What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

[Schweik]

I get that, Schweik, I think a lot has to happen to escape the trench warfare mentality of "the bomber will always get through".

This had its germination in the Great War with individuals like Trenchard, Douhet and Mitchell, so we are looking at advocates of the offensive use of air power within the technological constraints of the time. Escaping from that mindset was anathema as to those individuals promoting strategic airpower, the reasons were manifold, not just theoretical means of winning wars. Remaining relevant in a post-war environment also played a part, so to overcome such a doctrine, a demonstrable action is required. Such things were proposed though, George Volkert, designer for Handley Page wrote a paper promoting a high speed unarmed bomber concept in the late 1930s and it set jaws a-wagging in the British Air Ministry - Volkert's concept was designed to provoke argument though, rather than as a viable and actionable doctrine.

Nonetheless, a lot has to change and frankly, the restrictions of th technology of the day meant that engine power outputs, powered defensive armament and metal structures offered advances to existing concepts, rather than entirely new concepts. It would really be once the shooting starts that thinking outside of the box in a military sense takes on some urgency, specifically because the major world players were not at war in the 1930s and the ravages of the Great War left an indelible impression.

In this time strategic bombers played the role of deterrent, not aggressor. They were the ballistic missile submarine, the MAD concept of the time and among the theorists, Douhet in particular promoted the concept as keeping German military expansion at bay following the war in his 1921 work Command Of The Air.

Yes I agree with most of that, I think Dan Carlin did a fantastic job of covering the pre-war theories about Strategic bombing (some of which were pretty hair raising) in his podcast Logical Insanity which I highly recommend. Part of the reason for the decisions made in WW2 was the horror of WW1 and everyone's desire to avoid replicating that, by which they somewhat counter-intuitively thought by being harsher and more ruthless particularly toward civilians, they could end the war sooner than thus make it less harmful ultimately. Problem was everyone escalated the same way and they kept fighting for years anyway.

Once you delve into the sort of military / bureaucratic / political reasoning for certain Strategic decisions, then you are certainly going to end up where they in fact did during the war. These people were entrenched both in the UK and the US, and ultimately we know it was their views that won out, at least during WW2. It's worth noting that not everyone agreed with them of course.

But for me, with these threads I like to look at the technical possibilities, not for example necessarily sending someone back in a time machine to lock Curtiss LeMay up in a lunatic asylum.

And subsequently to WW2 we can see that the fast precision bomber / fighter bomber concept did seem to have (rather gradually) won out, at least with aircraft, right? Sadly we still do face the threat of annihilation through ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear cruise missiles.

 

[Schweik]

Well again, the world was faced with total war. We could look back at this by today's standards and agree about the great losses for humanity, but for those living through it, quite a different stroy

Sure, but I don't think that means we can so easily dismiss it. This kind of dilemma has been a constant throughout recorded history. Very deadly wars were fought with no holds barred / scorched earth / take no prisoners mentality, and equally deadly and fraught wars were fought with some level of moderation and restraint, sometimes for very good reasons. I can cite a few examples if you need me to.

During WW2 people were aware that it was a Total War, but we did also employ some moderation. We didn't execute all of the Axis prisoners, nor did the Germans and Italians execute most of their Anglo-American prisoenrs. We didn't put hundreds of thousands of German or Italian civilians into re-education camps after the war like the Soviets did. If guys like Curtiss LeMay had been running the whole show without any push-back, who knows what would have happened.

I think we can agree perhaps that the Marshall Plan was ultimately a good idea, and that we didn't need to kill more civilians or destroy more cities than we actually did right?

Just keep in mind, aside from the moral aspect which we can probably go round and round on all day, Strategic bombing also cost a huge number of Allied aircrew their lives (46,000 casualties in the 8th AF and 26k dead, and roughly 65k casualties and 55k dead for Bomber Command), and we can see in retrospect that it wasn't that effective.

 

[Schweik]

Correct - and my last words on this

And like you I served with people who fought there and had family members who were there (to include my brother, smack in the middle of TET). I agree with you about the tunnels and the break down of discipline. When you say "defeats," can you name one that permanently drove our forces out of a particular area? No you can't because there really wasn't any. Despite all the internal misgivings, the buffoonery by some in charge and the mis-guided politics, we won every major coordinated battle by the NVA. Did the might of the US Military not drive the NVA to the Paris Peace treaty???

I rest my case!

No comparison - the British were forced to surrender. We saw our continued involvement fruitless as it was finally recognized we were supporting a regime that was corrupt and expected US to do their fighting (just like Afghanistan). South Vietnam, with it's internal corruption like a cancer, stood on it's own for two years. ARVN soldiers used to call the US "The big PX."

The Paris Peace treaty did what exactly?

The English left after the Revolutionary war, and I don't think that was their original plan.

The US left after the Vietnam war, and I don't think that was their original plan.

We ultimately were responsible for the governments in South Vietnam and Afghanistan. If there was no way to have a functional alliance with some faction in the local country we were ostensibily fighting to protect, what was the point of being there?

 

[nuuumannn]

Part of the reason for the decisions made in WW2 was the horror of WW1 and everyone's desire to avoid replicating that, by which they somewhat counter-intuitively thought by being harsher and more ruthless particularly toward civilians, they could end the war sooner than thus make it less harmful ultimately. Problem was everyone escalated the same way and they kept fighting for years anyway.

Very much so, Schweik, but "Victory at all costs" has a cost - it's written in the quote. It's hard to rank the moral cost of total war objectively through the lens of time and post-war civil and social existence - Roger Waters called it "The Bravery of being out of Range". When you are the one having to make the decisions to attack civilian populations out of pressure to demonstrate results because your population is suffering the same and you have the power to do so, the moral argument takes a back seat.

And subsequently to WW2 we can see that the fast precision bomber / fighter bomber concept did seem to have (rather gradually) won out, at least with aircraft, right?

Yes and no. The technology was not quite there and it had to be demonstrated as being viable in order to be accepted, but alongside existing methods of bombing, not instead of them. The other lesson that is so often forgotten regarding World War Two, or any of the 20th Century conflicts is that they were waged and won not through some single master stroke of genius but the application of tried and tested doctrine through joint effort. This is the most significant lesson to be learned and current warfare doctrine spouts it universally - wars, battles, conflict is won through collective effort, a melding of differing strategies, characteristics and roles.

The lesson here then, is that high speed unarmed bombers work in conjunction with heavy bombers, not instead of them. There are circumstances where both apply equally or differently. This has been made plainly clear throughout modern military history since WW2, in the 1991 Gulf War, for example.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The Paris Peace treaty did what exactly?

Ended the war for the US. We enabled South Vietnam to stand on their own (wishful thinking in the eyes of the politicians)

The English left after the Revolutionary war, and I don't think that was their original plan.

They left because they were defeated

The US left after the Vietnam war, and I don't think that was their original plan.

There was never a plan for Vietnam - thank the politicans.

We ultimately were responsible for the governments in South Vietnam and Afghanistan. If there was no way to have a functional alliance with some faction in the local country we were ostensibily fighting to protect, what was the point of being there?

Agree 100% - that's where you get mis-guided politicians involved.

 

[Schweik]

Ended the war for the US. We enabled South Vietnam to stand on their own (wishful thinking in the eyes of the politicians)

They left because they were defeated

There was never a plan for Vietnam - thank the politicans.

Agree 100% - that's where you get mis-guided politicians involved.

Hence we should try to remember the Powell Doctrine from now on.

 

[Schweik]

Very much so, Schweik, but "Victory at all costs" has a cost - it's written in the quote. It's hard to rank the moral cost of total war objectively through the lens of time and post-war civil and social existence - Roger Waters called it "The Bravery of being out of Range". When you are the one having to make the decisions to attack civilian populations out of pressure to demonstrate results because your population is suffering the same and you have the power to do so, the moral argument takes a back seat.

Well, yeah ok. I'd say to Roger he has the bravery of being a rich twat. So what? I've "proved my bravery" enough to various people you never met or will meet so as to feel qualified to comment on historical events which took place before I was born. I'm not going to be shamed into feeling like I'm not allowed to second guess mistakes of people in the past. That is a big part of what we do when we discuss history. If you don't like that I'd say maybe try some other forum.

And I don't really criticize the British for making the decisions they did when they basically had no other choice. I've made plenty of mistakes in my own life (and sometimes just did what had to be done) when I felt like I didn't have any other choice. Where it starts to look like a screw up (or much worse) is when other avenues do open up but you keep just doing the same thing even though casualties are mounting and lives are being wasted, including (and perhaps especially) those of your own countrymen.

Yes and no. The technology was not quite there and it had to be demonstrated as being viable in order to be accepted, but alongside existing methods of bombing, not instead of them. The other lesson that is so often forgotten regarding World War Two, or any of the 20th Century conflicts is that they were waged and won not through some single master stroke of genius but the application of tried and tested doctrine through joint effort. This is the most significant lesson to be learned and current warfare doctrine spouts it universally - wars, battles, conflict is won through collective effort, a melding of differing strategies, characteristics and roles.

Yes and some adaptations which were made were quite wise and clever, others were colossal blunders which cost thousands of lives. I put the Strategic bombing campaign in the latter category, along with say, Operation Goodwood and the Battle of Kasserine Pass..

The lesson here then, is that high speed unarmed bombers work in conjunction with heavy bombers, not instead of them. There are circumstances where both apply equally or differently.

That is the "lesson" of what they actually did, which we all already know quite well. And I'm saying it was (to put it kindly) a tragic mistake.

This has been made plainly clear throughout modern military history since WW2, in the 1991 Gulf War, for example.

The scale of the use of heavy bombers in the 1991 Gulf War is not comparable to the scale in WW2, the Korean War, or Vietnam, either in terms of impact, lives lost, or scale compared to other aspects of the war effort. So I see this as a pretty weak argument.

 

[Schweik]

I think we have a tendency sometimes to circle the wagons, especially along nationalistic lines, when these discussions come up, and refuse to admit the mistakes of the past. But we need to see them clearly unless we want to make mistakes over and over (like Vietnam followed by Afghanistan).

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Sure, but I don't think that means we can so easily dismiss it.

No, we learn from it

This kind of dilemma has been a constant throughout recorded history. Very deadly wars were fought with no holds barred / scorched earth / take no prisoners mentality, and equally deadly and fraught wars were fought with some level of moderation and restraint, sometimes for very good reasons. I can cite a few examples if you need me to.

No you don't have to, well aware of both scenerios

During WW2 people were aware that it was a Total War, but we did also employ some moderation. We didn't execute all of the Axis prisoners, nor did the Germans and Italians execute most of their Anglo-American prisoenrs.

We did execute some prisoners - I believe at Guadalcanal there was a "take no prisoner" order for a time.

We didn't put hundreds of thousands of German or Italian civilians into re-education camps after the war like the Soviets did.

No but we put Japanese Americans in internment camps!

If guys like Curtiss LeMay had been running the whole show without any push-back, who knows what would have happened.

Agree there

I think we can agree perhaps that the Marshall Plan was ultimately a good idea, and that we didn't need to kill more civilians or destroy more cities than we actually did right?

and agree

Just keep in mind, aside from the moral aspect which we can probably go round and round on all day, Strategic bombing also cost a huge number of Allied aircrew their lives (46,000 casualties in the 8th AF and 26k dead, and roughly 65k casualties and 55k dead for Bomber Command), and we can see in retrospect that it wasn't that effective.

I equate the strategic bombing campaign like 17th and 18th century infantry lines squaring off in their lines and blasting away at each other. You had lumbering 4 engine bombers hovering over enemy territory lobbing bombs on factories and many times civilians. You have flack batteries returning fire and in the middle of it all you had fighters doing their best to bring down this enemy "line" be it in the air.

I say again - if you want to take a snapshot of the technology of the day, how it was deployed and the final results, by 1946 standards strategic bombing was a success. As we evaluate what was done in retrospect and consider how we could have done things differently, especially considering today's technology, and how we view risks and causalities, it was dismally ineffective in the cost of men and material.

 

[nuuumannn]

The scale of the use of heavy bombers in the 1991 Gulf War is not comparable to the scale in WW2, the Korean War, or Vietnam, either in terms of impact, lives lost, or scale compared to other aspects of the war effort. So I see this as a pretty weak argument.

You're missing the point. The reference to using strategic bombers and light strike aircraft in conjunction with each other is the focus here, not the wider implications of the war in general.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I think we have a tendency sometimes to circle the wagons, especially along nationalistic lines, when these discussions come up, and refuse to admit the mistakes of the past. But we need to see them clearly unless we want to make mistakes over and over (like Vietnam followed by Afghanistan).

Agree 100% but we need to separate "the wheat from the chaff" and validate the effort of soldiers when they are/were placed in a compromising situations by misguided politicians where there was not a military option to achieve peace.

 

[nuuumannn]

And I'm saying it was (to put it kindly) a tragic mistake.

Yet it shortened the war by a huge degree and rendered Germany and Japan militarily inoperable, which was its aim.

Well, yeah ok. I'd say to Roger he has the bravery of being a rich twat. So what? I've proved my bravery enough to various people you never met or will meet so as to feel qualified to comment on historical events which took place before I was born.

You are allowing your feelings on the subject to get the better of you here. The point about Waters was the meaning of what he said to illustrate a point, not a blight on his nor anyone else's character.

I put the Strategic bombing campaign in the latter category, along with say, Operation Goodwood and the Battle of Kasserine Pass..

Yet it helped the Allies achieve victory. I suspect your arguments on the subject are losing objectivity, Shweik and while I decry the losses of war - I don't think there's anyone here who doesn't, this forum isn't the right place to be airing your grievances about the moralities of the strategic bombing campaign - and frankly it is outside the scope of this particular discussion.

 

[Schweik]

I equate the strategic bombing campaign like 17th and 18th century infantry lines squaring off in their lines and blasting away at each other. You had lumbering 4 engine bombers hovering over enemy territory lobbing bombs on factories and many times civilians. You have flack batteries returning fire and in the middle of it all you had fighters doing their best to bring down this enemy "line" be it in the air.

I say again - if you want to take a snapshot of the technology of the day, how it was deployed and the final results, by 1946 standards strategic bombing was a success. As we evaluate what was done in retrospect and consider how we could have done things differently, especially considering today's technology, and how we view risks and causalities, it was dismally ineffective in the cost of men and material.

Sure, and I think that is a pretty good analogy, but lets call it say, the US Civil War- in the beginning everyone had muzzle loading muskets, which to be used effectively have to be massed together like that , by the end you had radically different technologies like lever action rifles and gattling guns, ironclads, spotter balloons and explosive shells which allowed for different and more effective tactics to be used.

In this analogy I'd call the Mosquito the lever action rifle and the big heavies the old blunderbus. So the criticism (of the leadership) is i not being a bit more agile in adapting new tactics. The meat of the discussion is really the technical aspects of what new and different tactics could be adopted.

 

[Schweik]

Yet it shortened the war by a huge degree and rendered Germany and Japan militarily inoperable, which was its aim.

Disagree

You are allowing your feelings on the subject to get the better of you here. The point about Waters was the meaning of what he said to illustrate a point, not a blight on his nor anyone else's character.

No, you are misinterpreting my tone. Slight sarcasm and mild exasperation is intended. I found the quote a bit facile.

Yet it helped the Allies achieve victory. I suspect your arguments on the subject are losing objectivity, Shweik and while I decry the losses of war - I don't think there's anyone here who doesn't, this forum isn't the right place to be airing your grievances about the moralities of the strategic bombing campaign - and frankly it is outside the scope of this particular discussion.

And I'm saying using the heavy bombers led to unnecessary loss of life. If you feel that discussion of civilian casualties is beyond the scope of this forum (or what you want to encompass in your own mind) then focus purely on the horrific losses to Allied aircrew and the expense of all the smashed up aircraft they lost.

My argument does not hinge on the moral aspect, that is just one side of it. I am not sure why you are exclusively focusing on that as a way to shut me down, so I won't speculate. But it is a side of the whole air power discussion which was hotly debated by the military leadership of the air forces during the war, many books on military aviation history of WW2 have been written on this subject in fact and I have a few on my bookshelf I can see as I type this. So in that sense I think it certainly is admissible, but you don't need to even consider that to see the value of using mosquitos instead of B-17s, and by extension focusing much more on the fast and precise rather than the slow and heavy aircraft.

If you personally find that part of the conversation difficult lets focus on the technical aspects. I say it was harder to shoot down mosquitos.

 

[nuuumannn]

In this analogy I'd call the Mosquito the lever action rifle and the big heavies the old blunderbus. So the criticism (of the leadership) is i not being a bit more agile in adapting new tactics. The meat of the discussion is really the technical aspects of what new and different tactics could be adopted.

I agree, and it was the combined use of both weapons in their respective roles that added dimension to the overall strategic aim, rather than a single 'silver bullet' that changes everything - these very rarely fulfil expectations. The "new" comes with caveats, of course, these being acceptance and viability, but again, this has to be demonstrated before it is accepted. To not do so could backfire and an entirely unfavourable result could eventuate.

 

[Shortround6]

The Mosquito idea uses a lot of the retrospectroscope.

As conceived and the first 10 bombers off the production line the plane carried four 250lb bombs, the same bomb load as the Fairey Battle and the Blenheim.
It was well into 1942 when they got four 500lb bombs into a Mosquito at which point the Americans had 2-3 plants building B-17s and either 5 plants building B-24s or a smaller number actually producing B-24s with the extra plants being built. Buick, Chevrolet, Studebaker and others were either starting to put out engines or were finishing up construction on plants that would build radial engines by the tens of thousands.
Cancelling all of this to build even a metal Mosquito would have delayed the US bombing offensive by over a year.
Only two squadrons used Mosquitoes bombers in daylight missions in 1942 and until May of 1943. After that daylight raids were conducted by the fighter bomber version with two 500lb bombs inside and, depending on mission, two 500lbs under the wings.
Mosquito losses of the these first two squadrons were high. The two daylight bomber Mosquito Squadrons were switched to night pathfinders joining a 3rd Mosquito squadron.


Improved Merlins, 100/130 fuel allowed the Mosquito to improve it's performance and a 1944 Mosquito could do a lot of things a 1942 Mosquito could not do. But by late 1943/early 1944 it was way, way too late to switch bombing tactics/strategy.

Success of a daylight Mosquito campaign also depends on the Germans doing exactly what they did as far as their own aircraft development.
That is NOT dropping the compression ratio in their engines and using higher boost for more power and coming up with a successor to the Bf 109 or streamlining/stretching the 109 just a bit.
It also depends on the Germans NOT switching AA gun production to fewer 88mm and up guns to more 37-55mm AA guns (or even more 20mm guns)

Mosquitoes sucked at carrying incendiaries and the 4000lb cookie doesn't go operational until 1944.

 

[Schweik]

You're missing the point. The reference to using strategic bombers and light strike aircraft in conjunction with each other is the focus here, not the wider implications of the war in general.

No you are missing my point. Of course there is inevitably some use of heavy and 'light' (I would say fast) strike aircraft up to the Gulf War. The reason they could still be used in the Gulf War are quite specific, but lets put that aside for the moment.

It is at the very least incorrect and highly misleading to suggest that the use of heavy bombers i.e. a few B-52s in the Gulf War is in any way comparable to the heavy bomber campaigns of WW2. My point was that the balance of how these types of aircraft are used has shifted dramatically through the second half of the 20th Century and now into the 21st, and we now almost exclusively use supersonic fighters to perform air strikes (i.e. 'bombing campaigns').

There is really no longer any role for heavy bombers of the B-52 / Tu - 95 type except (as I previously stated) as stand off cruise missile delivery systems, nuclear delivery vehicles and / or (in the case of something like the B-2 Spirit) stealthy anti-C3I bombers. But an aircraft like a B-1B or an Su-34 which arguably may still have a role in modern warfare, has much more in common with a Mosquito than with say, a Lancaster, Hallifax, or a B-17 or B-24. The Su-24 and A-10 conversely are more like an Il-2 Sturmovik or a Stuka.

 

[Schweik]

I agree, and it was the combined use of both weapons in their respective roles that added dimension to the overall strategic aim, rather than a single 'silver bullet' that changes everything - these very rarely fulfil expectations. The "new" comes with caveats, of course, these being acceptance and viability, but again, this has to be demonstrated before it is accepted. To not do so could backfire and an entirely unfavourable result could eventuate.

Well we know they didn't move fast in this case, and they stuck with the blunderbus. I am saying that was a mistake, though I am not claiming there was necessarily a way to avoid it in terms of the political and bureaucratic angle. I'm just pointing out it was certainly technically viable.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

There is really no longer any role for heavy bombers of the B-52 / Tu - 95 type except (as I previously stated) as stand off cruise missile delivery systems, nuclear delivery vehicles and / or (in the case of something like the B-2 Spirit) stealthy anti-C3I bombers. But an aircraft like a B-1B or an Su-34 which arguably may still have a role in modern warfare, has much more in common with a Mosquito than with say, a Lancaster, Hallifax, or a B-17 or B-24. The Su-24 and A-10 conversely are more like an Il-2 Sturmovik or a Stuka.

Actually not true - if you have a situation where you have to obliviate a large area and have total control of the airspace, then I can see a use of a heavy bomber(s) operating at higher altitudes. Also consider as the string of bombs leave the bomb bays of these aircraft, they can be guided to a precise target with pinpoint accuracy, something not available during WW2.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Well we know they didn't move fast in this case, and they stuck with the blunderbus. I am saying that was a mistake, though I am not claiming there was necessarily a way to avoid it in terms of the political and bureaucratic angle. I'm just pointing out it was certainly technically viable.

See post 476 - I think SR's points closes the door on that!