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Its on the Mosquito web page 21 January German Jet Encounters
I think that the often heard average B-17 load of ~3800 lbs to Berlin is because of the usual mix of HE bombs and Incendiaries. The Incendiary part of the load was less dense than the HE bombs so the overall weight carried was less.
Multiple sources are confirming that it is expensive to operate, buggy, and too often not combat-ready:
>>Those who live by technology die by it too. Unsurprisingly, the F-35's 8 million lines of code are buggy, as are the 24 million lines running the aircraft's maintenance and logistics software on the ground. Sometimes pilots have to press Ctrl+Alt+Delete while in flight to reboot the multimillion-dollar radar. The F-35 computer code, government auditors say, is "as complicated as anything on earth." What can be coded can also be hacked, another vulnerability for the F-35.<<
The F-35 tells everything that's broken in the Pentagon
While Historynet is a good reference, it only gives a limited over view and lacks detail.HistoryNet is a goto for high school history teachers seeking to develop controversial history topics for students to explore. If you can find a source that contradicts this, I'd like to see it.
I recall articles written in my youth that the Me 262, handicapped as it was by its range, would never have made a useful bomber, that it's utility as a fighter posed a far greater strategic threat to our bombers and fighters, and that Hitler's insistence delayed it.
As relating to the issue of the forward-looking Mosquito being dismissed by backwards-thinkers, the F-35 is a piloted plane whose days are numbered:
>>The F-35 project has been troubled from the start and the future of jet planes is in doubt. Many believe the F-35 will be the last jet plane. But piloted planes retain an air of necessity in the military. A recent Rand study published by the Air Force Times reports that former pilots, over every other classification, have been promoted to positions of power, shaping debate about the future of jet planes. The current commander at Truax, Col. Erik Peterson, comes from this background.
The chief of staff of the Air Force, Gen. David Goldfein, believes that the future of fighting adversaries is cyber warfare. This, along with missile technology and drones, are what the future holds — not fighter jet planes. The romantic image of dogfighting is no longer reality.<<
Opinion | The F-35 is already obsolete
In the late 50's folks said that air-to-air combat was obsolete. 6 years later we went to Vietnam and were initially getting our asses handed to us because those great minds didn't get the memo from the politicians of the day!
In the late 50's folks said that air-to-air combat was obsolete. 6 years later we went to Vietnam and were initially getting our asses handed to us because those great minds didn't get the memo from the politicians of the day!
F-35 Is Performing Far Better Than Critics Would Have You ThinkMultiple sources are confirming that it is expensive to operate, buggy, and too often not combat-ready:
>>Those who live by technology die by it too. Unsurprisingly, the F-35's 8 million lines of code are buggy, as are the 24 million lines running the aircraft's maintenance and logistics software on the ground. Sometimes pilots have to press Ctrl+Alt+Delete while in flight to reboot the multimillion-dollar radar. The F-35 computer code, government auditors say, is "as complicated as anything on earth." What can be coded can also be hacked, another vulnerability for the F-35.<<
The F-35 tells everything that's broken in the Pentagon
The fact is, the USAAF strategic bombing campaign in the ETO was both an abject failure and a rousing success.
It was a failure in that the idea of destroying a country's industrial war-making ability by air attacks simply did not work. The idea started when a flood wiped out an American aircraft propeller factory and the USAAC decided that if you could destroy that factory from the air you could win the war, right there; didn't work against Germany.
It was a rousing success in that it destroyed the Luftwaffe. From 1 Jan 1944 to 1 Jan 1945 the Germans lost over 20,000 airplanes while they were being delivered to the operational units. That was because USAAF fighters were roaming all over Europe, shooting up everything, especially airplanes.
And in turn that was because the fighters were needed to escort the heavy bombers. And the Luftwaffe could not ignore those bombers; they did too much damage. Also it was a matter of honor. During the Battle of The Bulge the USAAF used an especially vicious tactic. When the weather cleared enough to enable the Allied fighter bombers to go to work, the correct thing for the Luftwaffe to do was to throw everything at those ground attack aircraft. But the USAAF would stage a heavy bomber daylight raid on a nearby German city. The Luftwaffe was already being criticized. "500 American bombers hit us yesterday! Where was the Luftwaffe?" Well, the Luftwaffe was there, heavily outnumbered and getting its arse shot off, but it did not look like that from the ground. So they had to defend the cities rather than help the ground troops.
The RAF Bomber Campaign to "dehouse" the German populace and cause an uprising in the country to overthrow the Nazis was an abject failure. No matter how bad they got hit the German civilians were far more afraid of the Nazis than they were the Allied heavy bombers. Bomber Harris was opposed to anything that took his bombers away from dehousing but after the war said, "The Americans were right. We should have used our bombers against the German oil supplies."
So, we needed to use lots of airplanes that could be intercepted so to force the Luftwaffe to come up and fight - and be destroyed. In WWII the USAAF suffered as many casualties, killed, wounded, and captured, as the entire USN and USMC put together. It was worth it.
Unfortunately, internet-based research is where schools are going, especially now that remote learning has been increasingly "a thing." Quaint idea about "archives", though.Hi,
Take this in mind when viewing internet sources
Many books written in the not that ancient past use the same sources. An awfull lot of them are surpassed with more and other archive source material wich can and will frequently change viewpoints.
The fan boy sites. Those have an agenda. They think airplane x is the best and listen to no reason. Not from real live pilots to manuals to documents. Blind but stubburn.
Propaganda. Try to find here on this board the discussion on the P-61 nightfighter. For all sorts of reasons as Dana Bell explained it was not that a great plane. In fact it was far less then great. But period documents would make one believe it was great. Only after really researching and digging one can get another more realistic opinion. And this is not just 1 case.
Interpretation of facts. Somehow people see the same charts in different ways or come to a totally different view on the same subject i.g could the luftwaffe have won the battle of Brittain or the p-51 won the war. Not only armchair generals will fight over these kinds of subjects but even professional historians.
Writers. Not all writers stick to facts some (Caitlin i.g. ) have quite a big thumb. Or just want to sell books and juice up history with imagination
Now if you really want to teach youngsters, show them how archives work. Let them chase the sources of the books they read. That will be interesting, and let them try to find new material. Tons of it still waiting.
If one would try to do research only based in internet sites, wiki etc one would risk a very bad research outcome.
While I agree your primary statement of 'failure' (in 1943), the concept of destroying key German industry from the air was not flawed -
Why do you put experts in quotation marks? Some posters here really are experts and I are not one of them.. If you do a forum search you will find that the subject of using Mosquitos as a strategic weapon is far from new some would say it has been done to death. You are not challenging people with a provocative theory that challenges assumptions, you are going over an old theory that has been debunked many times.Unfortunately, internet-based research is where schools are going, especially now that remote learning has been increasingly "a thing." Quaint idea about "archives", though.
I've donated history books to Ann Arbor schools that I thought there was a chance would get read. Unfortunately, I have been made persona non grata as a substitute in Ann Arbor schools since being "cancelled" for opining that religious fundamentalism and theocratic are a chief contributor to war (I happened to mention the Hasidics as an example). Political Correctness means that there are acceptable versions of history that can be taught, that if a student seeks alternative explanations, they will be sanctioned or ignored.
As for HistoryNet, I fail to see where Stephan Wilkinson is in error here. He is a reputable author who makes history palatable, unlike the dozens of musty, over-technical, biased volumes I possess (including six by Martin Caidin who thrilled me as an adolescent).
My approach to history in the classroom is based on the Discovery Approach. I present something provocative without preface, challenging them to seek their own answers and applauding those who present arguments that are supportable, ever when I don't agree with the conclusions. This is what I was taught to do at The Universuty of Iowa, but was chastised for using it in the classroom. Like many of the "experts" here, it was my job to tell them what to believe, to present the set of facts the Texas Education Agency agreed upon.
You argued against your own point with the evidence you present. Largely because of the reasons stated, it was flawed. We had neither the intelligence nor the overwhelming numbers early to do anything but nuisance raids, and at that, the Mosquito excelled.While I agree your primary statement of 'failure' (in 1943), the concept of destroying key German industry from the air was not flawed - it failed in 1943 because a.) the force was not large enough to repeatedly attack The Critical industry (Ball Bearings before decentralizing after August 1943) and b.) a few other 'critical industries' such as Chemical (not just powder/munitions but Fertilizer essential to feeding German population) and Central Power grids, as well as Petroleum/Synthetic Fuel refining.
The three barriers to success in 1943 were lack of high performance long range fighter escort, precision radar mapping/targeting technology to assist precision strikes in bad weather, and adequate inventory of bombers and trained crews. Additional issues included inadequate intelligence for critical target group selection and wrong bomb selection - most attacks should have made the 1000 pounder the absolute Minimum bomb, with 2000 pounders more appropriate..
Who is "We", the first thousand bomber raid was in May 1942. that is long before the Mosquito was announced to the public. Thousand-bomber raids - WikipediaYou argued against your own point with the evidence you present. Largely because of the reasons stated, it was flawed. We had neither the intelligence nor the overwhelming numbers early to do anything but nuisance raids, and at that, the Mosquito excelled.
More Mosquitoes earlier could have disrupted more infrastructure. Roaming flights with fighter protection could have rumbled rail lines and bridges sooner. We could have supplied a couple of thousand Mosquitoes by the end of 1942 to marked effect. Thar's my basic argument, likely the one Elliott Roosevelt unsuccessfully advanced. He did grasp its utility with secret intelligence operations, though. I'm suggesting more could have been done with more resources directed toward covert activities.
Some have argued that the semi-disastrous Ploesti raid would have been just as effective using fewer Mosquitoes with less loss of crews. Fuel really was the Nazis' Achilles heel and we knew that, but we diverted bomber energy to civilian targets which did not break the German morale any more than Hitler's London bombing broke the Brits.
Utter Bovine Fecal matter. First, there was zero possibility given the wildest of fantasy prioritization to build Mosquito airframes, beginning in 1940, to be able to develop a logistics capability of filling projected Bombardment TO&E for FY 42/42. Second there is no fantasy priority to develop and produce Packard engines to even fulfil existing 1941/42 requirements for RCAF/RAF Lancasters and Mosquitos. That was the Major barrier to introducing the P-51B in the ETO in September vs December.You argued against your own point with the evidence you present. Largely because of the reasons stated, it was flawed. We had neither the intelligence nor the overwhelming numbers early to do anything but nuisance raids, and at that, the Mosquito excelled.
More Mosquitoes earlier could have disrupted more infrastructure. Roaming flights with fighter protection could have rumbled rail lines and bridges sooner. We could have supplied a couple of thousand Mosquitoes by the end of 1942 to marked effect. Thar's my basic argument, likely the one Elliott Roosevelt unsuccessfully advanced. He did grasp its utility with secret intelligence operations, though. I'm suggesting more could have been done with more resources directed toward covert activities.
Some have argued that the semi-disastrous Ploesti raid would have been just as effective using fewer Mosquitoes with less loss of crews. Fuel really was the Nazis' Achilles heel and we knew that, but we diverted bomber energy to civilian targets which did not break the German morale any more than Hitler's London bombing broke the Brits.
Ahh yes the discovery approach. Ok that says lot. Try if you can to watch some of its programs. And see what kind of acedemic value survives. Research has to be fast and a kinda of sexy.Unfortunately, internet-based research is where schools are going, especially now that remote learning has been increasingly "a thing." Quaint idea about "archives", though.
I've donated history books to Ann Arbor schools that I thought there was a chance would get read. Unfortunately, I have been made persona non grata as a substitute in Ann Arbor schools since being "cancelled" for opining that religious fundamentalism and theocratic are a chief contributor to war (I happened to mention the Hasidics as an example). Political Correctness means that there are acceptable versions of history that can be taught, that if a student seeks alternative explanations, they will be sanctioned or ignored.
As for HistoryNet, I fail to see where Stephan Wilkinson is in error here. He is a reputable author who makes history palatable, unlike the dozens of musty, over-technical, biased volumes I possess (including six by Martin Caidin who thrilled me as an adolescent).
My approach to history in the classroom is based on the Discovery Approach. I present something provocative without preface, challenging them to seek their own answers and applauding those who present arguments that are supportable, ever when I don't agree with the conclusions. This is what I was taught to do at The Universuty of Iowa, but was chastised for using it in the classroom. Like many of the "experts" here, it was my job to tell them what to believe, to present the set of facts the Texas Education Agency agreed upon.