drgondog
Major
Generally agree with your opening statements. That said, in context of prosecuting The campaign from D-Day to VE Day, destruction of LW was number one factor. Denying Germany air supremacy over a.) the battlefield and b.) over key industry, enabled Allied bomber campaign to strike critical targets - even if inefficiently. Simple Battlefiels/Front Line/MLR air superiority reduced Wermacht mobility window by half (more than half as night time logistics is harder).Had a little time to kill this morning and read the entire thread. It seems to me that the original post is based on the inherent belief that "precision" placement of ordinances will be the ultimate game changer in conflict. This was the same precision delivery of ordinance belief that the Bomber Mafia based their theories of air combat on, but differing in the platforms for delivery. I think the postwar studies by the 8th Air Force are insightful on how effective the bombing campaign was, or wasn't, and how wrong allied planners were in what targets were most critical to the German war effort. IIRC, where the air campaign was most successful was in the inadvertent (as in unplanned) destruction of Germany's coal stocks and infrastructure as Germany ran on coal vs oil for industry/transportation/power. This had a greater effect on hindering German war efforts than any of the other targets. Second was the attack on German mobility especially leading up to D-Day and its impact Nazi military effectiveness. Third was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Fourth, and last was the drain on the German economy and resources to support ever greater anti-bombing defense infrastructure and damage repair. These successes are far less about targeted precision attacks and more about campaigns that rely on mass and overbearing weight of attacking forces.
The Mosquito is a formidable aircraft and it has a devoted cult following, but it wasn't the aircraft to carry out the type of air campaign that ultimately proved most decisive. The belief in targeted precision air attacks often overestimates actual effectiveness and in the 1940's that precision was very hard to achieve on a regular basis. Even today, with the kinds of technologies that we have precision is not always that precise, I'm still struck by how many dumb bombs vs smart bombs are dropped in combat today.
As to wrongness of allied planning, selection of key bottleneck industry such as Ball Bearings, Engine manufacturing, chemical and fuel plants, weren't wrong - but inability to follow up often impinged on the ultimate success. True that less than optimal bombing accuracy was huge even in clear weather - but bomb selection was also flawed.
To last point - yes but recall that the electronic based target acquisition and aiming systems in aircraft beginning with A-7 have produced 'battlefield acceptable results - even for point targets like tracked vehicles. LGB and JDAM type precision weapons are for high value (Command and Control underground bunker, etc).