What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress?

[Schweik]

The inference seems to be that if Mossies were used there would be no, or fewer, casualties. Would that be due to speed or structure? Certainly not due to defensive firepower. How many crippled acft would return to Britain with one or two engines shot out? How would an injured pilot be assisted at the controls to bring the plane home. Since it seems twice the number of acft would be required to do/deliver the job, would aircrew losses still be less?

See my post on bombing accuracy and per-mission survival rates.

The truth is however we don't know how many Mosquitos would have been destroyed in a 'What-If' scenario, I certainly agree that the Germans would have adapted to the new strategy. Do you think they could have shot down as many Mosquitoes as they did Lancasters?

 

[Schweik]

IMO - the question to be answered is how many Mosquitos would be required to destroy a Petroleum/Chemical facility (defined perhaps by reducing product delivery to 10% of capacity).

Related questions a.) For any given attack strategy, what are the CEPs expectations (documented testing/actual results for proposed attack strategy) for each attacking Mossie at 600 miles and b.) why do we believe that? c.) what is recommended attack plan - i.e. single Mossies in trail? Flight/Section sized force in formation? mass formation of Wing level strength? Daylight, Night? What missions are compromised by shifting Mossie inventory toward long range strategic attacks?

The RAF optical bombsight was probably as good as the Speery - but? Mossie cruise speed makes single a/C attacks harder to defend than formation sized force but the loss rate should still be high.

This post asks the questions which I'd like to see investigated and hopefully answered here.

CEP or 'per mission accuracy rate' is something I'd like to know but don't. I think 600 miles may be one of a few different rage bands depending on the type of Mosquito and the amount of ordinance carried.
Which attack plan or strategy would be employed would also depend on many factors, but I would suggest the Mosquito would not have to fly in a bomber stream or a close formation, in fact I would suspect many smaller formations might be more effective.
Whether daylight or night would probably depend on German countermeasures.

I would also think that if we can assume that Mosquitos were not attacking in large formations or bomber streams, and could attack a variety of targets from a variety of directions, the Germans would not be able to concentrate all their defenses as much as they did against the heavies.

 

[pbehn]

The last part about 'almost welcoming to the occupying army' didn't often apply to USAF brats. My experience as an Air Force brat in Tokyo was that conduct (polite show of respect) versus thought (contempt for foreign American Devil) was prevalent. I was a Gai-Jin then and deep down no Japanese person feels inferior to another race. At least we don't top the hit parade of China and Korea. Gratitude and Thank You were transformed into to various forms of expression of obligation or owed debt - which translated to neutral (mild obligation) to resentment for your thoughtfulness. If gifts are exchanged your Japanese host will always try to 'give more' in concert with the framework of obligation. I recognize that 70+ years is plenty of time to weed out the 'old' and 'bring in the new'. (like US).

I worked with the Japanese for 5 years in Japan (six months) Paris to years, Saudi two years and London 6 months. What you describe is just Japanese like, maybe a bit different if in the military. The average Japanese steel worker and manager is the same as any other anywhere. However socially everything was about obligation and hierarchy and duty, with themselves and with others. If they invite you to play something they find a way to let you win, I got a small trophy for a tennis tournament, I cant play tennis, first time I played was that night. I even managed to beat some at table tennis, I was quite a good player at school and was coached in a club for a while, I know when someone is letting me win, buts thats the way it is, it wasnt about sport but a pleasant social evening, village crown green bowling is the English equivalent.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I resent that, and I've seen you make mistakes and omissions yourself, I didn't make assumptions beyond what I actually knew about you which isn't that much. I try to be very clear when I do know about a particular technical issue and when I don't. I think sometimes when you are making high-level points about things everyone either already knows or should know you don't have to plunge into every single nuance like a legal contract. But I'll be sure and hold you to the same standard in the future.

Resent it all you want - I quoted what you wrote - feel free to hold me to the same standard!!!

You are still missing my point. If you are going to engage in a 'What If" such as the subject of this thread, then you have to assume a different goal and a different mission. I have been saying here, and have said in previous iterations of the same discussions, that the bomb truck mentality, the idea of moving mud or just "delivering the maximum amount of bombs over target" is a bad strategy.

Assuming a different goal is one thing in a "what if" is one thing - applying your opinion to actual facts are another. There were many times where the "bomb truck" worked - it's easy to play armchair quarterback 70 years after the fact with a full perspective of what actually transpired

During WW2 even though they didn't have precision guided munitions such as we have in the modern world, they did have more and less accurate methods of bombing and more and less accurate methods of bombing.

Ok and sometimes those "less accurate methods" were the only way you were going to get the mission accomplished

We know they didn't ramp up Mosquito production super early. We know what happened in the actual war. But the point is not the bombload.

Tell that to LeMay and Harris

Let me try to spell this out more clearly.

B-17 carried a 8 x 500 lb bombs for a 4,000 bomb load on a long mission. Lets say you have 50 of them on your raid. That's 200,000 lbs of bombs, or 100 tons. Pretty impressive.
But if you only have 7% bombing accuracy, that is actually 14,000 lbs of bombs, or 7 tons hitting the target. For many targets this may not be enough.

You're using the lowest denominator here - some raids were much higher, I've read up to 60%, Bill M could probably chime in on that. And if that 7% accuracy kept the workers out of the factories and shut down production for a spell, that was as good as 100%. I believe this was a thought process bomber Harris had...

On a long mission, a mosquito might carry two 500 lb bombs, for a 1,000 lb load*. Lets say you have 50 of those so 50,000 lbs of bombs or 25 tons. Looks like far less than the B-17 raid!
I don't know how much better the accuracy was for a Mosquito, but we know their accuracy is higher. Lets say for sake of argument they hit 30% of the time (and I'm not saying for sure that they did).

If their rate of accuracy was that much better, that same paltry 50,000 lbs of bombs converts to 15,000 7.5 tons - actually better than the B-17 raid.
With an increased bomb load to 2,000 lbs per Mosquito, you are now carrying 100,000 and hitting with 30,000 lbs or 15 tons. More than twice as good as the B-17s.

And now lets look at the knock on advantages:

1) You are risking 100 aircrew in the Mosquitos, vs. 500 in the B-17 strike. You have two engines in each Mosquito vs. four engines in each B-17. 13 guns on the B-17 vs 4 guns (or none) on the Mosquito.
2) This is a big one. The Mosquitoes also have a much better survival rate. For the B-17 I've seen various rates between 5-7% on average to as high as 16% for Schewinfurt. Lets say 5%. For the Mosquito the number I've seen quoted is 28,000 sorties losing 193 aircraft which is a 0.7% loss rate.
That means if you fly five missions, you are down to 38 B-17s left. You still have 48 Mosquitos left.
3) So if you hit your target repeatedly, as they often did, you are actually going to be getting better and better results comparatively

From my understanding the Lancaster had a higher loss rate than the B-17 for the war, though I'm not sure precisely how high, and bombing at night they certainly had a lower accuracy (barring special raids like the dambusters or something).

This is meaningless as you're grabbing numbers out of the air and you're trying to compare loss rates when these aircraft were flying entirely different missions, in different conditions and at different altitudes- I would tend to follow this if you had a factual model to compare!!!

My whole argument above hinges partly on how much more accurate a Mosquito actually was compared to a B-17, and I freely admit I don't actually know that - it would take a bit of research to get even a vague sense of what that number really was but it could be measured for certain raids. The other factors such as mission survival rates come into play regardless.

Well I guess all this is mute then!

The Bottom Line is, if we can in fact make the assumption that a fast bomber like a Mosquito could hit targets three or four times more accurately, then I think you can definitely make a strong case that a completely different type of bomber offensive could have been possible at some point, and probably would have been more successful.

Again your opinion without complete information (by your own admittance!)

 

[FLYBOYJ]

My whole argument above hinges partly on how much more accurate a Mosquito actually was compared to a B-17, and I freely admit I don't actually know that

And even if you did know that, you're comparing two very different aircraft that were operated in very different capacities under very different operational scenarios.

 

[nuuumannn]

n terms of capability - flying over German held territory with relative impunity, it really had no competition on the Allied side, nor did the Axis have anything that could really compare to it. To me that was revolutionary.

If it were a revolution it would have meant that the previous type of aircraft would not have been continued. A revolution, apart from the circular sense is a radical and complete change of a situation or circumstance. The British did not cease building Blenheims (ok, this has to be asked why not...) and Wellingtons once the Mosquito arrived and the pace of bomber development actually escalated following the debut of the Mosquito, and not because of it. The Halifax for example was a bit of a whipping boy since it suffered with drag and other issues, yet production continued and the bugs were (mostly) ironed out in 1943. In the time the Mosquito went from prototype to production, the troublesome Manchester went from a twin-engined under performer to the four-engined production aircraft being introduced into service, which eventually became the mainstay of Bomber Command, its most numerous bomber type. If the Mosquito was a revolution, these things wouldn't have happened.

As mentioned earlier, because of its unrivalled performance and capability, the Mosquito carved a niche for itself within RAF operations; it did not replace everything else, nor did it bring about sweeping change that rendered everything else obsolete, because the very things you are claiming it changed continued to be employed despite what the Mosquito brought to the table. Big bomber development and production continued well after the Mosquito entered service.

As for the performance aspects, yes, it could operate with impunity over enemy territory, but it wasn't invulnerable and with the advent of better performing interceptors and then jet fighters the Mosquito's performance margin became less marked. The Ju 86P could operate with impunity over Britain until it couldn't, even Zeppelins flying over Britain until 1916 were invulnerable to the defences, that is until incendiary ammunition came into common use.

Yes, the Mosquito had great performance and capability and as I mentioned offered a different dimension to existing practise, but it did not revolutionise air warfare. For every measure there is a countermeasure and the same happened to the Mosquito.

 

[nuuumannn]

I've seen it mentioned that the Mosquito was the first truly multirole aircraft - I'd put forward the humble Royal Aircraft Factory BE.2 family from the Great War; it was a specialised night fighter - that thing was responsible for shooting down more German airships than any other type, it served as a photo-recon platform, artillery spotter, light bomber - usually flown as a single-seater with the Lewis gun removed, too (the original unarmed bomber!), anti-submarine coastal patrol aircraft, single-seat day interceptor with synchronised forward firing gun - in the B.E.12 variant, general transport hack and two-seat training machine, the RNAS even used them for aircraft carrier aircrew familiarisation training- on land bases with Furious' air component, I'm not sure whether BE.2s ever landed on or took off from Argus or Furious, but it wouldn't surprise me if they had. The type did have a terrible reputation and less than average performance, but it was consistently adaptable and it was designed by Geoffrey de Havilland...

BE.2e-2

 

[Schweik]

Resent it all you want - I quoted what you wrote - feel free to hold me to the same standard!!!

I was referring to your characterization of my posts - and I think you may have misread my reply.

Assuming a different goal is one thing in a "what if" is one thing - applying your opinion to actual facts are another. There were many times where the "bomb truck" worked - it's easy to play armchair quarterback 70 years after the fact.

I think the technical limitations were clearly there very early on - you couldn't do precision daylight bombing with Blenheims and and Hampdens which couldn't even survive over German held territory. You can't do fast bomber raids with bombers that top out at 230 mph and cruise at 180 mph.

Once the Mosquito arrives however, this begins the change. The technical limitation falls away.

Ok and sometimes those "less accurate methods" were the only way you were going to get the mission accomplished

Tell that to LeMay and Harris

We know what decisions they did in fact make. The question of this thread is based on whether that was the only decision possible or if they could have gone another route. If you are saying that we can't even explore alternatives then there is no point to any of the discussion.

You're using the lowest denominator here - some raids were much higher, I've read up to 60%, Bill M could probably chime in on that

I don't know what the average bombing accuracy for the Mosquito was, or the Lancaster, but I believe that data does exist. The data for the 8th AF I am more familiar with and that 7% is actually pretty generous. The seven percent figure quoted was from a study of 8th AF bombing in the fall of 1944 according to the Wiki. But that was for a 1,000 foot 'target area'.

Page 5 of the United States Strategic Bombing survey concluded that on average for the war only 20% of the bombs dropped by US aircraft in Europe fell within 1,000 feet of their target. A 500 lb bomb hitting 280 meters away from a reinforced concrete building may not do any damage at all aside from breaking some windows. According to the Air Force, a 500 lb bomb had a 'lethal radius' of 60-90 feet. So that would mean that the actual rate of hitting targets closely enough to damage them would be something more like 2% if my math is right (maybe somebody can correct me on that).

Another Air Force study states that 16% of bombs dropped in 1943 hit within 1,000 feet of the AP.

Using the H2X targeting system the CEP increased to 3,000 feet.

This is meaningless as you're grabbing numbers out of the air and you're trying to compare loss rates when these aircraft were flying entirely different missions, in different conditions and at different altitudes- I would tend to follow this if you had a factual model to compare!!!

I am not grabbing numbers out of the air, as I just pointed out, I think at least a ballpark figure on the accuracy of the US heavy bombers is known and available. Of course the numbers, as always, are subject to interpretation. I assume that figures for the Mosquito can also be found, but I acknowledge I don't know what those numbers are. I'd be willing to bet a weeks pay though that the Mosquito was more accurate than the B-17 and those numbers can in fact be found. It's just a matter of how much more accurate (and how much data is actually available on this... is it enough to really compare the two.

Well I guess all this is mute then!

Again your opinion without complete information (by your own admittance!)

Moot. Yes I'd say we have partial information and more will likely emerge here with a little patience. I'm just trying to identify where we need to focus to settle the debate.

 

[Schweik]

If it were a revolution it would have meant that the previous type of aircraft would not have been continued. A revolution, apart from the circular sense is a radical and complete change of a situation or circumstance. The British did not cease building Blenheims (ok, this has to be asked why not...) and Wellingtons once the Mosquito arrived and the pace of bomber development actually escalated following the debut of the Mosquito, and not because of it. The Halifax for example was a bit of a whipping boy since it suffered with drag and other issues, yet production continued and the bugs were (mostly) ironed out in 1943. In the time the Mosquito went from prototype to production, the troublesome Manchester went from a twin-engined under performer to the four-engined production aircraft being introduced into service, which eventually became the mainstay of Bomber Command, its most numerous bomber type. If the Mosquito was a revolution, these things wouldn't have happened.

As mentioned earlier, because of its unrivalled performance and capability, the Mosquito carved a niche for itself within RAF operations; it did not replace everything else, nor did it bring about sweeping change that rendered everything else obsolete, because the very things you are claiming it changed continued to be employed despite what the Mosquito brought to the table. Big bomber development and production continued well after the Mosquito entered service.

This is just a recitation of what we already know did in fact happen. My point is not that they stopped making everything else, my point is that the new capabilities offered by the Mosquito meant they could have made fewer heavy bombers, at least in theory and at least from the technical point of view vis a vis what the aircraft could do in terms of military capabilities. We all know quite well that they kept making heavy bombers and even (for some unknown reason) Blenheims. But the Mosquito was revolutionary in it's capabilities. I think I have already demonstrated that not that I needed to, it's a well known fact.

As for the performance aspects, yes, it could operate with impunity over enemy territory, but it wasn't invulnerable and with the advent of better performing interceptors and then jet fighters the Mosquito's performance margin became less marked. The Ju 86P could operate with impunity over Britain until it couldn't, even Zeppelins flying over Britain until 1916 were invulnerable to the defences, that is until incendiary ammunition came into common use.

The Ju 86P could operate with impunity briefly, for a few months in 1942* until they modified some Spitfires to catch it, and then once a few were shot down it was out of business. Even that short window caused a great deal of consternation for the British. Much as the Ki-46 did in the Pacific. But neither the Ju 86 nor the Ki46 compared with the Mosquito in versatility or performance. The Mosquito as a recon plane was a huge headache for the Germans all alone, but it also created more headaches as a night fighter, intruder, bomber, fighter bomber, maritime strike aircraft and so on.

Yes, the Mosquito had great performance and capability and as I mentioned offered a different dimension to existing practise, but it did not revolutionise air warfare. For every measure there is a countermeasure and the same happened to the Mosquito.

I didn't say it revolutionized air warfare in the sense that they stopped everything and switched over to using them instead of the heavy bomber offensive - I am arguing they could have done so at least in terms of technical / performance capabilities. The point of a thread like this isn't to debate what we all know happened historically. You are saying over and over that they didn't change everything they were doing, that the Mosquito was just slotted into the major focus which was the heavy bomber raiding, and I obviously agree with that. I'm saying that was probably a mistake, for example if you look at the appalling casualty rate for Bomber Command pilots and to a slightly lesser extent, the 8th AF. The Mosquito had the potential to be a bigger deal than it even was.


*From the wiki on the Ju 86: "After the RAF mounted a special interception squadron using modified Spitfire Mk IXs, and one bomber attempting a raid on Portsmouth was intercepted on 12 September 1942, no further flights over England were attempted.[16]"​

 

[Schweik]

And even if you did know that, you're comparing two very different aircraft that were operated in very different capacities under very different operational scenarios.

I'm well aware of this - and I'm suggesting fast strike aircraft are more effective in general than large heavy bombers.

I am suggesting that a few bombs dropped accurately are more effective than many more bombs dropped inaccurately (obviously this depends on the ratio between the two).

I am saying that aircraft which can strike repeatedly and take fewer losses are better for the overall effort than aircraft with 7 or 8 times the per sortie loss rate.

 

[nuuumannn]

But the Mosquito was revolutionary in it's capabilities. I think I have already demonstrated that not that I needed to, it's a well known fact.

It wasn't though. A revolution is exactly what I stated, a complete wholesale change, not just better performance than its predecessors.

I didn't say it revolutionized air warfare in the sense that they stopped everything and switched over to using them instead of the heavy bomber offensive - I am arguing they could have done so.

That is what a revolution is! That would have happened if the Mosquito was a revolution! You might be getting your definitions mixed up there, Schweik...

As for the Ju 86P, you're missing the point as to why it was mentioned. Yes, I know it was intercepted, but so were Mosquitoes. This is the point I am making, its performance, while superior when it first appeared, was overcome by better interceptors, just like the Ju 86P.

And yes, I know this is a what-if, but I am arguing against the suggestion the Mosquito was revolutionary, not whether its impact could have been.

 

[nuuumannn]

The French Revolution was a complete change in French governorship, the people chose to reject the status quo by overthrowing the monarchy and eventually executing them and imposing a republic, otherwise we'd just be calling it the French Slight Change in Governing Practise, which doesn't have the same impact and the country would still be a constitutional monarchy, which it isn't.

 

[Schweik]

It wasn't though. A revolution is exactly what I stated, a complete wholesale change, not just better performance than its predecessors.

But I didn't call it a 'revolution' I called it revolutionary.

Merriam Webster defines that as "Constituting or bringing about a major or fundamental change". The Mosquito certainly did do that, however, I was not just referring to it's actual use, but it's performance, it's capabilities and therefore it's potential. You seem to be failing to grasp that nuance. It had revolutionary potential. We know they did not fully realize that potential in the sense that they changed the nature of the bombing offensive. But I am arguing they could have.

There is however no argument that a Mosquito was a revolutionary improvement over a Blenheim. The Mosquito went into service in 1942 and was not surpassed in performance by any Allied bomber in service, at least that I know of, until the end of the war. That is an outlier.

That is what a revolution is! That would have happened if the Mosquito was a revolution! You might be getting your definitions mixed up there, Schweik...

As for the Ju 86P, you're missing the point as to why it was mentioned. Yes, I know it was intercepted, but so were Mosquitoes. This is the point I am making, its performance, while superior when it first appeared, was overcome by better interceptors, just like the Ju 86P.

The Ju 86P was no longer used as recon after the first couple of interceptions (over the UK and in the Middle East). It was only used effectively for a few months. The Mosquito however was still being used and continued to be a major problem for the Luftwaffe right to the end of the war. Mosquito could also do low level recon not just high altitude.

So even just as a recon aircraft, the Mosquito was far more important than the Ju 86P for years in service and number of sorties alone. But of course it also excelled in so many other roles already listed, including being basically the only Allied bomber capable of flying strikes into enemy territory unescorted and surviving at an acceptable rate. I would argue that not even the Jets like the Ar 234 and Me 262 caused as much consternation among the Allies, particularly in the bomber role, as the Mosquito did to the Germans.

 

[Schweik]

The French Revolution was a complete change in French governorship, the people chose to reject the status quo by overthrowing the monarchy and eventually executing them and imposing a republic, otherwise we'd just be calling it the French Slight Change in Governing Practise, which doesn't have the same impact and the country would still be a constitutional monarchy, which it isn't.

Was the Me 262 a revolutionary change in aircraft design?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I think the technical limitations were clearly there very early on - you couldn't do precision daylight bombing with Blenheims and and Hampdens which couldn't even survive over German held territory. You can't do fast bomber raids with bombers that top out at 230 mph and cruise at 180 mph.
Once the Mosquito arrives however, this begins the change. The technical limitation falls away.

If you're talking about Blenheims and and Hampdens

We know what decisions they did in fact make. The question of this thread is based on whether that was the only decision possible or if they could have gone another route. If you are saying that we can't even explore alternatives then there is no point to any of the discussion.

I'm willing to discuss alternatives when they make sense and are operationally accurate.

I don't know what the average bombing accuracy for the Mosquito was, or the Lancaster, but I believe that data does exist. The data for the 8th AF I am more familiar with and that 7% is actually pretty generous. The seven percent figure quoted was from a study of 8th AF bombing in the fall of 1944 according to the Wiki. But that was for a 1,000 foot 'target area'.

Again that was one snapshot - there were plenty of raids that were higher

Page 5 of the United States Strategic Bombing survey concluded that on average for the war only 20% of the bombs dropped by US aircraft in Europe fell within 1,000 feet of their target. A 500 lb bomb hitting 280 meters away from a reinforced concrete building may not do any damage at all aside from breaking some windows. According to the Air Force, a 500 lb bomb had a 'lethal radius' of 60-90 feet. So that would mean that the actual rate of hitting targets closely enough to damage them would be something more like 2% if my math is right (maybe somebody can correct me on that).

Another Air Force study states that 16% of bombs dropped in 1943 hit within 1,000 feet of the AP.

Using the H2X targeting system the CEP increased to 3,000 feet.

Well aware of that report - and I think a 500 pound bomb within 1000 of a target can be just as good as a direct hit and again this will depend on the target, so why don't you use 20% in your calculations!

I am not grabbing numbers out of the air, as I just pointed out, I think at least a ballpark figure on the accuracy of the US heavy bombers is known and available.

Nope, until you can come up with some raids and what the post reconnaissance reports state, you are grabbing numbers as there were raids where more than 7% of the targer was hit.

Of course the numbers, as always, are subject to interpretation. I assume that figures for the Mosquito can also be found, but I acknowledge I don't know what those numbers are. I'd be willing to bet a weeks pay though that the Mosquito was more accurate than the B-17 and those numbers can in fact be found. It's just a matter of how much more accurate (and how much data is actually available on this... is it enough to really compare the two.

I'll agree with that but again you're comparing two different aircraft that flew two different roles under two different conditions!!!

Moot. Yes I'd say we have partial information and more will likely emerge here with a little patience. I'm just trying to identify where we need to focus to settle the debate.

No Mute - because it's not worth trying to discuss inaccurate information!

 

[Schweik]

Is the figure of a wartime average of 20% hits within 1,000 feet correct for the US heavy bombers or no? That comes from the USAAF postwar report which I linked. If we agree on that, it's a starting point. I do not agree that a 500 lb bomb hitting 1,000 (or 800) feet away necessarily destroys a target, incidentally.

 

[pbehn]

The theory of the Mosquito wasnt revolutionary, the Blenheim was also a "fast bomber", the practice of it was. It was designed to be fast and that wasnt just not having defensive armament. In cooling drag, wing profile and surface finish clean lines it was on par with the P-51. If it was designed to an RAF spec it would have a three man crew because conventional wisdom said you needed a three man crew. The guy in the plane next to the pilot needed many skills and maybe more training than the pilot himself and the RAF had to develop smaller equipment and various aids to the two crew who were performing the duties of 5/6 in a Lancaster

 

[drgondog]

Is the figure of a wartime average of 20% hits within 1,000 feet correct for the US heavy bombers or no? That comes from the USAAF postwar report which I linked. If we agree on that, it's a starting point. I do not agree that a 500 lb bomb hitting 1,000 (or 800) feet away necessarily destroys a target, incidentally.

You do realize that "20%hits within 1000 feet" of aiming point means that the actual bomb strikes from a direct hit to 1000 feet away, included counted hits on the actual Aiming Point?

That said, the reason to move away from unguided to guided munitions was explicitly to move a large CEP to direct hits. Several attempts were made, both optically and wire guided, but reliability remained very low until the PAVE system of the 60s

 

[drgondog]

Is the figure of a wartime average of 20% hits within 1,000 feet correct for the US heavy bombers or no? That comes from the USAAF postwar report which I linked. If we agree on that, it's a starting point. I do not agree that a 500 lb bomb hitting 1,000 (or 800) feet away necessarily destroys a target, incidentally.

Up the size a bit - how about Nagasaki and Hiroshima?

 

[Schweik]

You do realize that "20%hits within 1000 feet" of aiming point means that the actual bomb strikes from a direct hit to 1000 feet away, included counted hits on the actual Aiming Point?

That said, the reason to move away from unguided to guided munitions was explicitly to move a large CEP to direct hits. Several attempts were made, both optically and wire guided, but reliability remained very low until the PAVE system of the 60s

Yes I agree, and if you use the USAAF's own calculation of a ~ 100 foot zone of destruction from a 500 lb bomb, and then double it just to be fair, that still leaves you with about 80% of the bombs dropped within a 1,000 ft CEP as being ineffective.