What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

NevadaK said:

Had a little time to kill this morning and read the entire thread. It seems to me that the original post is based on the inherent belief that "precision" placement of ordinances will be the ultimate game changer in conflict. This was the same precision delivery of ordinance belief that the Bomber Mafia based their theories of air combat on, but differing in the platforms for delivery. I think the postwar studies by the 8th Air Force are insightful on how effective the bombing campaign was, or wasn't, and how wrong allied planners were in what targets were most critical to the German war effort. IIRC, where the air campaign was most successful was in the inadvertent (as in unplanned) destruction of Germany's coal stocks and infrastructure as Germany ran on coal vs oil for industry/transportation/power. This had a greater effect on hindering German war efforts than any of the other targets. Second was the attack on German mobility especially leading up to D-Day and its impact Nazi military effectiveness. Third was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Fourth, and last was the drain on the German economy and resources to support ever greater anti-bombing defense infrastructure and damage repair. These successes are far less about targeted precision attacks and more about campaigns that rely on mass and overbearing weight of attacking forces.

The Mosquito is a formidable aircraft and it has a devoted cult following, but it wasn't the aircraft to carry out the type of air campaign that ultimately proved most decisive. The belief in targeted precision air attacks often overestimates actual effectiveness and in the 1940's that precision was very hard to achieve on a regular basis. Even today, with the kinds of technologies that we have precision is not always that precise, I'm still struck by how many dumb bombs vs smart bombs are dropped in combat today.

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Generally agree with your opening statements. That said, in context of prosecuting The campaign from D-Day to VE Day, destruction of LW was number one factor. Denying Germany air supremacy over a.) the battlefield and b.) over key industry, enabled Allied bomber campaign to strike critical targets - even if inefficiently. Simple Battlefiels/Front Line/MLR air superiority reduced Wermacht mobility window by half (more than half as night time logistics is harder).

As to wrongness of allied planning, selection of key bottleneck industry such as Ball Bearings, Engine manufacturing, chemical and fuel plants, weren't wrong - but inability to follow up often impinged on the ultimate success. True that less than optimal bombing accuracy was huge even in clear weather - but bomb selection was also flawed.

To last point - yes but recall that the electronic based target acquisition and aiming systems in aircraft beginning with A-7 have produced 'battlefield acceptable results - even for point targets like tracked vehicles. LGB and JDAM type precision weapons are for high value (Command and Control underground bunker, etc).

drgondog said:

Generally agree with your opening statements. That said, in context of prosecuting The campaign from D-Day to VE Day, destruction of LW was number one factor. Denying Germany air supremacy over a.) the battlefield and b.) over key industry, enabled Allied bomber campaign to strike critical targets - even if inefficiently. Simple Battlefiels/Front Line/MLR air superiority reduced Wermacht mobility window by half (more than half as night time logistics is harder).

As to wrongness of allied planning, selection of key bottleneck industry such as Ball Bearings, Engine manufacturing, chemical and fuel plants, weren't wrong - but inability to follow up often impinged on the ultimate success. True that less than optimal bombing accuracy was huge even in clear weather - but bomb selection was also flawed.

To last point - yes but recall that the electronic based target acquisition and aiming systems in aircraft beginning with A-7 have produced 'battlefield acceptable results - even for point targets like tracked vehicles. LGB and JDAM type precision weapons are for high value (Command and Control underground bunker, etc).

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Thanks drgondog,

I agree with you that in chronological order of the war, defeating the LW was the primary objective. It's been some time since I read it, but I believe the post war bombing report was less chronological in its perspective. The thing I most clearly recall is how the bombing campaign was relatively ineffective against industrial bottlenecks, but by targeting rail yards not only affected logistics, but Germany's coal infrastructure which was a more vulnerable resource.

I certainly defer to you on more recent technologies. I've been fortunate to have quite a few Air Force officers as friends and they are my primary source for the ratio of dumb vs smart weapons they have used in either gulf campaign.

Regards.

Kk

NevadaK said:

Thanks drgondog,

I agree with you that in chronological order of the war, defeating the LW was the primary objective. It's been some time since I read it, but I believe the post war bombing report was less chronological in its perspective. The thing I most clearly recall is how the bombing campaign was relatively ineffective against industrial bottlenecks, but by targeting rail yards not only affected logistics, but Germany's coal infrastructure which was a more vulnerable resource.

I certainly defer to you on more recent technologies. I've been fortunate to have quite a few Air Force officers as friends and they are my primary source for the ratio of dumb vs smart weapons they have used in either gulf campaign.

Regards.

Kk

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KK - the bombing effects of say the first two strikes on Scweinfurt and Ploesti were not total failures, for example, but failure to a.) repeat, and b.) use heavier (min 1000, better 2000#) to destroy machinery and complex systems) weren't the fault of either the strategy of the planners or the method of attack. The concept of 'strategic' bombing in ETO when targets were obscured by late Fall/Winter cloud cover was a misnomer at best and a commentary of sorts on the notion of blind bomber strikes using Mickey.

Rail was always productive for several days of outage, but unless switching controls were destroyed, the M/Y was only abused for say a week until manual labor could clear and replace... but a lot easier to fix than Schweinfurt. Other potentially lucrative targets like Coal, Fertilizer, and Hydo were all attacked but Allied planners failed to anticipate the resiliency of Germany. Japan and B-29 incindiery attacks were extremely effective because the Japanese typical home within the cities was more populated with wood/bamboo/paper, including small part shops - which made Hamburg look like a 'bad evening' versus Armageddon.

As to iron vs smart. I was in the middle of the LGB development early 70s (in the airframe/aero side curiously on loan from Bell) when TI was doing 'bang/bang control sytems which responded to a laser light seeker placing the image onto a panel quadrant semi conductor plate - telling which set of 'canards' to deflect to move the acquired signal to 'center' the laser designator. Unfortunately the Pave bird had to orbit and designate the target usually innundated in Flak.

At the same time the A-7D HUD/Computing gunsight/bombsite was getting almost twice CEP reduction with iron bombs over F-100, F4, F-105, etc and continued to improve In Gulf War I. A-10s were a lot more accurate with iron bombs than F-16/F-15 and A/F-18 but A-6 pretty good also. LGB technology extending to 'drop and forget' for JDAM type systems were a major step forward - but there is still a wide range of targeting in which iron bombs just fine (i.e. frag/cluster/etc on the Highway of Death.

drgondog said:

KK - the bombing effects of say the first two strikes on Scweinfurt and Ploesti were not total failures, for example, but failure to a.) repeat, and b.) use heavier (min 1000, better 2000#) to destroy machinery and complex systems) weren't the fault of either the strategy of the planners or the method of attack. The concept of 'strategic' bombing in ETO when targets were obscured by late Fall/Winter cloud cover was a misnomer at best and a commentary of sorts on the notion of blind bomber strikes using Mickey.

Rail was always productive for several days of outage, but unless switching controls were destroyed, the M/Y was only abused for say a week until manual labor could clear and replace... but a lot easier to fix than Schweinfurt. Other potentially lucrative targets like Coal, Fertilizer, and Hydo were all attacked but Allied planners failed to anticipate the resiliency of Germany. Japan and B-29 incindiery attacks were extremely effective because the Japanese typical home within the cities was more populated with wood/bamboo/paper, including small part shops - which made Hamburg look like a 'bad evening' versus Armageddon.

As to iron vs smart. I was in the middle of the LGB development early 70s (in the airframe/aero side curiously on loan from Bell) when TI was doing 'bang/bang control sytems which responded to a laser light seeker placing the image onto a panel quadrant semi conductor plate - telling which set of 'canards' to deflect to move the acquired signal to 'center' the laser designator. Unfortunately the Pave bird had to orbit and designate the target usually innundated in Flak.

At the same time the A-7D HUD/Computing gunsight/bombsite was getting almost twice CEP reduction with iron bombs over F-100, F4, F-105, etc and continued to improve In Gulf War I. A-10s were a lot more accurate with iron bombs than F-16/F-15 and A/F-18 but A-6 pretty good also. LGB technology extending to 'drop and forget' for JDAM type systems were a major step forward - but there is still a wide range of targeting in which iron bombs just fine (i.e. frag/cluster/etc on the Highway of Death.

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Thanks,

Your insight is always appreciated.

Kk

NevadaK said:

Had a little time to kill this morning and read the entire thread. It seems to me that the original post is based on the inherent belief that "precision" placement of ordinances will be the ultimate game changer in conflict. This was the same precision delivery of ordinance belief that the Bomber Mafia based their theories of air combat on, but differing in the platforms for delivery. I think the postwar studies by the 8th Air Force are insightful on how effective the bombing campaign was, or wasn't, and how wrong allied planners were in what targets were most critical to the German war effort. IIRC, where the air campaign was most successful was in the inadvertent (as in unplanned) destruction of Germany's coal stocks and infrastructure as Germany ran on coal vs oil for industry/transportation/power. This had a greater effect on hindering German war efforts than any of the other targets. Second was the attack on German mobility especially leading up to D-Day and its impact Nazi military effectiveness. Third was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Fourth, and last was the drain on the German economy and resources to support ever greater anti-bombing defense infrastructure and damage repair. These successes are far less about targeted precision attacks and more about campaigns that rely on mass and overbearing weight of attacking forces.

The Mosquito is a formidable aircraft and it has a devoted cult following, but it wasn't the aircraft to carry out the type of air campaign that ultimately proved most decisive. The belief in targeted precision air attacks often overestimates actual effectiveness and in the 1940's that precision was very hard to achieve on a regular basis. Even today, with the kinds of technologies that we have precision is not always that precise, I'm still struck by how many dumb bombs vs smart bombs are dropped in combat today.

Click to expand...

With regard to the part of your post in bold, in principle this was the same reason the Germans specified (or tried to) every bomber to be a dive bomber to increase accuracy and therefore require less planes to do the same job. In fact level bombing could be highly accurate but it needs a lot of training and practice, not everyone can do it and you cant do it under all conditions.

drgondog said:

but failure to a.) repeat, and b.) use heavier (min 1000, better 2000#) to destroy machinery and complex systems) weren't the fault of either the strategy of the planners or the method of attack.

Click to expand...

The bombers at Schweinfurt 1 used 1,000lb bombs. Not sure about Schweinfurt 2.

There were 80 hits on factory buildings from ~1,000 - 1,200 bombs carried - IIRC each B-17 carried 5 x 1,000lb.

The reason that there was no quick follow up was that the 8th AF lacked sufficient strength and that the bombers and crew on the raid suffered badly at the hands of the Luftwaffe.

And the RAF Bomber Command was busy elsewhere. Not sure why Schweinfurt wasn't on their agenda a few days later.

wuzak said:

The bombers at Schweinfurt 1 used 1,000lb bombs. Not sure about Schweinfurt 2.

There were 80 hits on factory buildings from ~1,000 - 1,200 bombs carried - IIRC each B-17 carried 5 x 1,000lb.

The reason that there was no quick follow up was that the 8th AF lacked sufficient strength and that the bombers and crew on the raid suffered badly at the hands of the Luftwaffe.

And the RAF Bomber Command was busy elsewhere. Not sure why Schweinfurt wasn't on their agenda a few days later.

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True but incomplete if we believe Freeman. August 17 narrative states 1017 250#, 719 500# and 235 1000# - near 8% of tonnage dropped. Suspect mixed load on most of B-17s attacking Scweinfurt. Post war analysis admitted that both Refineries and tough industrial targets required 1000, but better 2000 pound load. A good analogy might be 'Use #6 instead of #9 on high passing Pheasant'

A pre war atlas lists Schweinfurt as "machinery, soap, paint and tobacco; population 36,836". Not the size of target Bomber Command could reliably find until the radio navigation aids were moved to the French border.

The RAF AHB did some translations of German raid damage report.
8th AF target Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher on 17/08/1943 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 54 a/c lost 9 HE 25.0 IB 88.0 Total 113.0 Short tons
8th AF target Schweinfurt/VKF 1 on 17/08/1943 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 78 a/c lost 4 HE 145.0 IB 40.0 Total 185.0 Short tons
8th AF target Schweinfurt/VKF 2 on 17/08/1943 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 51 a/c lost 23 HE 127.2 IB - Total 127.2 Short tons

SCHWEINFURTH, E. 1679 - Chief, Orpo, 8a 1151 - Min. of Pub. Inf. & Prop., E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 17 AUGUST, (USAAF). Approximately 270 aircraft took part in this raid from 1600 until 1700 hours. The main weight of the attack fell on the Central Station, Old Town and the industrial and barracks area.

Bombs dropped: 1 mine, 1317 H.E. (59 duds), 27 phosphorous bombs 1800 oil bombs.

Houses: 160 destroyed and 1010 damaged.

Fires: 19 major and 150 medium to small fires.

Casualties: 249 dead, 639 injured.

The firms of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co., Fichtl & Sachs Ballbearing Works and the Rothhenburger Metal Works were severely damaged. No. 2 Works of the Vereinigte Kugellager Works was partially damaged.

The Central Station was destroyed and a few trains burnt out. The Goods Yards were also hit, damaging buildings, tracks and rolling stocks. Damage was also caused to 2 barracks. The Municipal Gas Works were destroyed and Post Office buildings badly damaged. On the firm of Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. 33500 kg of H.E. and 3900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped, destroying 19000 sq. metres = 8% of the total area of the factory.

8th AF target Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher on 14/10/1943 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 81 a/c lost 10 HE 165.7 IB - Total 165.7 Short tons
8th AF target Schweinfurt/VKF 1 on 14/10/1943 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 61 a/c lost 35 HE 63.0 IB 74.1 Total 137.1 Short tons
8th AF target Schweinfurt/VKF 2 on 14/10/1943 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 86 a/c lost 15 HE 166.5 IB 13.5 Total 180.0 Short tons

SCHWEINFURTH, E. 2576 - LGK XII summaries, E. 2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod., 14 OCTOBER (USAAF). There are no German documents available which give details of where the bombs fell but it is evident from the following the ball-bearing works were mainly affected. About 250 - 300 aircraft took part.

Bombs Dropped: A number of mines, 1200 H.E., 1500 oil bombs.

Houses: 107 destroyed and 280 damaged.

Casualties: 283 dead and 359 injured.

Of the bombs dropped, 3600 kg of mines, 35500 kg of H.E. and 2400 kg of incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Kugellagerwerk Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. They destroyed 19400 sq. metres of the factory area, equal to 8.5% of the total area. In addition 45 1000 lb (2 duds) H.E. and 43 261b (2 duds) incendiary bombs fell on the factory area of the Vereinigten Kugellager-fabrik, Works I and II.

8th AF target Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher on 24/02/1944 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 238 a/c lost 11 HE 399.3 IB 175.3 Total 574.6 Short tons
BC target Schweinfurt on 24/02/1944 target class City Sighted H2S (N) a/c attacking 662 a/c lost 33 HE 1,372.8 IB 1,160.8 Total 2,533.6 Short tons
Bomber Command War Diaries: two waves, 392 and 342 aircraft 2 hours apart. Schweinfurt records refer to "nominal damage" in the RAF night raid and give a combined figure of 362 people killed by the USAAF raid the previous day and the RAF raid.
SCHWEINFURT, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 24/25 FEBRUARY. This is the only source available and information refers to the ball-bearing works only. No details are available of any other results of the raid.

Estimated No. of Aircraft: 1100
Weight of Bombs dropped: 102681 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Weight of Bombs on work areas: 68330 kg. H.E. & incendiary
Floor area of works buildings destroyed: 79435 sq. metres.

BC target Schweinfurt on 25/02/1944 target class City Sighted Vis (N) a/c attacking 5 a/c lost 0 HE 2.2 IB 0.7 Total 2.9 Short tons

8th AF target Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher on 24/03/1944 target class Bearings Sighted H2X a/c attacking 60 a/c lost 0 HE 51.5 IB 78.8 Total 130.3 Short tons

8th AF target Schweinfurt/Kugelfisher on 13/04/1944 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 153 a/c lost 14 HE 202.5 IB 138.7 Total 341.2 Short tons
8th AF report. Good results. The hitherto undamaged Kugelfisher buildings were heavily damaged, with the new integrated plant one third destroyed. Some further damage as also done to VKF Works I and Eichtel & Sachs, and to built up areas of the city

SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 13 APRIL, (USAAF). A medium heavy attack was launched against Schweinfurt and Augsburg as well as a number of airfields. From 1313 to 1525 hours penetrations by strong formations with fighter escort took place between Longwy and Remagen. The more northerly forces attacked Schweinfurt and at 1436 hours a covering force was at Kaiserslautern and after covering the returning bombers left the LGK area between Luxemburg and Remagen.

At 1338 hours the stronger forces change course to SE in the Saarbruecken/Pirmasens area for their attack on Augsburg and airfields. (For detail, see under Augsburg and Airfields.)

Bombs dropped: 500 H.E., 2500 oil bombs.

Houses: 53 destroyed, 106 severely damaged, 282 medium to slight damage.

Fires: 40 major, 31 medium and 100 smaller fires.

Casualties: 13 dead, 37 injured.

The Rotenburger Metal Works are reported as destroyed, while Kugelfischer, VKF and Duetsche Gelatine suffered severe and Fichtel & Sachs medium damage.

At Fichel & Sachs 756 sq. metres of floor space were destroyed by 67 incendiary bombs and Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. suffered damage from 1800 kg of mines, 29000 kg of H.E. and 3500 kg of incendiary bombs which destroyed 17% (= 42500 sq. metres) of floor space.

In addition, 500 H.E., 270 fragmentation and 606 oil bombs were dropped on the 80 localities, destroying 77 houses and damaging 203, killing 114 and injuring 130.

BC target Schweinfurt on 26/04/1944 target class City Sighted Vis (N) a/c attacking 217 a/c lost 23 HE 155.0 IB 593.2 Total 748.2 Short tons
Bomber Command War Diaries: This raid was a failure. The low level marking provided for the first time by Mosquitoes of 627 squadron was not accurate. Unexpectedly strong head winds delayed the Lancaster marker aircraft and the main force of bombers. German night fighters were carrying out fierce attacks throughout the period of the raid. The bombing was not accurate and most of it fell outside Schweinfurt. Only 2 people were killed in Schweinfurt.

SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 26/27 APRIL. Between 0054 and 0143 hours a force estimated at 400 to 500 aircraft entered the area and steered an E course between Mannheim and Stuttgart and later a N course to Schweinfurt.

Bombs dropped: 6 mines, 300 H.E., 5000 phosphorous bombs, 20000 incendiary bombs.

Houses: 122 destroyed, 120 severely damaged, 64 medium damage, 335 slightly damaged.

Casualties: 5 dead, 45 injured.

The ball-bearing works sustained fairly heavy damage. No. 1 Works of the United Ball-bearing Co. were obliged to reduce their production for some days. At Fichtel & Sachs the gas generator plant was put out of action for some time as a result of fire and the Star Co. suffered very severe damage, resulting in a 100% drop for some time. The Rotenburger Metal Works also suffered a 100% drop for about a fortnight as a result of severe damage by H.E. bombs.

In the Armaments Ministry document the weight of bombs dropped on Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft, Kugellager Fichtel & Sach and Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. is given as about 22000 kg of mines, H.E. and incendiary bombs. The greatest weight fell on Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co. but 68% (16625 sq metres) of the works area of the Star Kugelhalter Gesellschaft was destroyed.

8th AF target Schweinfurt/VKF 1 on 19/07/1944 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 173 a/c lost 2 HE 299.5 IB 102.1 Total 401.6 Short tons
8th AF report. General Engineering plants. Good results, Area S of M/Y well hit. Kugelfischer works: 2 large machine shops hit by HE. Other hits on medium machine shop, administration offices, power plant (half destroyed) and several unidentified buildings. Fichtel and Sachs A.G.: Electroplating shops damaged. Demagnetisation shops: Severe damage, large central machine shop damaged in SE corner. Boiler House damaged. VKF: Stores and machine shop well hit.

SCHWEINFURT, 8a 2341 - LGK VII War Diary, E.2606 - Min. of Arm. & War Prod, 19 JULY, (USAAF). About 200 - 250 bombers with fighter escort penetrated on an easterly course from 0810 to 0903 between Schneeifel and Ahrweiler.

Bombs dropped: 1000 H.E., 1200 oil bombs, 5000 incendiary bombs.

Houses: 123 were destroyed and 200 sustained medium to slight damage.

Casualties: 5 dead, 30 injured and 49 missing.

Fichtel & Sachs ball-bearing works sustained damage causing 100% loss of production for the time being, and Star Ball-bearing works suffered medium damage. The telephone and teleprinter service were put out of action. The Adolf-Hitler Barracks also suffered damage by H.E.

According to Document E. 2606, 39 H.E. and 10 incendiary bombs fell on Fichtel & Sach, destroying 9416 sq. m. of floor space of the works. At Kugelfischer, Georg Schaefer & Co 18000 kg of H.E. and 1900 kg of incendiary bombs were dropped destroying 18000 sq. m. (= 8%) of the total works complex.

8th AF target Schweinfurt/VKF 1 on 21/07/1944 target class Bearings Sighted Vis a/c attacking 99 a/c lost 1 HE 174.5 IB 57.8 Total 232.3 Short tons
8th AF report. Very good results. Four concentrations of HE bombs and 3 concentrations of IB bombs cover the Fichel Sachs, Deutsche, VKF and S portion of Kugel Fischer. All concentrations well placed.

8th AF target Schweinfurt on 9/10/1944 target class I/A Sighted H2X a/c attacking 329 a/c lost 0 HE 811.2 IB 4.7 Total 815.9 Short tons
8th AF report. Good results. Of the 5 factories of the ball bearing works of Vereinigte Kugellager-Fabriken A.G. (VKF. Werk 2) has been most severely damaged as a result of this attack. Fichtel & Sachs A.G. cycle and clutch works, have also been hit and 5 buildings have suffered additional heavy damage. One small shed in the Kugelfischer ball bearing works appears to have been damaged. in V.K.F. Werk 2 the heat treatment shop, 3 machine shops, the boiler house, and the stores and packing department have all received additional severe damage. There is new damage to the town mainly concentrated in the business/residential districts. There are considerable scattered incidents including hits in a barracks area.

SCHWEINFURT, E. 970 - LGK XIV, 9 OCTOBER, (USAAF). About 350 - 400 aircraft carried a raid between 1432 and 1515 hours, when the main target was the industrial area of the town.

Bombs dropped: 1500 - 2000 H.E. as well as incendiary bombs.

Fires: 1 major and 12 smaller fires.

Casualties: 22 dead, 14 unrecovered.

Kugel-Fischer was hit by 9 H.E. and some damage was caused. No.2 works of VKS suffered severely in the press shop, lathe department, machine tool shop etc. A quantity of oil was burnt. The Star Ball-bearing works suffered from H.E. and the main water supply was destroyed. Considerable damage was also caused to the electricity supplies.

The Central Station was hit by 58 H.E. and 5 duds, causing 12 lines to be put out of action. A quantity of H.E. bombs was also dropped on targets in the neighbourhood of Schweinfurt causing material damage and a number of fatal casualties.

End raid reports.

In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards, which often also had the repair facilites. As the German military trains were made up in Germany, then looped to the forces in France then back to Germany the marshalling yard strikes turned out to be the least cost effective way to stop German military supplies, apart from reducing local rail repair capacity, as long as the yards had through lines the German trains could use those. On the other hand if you wanted to heavily damage the economy they were very cost effective, as the marshalling yards making and breaking up trains was/is crucial in the movement of goods, as the raids on France showed. This evidence was used in the decisions about what to bomb later in 1944/45.

An example is a convoy from the US to England, in March 1944, 18 full and 24 part ship Army cargoes (1,500 vehicles on wheels, 200 cased, 200 aircraft and gliders, 50,000 tons of supplies). Eight days to discharge, 75 trains using 10,000 cars to clear, plus some road transport, these land movements also generated the need for 27 trains with 8,000 cars for things like inter depot movements and rail supplies.

Geoffrey Sinclair said:

In the disputes over heavy bomber targets pre D-day it was understood the heavies were really only able to hit marshalling yards, which often also had the repair facilites. As the German military trains were made up in Germany, then looped to the forces in France then back to Germany the marshalling yard strikes turned out to be the least cost effective way to stop German military supplies, apart from reducing local rail repair capacity, as long as the yards had through lines the German trains could use those. On the other hand if you wanted to heavily damage the economy they were very cost effective, as the marshalling yards making and breaking up trains was/is crucial in the movement of goods, as the raids on France showed. This evidence was used in the decisions about what to bomb later in 1944/45.

An example is a convoy from the US to England, in March 1944, 18 full and 24 part ship Army cargoes (1,500 vehicles on wheels, 200 cased, 200 aircraft and gliders, 50,000 tons of supplies). Eight days to discharge, 75 trains using 10,000 cars to clear, plus some road transport, these land movements also generated the need for 27 trains with 8,000 cars for things like inter depot movements and rail supplies.

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??? Rail M/Y important, but just looking at Freeman's War Diary, during Big Week as a sample, only One Primary target (of approximately 40) was a specific M/Y (Coevorden 2-21). That said, perhaps a M/Y was the aiming point for the Brunswick city strike or Targets of Opportunity when weather conditions over Primary was too poor.

French M/Y, rail related targets, V weapons and airfields (combined) occupied a significant population of 1st 1/3 of May Primary targets. Oil and Chemicals in Mid May, then back to M/Y, other Rail (viaducts), and airfields. Jan, Feb, March, April dominantly LW related industrial targets (aircraft, engines, assembly), V weapons sites, A/F, U-Boat.

What is your reference for 'only really able to hit marshaling yards?

wuzak said:

Not sure why Schweinfurt wasn't on their agenda a few days later.

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Harris was violently opposed to what he called "panacea" targets, and favored continued area bombing.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Harris was violently opposed to what he called "panacea" targets, and favored continued area bombing.

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Hi

Also flying in the summer means long daylight hours and short nights, probably not a good idea for night bombers. BC generally undertook their long range missions when the nights were longest, while the 8th AF generally undertook their long range missions when the days were longest. July/August is long daylight hours.

Mike

wuzak said:

The bombers at Schweinfurt 1 used 1,000lb bombs. Not sure about Schweinfurt 2.

There were 80 hits on factory buildings from ~1,000 - 1,200 bombs carried - IIRC each B-17 carried 5 x 1,000lb.

The reason that there was no quick follow up was that the 8th AF lacked sufficient strength and that the bombers and crew on the raid suffered badly at the hands of the Luftwaffe.

And the RAF Bomber Command was busy elsewhere. Not sure why Schweinfurt wasn't on their agenda a few days later.

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Hi
From BC War Diaries:
17/18 Aug 1943 - Peenemunde (V1 & V2 development facilities).
22/23 Aug 1943 Leverkusen ( I G Farben main target).
23/24 Aug 1943 Berlin.
27/28 Aug 1943 Nuremburg.
30/31 Aug 1943 Monchengladbach/Rheydt.
31 Aug/1 Sept 1943 Berlin.

So quite busy.

Mike

Does put paid to the thought "why didn't they just......"

SaparotRob said:

Does put paid to the thought "why didn't they just......"

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Hi
For interest, information reference Ball bearings from the NID Geographical on Germany Vol. III (of four, November 1944 edition of 1942 original), page 311:


Mike

Of the other targets you had listed, Nuremberg caught my eye. I wondered what was the target there. It does seem to tie in with attacks on Schweinfurt. My only knowledge of it is Schweinfurt=ball bearings. Thanks for the post. Very informative.

SaparotRob said:

Of the other targets you had listed, Nuremberg caught my eye. I wondered what was the target there. It does seem to tie in with attacks on Schweinfurt. My only knowledge of it is Schweinfurt=ball bearings. Thanks for the post. Very informative.

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When the RAF hit Nuremburg the main reason was it was Nuremburg, place of the Nazi Rallies. On the disastrous March 1944 raid 120 of the aircraft actually hit Schweinfurt. Whatever the supposed target was, they bombed through cloud with sky marking.

pbehn said:

When the RAF hit Nuremburg the main reason was it was Nuremburg, place of the Nazi Rallies. On the disastrous March 1944 raid 120 of the aircraft actually hit Schweinfurt. Whatever the supposed target was, they bombed through cloud with sky marking.

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That's what I first thought of when I read the list of cities targeted. I wasn't aware of any other strategic value of Nuremberg. Its manufacturing value never seems to be mentioned in the cursory histories I've read.

SaparotRob said:

That's what I first thought of when I read the list of cities targeted. I wasn't aware of any other strategic value of Nuremberg. Its manufacturing value never seems to be mentioned in the cursory histories I've read.

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Apart from its links to the Nazi regime it was the second largest city in Bavaria and according to Wiki "During the Second World War, Nuremberg was the headquarters of Wehrkreis (military district) XIII, and an important site for military production, including aircraft, submarines and tank engines."

MikeMeech said:

Hi

Also flying in the summer means long daylight hours and short nights, probably not a good idea for night bombers. BC generally undertook their long range missions when the nights were longest, while the 8th AF generally undertook their long range missions when the days were longest. July/August is long daylight hours.

Mike

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Right, and I really hadn't considered this aspect that much -- but you're spot-on.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Right, and I really hadn't considered this aspect that much -- but you're spot-on.

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A former member here Bill Runnels was a bombardier on B-17s flying from UK. His longest mission was 11 hours. In the depths of winter you need to be taking off forming up and landing in the dark to mount a long raid into Germany. RAF missions were shorter because they didnt have all the forming up stuff and didnt stay in a formation but in the height of summer on June 21st it is only properly dark for about 3 hours and in a full moon it isnt actually dark at all.

Like you I hadnt considered it until I saw Bill's post.