years later, in December of 1939, she was requisitioned by the Kriegsmarine and placed in a minesweeper unit. She was re-designated the M-1903 and received a military crew and light armament. She first saw service in April of 1940 during the invasion of Norway, and assisted in the rescue of the cruiser Lützow as well as rescuing the crew of the sunk minesweeper M-1101 Foch & Hubert.
In 1944, the Mosel was transferred to a Vorpostenboote flotilla in Denmark where she was again re-designated as the V 1605. In October of that year, she was assigned to escort the tanker Inger Johanne. On October 15, the tanker and its escort were attacked by 21 Allied Beaufighters and 17 Mosquitoes from Banff and Dallachy Wings

 

[Koopernic]

Which is why Mosquitoes were required for pathfinder duties.

Lancasters could only get to an altitude of 22,000-24,000ft, which restricted the range of the Obo system. B.IV Mosquitoes could fly at 30,000ft to 35,000ft, extending the range of the system.

Oboe was very accurate and surprisingly long ranged, I get about 453km at 33,000ft. I imagine there were still issues with mid altitude cross winds but the might be estimated and im pretty sure that if given the task British radar engineers would have been able to produce a doppler radar to probe the drift caused by those winds. I'm pretty sure that a comparison of True Air Speed versus Actual Ground Speed (from Oboe) would give a good picture of head winds. I must try to obtain a manual.

Vance Chipman was show down on a

Regarding your picture:

>>NS538 one of 654th Bombardment Squadrons five "Mickey ships" and was the USAAF's H2-X equipped prototype. Crashed after an mid air explosion on the 8th Sept 1944 with the loss of the crew F/O Russell C Whitmer (pilot) USAAF and MSgt Raymond C Armstrong (nav) USAAF.<<

654th Bomb Squadron | American Air Museum in Britain

My SO's Uncle Vance Chipman crashed on a Mosquito Mickey Mission over Schweinfurt after being hit with AA fire.

>>However there was an Achilles Heel... it was neither Mickey nor Mossie but the complex photographic equipment required to capture the screen images with consistency and acceptable quality. The overall performance achieved on these radarscope runs was no doubt a focal point in the arguments when—with the losses of planes and crews rising—no less a person than U.S. President's son Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, under advisement from his officers, reportedly pressed for this project to be ended. He was unsuccessful. My research shows that this project involved no more than 12 Mosquitos, all of them allotted to this one squadron at Watton after being fitted with H2X at Alconbury. After the overshoot on 12 May 1944, writing-off the first of them, worse was to come: the next was lost on active service, brought down by a night-fighter on one of these radarscope photography missions to a target in Germany, the two-man crew becoming the first fatalities of the Mickey project. Two more Mickey Mossies were destroyed over enemy territory, one in unknown circumstances—the pilot perhaps blinded by searchlights before spiralling to the ground—and the other known to have fallen victim to flak, resulting in a third fatality and three prisoners-of-war. Flying accidents in training caused four deaths in two further write-offs. The seventh and final write-off was the result of an accident during take-off. According to the book, An Accounting of the 25th Bomb Group, Taylor Publishing Company, Dallas, Texas, USA, with data compiled and chronicled by George R Sesler, Headquarters Sq., 25th Bomb Group, some 132 Mickey missions were carried out with as many as 96 of those 132 missions having been deemed failures—mostly because the photographic equipment failed or because, when the photographs were assessed for suitability, they were judged to be unacceptable. On Sesler's figures, obtaining "acceptable, highpriority bomb-approach ground scans" to 36 strategic targets "deep inside the Axis powers" meant a 27 per cent success rate for the project, though it cost the lives of two pilots and one navigator (another pilot and two navigators becoming prisoners-of-war) in addition to three aircraft. By the time the war in Europe ended, just five of the twelve Mickey Mossies remained fit for purpose, though changing requirements meant that four had been moved already from their originally intended ground-scanning duties and assigned instead to the OSS for intelligence activities. <<

http://usaf-nav-history.com/dr0114.pdf

It seems the USAAF mickey operation was conducted at night. This would add immeasurably to the hazards. I'm wondering if relative inexperience in night operations could be the problem.

I recall reading that the Luftwaffe lost nearly 50% of its night fighter pilots to training accidents while far more experienced Finnish pilots on the same training courses averaged only 10%.

 

[pbehn]

"Germany didn't mobilise for war till 1942/43". Its long been known to be incorrect but was thoroughly dismissed by Tooze. The upswing in production that occurred after 1942 and was particularly noticeable in 43 had to do with the long term investment in factories, plant and automation coming to fruition. Factories, Presses, Casting, Modified designs suited to these techniques, cranes, jigs etc. If you want to stop production you have to destroy that equipment and area bombing doesn't often do that. Many of these factories were 'new built' and not in the geometric centre of a city which was a typical target of Area Bombing.

Whatever Area Bombing that happened in the Ruhr its claimed success can't be judged without considering that most of the Ruhr Region was within range of Oboe blind bombing technique which was slightly more accurate than x-geraet. The radar horizon from a 100m tall tower to a Oboe equipped aircraft at 9000m/29,500ft is 437km and so Oboe stations at say Great Yarmouth and Dover would cover all of the Ruhr. Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Bonn.

I notice that in 1941/42 a great many German technical programmes failed to meet their deadlines because they were overly ambitious designs certainly in aviation there is the Me 210/410, He 177 to that we can add Panther tank (which went from design to combat service in 1 year) so delays in steel production might be explained by other means.

In terms of getting on topic and in terms of Mosquitos versus B-17. Latter versions of Oboe were able to guide multiple aircraft so so no doubt waves of 50 Mosquitos (or heavy bomber) with 2000lbs of bombs could cause massive damage to a factory or plant and the surrounding infrastructure.

The 8.8cm FLAK 37 would have been completely useless.

Sorry, maybe the wording wasnt clear to the point I was making. In the summer of 1940 Germany was at war with the UK and Commonwealth and was being out produced in most things, like single engined twin engined and 4 engined aircraft. Then Germany got involved in North Africa helping Italy, then in the Balkans to secure the back door, then Germany invaded Russia and the Soviet Union and to put a cap on it all declared war on the USA. By the end of 1941 beginning of 1942 Germany had taken on massively more commitments in terms of materials needed and had so far done nothing to satisfy those needs. Germany didnt mobilise for the wars it got involved in. By 1943 when things started to happen as far as increases in production happened the war was actually settled, Germany was retreating after Kursk and El Alamein and the Allies were landing in Italy.

You cannot use later versions of Oboe and various othe navigation aids to argue for a different strategy when the werent there. Navigation improved after D-Day and the Normandy breakout because transmitting stations were set up in France to extend the radio horizon.

 

[pbehn]

When comparing tonnages of bombs used to destroy a V1 site, you must take into account Mosquitos used Oboe, I cant see why B-17s or Lancasters using Oboe wouldnt be just as successful Oboe - AMES Type 9000

 

[wuzak]

When comparing tonnages of bombs used to destroy a V1 site, you must take into account Mosquitos used Oboe, I cant see why B-17s or Lancasters using Oboe wouldnt be just as successful Oboe - AMES Type 9000

I believe that the Mosquitoes that attacked V1 sites were mostly FB.VI, which did not use Oboe.

Oboe was primarily used for target marking.

 

[wuzak]

I don't think Mosel could be termed a FLAK ship. She was a 10 knot trawler impressed as a mine sweeper and a light escort given a few 20mm FLAK guns.

German trawler V 1605 Mosel
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
View attachment 623429
Mosel under attack by Canadian aircraft
History View attachment 623430Nazi Germany Namesake:Moselle RiverLaid down:1937Commissioned:September 1939 Fate:Sunk by aircraft on 15 October 1944 General characteristics Class and type:
Fishing Trawler (1937-1939) Minesweeper (1939-1940)
Vorpostenboot (1940-1944)Tonnage:427 tonsLength:49.7 m (163 ft 1 in)Beam:8.1 m (26 ft 7 in)Draft:3.8 m (12 ft 6 in)Speed:10 knots
The V 1605 Mosel, previously known as the M-1903, was a German trawler, minesweeper, and Vorpostenboot throughout World War II.
History
The Mosel was laid down as a fishing trawler in 1937 in Bremerhaven for the civilian Hans Kunkel. Two years later, in December of 1939, she was requisitioned by the Kriegsmarine and placed in a minesweeper unit. She was re-designated the M-1903 and received a military crew and light armament. She first saw service in April of 1940 during the invasion of Norway, and assisted in the rescue of the cruiser Lützow as well as rescuing the crew of the sunk minesweeper M-1101 Foch & Hubert.
In 1944, the Mosel was transferred to a Vorpostenboote flotilla in Denmark where she was again re-designated as the V 1605. In October of that year, she was assigned to escort the tanker Inger Johanne. On October 15, the tanker and its escort were attacked by 21 Allied Beaufighters and 17 Mosquitoes from Banff and Dallachy Wings

Vorpostenboot (plural Vorpostenboote), also referred to as VP-Boats, flakships or outpost boats

Vorpostenboot - Wikipedia

 

[pbehn]

I believe that the Mosquitoes that attacked V1 sites were mostly FB.VI, which did not use Oboe.

Oboe was primarily used for target marking.

From the linked article
In a further article, Bruce Neale refers to the elimination of Hitler's guided weapon sites by Oboe-aided bombers, and continues:

• If the destruction of these sites was Oboe's only success, it would have been worth while in terms of lives saved from the flying bomb. As it was, Oboe (along with H2S, Gee, Gee-H) played a decisive part in the total bomber offensive against Germany. But one must never forget the courage, skill and dedication of the pilots and navigators of the Pathfinder Force and, of course, the superlative qualities of the ubiquitous Mosquito! Towards the end of the war in Europe, food 'bombs' were dropped on Holland for the starving Dutch people. By pre-arrangement with the Dutch Resistance, a site was chosen well away from the German security forces for a 'drop'. The precise aiming point was signalled to London and the CAT/MOUSE ranges calculated. At a pre-arranged time Oboe Mosquitoes carrying food cannisters set out to rendezvous with the Resistance and the cannisters were dropped to within 30 yards of the aiming point where eager hands rapidly distributed the contents.

 

[VintageIron]

Okay I know we fitted Allison liquid cooled engines to a B-17 as a trial, how would a B-17 with 4 Rolls-Royce Griffons had performed? Or for that matter a P-38? Yes, production was a limiting factor, but, I do love the sound of multiple Rolls-Royce engines

 

[Donald Johnson]

It seems the USAAF mickey operation was conducted at night. This would add immeasurably to the hazards. I'm wondering if relative inexperience in night operations could be the problem.

I recall reading that the Luftwaffe lost nearly 50% of its night fighter pilots to training accidents while far more experienced Finnish pilots on the same training courses averaged only 10%.

Yes, there were issues with training AAF pilots to fly the Mossie, but Vance Chipman was a highly experienced Mossie pilot having served in the RCAF (and survived a crash-landing in the MM388). He enlisted in the AAF in 1943, doubling his pay, but was not able to bring his highly skilled navigator (from New Zealand) with him. The Mickey was cumbersome, often ineffective, and I haven't been able to establish whether the Germans were able to home in on its signal to shoot him down (even though a Wikipedia entry says flatly that they were not).

MM388 | American Air Museum in Britain

 

[Ovod]

Okay I know we fitted Allison liquid cooled engines to a B-17 as a trial, how would a B-17 with 4 Rolls-Royce Griffons had performed? Or for that matter a P-38? Yes, production was a limiting factor, but, I do love the sound of multiple Rolls-Royce engines

Not sure why you'd bother?
Why not a P&W R-2800 on a Hawker Typhoon, or on a Spitfire?

 

[JDCAVE]

…That said I am skeptical that it would be very effective vs small critical targets with 100 bombers, much less 1 or several...

Used routinely on small oil targets during the war, for example, Scholven Buer, December 29, 1944. Dad was on this op. Bomber Command reported that a total of 324 aircraft bombed the target. There were 13 abortive sorties and 4 aircraft were missing or 1.2 % of the force17. Two aircraft were believed to have been shot down by flak and one by unknown causes. One aircraft was believed lost over the English Channel by non-enemy action. The major part of the raid was centred on the NE part of the plant, which was severely hit. The compressor house and paste preparation and injector house were seriously damaged, the latter being four-fifths destroyed. Four medium-sized storage tanks were destroyed and 23 others damaged. Two large gasholders had their roofs holed and 10 unidentified buildings and a cooling tower were affected. It was successful that night, but it wasn't always.

The limitation Oboe was, only one aircraft could be controlled at a time. For example on the Scholven raid, 6 pathfinder mosquitos bombed and 8 were abortive. The number abortive aircraft is typical of a standard oboe controlled raid as the aircraft flew in pairs and in case of failure of the oboe receiving equipment in the lead aircraft, the backup aircraft took over the target marking duties. The oboe mosquitoes opened the attack and the pathfiner Lancaster force backed up the markers. A Master Bomber was not used that night. In rare situations Oboe was used on a single Lancaster in a so-called oboe leader situation.

But really, why are we discussing this? The aircraft were deployed in the manner that the commanders believed they were best utilized. We do not have all of the information that was available at the time these decisions were made. I find studying what was actually achieved during the war is far more interesting than thinking about what could have been.

Jim

 

[nuuumannn]

Just diverting back to Dresden again momentarily, I saw this. It was a part of the briefing given before the Dresden raid by the RAF. It is quite specific.

"Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester, is also far the largest un-bombed built-up area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westwards and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees and troops alike but to house the administrative services displaced from other areas.

At one time well known for its china, Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance and like any large city with its multiplicity of telephone and rail facilities, is of major value for controlling the defence of that part of the front now threatened by Marshal Koniev's breakthrough.

The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."

 

[Donald Johnson]

Just diverting back to Dresden again momentarily, I saw this. It was a part of the briefing given before the Dresden raid by the RAF. It is quite specific.

"Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester, is also far the largest un-bombed built-up area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westwards and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees and troops alike but to house the administrative services displaced from other areas.

At one time well known for its china, Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance and like any large city with its multiplicity of telephone and rail facilities, is of major value for controlling the defence of that part of the front now threatened by Marshal Koniev's breakthrough.

The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."

This at least acknowledges the political nature of this attack and how it relates to future strategic policy. Certainly, the rationale was in keeping with the policy of the day, but questioning it is something we must continue doing.

 

[GrauGeist]

Certainly, the rationale was in keeping with the policy of the day, but questioning it is something we must continue doing.

I find it a interesting how this recent "questioning" trend seems to be permeating every move military leaders made in a war that was waged in an entirely different age of both technology and thinking.
We have the luxury to sit back and scrutinize every move, every decision and even the machines used because we have all the information, maps, defensive numbers and even secret information that either side did not possess at the time.

Nobody seems the least bit concerned about the demise of Chongqin, Nanking, Shanghai, Warsaw, Poznan, Bialystok, Jaslo, Polanow, Zabludow, Gubin, Oradour sur Glane, Murmansk, Bryansk, Vitabsk, Stalingrad, Vyasma, Minsk, Smolensk, Kursk, Voronezh, Sevastopol, Chernogov and so on.

Should we, then, question and scrutinize Sherman's "scorched earth policy" starting with Atlanta and ending in South Carolina, burning cities, town, homes and crops along the way?

Perhaps we should also question the motives behind Scipio's complete destruction of Carthage?

Where does it end?

 

[JDCAVE]

Just diverting back to Dresden again momentarily, I saw this. It was a part of the briefing given before the Dresden raid by the RAF. It is quite specific.

"Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester, is also far the largest un-bombed built-up area the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westwards and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium, not only to give shelter to workers, refugees and troops alike but to house the administrative services displaced from other areas.

At one time well known for its china, Dresden has developed into an industrial city of first-class importance and like any large city with its multiplicity of telephone and rail facilities, is of major value for controlling the defence of that part of the front now threatened by Marshal Koniev's breakthrough.

The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."

Why not just post the document, if you have it? Oh wait. I do have one.

Jim

 

[ThomasP]

Hey GrauGeist,

re "Where does it end?"

Hopefully, never. Both in the aide of (hopefully) preventing future 'bad' behavior during war . . . and as a source of interesting discussions/threads of course.

 

[pbehn]

I find it a interesting how this recent "questioning" trend seems to be permeating every move military leaders made in a war that was waged in an entirely different age of both technology and thinking.
We have the luxury to sit back and scrutinize every move, every decision and even the machines used because we have all the information, maps, defensive numbers and even secret information that either side did not possess at the time.

Nobody seems the least bit concerned about the demise of Chongqin, Nanking, Shanghai, Warsaw, Poznan, Bialystok, Jaslo, Polanow, Zabludow, Gubin, Oradour sur Glane, Murmansk, Bryansk, Vitabsk, Stalingrad, Vyasma, Minsk, Smolensk, Kursk, Voronezh, Sevastopol, Chernogov and so on.

Should we, then, question and scrutinize Sherman's "scorched earth policy" starting with Atlanta and ending in South Carolina, burning cities, town, homes and crops along the way?

Perhaps we should also question the motives behind Scipio's complete destruction of Carthage?

Where does it end?

Well certainly Scotland and the Scots should always be considered with the 1138 Battle of the Standard in mind, an utter disgrace and no Scot has ever said sorry to me.

 

[GrauGeist]

Perhaps we should question the motives behind the asteroid that struck the Yucatan, wiping out the Dinosaurs.

I honestly feel that the Dinosaurs were victims in that situation.

 

[buffnut453]

Perhaps we should question the motives behind the asteroid that struck the Yucatan, wiping out the Dinosaurs.

I honestly feel that the Dinosaurs were victims in that situation.

Nah...they had it coming to them. All that violent repression of mammalian species....

Coat time again, methinks.

 

[pbehn]

Why not just post the document, if you have it? Oh wait. I do have one.

Jim

Do you know what the abbreviations mean? Interested to know why briefing notes were sent from S.I.C. in Middleton St George to G.I.C. HQ of 6 Group