What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (2 Viewers)

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Status
Not open for further replies.
Very few units got Henry rifles. Spencers were more common but Spencers were slower firing (working the lever did not cock the hammer)
Being able to shoot repeatedly even if you still had to pull the hammer back manually was still a game changer. So were revolvers but repeating rifles took it to another order of magnitude. Spencers incidentally shot not so much pistol ammunition but rather a 56 caliber ball which was pretty hefty (350 grain and between 1,000 and 1200 fps). And it held 7 of those which could be discharged pretty rapidly. The range was supposed to be 500 yards, though of course that depends on the shooter and the conditions.

The Henry rifle shot a little bit smaller .44 cal, 200 grain bullet at around 1,100 fps, also not a small round. It held 15 rounds. It did have a relatively short range. But this was huge difference from (and major advantage over) any muzzle loader.

The US on both sides must have been using a lot of defective muzzle loading rifles. British figured the Muzzle loading rifles were effective at 10 times that distance in Crimea.

The problem may be in what was considered "effective" range. Even volley fire by smooth bores was ineffective at about 100yds. However
View attachment 647554
rear sight of 1853 Enfield. Laid flat was the 100yd position, the first hump/bump is 200 yds the next is 300yds and the 4th was 400yds. Then the sight was raised to vertical and the sliding portion was set to the appropriate mark.

The 1853 Enfeild was what was known as a 'rifled musket' which was kind of a stop gap or intermediate type of weapon (basically a musket which had been modified with a rifled barrel), although there were actual several smoothbore muskets used in the civil war as well.

The civil war in fact bridged the gap between really three distinct eras in terms of the small arms used.

Longer ranged fire was often difficult in mass engagements in this period because they were not yet using smokeless powder so the battlefield would quickly get obscured by vast clouds of gunsmoke.
Effective range might be a range at which even single digit percentage of hits was obtained on a "formation target" lie a screen 6 feet high and 20 ft wide (head of a marching column.)
British were publishing manuals showing trajectories and danger spaces from about 1856 on.

Rifled muzzle loaders made Cavalry charges on open ground a lot more costly, it also made bayonet charges on foot a lot more costly but it took quite a while for some officers (even generals) to figure that out.

What you could do in practice vs. what could be done in theory was always at variance. In theory various WW2 fighter aircraft could kill targets 1,000 yards away, but in practice most shot from much closer - 300 yards, 200, some got within 50 yards and still didn't always hit.

And pilots get a lot more training than infantry conscripts. It's not so much that the weapons were defective as the training and discipline wasn't always up to par. We know from excavations of civil war battlefields that some guys never even fired their weapon but ended up loading it over and over four or five times before the weapon was dropped.

The ammunition also mattered a lot. At one point some Confederate units were using clay bullets which didn't have the best range. Some units shot balls some shot more modern bullets like Minié balls, or the type of brass cartridges used by the repeaters.
 
Well, by late 1941/early 1942 you had a virtual aircraft carrier in US bomber production. It took over a year to build the first 500 B-24s. It took about 3 months to build the next 500.

In 1942 the US built just under 16,000 R-1820s, around 22,600 R-1830s, just under 15,000 Allisons, about 11,800 R-2800s and 7,250 V-1650s.
Over all production of aircraft engines would roughly double in 1943.

Yes you can change production. But in "many what ifs" people don't want to pay the cost.

Is the cost more than 70,000+ dead Allied airmen, plus whatever carnage we aren't suppose to think about on the ground in Hamburg etc.?
 
I still say the Mosquito was to WW2 what the Henry rifle was to the Civil War, though you could substitute the Spencer if you prefer ;)

 
I'm just pointing out it was certainly technically viable.

It was, and as Callum posted above, there was certainly discussion surrounding the effectiveness of the type compared to existing heavies. But this is within Bomber Command in Britain and despite this evidence, there was no way that the heads would have advocated discontinuing Lancaster production for a solely Mosquito force. Sticking with the what-if element, it would have been foolhardy for such a move to have been undertaken by the USAAF despite the evidence. A force of 100 to 500 Lancasters can do a lot more damage than an equivalent force of similarly numbered Mosquitoes.

Again, joint effort using a variety of platforms in specialised roles produces a broader result. Look at the use of the English Electric/Martin B-57 Canberra in combat scenarios as a good comparison of what two different classes of aeroplane bring to the table. The Canberra was the spiritual successor to the Mosquito and its value to both the RAF and USAAF was enormous as a fast tactical striker, high altitude recon platform etc, yet both air forces maintained heavy bombers.
 
Is the cost more than 70,000+ dead Allied airmen, plus whatever carnage we aren't suppose to think about on the ground in Hamburg etc.?
You're trying to equate the cost of manufacturing a weapons system to combatant lives on a what if scenario, apples and oranges. OK - you can try to use hindsight to justify the production and deployment of the Mosquito in place of the heavy bomber, what you don't know is how it "would have" deployed or the final outcome. Over 1,200 bombers incinerated Dresden, what makes you think bomber Harris would not have taken 2000 Mosquitoes and done the same???
 
You're trying to equate the cost of manufacturing a weapons system to combatant lives on a what if scenario, apples and oranges. OK - you can try to use hindsight to justify the production and deployment of the Mosquito in place of the heavy bomber, what you don't know is how it "would have" deployed or the final outcome. Over 1,200 bombers incinerated Dresden, what makes you think bomber Harris would not have taken 2000 Mosquitoes and done the same???

Very true, Harris could have taken 2,000 Mosquitoes and done the same.

But if all they have are the 1,200 Lancasters (or that plus 300 Mosquitoes or whatever they actually had deployed at the time) they don't have the same options.

If you had 2,000 Mosquito bombers or fighter-bombers (as distinct from say night fighters or whatever) those could be used for all different other kinds of raids. Maybe by then they could launch strikes from Italy and hit Ploesti. Or they could hit some actual factories in Holland or Northern Germany in the Rhur valley or on the coast somewhere, (instead of wrecking the city around them). Or hit the docks at Bremerhaven or take out radars or bridges or railheads or heavy water plants or V-2 sites or whatever you wanted to do. Hit the Scharnhorst in a high speed attack. Hit the Gestapo HQ before a big resistance op.

The Mossies would give them a lot more options than the Lancs.
 
It was, and as Callum posted above, there was certainly discussion surrounding the effectiveness of the type compared to existing heavies. But this is within Bomber Command in Britain and despite this evidence, there was no way that the heads would have advocated discontinuing Lancaster production for a solely Mosquito force. Sticking with the what-if element, it would have been foolhardy for such a move to have been undertaken by the USAAF despite the evidence. A force of 100 to 500 Lancasters can do a lot more damage than an equivalent force of similarly numbered Mosquitoes.

Again, joint effort using a variety of platforms in specialised roles produces a broader result. Look at the use of the English Electric/Martin B-57 Canberra in combat scenarios as a good comparison of what two different classes of aeroplane bring to the table. The Canberra was the spiritual successor to the Mosquito and its value to both the RAF and USAAF was enormous as a fast tactical striker, high altitude recon platform etc, yet both air forces maintained heavy bombers.

I think the Canberra is a pretty good example of precisely what I meant to be done with the Mosquito. The timing wasn't perfect for Vietnam but they were probably more effective at interdicting VC supplies on the Ho Chi Minh trail than the Arc Light strikes were. By that time though they had many other fast strike aircraft that could do that same job and by the 1960s the Canberra was not revolutionary the way the Mossie was in say, 1943.
 
If the U.S. had built the Mosquito instead of the B-17 (gasp!), the U.S. would find itself scrambling for a long range bomb truck. Other heavy bombers under development will have to be rushed into service. These will arrive in service later than what really happened. There will be heavy bomber designs and proposals existing even with the U.S. going with the Mosquito. There will be heavy bomber designs because the large aviation powers were monkeying around with all kinds designs (B-15 for one example). The hard pressed Mosquito will soldier on until the B-24's and B-??s show up. There won't be enough Wooden Wonders. I'm guessing U.S. industry would have trouble building wooden aircraft on the same scale as building metal aircraft.

I'm ignoring the all the temporal upheaval. That's what I think would've happened if America had built the De Havilland instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress.
And the U.S. is going to need a BUNCH more pilots.
 
Last edited:
Such things were proposed though, George Volkert, designer for Handley Page wrote a paper promoting a high speed unarmed bomber concept in the late 1930s and it set jaws a-wagging in the British Air Ministry - Volkert's concept was designed to provoke argument though, rather than as a viable and actionable doctrine.

Volkert did have a doctrine for his high speed bomber proposal - but it wasn't precision bombing.

In fact he argued it would be pointless to try to hit targets accurately, rather perform indiscriminate bombing, possibly with poison gas bombs.
 
As conceived and the first 10 bombers off the production line the plane carried four 250lb bombs, the same bomb load as the Fairey Battle and the Blenheim.

True, it was designed around 4 x 250lb GP bombs.


It was well into 1942 when they got four 500lb bombs into a Mosquito at which point the Americans had 2-3 plants building B-17s and either 5 plants building B-24s or a smaller number actually producing B-24s with the extra plants being built. Buick, Chevrolet, Studebaker and others were either starting to put out engines or were finishing up construction on plants that would build radial engines by the tens of thousands.

The Mosquito did not have to be changed to carry the four 500lb bombs. Rather, it was the bombs that were changed, cropping the tails of the 500lb MC. Drop tests proved the shorter tail was not detrimental to accuracy.

I'm not sure what you define as "well into 1942". After all, the Mosquito was only getting into operations in the latter half of 1942 anyway.


Only two squadrons used Mosquitoes bombers in daylight missions in 1942 and until May of 1943. After that daylight raids were conducted by the fighter bomber version with two 500lb bombs inside and, depending on mission, two 500lbs under the wings.
Mosquito losses of the these first two squadrons were high. The two daylight bomber Mosquito Squadrons were switched to night pathfinders joining a 3rd Mosquito squadron

Raids in 1942 and the first half of 1943 were small,, often consisting of no more than 6 bombers. With so few on a mission, even just one loss makes for a large loss percentage.

You may have unintentionally implied that the switch to pathfinding was due to the losses.

I don't believe it was, but that the use as pathfinders was more useful to the RAF at that time, and a better use for the Mosquitoes. For one thing, the Mosquitoes could fly substantially higher than any of the RAF heavies, which increased the useful range of Oboe and Gee.


Improved Merlins, 100/130 fuel allowed the Mosquito to improve it's performance and a 1944 Mosquito could do a lot of things a 1942 Mosquito could not do. But by late 1943/early 1944 it was way, way too late to switch bombing tactics/strategy.

Didn't 100/130 fuel arrive before, or around the same time, as the Mosquito?


Success of a daylight Mosquito campaign also depends on the Germans doing exactly what they did as far as their own aircraft development.
That is NOT dropping the compression ratio in their engines and using higher boost for more power and coming up with a successor to the Bf 109 or streamlining/stretching the 109 just a bit.
It also depends on the Germans NOT switching AA gun production to fewer 88mm and up guns to more 37-55mm AA guns (or even more 20mm guns)

That is all true.


Mosquitoes sucked at carrying incendiaries and the 4000lb cookie doesn't go operational until 1944.

Interesting. Define "sucked"?

The Mosquito could carry small bomb containers with incendiaries in place of one or more 500lb GP bombs.

The 4,000lb HC "cookie" capability did not come until 1944, and it coincided, roughly, with the B.XVI being introduced (after a short run on B.IX in 1943).

That capability also allowed the Mosquito to carry the 4,000lb MC bomb, which was a GP type bomb that was used much less than the HC bomb. IIRC there was also a 4,000lb IB - incendiary bomb, which could be carried by the Mosquito.

The 4,000lb bomb rack was also commonly used to carry a single 1,000lb Target Indicator. 627 Squadron also modified their carriers to fit two 1,000lb TIs, which were the same size as the 1,000lb MC bomb.

Experiments were made in 1942/43 on different bombs to be carried. One was a single 1,000lb GP in the forward bay, and two 500lb MC in the rear bay. But that was never proceeded with.

The bulged bomb bay was being underutilised by pathfinders, so ways to carry more TIs was looked at. One was to adapt a bomb beam from a Wellington that could carry eight 250lb TIs - or eight 500lb MCs, though this was deemed to cause a dangerous rearward CoG.
 
If if you deploy a Mosquito at altitude (as you suggested in some of your previous posts) you're still looking at the same thing. They are going to have to slow down to deliver their bombs and be subject to flack. At that point they may have a chance to run away after they deliver their bombs providing they aren't being attacked head on.

Mosquitoes could bomb at 300mph IAS. Or at least their bomb bay doors could open at that speed.

I suspect that the B-17 could also bomb at higher speeds than it did, but it was constrained by formation flying.
 
At one point some Confederate units were using clay bullets which didn't have the best range.
Sorry for contributing to even more off topic chatter, but I gotta throw the BS flag for this outrageous quip. Please cite references to support this ballistic impossibility.
 
Volkert did have a doctrine for his high speed bomber proposal

Not really a doctrine, but a revision of existing proposals. His argument was very convincing but it wasn't intended on the production of a specific aircraft based on the specs he provided, just a comparison of features and performance with P.13/36 as it stood. He focussed specifically on the fitting of complex and heavy gun turrets and their removal, which saved on crew as well. It was nothing more than a possible arguing point for the concept of an unarmed high speed bomber, although he is recorded as feeling strongly about it. He found support in unlikely places, including with Ludlow-Hewitt C-in-C Bomber Command.

What always strikes me as unusual is that he did appreciate the concept of a streamlined bomber, yet the aircraft he did build to P.13/36, the Halifax was a draggy overweight troublesome thing...
 
Last edited:
I think the Canberra is a pretty good example of precisely what I meant to be done with the Mosquito. The timing wasn't perfect for Vietnam but they were probably more effective at interdicting VC supplies on the Ho Chi Minh trail than the Arc Light strikes were. By that time though they had many other fast strike aircraft that could do that same job and by the 1960s the Canberra was not revolutionary the way the Mossie was in say, 1943.

I can't really support the claim the Mosquito was revolutionary. It replaced its predecessors in that it had greater performance than them, and as for its wooden structure, it was an evolutionary step in structural practices that de Havilland applied in the DH.88 Comet and DH.91 Albatross. It certainly carved a niche for itself and gave the RAF new dimensions in offensive capability, but it didn't introduce sweeping change on a revolutionary scale. As I've been stating, it introduced new options to old practices.

While it might not have been in the USAF, in the RAF the Canberra had the same impact that the Mosquito did. It proved itself very flexible and added a different dimension to the RAF's air capability. Until the U-2, the Canberra had a far higher ceiling than virtually every other aircraft in military service and Canberras made many overflights of the Soviet Union with relative impunity before the U-2 appeared on the scene. The last Canberras were retired from the RAF in 2006; PR.9 photo recon platforms with 39 Sqn.
 
Now you're assuming a scenario. So now you're going to have bomber Mosquitoes escorted by P-38s and P-51? How far and what kind of bomb loads? Do you think you're going to Berlin and back and going to influct any kind of meaningful damage???

Load to Berlin was 2,000lb for a Mosquito B.IV, 4,000lb for a B.XVI with bulged bomb bay.
 
True, it was designed around 4 x 250lb GP bombs.




The Mosquito did not have to be changed to carry the four 500lb bombs. Rather, it was the bombs that were changed, cropping the tails of the 500lb MC. Drop tests proved the shorter tail was not detrimental to accuracy.

I'm not sure what you define as "well into 1942". After all, the Mosquito was only getting into operations in the latter half of 1942 anyway.




Raids in 1942 and the first half of 1943 were small,, often consisting of no more than 6 bombers. With so few on a mission, even just one loss makes for a large loss percentage.

You may have unintentionally implied that the switch to pathfinding was due to the losses.

I don't believe it was, but that the use as pathfinders was more useful to the RAF at that time, and a better use for the Mosquitoes. For one thing, the Mosquitoes could fly substantially higher than any of the RAF heavies, which increased the useful range of Oboe and Gee.




Didn't 100/130 fuel arrive before, or around the same time, as the Mosquito?




That is all true.




Interesting. Define "sucked"?

The Mosquito could carry small bomb containers with incendiaries in place of one or more 500lb GP bombs.

The 4,000lb HC "cookie" capability did not come until 1944, and it coincided, roughly, with the B.XVI being introduced (after a short run on B.IX in 1943).

That capability also allowed the Mosquito to carry the 4,000lb MC bomb, which was a GP type bomb that was used much less than the HC bomb. IIRC there was also a 4,000lb IB - incendiary bomb, which could be carried by the Mosquito.

The 4,000lb bomb rack was also commonly used to carry a single 1,000lb Target Indicator. 627 Squadron also modified their carriers to fit two 1,000lb TIs, which were the same size as the 1,000lb MC bomb.

Experiments were made in 1942/43 on different bombs to be carried. One was a single 1,000lb GP in the forward bay, and two 500lb MC in the rear bay. But that was never proceeded with.

The bulged bomb bay was being underutilised by pathfinders, so ways to carry more TIs was looked at. One was to adapt a bomb beam from a Wellington that could carry eight 250lb TIs - or eight 500lb MCs, though this was deemed to cause a dangerous rearward CoG.
I am not disputing anything you posted. You are providing more information as to what happened. My point is that for all of it's accomplishments The Mosquito was too late in timing to affect the American bomber program as a result of any observed results. The B-17 and B-24 programs of multiple factories were already well under way in 1941.

Incendiary bombs were low weight to volume. Any bomber with a small bomb bay sucked at carrying incendiaries. The B-17 was not noted for it's large bomb bay ;)
the size of it's bomb bay is one reason that the Mosquito keeps being brought up as an alternative. As you know the mosquito could carry the 4000lb cookie to Berlin.
The B-17 could carry 5,000lb of HE bombs (ten 500lb or five 1000lb bombs) but only about 3000lbs of incendiary bombs which gave it an average bomb load of 4,000lb which to some people means the two planes carried an equal load.
 
I am not disputing anything you posted. You are providing more information as to what happened. My point is that for all of it's accomplishments The Mosquito was too late in timing to affect the American bomber program as a result of any observed results. The B-17 and B-24 programs of multiple factories were already well under way in 1941.

I don't disagree.

However, it didn't take long to get Canadian production up and running.

If the desire was to make a metal Mosquito, I'd suggest that a second generation unarmed bomber would have been a better bet for the USAAF. It could use the latest aerodynamic features, be designed around a bigger bomb load, providing sufficiently powerful engines were available.
 
Mosquitoes could bomb at 300mph IAS. Or at least their bomb bay doors could open at that speed.
To accurately bomb at altitude using an optical precision bomb sight (if there was really such a thing) they needed to fly a lot slower. Once site I visited mentioned the maximum bomb run speed was 250 mph. I saw one page mention the Enola Gay dropped the atomic bomb at 220 mph.
 
To accurately bomb at altitude using an optical precision bomb sight (if there was really such a thing) they needed to fly a lot slower. Once site I visited mentioned the maximum bomb run speed was 250 mph. I saw one page mention the Enola Gay dropped the atomic bomb at 220 mph.

I don't think there is such a thing as accurately bombing "from altitude" unless the weather is perfect. Accurate bombing was done at low altitude unless you have guided munitions (and many of those require you to be at 10,000 ft or lower IIRC). Maybe with JDAM.

But it is possible to fly to a target at high altitude and then descend to a lower altitude to drop bombs.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Users who are viewing this thread

Back