What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

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I'm sure many of us, at one time or another, wondered about Mosquitos instead of B-17s. I have. What if the RAF went with Mosquitos instead of the Lancaster?
Well you would have to replace Wellingtons and Halifaxes so if we include B-17s and B-24s and considering payloads lets call it a round 100,000 Mosquitos?
 
The problem with this thread is that (and this is the same with a lot of these what-if threads) we are painting a very sanitised version of the aircraft without acknowledging the bugs or the issues that might arise if such a thing as stipulated in the original post were to happen. It's easy to place an aeroplane like the Mosquito on a pedestal, but without context it is meaningless to do so - the Mosquito was not infallible and complications to the thread, like mission profiles, bomb loads to destroy relevant targets, casualty rates, collateral damage, production issues, diversion of resources etc provide much needed context to a simplistic and unrealistic scenario. We can "say" anything we like, but without that context it makes no sense in a real-world situation.

I know, being a kill-joy is nooo fun. :D
 
the last was late May 1943,
Hi Dana.
And replaced by the Halifax??

Scan0785.jpg


(Data box from Flypast)
 
SaporatRob asked I'm sure many of us, at one time or another, wondered about Mosquitos instead of B-17s. I have. What if the RAF went with Mosquitos instead of the Lancaster?

Then you would have to cancel all those operations like the dam busters and those where they used Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs. NOT a good idea

I note in Dana's chart that the Mosquito replaced the Beaufighter in 43 and B-25 in 1945 so obviously the RAF still thought highly of its capabilities.

Sorry did not use the proper quote system - for some reason my browser refused to activate it
 
Yes. However Oboe guided Mosquito could, in theory, have done so with accuracy. However, such aircraft typically dropped target indicators, rather than bombs. The "cookie" was not particularly aerodynamic, and accurate delivery suffered as a result.

Thread creep! Wow! 43 pages on why didn't the US build Mosquitoes instead of B-17's. The correct answer is "Because they didn't." It's irrelevant. The US chose the tools they wanted to fight the battles over Europe and it didn't include the Mosquito. Basil Dickens, the head of Operational Research, Bomber Command, notes the topic had come up many times during the war. Why not Mosquitoes instead of 4-engine heavy bombers? His answer, not mine, is attached. "It was bombs on the target per casualty that really mattered, and
there is little evidence of the bombing accuracy of the Mosquitoes."


View attachment 648859


The full document is available here and is a fascinating read, even if your lips get tired.


Jim
Schweik and other proponents: Would you please reread this post (857) again?
Dickens ORS on possiblity  of Mosquitoes replacing 4 engine AC.jpg
Basil Dickens, head of Operations Research for Bomber Command, and wartime witness of events, clearly had more insight, expertise, scientific background, experience, years of real time examination of far more data on this than you have! It was his expert opinion that the mosquito could not replace heavy bombers! It's case closed! End of story! Seriously!

The Commanders of the Strategic Air Offensive were not fools. Second guessing them is fruitless and in this case, just plan silly!

Again. The mosquito was a fabulous aircraft that had it's role. But it was not a good candidate to replace the B-17.

1,065 posts on this topic! Unbelievable!

Jim
 
And replaced by the Halifax??

First time I've heard that before (I blame Ken Ellis!); the two primary Mosquito day bomber squadrons, 105 and 139 remained operating the type throughout the war, the former being the first Mosquito bomber squadron receiving B.IVs, then re-equipping with Mk.IXs later in the war and the latter was the same, although they were tasked with pathfinding and fewer low level dusk raids, which were their specialty within the first year of operations using the Mosquitoes. Mosquitoes took part in the first thousand bomber raid and they were regarded as not a success in this operation, the units switching to the low level strike raids, which had generally good results, but with high casualty rates owing to flak and various other things, such as flying into power lines etc (!), but overall the loss rate was considerable. Statistics from the aforementioned Mosquito book by Dana above:

Between 31/5/42 and 31/5/43, 105 and 139 Sqns suffered the following, aircraft missing per sortie was 6.7%, aircraft missing plus aircraft totally destroyed per sortie was 8.15%, total loss of aircraft per month was a quite high 18.6%.

In that year there were 726 sorties carried out, from which 48 aircraft did not return. Of 96 crewmembers, 12 are known to have become POWs and 3 evaded capture.

Harris in particular was impressed with the results of the two units' efforts, but they attacked specialised targets deep within enemy territory and suffered for it. An 18.6 percent loss rate per month was unsustainable, despite the good results of their pin prick attacks.
 
And replaced by the Halifax??

To be shamelessly facetious, the only thing Halifaxes replaced were themselves. Each subsequent variant was introduced with solutions or partial fixes to the various problems than each previous variant suffered until a point was reached where the number of fixes resulted in an aeroplane that wasn't consistently trying to kill its occupants and slow itself down owing to its propensity to provide built-in wind resistance, in the Mk.III (a converted B.II Series Ia fitted with Hercules engines), which appeared three years after the type's first flight (!).

Despite this series of ill-fitting and malfunctioning parts, drag inducing design flaws and complicated thought processes that made up the Halifax, Handley Page produced an eminently interesting aeroplane, of which I'm quite fond. It's the real life realisation of Miyazaki's Howl's Moving Castle!
 
The Vulcan is Super Cool.
I saw (and heard) these two critters running up their engines at Elvington, it was like some Sci-Fi mechanical mating ceremony.
101450_800.jpg
 
Schweik and other proponents: Would you please reread this post (857) again?

Basil Dickens, head of Operations Research for Bomber Command, and wartime witness of events, clearly had more insight, expertise, scientific background, experience, years of real time examination of far more data on this than you have! It was his expert opinion that the mosquito could not replace heavy bombers! It's case closed! End of story! Seriously!

The Commanders of the Strategic Air Offensive were not fools. Second guessing them is fruitless and in this case, just plan silly!


Again. The mosquito was a fabulous aircraft that had it's role. But it was not a good candidate to replace the B-17.

1,065 posts on this topic! Unbelievable!

Jim
Amen...
 
The problem with this thread is that (and this is the same with a lot of these what-if threads) we are painting a very sanitised version of the aircraft without acknowledging the bugs or the issues that might arise if such a thing as stipulated in the original post were to happen. It's easy to place an aeroplane like the Mosquito on a pedestal, but without context it is meaningless to do so - the Mosquito was not infallible and complications to the thread, like mission profiles, bomb loads to destroy relevant targets, casualty rates, collateral damage, production issues, diversion of resources etc provide much needed context to a simplistic and unrealistic scenario. We can "say" anything we like, but without that context it makes no sense in a real-world situation.
Very well said - additionally it makes it additionally painful when some participants try to continually justify their position with opinions and assumptions rather than hard facts or fully researching the subject matter at hand. It is so easy to play armchair quarterback 75 years after the fact! (I think we kinda said the same thing ;) )

I know, being a kill-joy is nooo fun. :D
Blame it on me! ;)
 
I saw (and heard) these two critters running up their engines at Elvington, it was like some Sci-Fi mechanical mating ceremony.
View attachment 649804
When I was about 14 I heard the sound of jet engines I had never heard before. Definitely a military sound. I lived close to a naval air station as well as JFK and I would try to identify planes by sound. This was different. I looked up and saw the delta shape of a Vulcan. I knew it was one having seen Thunderball. First time I had seen someone else's air force in my sky.
 
When I was about 14 I heard the sound of jet engines I had never heard before. Definitely a military sound. I lived close to a naval air station as well as JFK and I would try to identify planes by sound. This was different. I looked up and saw the delta shape of a Vulcan. I knew it was one having seen Thunderball. First time I had seen someone else's air force in my sky.
There was one at an airshow at El Toro MCAS IIRC, this was right after the Falklands. It was sitting on the ramp proudly waving the RAF flag from an open window in the cockpit.
 
Right, and the notion here is that a bit more accuracy and a lower per-mission loss rate can maybe make that happen faster than all the "de-housing".

I would warn against falling for the myth that the only thing Bomber Command did was incendiary raids on German cities. The peak year for incendiary bomb usage, both in terms of percentage of bombs dropped and actual tonnage, was 1943. In actuality Bomber Command expended plenty of ordnance against military targets.

For 1944-45, of the total tonnage dropped in Combined Bomber Offensive, Bomber Command, for example, accounted for 14.9% of the tonnage dropped on airfields; 64.4% of the tonnage dropped on V-weapon installations; 42.4% of the tonnage dropped on oil targets; and 28.0% of the tonnage dropped on transportation targets.

While towns and urban areas accounted for 78.2% of the tonnage dropped by Bomber Command in 1942, and 83.5% in 1943, it fell to 35.7% in 1944 and 36.8% in 1945.


Certainly, Bomber Command could have done more in regards to going after industrial targets, but for that to happen, you either need to change Harris' mind about 'panacea' attacks (highly unlikely), or else replace him.
 
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