What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

[33k in the air]

I'm sure many of us, at one time or another, wondered about Mosquitos instead of B-17s. I have. What if the RAF went with Mosquitos instead of the Lancaster?

The striking power issue is even larger there.

The Lancaster could haul 10,000 lbs of bombs to Berlin; the Halifax, about 8,000 lbs. That means to replace them with 4,000-lb capable Mosquitos means 2.5 for each Lancaster and 2 for each Halifax. Double those numbers in the case of the 2,000-lb capable Mosquito.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

The striking power issue is even larger there.

The Lancaster could haul 10,000 lbs of bombs to Berlin; the Halifax, about 8,000 lbs. That means to replace them with 4,000-lb capable Mosquitos means 2.5 for each Lancaster and 2 for each Halifax. Double those numbers in the case of the 2,000-lb capable Mosquito.

But wait - if the Mosquitos came in low, their bombs would be more accurate, right?!?

2+2=6

 

[33k in the air]

Well the UK was an aircraft carrier, it just needed a bigger stowage area.

Which then prompts the next question: armoured flight deck on that aircraft carrier, yes or no?

 

[GrauGeist]

There was one at an airshow at El Toro MCAS IIRC, this was right after the Falklands. It was sitting on the ramp proudly waving the RAF flag from an open window in the cockpit.

I recall seeing that.

I also recall seeing Royal Navy Harriers there once (not during an air show).

As far as unique jet engine sounds go, there was nothing quite like the sound of four GE TF39 turbofans howling away under the wings of a C-5 Galaxy.

 

[SaparotRob]

The striking power issue is even larger there.

The Lancaster could haul 10,000 lbs of bombs to Berlin; the Halifax, about 8,000 lbs. That means to replace them with 4,000-lb capable Mosquitos means 2.5 for each Lancaster and 2 for each Halifax. Double those numbers in the case of the 2,000-lb capable Mosquito.

Yup. Just what I thought. I thought I'd try to change my perspective a bit. Mosquito replaces a different heavy. Nope, not bias for the Boeing. It just doesn't work even with a switch from a night bombing specialist to the Mossie.

 

[33k in the air]

But wait - if the Mosquitos came in low, their bombs would be more accurate, right?!?

2+2=6

Well, to be fair, the lower the altitude, the greater the accuracy, in general. Though I would expect diminishing returns below a certain altitude. While Bomber Command certainly used the ~20,000 ft region for raids over Germany, in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Well, to be fair, the lower the altitude, the greater the accuracy, in general. Though I would expect diminishing returns below a certain altitude. While Bomber Command certainly used the ~20,000 ft region for raids over Germany, in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).

No agree, I was being a bit facetious. So that 2.5 Mosquitoes for each Lancaster would drop to 1.5, right?

 

[GrauGeist]

in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).

Actually, the bombing raids leading up to, and after D-Day saw a considerable amount of destruction inflicted on French towns, resulting in over 50,000 deaths. Caen alone saw over 1,000 dead between 6-7 June, 1944.

 

[33k in the air]

No agree, I was being a bit facetious. So that 2.5 Mosquitoes for each Lancaster would drop to 1.5, right?

Mosquitoes? Pfft. Just replace them with P-39s! The war would be won quickly!

 

[33k in the air]

Actually, the bombing raids leading up to, and after D-Day saw a considerable amount of destruction inflicted on French towns, resulting in over 50,000 deaths. Caen alone saw over 1,000 dead between 6-7 June, 1944.

The minimization efforts were sometimes not successful.

Caen is a whole other mess (which ended up helping the Germans more than than hurting them.)

 

[JDCAVE]

Well, to be fair, the lower the altitude, the greater the accuracy, in general. Though I would expect diminishing returns below a certain altitude. While Bomber Command certainly used the ~20,000 ft region for raids over Germany, in some raids over France in the run-up to D-Day it was down to ~8,000 feet to achive better accuracy (thus minimizing friendly civilian damage).

Most of dad's attacks were below 20,000'. On the raid to Pforzheim he bombed at 8,500'. Most bombed at less than 9,000'. Bombing heights depended in part on the town's defences.

 

[GrauGeist]

The minimization efforts were sometimes not successful.

Caen is a whole other mess (which ended up helping the Germans more than than hurting them.)

One of the reasons that bombers were flying lower, was because the Luftwaffe was not on strength and the number of Allied aircraft in the air over the landing areas (and inland) from 6 June onwards was overwhelming, so there was no need to fly at higher altitudes.

But the fact remains that the civilian toll was higher from the D-Day workup through the end of German occupation, than the years prior.

 

[33k in the air]

Most of dad's attacks were below 20,000'. On the raid to Pforzheim he bombed at 8,500'. Most bombed at less than 9,000'.

I'm presently going through the ORBs for 433 Squadron for 1944 working on a little (actually large) project. The lowest reported altitude so far was 2,500 feet on the evening of June 6/7. Here is what is reported as the bombing altitudes for the missions in January through March, 1944:

Jan. 20/21 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 21,700
Jan. 21/22 vs. Magdeburg = 20,000 to 22,500
Jan. 28/29 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 22,500
Jan. 30/31 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 21,000
Feb. 16/17 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 23,500
Feb. 19/20 vs. Leipzig = 21,000 to 25,000 (I suspect the latter is a typo)
Feb. 20/21 vs. Stuttgart = 21,000 to 23,000
Feb. 24/25 vs. Schweinfurt = 21,000 to 23,400
Feb. 25/26 vs. Augsburg = 21,500 to 22,000
Mar. 6/7 vs. Trappes = 13,000 to 13,600
Mar. 7/8 vs. Le Mans = 13,000
Mar. 13/14 vs. Le Mans = 11,500 to 12,000
Mar. 15/16 vs. Stuttgart = 20,000 to 23,500
Mar. 18/19 vs. Frankfurt = 20,000 to 22,100
Mar. 24/25 vs. Berlin = 19,500 to 22,000
Mar 26/27 vs. Essen = 19,300 to 22,000
Mar. 30/31 vs. Nuremberg = 21,000 to 22,000

Bombing heights depended in part on the town's defences.

Yes, that was certainly a part of the consideration as well..

 

[nuuumannn]

I saw (and heard) these two critters running up their engines at Elvington, it was like some Sci-Fi mechanical mating ceremony.

Elvington is an awesome place, very evocative and the runnable Victor - not actually owned and operated by the museum (not sure about the Nimrod) - certainly adds to its character. A highly recommended jaunt for any UK visitor.

YAM 07

YAM 08

YAM 12

My fave from the collection, the only place outside France you can see one of these.

YAM 04

Of course, the reason for the place's being was the desire of the founders to recreate a Handley Page Halifax, and the reproduction they have built is a magnificent effort and a story in itself.

YAM 25

Images here from my last visit to Elvington:

Yorkshire Air Museum

Elvington, Yorks, UK 2018.

www.flickr.com

 

[nuuumannn]

It is so easy to play armchair quarterback 75 years after the fact! (I think we kinda said the same thing )

I agree, Joe, but we are all guilty of playing armchair quarterback, or armchair some other position to some degree on this forum, nevertheless, there is a tendency toward romanticising aircraft and their capabilities or conversely disparaging them, without adequate foundation as time goes on and unfortunately the medium of the internet tends to spread idealisation-without-context with little restraint.

I had a similar discussion with another researcher on the subject of the Fw 187, that fantastic internet rubber chicken and it has arisen as a recent point of interest through the growth of the internet, as there was little real interest in it before the rise of this medium. The Fw 187 was previously regarded as a high performing also-ran that very few showed any interest in, with those who did write about it acknowledging its superior performance compared to the Bf 110, some of whom even put forward the notion that had it entered service it would have been a serious performer compared to other contemporary types, but little more that that tantalising piece of conjecture. Another reason this aircraft had so little traction was a complete dearth of credible information, of which there still is but what has been revealed has been misinterpreted to such a vast degree that the results can only be regarded as fantasised misinformation that sticks because of the dearth of credible resources.

The Mosquito however suffers from the reverse, there is so much out there on it (except for accurate information on the development of the Mosquito Turret Fighter, which is almost universally brushed over in texts about the type), that it has had glowing reviews from almost every author who writes about it, in print and in every other medium to the extent that its versatility has grown to an almost mythical status, where the context surrounding the type is frequently misinterpreted and the issues overlooked or simply ignored. The notion of halting production of a US heavy bomber to replace it with Mosquitoes in the middle of the war appears ludicrous to someone of a previous generation but is perfectly at home in this medium.

 

[GrauGeist]

Fully agree, Grant.
The decision makers of the day made their judgement (right or wrong) based in what they knew and or foresaw based on information at hand.
The Fw187 is a great point. Yes, it held great promise as an interceptor, BUT at the time, the RLM felt that the Bf109 and Bf110 were all that was nessecary.
We can look back and say "oh, but that was a stupid idea", however, we have the full picture of how things transpired, they didn't.
We can also examine the RLM's indifference to the He178's trials and the He280's "brush off" and jump up and down and yell "dumbasses!!" all we want, but the decisions were made based on the knowledge of the day. Propellor aircraft were tried and proven, this "jet thing" was some weird novelty that *might* prove useful someday.

As I mentioned in another thread a while back, the stuff we know about WWII today, would have us shot as spies, if we were to go back to the war years.

 

[Schweik]

I find it interesting that you strongly press your position, yet don't already know this. First, see Bowyer and Sharp Mosquito, pages 203-205. The first mission was late May 1942, the last was late May 1943, with nearly all the May '43 missions being dusk (not daylight) raids. Somewhere in my four linear feet of reports on US evaluations of the Mosquito is a memo noting that the RAF reported the end of unarmed Mosquito daylight missions as a result of increasing losses.

The US was very interested in the Mosquito for a variety of missions - I did a short article on the subject in Airfix Modelworld back in 2017, though I can't find my copy at the moment.

Finally, don't forget that the first very-long-range P-51 escort missions didn't come in any numbers until 1944. Large numbers of unarmed, unescorted Mosquitos did not stand any better chance than heavily armed B-17s and B-24s.

It's been an intersting discussion, but this just wasn't going to happen - and if it had happened, the results weren't gonna be pretty...

Cheers,



Dana

You can draw whatever conclusions you like. I am not unschooled on the Mosquito, I have five books about that aircraft specifically and probably another 20 about air combat in Theaters where it was active within sight of me as I type this post. But I'm not arrogant enough to presume that I know everything there is to know. I am neither trying to shut down the debate on a spurious basis nor being more concerned with pretending I 'won the argument' than actually trying to explore the scenario in the OP and determine it's genuine feasibility.

Instead, since this discussion kicked into gear, I've read a lot of attempts to shut it all down on the basis of:

1) A Mosquito can't carry as many bombs as a B-17 or Lancaster therefore it's inferior in that role. (Because strategic bombing = high altitude and / or night time area bombing)
2) A Mosquito once killed civilians therefore it's inaccurate.
3) The Mosquito wasn't actually used as a Strategic bomber therefore it couldn't have been.
4) They couldn't build more Mosquitos because US industry couldn't manufacture wooden aircraft.
5) They couldn't build more Mosquitoes because couldn't make enough engines.

And etc.

None of these types of arguments are actually true. Some of them are plausible until you look deeper into them, but a couple of those imply a lack of basic logical thinking ability. People declare an end to the discussion, without ever really having one (I think there was one for a few pages, but then it was drowned out). I didn't spend time posting in this thread just to argue round and round and round. And I'm not going to do that for much longer because it's apparently pointless.

Discussion of the actual operational details of the outcome of Mosquito bomber raids (whether they were from Bomber Command or Fighter Command is totally irrelevant to this) could actually tell us, one way or another, whether this was technically feasible. I would be interested in looking closer at those specific details. You seemed to be implying you had some such data at hand, but instead you are posting about generalities. I'd like to know specifics.

When did Mosquitos start taking 'unacceptable' losses on bombing raids? Did these approach the 49% of bomber crew losses suffered by bomber command by the way? How closely does this correlate with the arrival of P-38s, P-47s and then P-51s in Theater?

What was the loss rate for different types of Mosquito (strike) missions?

What was the bombing accuracy for different types of Mosquito (strike) missions? Including both day and night-time? Do we have any hard numbers? I'd love to look at specific cases and add them up.

What was the main problem for Mosquitos? Interceptors? Heavy Flak? Light Flak?

In 1942, at the Eindoven raid, Mosquitos were able to outrun the FW 190s sent to intercept the strike, and were even able to act as bait to draw those fighters away from the other, far more vulnerable Venturas and Bostons. I am sure this would end as soon as a German fighter (probably a 109 variant) is available in numbers which can catch a Mosquito, because it's only real defense is speed - so I have no doubt that as faster fighters arrived, Mosquito units ran into trouble. But Mosquitos got faster too. And escort fighters became available and then got better and better range. I don't think it was so simple.

The main thing I call into question in all this is the whole idea of the 'bomb truck'. Just bringing 10 tons of bombs into the general vicinity of a target area is not going to win the war. The whole school bus analogy was brought up. I agree a Lancaster or a B-24 is a far better "school bus" than a Mosquito. I just don't think a "school bus" is a good weapon for destroying strategic, operational, or tactical targets, except in very special cases.

 

[JDCAVE]

I'm presently going through the ORBs for 433 Squadron for 1944 working on a little (actually large) project. The lowest reported altitude so far was 2,500 feet on the evening of June 6/7. Here is what is reported as the bombing altitudes for the missions in January through March, 1944:

Jan. 20/21 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 21,700
Jan. 21/22 vs. Magdeburg = 20,000 to 22,500
Jan. 28/29 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 22,500
Jan. 30/31 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 21,000
Feb. 16/17 vs. Berlin = 20,000 to 23,500
Feb. 19/20 vs. Leipzig = 21,000 to 25,000 (I suspect the latter is a typo)
Feb. 20/21 vs. Stuttgart = 21,000 to 23,000
Feb. 24/25 vs. Schweinfurt = 21,000 to 23,400
Feb. 25/26 vs. Augsburg = 21,500 to 22,000
Mar. 6/7 vs. Trappes = 13,000 to 13,600
Mar. 7/8 vs. Le Mans = 13,000
Mar. 13/14 vs. Le Mans = 11,500 to 12,000
Mar. 15/16 vs. Stuttgart = 20,000 to 23,500
Mar. 18/19 vs. Frankfurt = 20,000 to 22,100
Mar. 24/25 vs. Berlin = 19,500 to 22,000
Mar 26/27 vs. Essen = 19,300 to 22,000
Mar. 30/31 vs. Nuremberg = 21,000 to 22,000



Yes, that was certainly a part of the consideration as well..

Thanks. I have the following heights for dad's sorties, Lancaster X aircraft, 419 Squadron:

Sept 27, 1944 Bottrop, 16,500 (daylight, dad 2nd pilot)
Oct 4, Bergen 12,500 (daylight)
Oct 6, Dortmund 20,000
Oct 9, Bochum 17,500
Oct 14, Duisburg (am) 20,000
Oct 14, Duisburg (pm) 21,000
Nov 1, Oberhausen 19,500
Nov 2, Düsseldorf 20,500
Nov 4, Bochum 18,500
Nov 6, Gelsenkirchen 19,000 (daylight)
Nov 18, Munster 18,000 (daylight)
Nov 27, Neuss 18,000
Dec 2, Hagen 18,000
Dec 4, Karlsruhe 17,000
Dec 5, Soest 19,000
Dec 17, Duisburg 19,500
Dec 20, Cologne, NOET.
Dec 29, Scholven Buer 17,000.
Feb 7, 1945 Goch did not bomb, most a/c abortive, those 4 crews that bombed, did so at 5-11,500'.
Feb 13, Dresden 18,500
Feb 20, Dortmund 17,700
Feb 21, Duisburg 18,000
Feb 23, Pforzheim 8,500
Feb 27, Mainz (daylight) 18,000
Mar 1, Mannheim (daylight) 18,500
Mar 2, Cologne (daylight) 18,500
Mar 5, Chemnitz 16,000
Mar 7, Dessau 14,000
Mar 11, Essen (daylight) 18,400
Mar 24, Mathias Stinnes (daylight) 17,000
Mar 25, Hannover (daylight) 17,200

Only 4/29 operations at 20,000 or higher. 2 ops, did not bomb.

 

[GrauGeist]

You can draw whatever conclusions you like. I am not unschooled on the Mosquito, I have five books about that aircraft specifically and probably another 20 about air combat in Theaters where it was active within sight of me as I type this post. But I'm not arrogant enough to presume that I know everything there is to know. I am neither trying to shut down the debate on a spurious basis nor being more concerned with pretending I 'won the argument' than actually trying to explore the scenario in the OP and determine it's genuine feasibility.

Instead, since this discussion kicked into gear, I've read a lot of attempts to shut it all down on the basis of:

1) A Mosquito can't carry as many bombs as a B-17 or Lancaster therefore it's inferior in that role. (Because strategic bombing = high altitude and / or night time area bombing)
2) A Mosquito once killed civilians therefore it's inaccurate.
3) The Mosquito wasn't actually used as a Strategic bomber therefore it couldn't have been.
4) They couldn't build more Mosquitos because US industry couldn't manufacture wooden aircraft.
5) They couldn't build more Mosquitoes because couldn't make enough engines.

And etc.

None of these types of arguments are actually true. Some of them are plausible until you look deeper into them, but a couple of those imply a lack of basic logical thinking ability. People declare an end to the discussion, without ever really having one (I think there was one for a few pages, but then it was drowned out). I didn't spend time posting in this thread just to argue round and round and round. And I'm not going to do that for much longer because it's apparently pointless.

Discussion of the actual operational details of the outcome of Mosquito bomber raids (whether they were from Bomber Command or Fighter Command is totally irrelevant to this) could actually tell us, one way or another, whether this was technically feasible. I would be interested in looking closer at those specific details. You seemed to be implying you had some such data at hand, but instead you are posting about generalities. I'd like to know specifics.

When did Mosquitos start taking 'unacceptable' losses on bombing raids? Did these approach the 49% of bomber crew losses suffered by bomber command by the way? How closely does this correlate with the arrival of P-38s, P-47s and then P-51s in Theater?

What was the loss rate for different types of Mosquito (strike) missions?

What was the bombing accuracy for different types of Mosquito (strike) missions? Including both day and night-time? Do we have any hard numbers? I'd love to look at specific cases and add them up.

What was the main problem for Mosquitos? Interceptors? Heavy Flak? Light Flak?

In 1942, at the Eindoven raid, Mosquitos were able to outrun the FW 190s sent to intercept the strike, and were even able to act as bait to draw those fighters away from the other, far more vulnerable fighters. I am sure this would end as soon as a German fighter is available in numbers which can catch a Mosquito, because it's defense is speed - so I have no doubt that as faster fighters arrived, Mosquito units ran into trouble. But Mosquitos got faster too. And escort fighters became available and then got better and better range.

The main thing I call into question in all this is the whole idea of the 'bomb truck'. Just bringing 10 tons of bombs into the general vicinity of a target area is not going to win the war. The whole school bus analogy was brought up. I agree a Lancaster or a B-24 is a far better "school bus" than a Mosquito. I just don't think a "school bus" is a good weapon for destroying strategic, operational, or tactical targets, except in very special cases.

Ok - if the Mosquito was such a glaring solution, why didn't they?

 

[Schweik]

I would warn against falling for the myth that the only thing Bomber Command did was incendiary raids on German cities. The peak year for incendiary bomb usage, both in terms of percentage of bombs dropped and actual tonnage, was 1943. In actuality Bomber Command expended plenty of ordnance against military targets.

For 1944-45, of the total tonnage dropped in Combined Bomber Offensive, Bomber Command, for example, accounted for 14.9% of the tonnage dropped on airfields; 64.4% of the tonnage dropped on V-weapon installations; 42.4% of the tonnage dropped on oil targets; and 28.0% of the tonnage dropped on transportation targets.

While towns and urban areas accounted for 78.2% of the tonnage dropped by Bomber Command in 1942, and 83.5% in 1943, it fell to 35.7% in 1944 and 36.8% in 1945.


Certainly, Bomber Command could have done more in regards to going after industrial targets, but for that to happen, you either need to change Harris' mind about 'panacea' attacks (highly unlikely), or else replace him.

I never fell for any such 'myth', I first read Webster and Franklin's "The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany" when I was a kid back in the 70s and I used to pour over every book I could find on WW2 aviation in libraries as a youngster, and now that I'm an old man I have bought quite a few. I'm not a Mosquito 'fan boy'. I'm about as interested in WW2 aircraft as anyone else here, which is to say a lot, but I don't really play favorites. You always get accused of that if you point out something did better than once expected or overturn some persistent myth. Or challenge a cherished idea, per the OP.

"De-housing" was a policy. That is what I was criticizing. It started out as a 'virtue derived from necessity', but I believe they stuck with it longer than they needed to. I think also, by the way, that the number of tons dropped on cities declined partly because many of the cities were already wrecked by 1945.

I don't think there is anything morally wrong in second guessing the decisions of 75 years ago or the wisdom of guys like Harris or LeMay. For some reason we are quite comfortable criticizing certain decisions that were made during the war, but not others. Who decides this? What is the point of discussing historical aviation if you are forced to pretend nothing could have ever been done any other way?