What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

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I do think they could have possibly made a metal Mosquito, but as far as I know the Mossie was an order of magnitude superior to all other fast bombers in the war.

I don't. The rationale behind the Mosquito was that it was made of non-strategic materials. If the aircraft was to be redesigned to be made of metal, the time factor would have been enormous, let alone de Havilland itself holding design rights. The Mosquito was not designed and constructed like metal aeroplanes. The whole thing would have to be started from scratch and why devote that much effort to doing so when there's a perfectly capable wooden one with commands across the spectrum begging for more examples of the type? Then the next question is, how long, once our metal Mosquito has been drawn up, is it going to take to get it into production and service? How useful would it have actually been by then? Why waste the resources and time in doing so when operators are crying out for the type in its initial form? It would have been far more expedient to have been built as it originally was.

When debating this topic we tend to miss what the Mosquito brought to the table and why it was so vaunted and it wasn't specifically what it offered to the strategic bombing campaign that made it so. The real secret to the Mosquito's success was that its one airframe was broadly adapted for use outside of the scope of its initial design as a bomber. Its performance and capabilities lent it to high altitude photo recon, target marking, low-level precision strike, maritime strike, night fighting etc, all of which were not strategic bombing.
 
It would be really interesting to look at how much. P-51 pilots claimed 4239 enemy aircraft over Europe and 1,000 in the MTO. P-47s claimed 2685 in Europe. We know some of that is overclaiming but even if you figure half are wrong, that's a large number (4000+) of fighters. Do the numbers for the defensive gunners on the big bombers match that? I know the bombers got a good number of enemy aircraft but I don't think it compares to what the fighters did.
It didn't but using an all Mosquito force you wouldn't of had 10 guns shooting back at an attacking enemy!!!
Attacking a four-engined heavy is very challenging, but the Luftwaffe were very cunning and they figured out ways to do it - attacking from the front, using heavy fighters, using rockets etc.. They got 60 at Schweinfurt the first time and 77 the second time, and lost 20-30 fighter aircraft each time. That's a lot, but it's definitely a bad swap for the allies considering 10 crew per bomber, which is why they pulled back until they had the escorts.
See below
More effort,? I don't think so. More bullets, probably yes. But shooting down a Mosquito takes a lot more horsepower and probably a bit more planning.
It seems you have forgotten or never read how treacherous it was for any Luftwaffe fighter to attack a bomber formation!!! To attach a bomber formation you had at least 10 gus per aircraft, multiply that by another 12 aircraft and the sky is filled with lead! Look at your own response above! If attacked from the rear a Mosquito isn't going to shoot back!!!!
 
I don't. The rationale behind the Mosquito was that it was made of non-strategic materials. If the aircraft was to be redesigned to be made of metal, the time factor would have been enormous, let alone de Havilland itself holding design rights. The Mosquito was not designed and constructed like metal aeroplanes. The whole thing would have to be started from scratch and why devote that much effort to doing so when there's a perfectly capable wooden one with commands across the spectrum begging for more examples of the type? Then the next question is, how long, once our metal Mosquito has been drawn up, is it going to take to get it into production and service? How useful would it have actually been by then? Why waste the resources and time in doing so when operators are crying out for the type in its initial form? It would have been far more expedient to have been built as it originally was.

When debating this topic we tend to miss what the Mosquito brought to the table and why it was so vaunted and it wasn't specifically what it offered to the strategic bombing campaign that made it so. The real secret to the Mosquito's success was that its one airframe was broadly adapted for use outside of the scope of its initial design as a bomber. Its performance and capabilities lent it to high altitude photo recon, target marking, low-level precision strike, maritime strike, night fighting etc, all of which were not strategic bombing.

I take your points. Without wading too far into the weeds, I'll say the following:

1) There did seem to be some issues with the wooden construction in tropical climates. That by no means says that the Mosquito wasn't a wildly successful design, or that these issues couldn't have been corrected earlier or more effectively than they were. We can debate how big of a problem this was, but if the issues were significant enough then that is the reason to make a metal one.

2) Other aircraft designs were transitioned from all or mostly wooden designs to all or mostly metal during the war. Some were also transitioned from partial fabric covering to all metal with equal success. For example the La-3 through 5 series fighters were made of wood, but the La 7 was made with a metal wing. The Hurricane had part fabric coverings but later model hurricanes were all-metal I believe.

3) I agree the original reason for making the Mosquito out of wood was cost (both in terms of money and strategic metals) but with the entry of the US into the war the shortage of aluminum was not so dire, so it could have been done.

4) I also agree that one of the Mosquito's greatest strengths was it's versatility. It was just so good that the many ways it was good, and the many ways it could be useful took a while to even fully grasp. I think this is the actual reason why a lot more of them weren't made. It was the gift that kept on giving, but unfortunately we didn't have the right people in the right position at the right time to do even more with it.

But having said all of the above, I think in the "what if" scenario of the OP, they could have gotten more use of it as a bomber and it could have replaced the heavies. That is just hindsight of course, but I don't think the path they chose was fore-ordained. And I think the Mosquito was up to the job (you can also see some idea of how far the design potential could be taken with the extremely impressive 475 mph Hornet and Sea Hornet.)
 
Totally disagree but that is definitely another thread and probably not something we would ever settle. I have very strong opinions on this one too. We definitely LOST Vietnam militarily and in every other way. Killing the whole population wouldn't have been a victory even if we could have done that without triggering WW III. Let's just say I think claiming that the US "Won" in Vietnam in any way is an outlier position these days.
Well call me an outlier!!! Militarily we repulsed every offensive by the NVA. Do I have to break it down for you??? The "Police Action" of suppressing the Viet Cong and conducting search and destroy patrols were a failure because the rules of engagement was dictated by politicians. We won the air war and bombed NVN to the peace table. I suggest you read up in Linebacker II. January 1973, the Paris Peace accord was signed. That is FACT!!!! In 1973 the war was over for the US military and our troops came home.

Ok I'll give you that one, looks like they lost between 17-31 B-52s over Vietnam looks like mostly to SA-2s or Flak, and B-52 tail gunner may have shot down between 1 and 3 Migs.
17 in combat, 12 to accidents, 2 scrapped due to battle damage. A MiG-21 pilot claimed a B-52 but this was never confirmed. B-52s claimed 2 MiG-21s
 
It didn't but using an all Mosquito force you wouldn't of had 10 guns shooting back at an attacking enemy!!!
No but (and admittedly this depends on when) Mosquitos could keep up with P-51s and P-38s at their highest cruise speeds, rather than forcing the latter to plod along and a dangerously slow rate, thus making them more effective.
It seems you have forgotten or never read how treacherous it was for any Luftwaffe fighter to attack a bomber formation!!! To attach a bomber formation you had at least 10 gus per aircraft, multiply that by another 12 aircraft and the sky is filled with lead! Look at your own response above! If attacked from the rear a Mosquito isn't going to shoot back!!!!

I do know and have read all about it. But I also know and have read all about how the Germans adapted to this big problem. I agree it was extremely hazardous to attack one of those heavily armed bombers. But the Luftwaffe adapted, they did so quickly and they did it quite well, as I think most people here are well aware. What they ultimately could not adapt to were large numbers of escort fighters which were at least competitive with their own best fighters.

The Americans started off with a theory that if you put enough guns on a bomber, it would be basically invulnerable. This was from the time when bombers tended to be faster or as fast as most fighters. As we know by the time the war started (spread beyond Manchuria and Spain) this notion about bombers and the closely related idea "the bomber will always get through" turned sideways as fighters started to pull away from bombers in speed. I believe this theory about bombers was proven wrong.

Ultimately, flying slow with a lot of guns is a static defense. The B-17 was called the 'flying fortress'. One constant about fortresses down the centuries is that while they can be quite effective, they are best only force multipliers. If you rely on static defense too much you had over the initiative to the enemy and that is a major limitation. Think Maginot Line. You can sit there with all your guns as I calmly line up my countermeasures and figure out what I need to do to get you. We know in fact historically that the Germans did figure out how to do that.

And meanwhile, have your forgotten or not read about how frustrating the Mosquito was to the Germans, (and not just at night) and how much effort they put into trying to catch them?

I should also add, 10 x machine guns per bomber does not help at all against flak. To the contrary, the need to fly in relatively dense formations and 'boxes' made the bombers much more vulnerable to flak. Similarly, flying the same route in a vast formation or 'stream' also makes you vulnerable.

Faster aircraft could survive flying in smaller groups along different routes, which made them less vulnerable to flak and made it harder for the defender to concentrate their forces effectively.
 
Several things in this needing clarification, Schweik...

There did seem to be some issues with the wooden construction in tropical climates.

Yes, but not a part of the original premise of the "what-if"

The Hurricane had part fabric coverings but later model hurricanes were all-metal I believe.

Nope, the only aspect of the Hurricane that went from wood to metal was the early Mk.I wing. The Hurricane was a metal aeroplane with wooden formers and stringers on the rear fuselage, with the rear fuselage covered in fabric. Apart from the early wing, the entire structural load bearing elements of the Hurricane throughout its life were metal.

Again though, in this you are ignoring the amount of effort it would take to redesign the Mosquito to be made of metal. Sure, there already is a large amount of the aircraft made of metal, but the major structural components, wings, fuselage, empennage are all wood and would require complete redesign to be redone in metal. It's not a Yak or an LAGG we are talking about here, the design was done to take advantage of the inherent pliability of wood as a structure - the moulds were pressure formed, the entire construction method was vastly different to metal construction. The entire structure would have to be redesigned to be built in metal, jigs would have to be made, production lines refitted out... We are talking a major effort.

The Mosquito was built by firms that specialised in woodwork - furniture factories, coachbuilders and the like. Traditional aircraft manufacturers didn't do so other than de Havilland, who had not migrated to all-metal structures because its line of business meant wooden aircraft were its bread and butter. Airspeed was bought by de Havilland and its MO was wooden structures as well, which fit with de Havilland's philosophy.

I agree the original reason for making the Mosquito out of wood was cost (both in terms of money and strategic metals) but with the entry of the US into the war the shortage of aluminum was not so dire, so it could have been done.

No, it wasn't. Britain never had a shortage of aluminium and cost was not the issue. Never, nada, not a thing. This is some fanboy's internet creation and previous members have also put forward the proposition that the reason behind the Hurricane and Mosquito being made of wood was because of said shortage. It's rubbish.

The Mosquito was designed that way because de Havilland specialised in all-wood structures and the firm felt it had much to offer, when virtually every other major manufacturer in Britain at the time were building metal aircraft. Avro, Shorts, Bristol, Handley Page, Fairey, Westland, Supermarine, Hawker, Armstrong Whitworth, even Gloster was building all-metal biplanes covered in fabric.

And I think the Mosquito was up to the job (you can also see some idea of how far the design potential could be taken with the extremely impressive 475 mph Hornet and Sea Hornet.)


It most certainly was up to the job, but as a wooden aircraft type it did the job extremely well. The Hornet was also partially constructed of wood, I might add, but it's worth mentioning it was not a strategic bomber.

The sheer waste of time and materials in redrawing the Mosquito as a metal aircraft when the USA had perfectly adequate aircraft to do the job doesn't make any sense. This is easily reflected in the fact that the USAAF did use Mosquitoes but not as strategic bombers.
 
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Well call me an outlier!!! Militarily we repulsed every offensive by the NVA. Do I have to break it down for you??? The "Police Action" of suppressing the Viet Cong and conducting search and destroy patrols were a failure because the rules of engagement was dictated by politicians. We won the air war and bombed NVN to the peace table. I suggest you read up in Linebacker II. January 1973, the Paris Peace accord was signed. That is FACT!!!! In 1973 the war was over for the US military and our troops came home.
I would actually love to get into this but this is not the thread for it and this may not even be the forum. You tell me you are a moderator right?

I had a lot of family who fought in Vietnam and I served with many guys who were there, and read a lot about the war as I'm sure you have to have developed such firm an opinion. I think the US lost militarily and many other ways and the political aspect was only a part of that. I think the US Army became unmanageable and discipline broke down. I think the Vietnamese successfully used underground fortresses (see Cu Chi tunnels) several times to inflict defeats on the US. The US never figured out an effective method of dealing with this strategy. The US supported political regimes failed much in the same ways as the ones in Afghanistan did. Ultimately in spite of killing a huge amount of people the US could not win the population over and they (the Vietnamese) did not want foreign occupation (or the war) to continue.

Asymmetric warfare isn't about winning offensives. The British won most of the battles in the Revolutionary war but they still lost the war.
17 in combat, 12 to accidents, 2 scrapped due to battle damage. A MiG-21 pilot claimed a B-52 but this was never confirmed. B-52s claimed 2 MiG-21s

Agreed, although the Wiki notes that several of the "lost to accidents" may have actually been flak or SA-2s.
 
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The sheer waste of time and materials in redrawing the Mosquito as a metal aircraft when the USA had perfectly adequate aircraft to do the job doesn't make any sense. This is easily reflected in the fact that the USAAF did use Mosquitoes but not as strategic bombers.

This has been debated many times before (as I mentioned previously) and one of the reasons brought up as to why they couldn't have scaled up Mosquito production is they supposedly couldn't get enough balsa wood from Ecuador IIRC. So that is one reason potentially. The other reason as I pointed out a couple of times already is that they had problems with the wood and glue etc. in tropical climates. If you wanted to takeover from the B-17 you would need to fix that. One way to do it would be to make an all-metal mosquito.

I never said it wouldn't have been a major effort, but so was building 12,000 B-17s right? If making an all-metal mosquito was going to solve some significant problems, then that would have been an option. If it didn't matter then they could go ahead and make a lot more wooden ones. I don't see the issue here.

Yes, we know the USAAF didn't use Mosquitoes as strategic bombers, and we know what route they did take. That doesn't mean it was inevitable or correct. Remember the premise of the OP and this entire discussion?
 
No but (and admittedly this depends on when) Mosquitos could keep up with P-51s and P-38s at their highest cruise speeds, rather than forcing the latter to plod along and a dangerously slow rate, thus making them more effective.
Now you're assuming a scenario. So now you're going to have bomber Mosquitoes escorted by P-38s and P-51? How far and what kind of bomb loads? Do you think you're going to Berlin and back and going to influct any kind of meaningful damage???
I do know and have read all about it. But I also know and have read all about how the Germans adapted to this big problem. I agree it was extremely hazardous to attack one of those heavily armed bombers. But the Luftwaffe adapted, they did so quickly and they did it quite well, as I think most people here are well aware. What they ultimately could not adapt to were large numbers of escort fighters which were at least competitive with their own best fighters.
The Luftwaffe was quite effective in bringing down bombers with fighters but they still couldn't keep up. It was still dangers and a lot less hazardous then locking on the tail of a Mosquito!!!
The Americans started off with a theory that if you put enough guns on a bomber, it would be basically invulnerable. This was from the time when bombers tended to be faster or as fast as most fighters. As we know by the time the war started (spread beyond Manchuria and Spain) this notion about bombers and the closely related idea "the bomber will always get through" turned sideways as fighters started to pull away from bombers in speed. I believe this theory about bombers was proven wrong.
OK, agree...
Ultimately, flying slow with a lot of guns is a static defense. The B-17 was called the 'flying fortress'. One constant about fortresses down the centuries is that while they can be quite effective, they are best only force multipliers. If you rely on static defense too much you had over the initiative to the enemy and that is a major limitation. Think Maginot Line. You can sit there with all your guns as I calmly line up my countermeasures and figure out what I need to do to get you. We know in fact historically that the Germans did figure out how to do that.
But if a fighter attacks that "static defense" it's still being shot at by 10 guns x the amount of aircraft in the box. Multiply that by 6 or 7 boxes.
And meanwhile, have your forgotten or not read about how frustrating the Mosquito was to the Germans, (and not just at night) and how much effort they put into trying to catch them?
They were and the reason why they were successful were because of the way they were deployed and tactics used. Depending who you talk to about 200 Mosquitoes were lost in air to air combat but upwards to 2,000 were lost to all causes.
I should also add, 10 x machine guns per bomber does not help at all against flak. To the contrary, the need to fly in relatively dense formations and 'boxes' made the bombers much more vulnerable to flak. Similarly, flying the same route in a vast formation or 'stream' also makes you vulnerable.
If if you deploy a Mosquito at altitude (as you suggested in some of your previous posts) you're still looking at the same thing. They are going to have to slow down to deliver their bombs and be subject to flack. At that point they may have a chance to run away after they deliver their bombs providing they aren't being attacked head on.
Faster aircraft could survive flying in smaller groups along different routes, which made them less vulnerable to flak and made it harder for the defender to concentrate their forces effectively.
Smaller groups? How are you going to destroy a major industrial center with "smaller groups?"
 
Yes, smaller groups. I think if you want to actually hit the factory, it's much more effective to put 20 bombs right on the actual plant than to scatter 5,000 bombs all over the city around it.
 
I think destroying all those 'industrial centers' like Hamburg was a great loss for humanity and for our collective culture. Just as much a strategic mistake as a moral and ethical one. One which also unnecessarily cost the lives of far too many Allied aircrew.
 
Everything about the Mosquito is by a retrospectoscope. When discussing what the Mosquito did as a bomber please remember the Mosquito squadrons were an elite in themselves. If every Lancaster squadron could do what 617 squadron (and a few others) could do then the RAF could have used a different strategy.
 
The other reason as I pointed out a couple of times already is that they had problems with the wood and glue etc. in tropical climates. If you wanted to takeover from the B-17 you would need to fix that. One way to do it would be

Which is why I say it wouldn't have happened. Yes the problems of the wood structure in tropical climes was an issue, but in 1942, when the USA was entering the war, possessing the knowledge of what was going to happen to the Mosquito comes with a time machine and a huge amount of foresight as the Mosquito was only just being introduced into service.

Any proposition of building the Mosquito out of metal following that time period just wouldn't have made sense and yes, I am aware this is a what-if, but again though, my argument against the proposition is a part of the what-if because I'm highlighting what would have happened had the decision been made to do so.

The problem with what-ifs is that despite the premise that they are a fictional scenario, suspension of disbelief and truisms is not generally required or necessary; there still has to be a logical decision process that leads to it, otherwise you creep dangerously into Nazi fan-fiction territory where the Me 262 is built in the billions and the Fw 187 is all-conquering - you might as well be watching re-runs of The Final Countdown... Logic and reason still have a part to play in a what-if.
 
Everything about the Mosquito is by a retrospectoscope. When discussing what the Mosquito did as a bomber please remember the Mosquito squadrons were an elite in themselves. If every Lancaster squadron could do what 617 squadron (and a few others) could do then the RAF could have used a different strategy.

That's an interesting point. But that said, by the second half of the war there were quite a few elite fighter and bomber units in the UK and US, training standards were improving steadily. Maybe part of the issue was the 'trench warfare mentality' of the heavy bomber offensive, though it's a bit of a chicken-egg thing.

I also readily admit it was quite difficult to perceive the immense value that the Mosquito offered to the Allied war effort. It's merits emerged rather gradually and I can't insist that somebody could have recognized it for what it was super early on. Sometimes we got lucky like that, such as with the development of the P-51. Sometimes we didn't.
 
Which is why I say it wouldn't have happened. Yes the problems of the wood structure in tropical climes was an issue, but in 1942, when the USA was entering the war, possessing the knowledge of what was going to happen to the Mosquito comes with a time machine and a huge amount of foresight as the Mosquito was only just being introduced into service.

Any proposition of building the Mosquito out of metal following that time period just wouldn't have made sense and yes, I am aware this is a what-if, but again though, my argument against the proposition is a part of the what-if because I'm highlighting what would have happened had the decision been made to do so.

The problem with what-ifs is that despite the premise that they are a fictional scenario, suspension of disbelief and truisms is not generally required or necessary; there still has to be a logical decision process that leads to it, otherwise you creep dangerously into Nazi fan-fiction territory where the Me 262 is built in the billions and the Fw 187 is all-conquering - you might as well be watching re-runs of The Final Countdown... Logic and reason still have a part to play in a what-if.

yeah ok but these are all basically problems with the whole concept of "what if" which is always a bit dangerous, I grant you.

Part of the reason to rehash these things is to have some ideas about what to do next time. That's one reason why I routinely debate the whole Strategic bombing thing.

Also the Mosquito was just incredible. It's a happy story to me.
 
I would actually love to get into this but this is not the thread for it and this may not even be the forum. You tell me you are a moderator right?
Correct - and my last words on this
I had a lot of family who fought in Vietnam and I served with many guys who were there, and read a lot about the war as I'm sure you have to have developed such firm an opinion. I think the US lost militarily and many other ways and the political aspect was only a part of that. I think the US Army became unmanageable and discipline broke down. I think the Vietnamese successfully used underground fortresses (see Cu Chi tunnels) several times to inflict defeats on the US. The US never figured out an effective method of dealing with this strategy. The US supported political regimes failed much in the same ways as the ones in Afghanistan did. Ultimately in spite of killing a huge amount of people the US could not win the population over and they (the Vietnamese) did not want foreign occupation (or the war) to continue.
And like you I served with people who fought there and had family members who were there (to include my brother, smack in the middle of TET). I agree with you about the tunnels and the break down of discipline. When you say "defeats," can you name one that permanently drove our forces out of a particular area? No you can't because there really wasn't any. Despite all the internal misgivings, the buffoonery by some in charge and the mis-guided politics, we won every major coordinated battle by the NVA. Did the might of the US Military not drive the NVA to the Paris Peace treaty???

I rest my case!
Asymmetric warfare isn't about winning offensives. The British won most of the battles in the Revolutionary war but they still lost the war.
No comparison - the British were forced to surrender. We saw our continued involvement fruitless as it was finally recognized we were supporting a regime that was corrupt and expected US to do their fighting (just like Afghanistan). South Vietnam, with it's internal corruption like a cancer, stood on it's own for two years. ARVN soldiers used to call the US "The big PX."
 
Maybe part of the issue was the 'trench warfare mentality' of the heavy bomber offensive, though it's a bit of a chicken-egg thing.

I get that, Schweik, I think a lot has to happen to escape the trench warfare mentality of "the bomber will always get through".

This had its germination in the Great War with individuals like Trenchard, Douhet and Mitchell, so we are looking at advocates of the offensive use of air power within the technological constraints of the time. Escaping from that mindset was anathema as to those individuals promoting strategic airpower, the reasons were manifold, not just theoretical means of winning wars. Remaining relevant in a post-war environment also played a part, so to overcome such a doctrine, a demonstrable action is required. Such things were proposed though, George Volkert, designer for Handley Page wrote a paper promoting a high speed unarmed bomber concept in the late 1930s and it set jaws a-wagging in the British Air Ministry - Volkert's concept was designed to provoke argument though, rather than as a viable and actionable doctrine.

Nonetheless, a lot has to change and frankly, the restrictions of the technology of the day meant that engine power outputs, powered defensive armament and metal structures offered advances to existing concepts, rather than entirely new concepts. It would really be once the shooting starts that thinking outside of the box in a military sense takes on some urgency, specifically because the major world players were not at war in the 1930s and the ravages of the Great War left an indelible impression.

In this time strategic bombers played the role of deterrent, not aggressor. They were the ballistic missile submarine, the MAD concept of the time and among the theorists, Douhet in particular promoted the concept as keeping German military expansion at bay following the war in his 1921 work Command Of The Air.
 
Yes, smaller groups. I think if you want to actually hit the factory, it's much more effective to put 20 bombs right on the actual plant than to scatter 5,000 bombs all over the city around it.
That's "IF" you can put the 20 bombs on the factory and make it back. I agree in some cases, considering the technology of WW2, the use of an aircraft like the Mosquito would have been better than sending over a massive bomber formation, but at the same time the bombs falling out of a bomber at 20,000 feet weren't smarter than one dropped at 200 feet!
 
I think destroying all those 'industrial centers' like Hamburg was a great loss for humanity and for our collective culture. Just as much a strategic mistake as a moral and ethical one. One which also unnecessarily cost the lives of far too many Allied aircrew.
Well again, the world was faced with total war. We could look back at this by today's standards and agree about the great losses for humanity, but for those living through it, quite a different story
 
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