What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

[FLYBOYJ]

I don't think there is such a thing as accurately bombing "from altitude" unless the weather is perfect. Accurate bombing was done at low altitude unless you have guided munitions (and many of those require you to be at 10,000 ft or lower IIRC). Maybe with JDAM.

But it is possible to fly to a target at high altitude and then descend to a lower altitude to drop bombs.

Are we talking about today or WW2???

Look at the altitudes raids over Germany and Japan were commonly conducted. Only the Tokyo firebombing were conducted at what was considered low altitudes. The first major Ploesti raid is another exception

 

[Schweik]

I can't really support the claim the Mosquito was revolutionary. It replaced its predecessors in that it had greater performance than them, and as for its wooden structure, it was an evolutionary step in structural practices that de Havilland applied in the DH.88 Comet and DH.91 Albatross. It certainly carved a niche for itself and gave the RAF new dimensions in offensive capability, but it didn't introduce sweeping change on a revolutionary scale. As I've been stating, it introduced new options to old practices.

You can't support it, but I can. The previous generation of British light or medium bombers - Blenheim, Battle, Hampden, Wellington, Whitley, though protected by gun positions and / or turrets, could not safely fly daylight missions even when well escorted by fighters, had a top speed of roughly 250 mph, cruised at around 180 mph, and flew at around 12,000 -15,000 ft. Their bombing accuracy was generally low and most of them were either quickly retired from combat or relegated to secondary Theaters. Of that group, only the Wellington really found a useful niche but it wasn't comparable to that Mosquito and it's niche generally kept it well away from Axis day-fighters.

The Mosquito could successfully fly day or night time missions over Germany unescorted, could fly solo recon sorties and survive (a very rare trait during WW2), and made a superb night fighter. None of the previous generation of British bombers qualified to do that. It flew between 370 - 415 mph at roughly 25,000 ft. It could cruise at 325 mph. In terms of performance it was half again as fast and flew twice as high as the other British bombers. It was faster than most German fighters, which is not something any other Allied bomber could manage.

In terms of capability - flying over German held territory with relative impunity, it really had no competition on the Allied side, nor did the Axis have anything that could really compare to it. To me that was revolutionary.

While it might not have been in the USAF, in the RAF the Canberra had the same impact that the Mosquito did. It proved itself very flexible and added a different dimension to the RAF's air capability. Until the U-2, the Canberra had a far higher ceiling than virtually every other aircraft in military service and Canberras made many overflights of the Soviet Union with relative impunity before the U-2 appeared on the scene. The last Canberras were retired from the RAF in 2006; PR.9 photo recon platforms with 39 Sqn.

The Canberra was an excellent aircraft in my opinion, but it also didn't offer anything that we didn't already have with other aircraft long before the end of the Vietnam war. In terms of Recon we had not only the U2 but also the SR 71. The Canberra could fly fast and high, but it couldn't escape an SA 2 or a MiG-25. By contrast, a Mosquito could outrun the fighters of it's day.

 

[Schweik]

Are we talking about today or WW2???

Look at the altitudes raids over Germany and Japan were commonly conducted. Only the Tokyo firebombing were conducted at what was considered low altitudes. The first major Ploesti raid is another exception

I am pointing out that even today it's not possible to bomb accurately from altitudes such as 20,000 - 30,000 ft. The reason that heavy bomber raids devolved into just bombing cities was because they had so much trouble hitting the actual factories, rail yards, production plants and so forth from altitude.

They also had relatively poor performance, and had to stick together for mutual protection, so that you wouldn't have a B-17 swooping down to lower altitude to strike and then soom climbing back out, whereas a fighter bomber or a fast bomber like a Mosquito could actually do that.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I am pointing out that even today it's not possible to bomb accurately from altitudes such as 20,000 - 30,000 ft.

Not true!!!! You have a variety of smart bombs, laser and satellite guided systems that can hit targets easily from altitude.

GBU-15 Guided Bomb Unit

The Guided Bomb Unit or GBU-15 is an unpowered, glide weapon used to destroy high value enemy targets. It was designed for use with F-15E, F-111F and F-4 aircraft, but the U.S. Air Force is currently

www.af.mil

I believe some of the carpet bombing with free fall bombs used in Afghanistan were GPS targeted with accurate results.

The reason that heavy bomber raids devolved into just bombing cities was because they had so much trouble hitting the actual factories, rail yards, production plants and so forth from altitude.

Show us your reference for that!

They also had relatively poor performance, and had to stick together for mutual protection, so that you wouldn't have a B-17 swooping down to lower altitude to strike and then soom climbing back out, whereas a fighter bomber or a fast bomber like a Mosquito could actually do that.

The doctrine changed after WW2 when you have aircraft AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS that can accurately deliver bombs at low altitudes and fast speeds. For the technology of the day the Mosquito was a very accurate bomber but you were still "bombing by hand" and there was a margin of error still induced. Post war delivery systems, smart weapons and eventually stealth technology changed the face of delivering a precision strike

 

[Schweik]

Not true!!!! You have a variety of smart bombs, laser and satellite guided systems that can hit targets easily from altitude.

GBU-15 Guided Bomb Unit

The Guided Bomb Unit or GBU-15 is an unpowered, glide weapon used to destroy high value enemy targets. It was designed for use with F-15E, F-111F and F-4 aircraft, but the U.S. Air Force is currently

www.af.mil

I already mentioned JDAM's as an exception to this. My understanding from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan however is that the fighter bombers typically dropped their laser guided ordinance from around 10,000 ft, not 30,000.

Show us your reference for that!

Seriously? There are entire books written about it. The US was still trying to hit specific factories, rail yards etc. (in Europe) almost to the end of the war, while the English had already given up on that for the most part by 1942 or 43. The American raids tended to be so heavy and miss so often (thus had to be done again and again) that the cities were gradually pulverized, and they participated with the British in some of the fire bombing raids previously mentioned.

The doctrine changed after WW2 when you have aircraft AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS that can accurately deliver bombs at low altitudes and fast speeds. For the technology of the day the Mosquito was a very accurate bomber but you were still "bombing by hand" and there was a margin of error still induced. Post war delivery systems, smart weapons and eventually stealth technology changed the face of delivering a precision strike

Accuracy obviously improved enormously with precision munitions, although as I'm sure you know they were already experimenting with radio, radar, and wire guided munitions during WW2. There was an enormous variance in accuracy between high altitude level bombing, medium altitude level bombing, low altitude precision bombing, skip and mast-height bombing, and true dive bombing. The Mosquito fell roughly in the middle of that range in terms of accuracy (which is to say, vastly more accurate under normal circumstances than a B-17 let alone a Lancaster bombing at night).

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I already mentioned JDAM's as an exception to this. My understanding from the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan however is that the fighter bombers typically dropped their laser guided ordinance from around 10,000 ft, not 30,000.

They have the capability to drop OVER 30,000 if required.

Seriously? There are entire books written about it.

Well tell us! The written doctrine from General Arnold specified industrial targets, later cities were targeted but targets that produced war material was the goal

The US was still trying to hit specific factories, rail yards etc. (in Europe) almost to the end of the war, while the English had already given up on that for the most part by 1942 or 43. The American raids tended to be so heavy and miss so often (thus had to be done again and again) that the cities were gradually pulverized, and they participated with the British in some of the fire bombing raids previously mentioned.

see above

Accuracy obviously improved enormously with precision munitions, although as I'm sure you know they were already experimenting with radio, radar, and wire guided munitions during WW2.

They were but free fall bombs were the primary weapon

 

[drgondog]

Virtually none of the oil that Germany got from Romania was of high enough quality to refine into aviation spirit economically, so while it is very important as a source
from a military perspective, from an aviation perspective, Romania was almost an irrelevance to the Luftwaffe. They of course hoped that would not be the case,
but thats actually how it turned out with what they were actually able to get from them.

By June 1944, the quantities from Romania also fell to the level of irrelevance.

View attachment 647524

Snowygrouch - The Ploesti Refinery complex was perhaps the single most important target for airpower doctrine for WWII. If the primary product(s) weren't Avgas (and they weren't), knocking it out would have reduced Germany's mechanized capability worse than a total loss at Schweinfurt. AvGas refining in other synthetic and crude refiners would have been required to reduce refining supply to Luftwaffe and shift production (if possible for some) to lower octane gas/petrol in order of priority to supply suface transportation and war fighting requirements.

To contemplate that 15th AF would actually send strategic forces to the 3rd heaviest defended target to Only bomb marshaling yards at Ploesti - as one our posters seems to thrive on - as part of the Transportation Plan, begs the question WHY? The USSR certainly wanted the rail centers at Bucharest and Ploesti bombed but they were not part of the Transportation Plan controlling USSTAF, RAF attacks on surface transportation networks - primarily in France.

I have to dig into some files long ago strored to see if there is evidence that 15th AF was explicitly ordered to limit attacks in Rumania to only M/Y.

The Transportation Plan specifically was tasked to disrupt in-country mobility (France/Brussels/Holland) and far east France on German border (Mulhouse) and far west Germany (Saarbrucken, Osnabruck) rail networks to move materials to the beach head. The attacks on German M/Y ceased two weeks prior to D-Day and 8th AF concentrated on airfields, viaducts, bridges though the end of May and into middle of June. I do know that 8th AF tasked 8th FC for many Fighter Bomber Sweeps that focused on surface targets including rail and M/Y and troop convoys -

 

[Schweik]

They have the capability to drop OVER 30,000 if required.

Right, but JDAM's are pretty expensive. The laser guided bombs (also expensive, but quite so much) tend to be dropped from lower altitude.

Well tell us! The written doctrine from General Arnold specified industrial targets, later cities were targeted but targets that produced war material was the goal

I'm not going to pull down books from the shelf and transcribe pages to prove an already very well known point for a side argument on this forum debate. But I'll quote from the Wiki:

"USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision bombing" of military targets for much of the war, and dismissed claims they were simply bombing cities. However the American Eighth Air Force received the first H2X radar sets in December 1943. Within two weeks of the arrival of these first six sets, the Eighth command gave permission for them to area bomb a city using H2X and would continue to authorize, on average, about one such attack a week until the end of the war in Europe.[171]​

In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1,000 feet (300m) around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, overall, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area.[172]​ In the fall of 1944, only seven percent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point."

The British terror or 'area bombing' campaign hinged largely on this specific paper, known as the "De-housing paper"

For sources I'd recommend the US Strategic Bombing Survey, Air War by Edward Jablonski (maybe a little dated now but I think it holds up pretty well) and Eagle Against the Sun by Ronald H. Spector for the Pacific Theater.

I believe the Mosquito generally did a lot better than 7% in terms of bombing accuracy.

see above

They were but free fall bombs were the primary weapon

yes but there is a huge difference between the above quoted statistics for high altitude level bombing vs. for example a Stuka or SBD dive bombing, or a fighter bomber or fast-bomber (like a Mosquito) bombing at low altitude. Small numbers of Mosquitos were able to hit precision targets on several occasions as we know, despite using unguided 'free fall bombs'.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Right, but JDAM's are pretty expensive. The laser guided bombs (also expensive, but quite so much) tend to be dropped from lower altitude.

Is that your opinion or fact? Again they are CAPABLE of being dropped for altitudes in excess of 30'000 feet. You said this was not possible!

I'm not going to pull down books from the shelf and transcribe pages to prove an already very well known point for a side argument on this forum debate. But I'll quote from the Wiki:

"USAAF leaders firmly held to the claim of "precision bombing" of military targets for much of the war, and dismissed claims they were simply bombing cities. However the American Eighth Air Force received the first H2X radar sets in December 1943. Within two weeks of the arrival of these first six sets, the Eighth command gave permission for them to area bomb a city using H2X and would continue to authorize, on average, about one such attack a week until the end of the war in Europe.[171]​

And that coincides with my statement

In reality, the day bombing was "precision bombing" only in the sense that most bombs fell somewhere near a specific designated target such as a railway yard. Conventionally, the air forces designated as "the target area" a circle having a radius of 1,000 feet (300m) around the aiming point of attack. While accuracy improved during the war, Survey studies show that, overall, only about 20% of the bombs aimed at precision targets fell within this target area.[172]​ In the fall of 1944, only seven percent of all bombs dropped by the Eighth Air Force hit within 1,000 feet of their aim point."

No argument

The British terror or 'area bombing' campaign hinged largely on this specific paper, known as the "De-housing paper"

For sources I'd recommend the US Strategic Bombing Survey, Air War by Edward Jablonski (maybe a little dated now but I think it holds up pretty well) and Eagle Against the Sun by Ronald H. Spector for the Pacific Theater.

And again no argument

I believe the Mosquito generally did a lot better than 7% in terms of bombing accuracy.

For the missions they were able to fly yes. If they were operated at altitude (Like you suggested earlier) the results would be the same as they had to drop their bombs at close to the same speeds as the heavies

yes but there is a huge difference between the above quoted statistics for high altitude level bombing vs. for example a Stuka or SBD dive bombing, or a fighter bomber or fast-bomber (like a Mosquito) bombing at low altitude. Small numbers of Mosquitos were able to hit precision targets on several occasions as we know, despite using unguided 'free fall bombs'.

And again you miss the point that based on the technology and the mission of the day, the doctrine was to lob the most amount of bombs over a given target. When you had mass formations of Lancasters (14,000 pound bomb load) B-24s (5-8000 pound bomb load) and B-17s (45-8000 pound bomb load) it's obvious what the weapon of choice was going to be.

 

[Schweik]

Snowygrouch - The Ploesti Refinery complex was perhaps the single most important target for airpower doctrine for WWII. If the primary product(s) weren't Avgas (and they weren't), knocking it out would have reduced Germany's mechanized capability worse than a total loss at Schweinfurt. AvGas refining in other synthetic and crude refiners would have been required to reduce refining supply to Luftwaffe and shift production (if possible for some) to lower octane gas/petrol in order of priority to supply suface transportation and war fighting requirements.

To contemplate that 15th AF would actually send strategic forces to the 3rd heaviest defended target to Only bomb marshaling yards at Ploesti - as one our posters seems to thrive on - as part of the Transportation Plan, begs the question WHY? The USSR certainly wanted the rail centers at Bucharest and Ploesti bombed but they were not part of the Transportation Plan controlling USSTAF, RAF attacks on surface transportation networks - primarily in France.

I have to dig into some files long ago strored to see if there is evidence that 15th AF was explicitly ordered to limit attacks in Rumania to only M/Y.

The Transportation Plan specifically was tasked to disrupt in-country mobility (France/Brussels/Holland) and far east France on German border (Mulhouse) and far west Germany (Saarbrucken, Osnabruck) rail networks to move materials to the beach head. The attacks on German M/Y ceased two weeks prior to D-Day and 8th AF concentrated on airfields, viaducts, bridges though the end of May and into middle of June. I do know that 8th AF tasked 8th FC for many Fighter Bomber Sweeps that focused on surface targets including rail and M/Y and troop convoys -

I think it's pretty simple. The Germans had a serious, chronic shortage of petrol of all types. Even if the Luftwaffe isn't using fuel from Ploesti but rather synthetic fuel, if the Ploesti source is gone that means the whole avialable stock of fuel is reduced, which means they have to get petrol for the tanks from somewhere else, which means less fuel for the Luftwaffe.

As for attacks against transportation / rail, to me that overlaps with operational bombing campaigns which were being done by medium bombers and fighter bombers as well as the heavies.

 

[Schweik]

Is that your opinion or fact? Again they are CAPABLE of being dropped for altitudes in excess of 30'000 feet. You said this was not possible!

I said the following, originally: "I don't think there is such a thing as accurately bombing "from altitude" unless the weather is perfect. Accurate bombing was done at low altitude unless you have guided munitions (and many of those require you to be at 10,000 ft or lower IIRC). Maybe with JDAM."

I'm not going to write every post like a legal contract with footnotes for every single exception. You know what I meant.

For the missions they were able to fly yes. If they were operated at altitude (Like you suggested earlier) the results would be the same as they had to drop their bombs at close to the same speeds as the heavies

No I'm suggesting they could fly in at high altitude for recon, and they could fly in at high altitude for raids too but drop to low altitude to perform their strike, then climb back up for the trip back home or fly back NOE.

And again you miss the point that based on the technology and the mission of the day, the doctrine was to lob the most amount of bombs over a given target.

Right - you are missing my point that this was basically a failed doctrine. I disagree with that doctrine and believe it was a mistake. I believe the Mosquito made it possible to pursue a different doctrine.

When you had mass formations of Lancasters (14,000 pound bomb load) B-24s (5-8000 pound bomb load) and B-17s (45-8000 pound bomb load) it's obvious what the weapon of choice was going to be.

Right, hence, make Mosquitos and more fighter-bombers (and maybe A-26s etc.) instead.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I said the following, originally: "I don't think there is such a thing as accurately bombing "from altitude" unless the weather is perfect. Accurate bombing was done at low altitude unless you have guided munitions (and many of those require you to be at 10,000 ft or lower IIRC). Maybe with JDAM."

I'm not going to write every post like a legal contract with footnotes for every single exception. You know what I meant.

No your words - I think you have a tendency of posting your opinion on technical items rather than actually researching or knowing how they really work

No I'm suggesting they could fly in at high altitude for recon, and they could fly in at high altitude for raids too but drop to low altitude to perform their strike, then climb back up for the trip back home or fly back NOE.

OK - your opinion

Right - you are missing my point that this was basically a failed doctrine. I disagree with that doctrine and believe it was a mistake. I believe the Mosquito made it possible to pursue a different doctrine.

You can say that with 20/20 hindsight 75 years later - that's easy! For the technology and resources available at that time and for what the mission was calling for, the heavy bombers were the answer. You were not going going to do this with an aircraft, be it very fast that carried a maximum 4,000 pound bomb load with a 600 mile combat radius! I agree the Mosquito "could have" been used in some raids where heavies were called in but in the bigger picture the goal was to deliver the maximum amount of bombs over target.

Right, hence, make Mosquitos and more fighter-bombers (and maybe A-26s etc.) instead.

And even if you made more it would take 3 or 4 Mosquitoes to carry the same bombload as a Lancaster, this was pointed out before. And for that to time up with actual history the Mosquito "would have" had to be in full production at least 2 years before it actually was.

 

[NevadaK]

Whew! Lot of posts going on. After reading all of this I just have a couple simpleton questions:

1) What does a mass raid with Mosquitos look like. Is it just large formation flying, but at a greater speed? Is it low altitude in squadron waves? IIRC low altitude air defenses, especially for static targets, were actually quite effective. I see a lot of arguments that the Mosquito would be different because of speed, but what would that actually look like in use.
2) So, this might be a little more controversial but I had a number of relatives who were in the ETO and a couple who were senior enough to be part of post-war military governance. They used to talk about how important it had been to comprehensively defeat Germany (as well as Japan). Their point was that Germany had to be made to want to surrender otherwise Europe would have devolved into an endless war. They all thought that the air campaign was a major contributor to that. I'm not advocating for this, but curious what the forums thoughts would be on that? And, how would greater precision and accuracy in bombing help or hinder that?

 

[drgondog]

Whew! Lot of posts going on. After reading all of this I just have a couple simpleton questions:

1) What does a mass raid with Mosquitos look like. Is it just large formation flying, but at a greater speed? Is it low altitude in squadron waves? IIRC low altitude air defenses, especially for static targets, were actually quite effective. I see a lot of arguments that the Mosquito would be different because of speed, but what would that actually look like in use.
2) So, this might be a little more controversial but I had a number of relatives who were in the ETO and a couple who were senior enough to be part of post-war military governance. They used to talk about how important it had been to comprehensively defeat Germany (as well as Japan). Their point was that Germany had to be made to want to surrender otherwise Europe would have devolved into an endless war. They all thought that the air campaign was a major contributor to that. I'm not advocating for this, but curious what the forums thoughts would be on that? And, how would greater precision and accuracy in bombing help or hinder that?

IMO - the question to be answered is how many Mosquitos would be required to destroy a Petroleum/Chemical facility (defined perhaps by reducing product delivery to 10% of capacity).

Related questions a.) For any given attack strategy, what are the CEPs expectations (documented testing/actual results for proposed attack strategy) for each attacking Mossie at 600 miles and b.) why do we believe that? c.) what is recommended attack plan - i.e. single Mossies in trail? Flight/Section sized force in formation? mass formation of Wing level strength? Daylight, Night? What missions are compromised by shifting Mossie inventory toward long range strategic attacks?

The RAF optical bombsight was probably as good as the Speery - but? Mossie cruise speed makes single a/C attacks harder to defend than formation sized force but the loss rate should still be high.

 

[Peter Gunn]

Whew! Lot of posts going on. After reading all of this I just have a couple simpleton questions:

1) What does a mass raid with Mosquitos look like. Is it just large formation flying, but at a greater speed? Is it low altitude in squadron waves? IIRC low altitude air defenses, especially for static targets, were actually quite effective. I see a lot of arguments that the Mosquito would be different because of speed, but what would that actually look like in use.
2) So, this might be a little more controversial but I had a number of relatives who were in the ETO and a couple who were senior enough to be part of post-war military governance. They used to talk about how important it had been to comprehensively defeat Germany (as well as Japan). Their point was that Germany had to be made to want to surrender otherwise Europe would have devolved into an endless war. They all thought that the air campaign was a major contributor to that. I'm not advocating for this, but curious what the forums thoughts would be on that? And, how would greater precision and accuracy in bombing help or hinder that?

In regards to your number two in quote, absolutely. The Imperial Germany army suffered a pretty obvious a$$ kicking in 1918, but that was never brought home to the general populace, instead they got fed the "stabbed in the back" pablum and bought into it with disastrous results. Other than a shortage of food and many other goods, Germany did not feel the full sting of the defeat in the field. Cities and farmland were untouched by war and no real material damage was suffered in Germany proper. There were those that wrote at the time (1918-1919) that the Germans were NOT convinced they had been defeated militarily and that within twenty years or so another war would be in the offing.

In WWII the German populace found out the full weight of defeat, not just food and goods shortages but massive destruction on a city wide scale, full occupation by conquering armies and total demilitarization, war crimes trials, the works. There's been no replay of German troublemaking in the last 80 years, I'll just leave it at that.

As for Japan, the people had been mislead and lied to so badly by their militaristic leaders one feels quite a bit of sympathy for them. But they too needed to feel the FULL weight of defeat lest revisionist ideologues begin stirring up trouble again and making them believe that they weren't REALLY defeated. In reading about the occupation of Japan immediately after the war (1945), it's interesting to see that the Japanese people themselves, after getting over the shock that the Americans were NOT barbarians with horns on their heads, were not only relieved to find that out but were quite gracious and almost welcoming to the occupying army.

Just finished Ian Toll's "Twilight of the Gods", the last book in his Pacific War trilogy, the last chapters deal with occupation of Japan, it makes for pretty interesting reading vis a vis Japanese/American relations in the immediate aftermath of the war.

 

[special ed]

Is the cost more than 70,000+ dead Allied airmen, plus whatever carnage we aren't suppose to think about on the ground in Hamburg etc.?

The inference seems to be that if Mossies were used there would be no, or fewer, casualties. Would that be due to speed or structure? Certainly not due to defensive firepower. How many crippled acft would return to Britain with one or two engines shot out? How would an injured pilot be assisted at the controls to bring the plane home. Since it seems twice the number of acft would be required to do/deliver the job, would aircrew losses still be less?

 

[drgondog]

In regards to your number two in quote, absolutely. The Imperial Germany army suffered a pretty obvious a$$ kicking in 1918, but that was never brought home to the general populace, instead they got fed the "stabbed in the back" pablum and bought into it with disastrous results. Other than a shortage of food and many other goods, Germany did not feel the full sting of the defeat in the field. Cities and farmland were untouched by war and no real material damage was suffered in Germany proper. There were those that wrote at the time (1918-1919) that the Germans were NOT convinced they had been defeated militarily and that within twenty years or so another war would be in the offing.

In WWII the German populace found out the full weight of defeat, not just food and goods shortages but massive destruction on a city wide scale, full occupation by conquering armies and total demilitarization, war crimes trials, the works. There's been no replay of German troublemaking in the last 80 years, I'll just leave it at that.

As for Japan, the people had been mislead and lied to so badly by their militaristic leaders one feels quite a bit of sympathy for them. But they too needed to feel the FULL weight of defeat lest revisionist ideologues begin stirring up trouble again and making them believe that they weren't REALLY defeated. In reading about the occupation of Japan immediately after the war (1945), it's interesting to see that the Japanese people themselves, after getting over the shock that the Americans were NOT barbarians with horns on their heads, were not only relieved to find that out but were quite gracious and almost welcoming to the occupying army.

Just finished Ian Toll's "Twilight of the Gods", the last book in his Pacific War trilogy, the last chapters deal with occupation of Japan, it makes for pretty interesting reading vis a vis Japanese/American relations in the immediate aftermath of the war.

The last part about 'almost welcoming to the occupying army' didn't often apply to USAF brats. My experience as an Air Force brat in Tokyo was that conduct (polite show of respect) versus thought (contempt for foreign American Devil) was prevalent. I was a Gai-Jin then and deep down no Japanese person feels inferior to another race. At least we don't top the hit parade of China and Korea. Gratitude and Thank You were transformed into to various forms of expression of obligation or owed debt - which translated to neutral (mild obligation) to resentment for your thoughtfulness. If gifts are exchanged your Japanese host will always try to 'give more' in concert with the framework of obligation. I recognize that 70+ years is plenty of time to weed out the 'old' and 'bring in the new'. (like US).

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Related questions a.) For any given attack strategy, what are the CEPs expectations (documented testing/actual results for proposed attack strategy) for each attacking Mossie at 600 miles and b.) why do we believe that? c.) what is recommended attack plan - i.e. single Mossies in trail? Flight/Section sized force in formation? mass formation of Wing level strength? Daylight, Night? What missions are compromised by shifting Mossie inventory toward long range strategic attacks?

The RAF optical bombsight was probably as good as the Speery - but? Mossie cruise speed makes single a/C attacks harder to defend than formation sized force but the loss rate should still be high.

Bill, you bring up excellent points that are continually missed in this discussion. Tactics would come into play but why take a hot rod and use it as a pick up truck?

IIRC the RAF bombsight MK XIV was limited to a maximum ground speed setting of 220 MPH, I could be wrong on this...

The inference seems to be that if Mossies were used there would be no, or fewer, casualties. Would that be due to speed or structure? Certainly not due to defensive firepower. How many crippled acft would return to Britain with one or two engines shot out? How would an injured pilot be assisted at the controls to bring the plane home. Since it seems twice the number of acft would be required to do/deliver the job, would aircrew losses still be less?

A reduced crew would minimize risks and possibly aircrew causalities but other considerations are brought into play as you point out. More airframes to complete the mission and the lack of dual controls are also big considerations.

 

[Schweik]

No your words - I think you have a tendency of posting your opinion on technical items rather than actually researching or knowing how they really work

I resent that, and I've seen you make mistakes and omissions yourself, I didn't make assumptions beyond what I actually knew about you which isn't that much. I try to be very clear when I do know about a particular technical issue and when I don't. I think sometimes when you are making high-level points about things everyone either already knows or should know you don't have to plunge into every single nuance like a legal contract. But I'll be sure and hold you to the same standard in the future.

You can say that with 20/20 hindsight 75 years later - that's easy! For the technology and resources available at that time and for what the mission was calling for, the heavy bombers were the answer. You were not going going to do this with an aircraft, be it very fast that carried a maximum 4,000 pound bomb load with a 600 mile combat radius! I agree the Mosquito "could have" been used in some raids where heavies were called in but in the bigger picture the goal was to deliver the maximum amount of bombs over target.

You are still missing my point. If you are going to engage in a 'What If" such as the subject of this thread, then you have to assume a different goal and a different mission. I have been saying here, and have said in previous iterations of the same discussions, that the bomb truck mentality, the idea of moving mud or just "delivering the maximum amount of bombs over target" is a bad strategy.

During WW2 even though they didn't have precision guided munitions such as we have in the modern world, they did have more and less accurate methods of bombing and more and less accurate methods of bombing.

And even if you made more it would take 3 or 4 Mosquitoes to carry the same bombload as a Lancaster, this was pointed out before. And for that to time up with actual history the Mosquito "would have" had to be in full production at least 2 years before it actually was.

We know they didn't ramp up Mosquito production super early. We know what happened in the actual war. But the point is not the bombload.

Let me try to spell this out more clearly.

B-17 carried a 8 x 500 lb bombs for a 4,000 bomb load on a long mission. Lets say you have 50 of them on your raid. That's 200,000 lbs of bombs, or 100 tons. Pretty impressive.
But if you only have 7% bombing accuracy, that is actually 14,000 lbs of bombs, or 7 tons hitting the target. For many targets this may not be enough.

On a long mission, a mosquito might carry two 500 lb bombs, for a 1,000 lb load*. Lets say you have 50 of those so 50,000 lbs of bombs or 25 tons. Looks like far less than the B-17 raid!
I don't know how much better the accuracy was for a Mosquito, but we know their accuracy is higher. Lets say for sake of argument they hit 30% of the time (and I'm not saying for sure that they did).

If their rate of accuracy was that much better, that same paltry 50,000 lbs of bombs converts to 15,000 7.5 tons - actually better than the B-17 raid.
With an increased bomb load to 2,000 lbs per Mosquito, you are now carrying 100,000 and hitting with 30,000 lbs or 15 tons. More than twice as good as the B-17s.

And now lets look at the knock on advantages:

1) You are risking 100 aircrew in the Mosquitos, vs. 500 in the B-17 strike. You have two engines in each Mosquito vs. four engines in each B-17. 13 guns on the B-17 vs 4 guns (or none) on the Mosquito.
2) This is a big one. The Mosquitoes also have a much better survival rate. For the B-17 I've seen various rates between 5-7% on average to as high as 16% for Schewinfurt. Lets say 5%. For the Mosquito the number I've seen quoted is 28,000 sorties losing 193 aircraft which is a 0.7% loss rate.
That means if you fly five missions, you are down to 38 B-17s left. You still have 48 Mosquitos left.
3) So if you hit your target repeatedly, as they often did, you are actually going to be getting better and better results comparatively

From my understanding the Lancaster had a higher loss rate than the B-17 for the war, though I'm not sure precisely how high, and bombing at night they certainly had a lower accuracy (barring special raids like the dambusters or something).


My whole argument above hinges partly on how much more accurate a Mosquito actually was compared to a B-17, and I freely admit I don't actually know that - it would take a bit of research to get even a vague sense of what that number really was but it could be measured for certain raids. The other factors such as mission survival rates come into play regardless.

The Bottom Line is, if we can in fact make the assumption that a fast bomber like a Mosquito could hit targets three or four times more accurately, then I think you can definitely make a strong case that a completely different type of bomber offensive could have been possible at some point, and probably would have been more successful.

* I know they sometimes carried more or less.

 

[Schweik]

In regards to your number two in quote, absolutely. The Imperial Germany army suffered a pretty obvious a$$ kicking in 1918, but that was never brought home to the general populace, instead they got fed the "stabbed in the back" pablum and bought into it with disastrous results. Other than a shortage of food and many other goods, Germany did not feel the full sting of the defeat in the field. Cities and farmland were untouched by war and no real material damage was suffered in Germany proper. There were those that wrote at the time (1918-1919) that the Germans were NOT convinced they had been defeated militarily and that within twenty years or so another war would be in the offing.

In WWII the German populace found out the full weight of defeat, not just food and goods shortages but massive destruction on a city wide scale, full occupation by conquering armies and total demilitarization, war crimes trials, the works. There's been no replay of German troublemaking in the last 80 years, I'll just leave it at that.

As for Japan, the people had been mislead and lied to so badly by their militaristic leaders one feels quite a bit of sympathy for them. But they too needed to feel the FULL weight of defeat lest revisionist ideologues begin stirring up trouble again and making them believe that they weren't REALLY defeated. In reading about the occupation of Japan immediately after the war (1945), it's interesting to see that the Japanese people themselves, after getting over the shock that the Americans were NOT barbarians with horns on their heads, were not only relieved to find that out but were quite gracious and almost welcoming to the occupying army.

Just finished Ian Toll's "Twilight of the Gods", the last book in his Pacific War trilogy, the last chapters deal with occupation of Japan, it makes for pretty interesting reading vis a vis Japanese/American relations in the immediate aftermath of the war.

I think the Obvious Ass Kicking for the Germans was the arrival of the Red Army in Berlin. You didn't need to incinerate Hamburg for the Germans to know they damn sure lost.

The Japanese also, from what I've read, were more influenced toward surrender by the rapid destruction of their remaining land army in Manchuria by the Soviets in the final two weeks of the war than they were by the fire bombing or even the atomic bombs.

The US and British may not have been too gentle but were the 'good cop' compared to the Soviets and Stalin.