What if Hitler had followed the Luftwaffe strategic war plan? (3 Viewers)

[tomo pauk]

That's essentially resorting to "but it might have..." style reasoning.

A legit thing on a what-if forum.

There is no realistic way that that production of anything other than Luftwaffe needs could have ceased.

I'm not sure that anyone suggested that.

But the premise here is not between Jul 40 - Jun 41

That was the time where the decision other than 'let's attack Russia' could've been made.

 

[Airborne2001]

Oh wow, they did really want to only have a quick war in 1939-1940 to subdue the West, and then go crazy seven years later in 1947. Thank goodness Halifax didn't win the 1940 election.

EDIT: One should add though that we honestly don't have much of a clue of what the USSR would've done in that time, though I suspect Stalin wouldn't only just sit around and wait for too long. I wonder what happens in the Pacific too.

 

[Airborne2001]

Not disagreeing with that premise but I only see that as happening if the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain - probably by keeping up attacks on the airfields rather than switching to the cities and by somehow removing Churchill (a lucky strike perhaps).

Even if this scenario occurred, I still don't see Hitler waiting years before attacking Russia. If anything, he would have been emboldened to attack sooner, perhaps even on the original May 1941 timetable which would have helped the Germans avoid the Russian winter.

That said, this all still needs multiple what ifs to occur…and would have been devastating for the world.

While winning the Battle of Britain is very hard, Churchill dying sometime in May 1940-May 1941 is not unreasonable by any means. Churchill was regularly visiting cities shortly after or sometimes even during bombings, and he also flew to france a few times before it surrendered mid-Battle of France. There was by all means a strong probability that he could've died during this time.

We are in danger of getting trapped in an USM discussion. I am consciously avoiding reiterating the flagellation of the deceased equine but every serious examination shows it would have been a failure no matter what sixes were thrown by the Germans.

In a wider view the BoB was far more than just an air war and the British were prepared to use any means to thwart an actual invasion. Including poison gas and persistent agents. This determination can be demonstrated by the issuing of gas bombs and spraying apparatus to airfields and bomb racks to second line units and trainers. Essentially the USM would be the offering of a German army presenting itself for defeat in detail.

The German Navy had to fight hard and dirty to reduce the planning down from an uncoordinated absurdity scattered randomly across the entire south coast in a mobile maritime disaster down into a vaguely feasible major raid that might gain a local foothold and depend upon pure luck for any resupply.

Germanys severe naval inferiority was a major thing that doomed them. They couldn't get the Vichy French navy in time, and the Italian navy was not gonna leave the Meditteranean mid-war with the bigger British navy. None of this really mattered though with Gibraltar being in British hands.

There are several differences between the Germans gaining control of the air over southern England in the summer/fall of 1940 and the British needing to surrender.
The British were afraid of the German invasion due to poor intelligence although the RN was not convinced of the German ability to invade.
The RN had several traditions dating back centuries. Their job was to keep Britian safe dating back to the Spanish Armada. Another was not leaving the army behind. Not just Dunkirk but shown in 1941 off Greece and Crete. Saving Battleships and Cruisers when a German invasion fleet was at sea was not going to happen. What would they save them for?
British intelligence may have been faulty about German airborne capabilities. Their achievements in Norway and Holland were impressive. But German resources were far from infinite.
The losses of the Ju 52 transports were in the hundreds. Losses of troops were also high and replacing paratroops was harder than replacing normal ground troops. Ability to resupply by air was severely limited in reality. The sea borne invasion/resupply route was pretty much a non-starter in reality.
British were trying everything they could to cover all the bases, rather than just assume things would workout. Germans' ability to base aircraft on coastal airfields after capture by airborne troops is going to be minimal/impossible. German ability to use even light AA was going to be minimal. Having to deliver them by Ju 52 was possible but not likely in any numbers.
Any reasonable assessment of the German navy's ability has to include the losses off Norway and the damage still needing repair.

An extremely underrated reason (at least from my perspective) for why Germany couldn't do Operation Sea Lion (of course there were many more than this) was Operation Weserubung. The already much smaller German navy was weakened notably from this considering that they lost 13 ships of destroyers and both heavy and light cruisers. Losing a surprisingly large amount of aircraft to the Netherlands campaign didn't help either.

 

[SaparotRob]

Oh wow, they did really want to only have a quick war in 1939-1940 to subdue the West, and then go crazy seven years later in 1947. Thank goodness Halifax didn't win the 1940 election.

EDIT: One should add though that we honestly don't have much of a clue of what the USSR would've done in that time, though I suspect Stalin wouldn't only just sit around and wait for too long. I wonder what happens in the Pacific too.

Would Stalin have been done with purging the ranks? Not my area of expertise (as if I have one).

 

[andy1967]

While winning the Battle of Britain is very hard, Churchill dying sometime in May 1940-May 1941 is not unreasonable by any means. Churchill was regularly visiting cities shortly after or sometimes even during bombings, and he also flew to france a few times before it surrendered mid-Battle of France. There was by all means a strong probability that he could've died during this time.


Germanys severe naval inferiority was a major thing that doomed them. They couldn't get the Vichy French navy in time, and the Italian navy was not gonna leave the Meditteranean mid-war with the bigger British navy. None of this really mattered though with Gibraltar being in British hands.


An extremely underrated reason (at least from my perspective) for why Germany couldn't do Operation Sea Lion (of course there were many more than this) was Operation Weserubung. The already much smaller German navy was weakened notably from this considering that they lost 13 ships of destroyers and both heavy and light cruisers. Losing a surprisingly large amount of aircraft to the Netherlands campaign didn't help either.

Operation Weserubung is interesting because it led to the resignation of Neville Chamberlain after his claim that Hitler had "Missed the bus " by Germany delaying its attack on Britain and her allies.

 

[Airborne2001]

Would Stalin have been done with purging the ranks? Not my area of expertise (as if I have one).

This is a good question that I don't have the best idea of either, though I believe he was (at least mostly if not entirely) done by Operation Barbarossa.

Operation Weserubung is interesting because it led to the resignation of Neville Chamberlain after his claim that Hitler had "Missed the bus " by Germany delaying its attack on Britain and her allies.

Operation Weserubung was the warning to a good number of higher ups in the UK that things were going to go down soon in Western Europe. In hindsight, the operation wasn't the best idea. If the Allies had been able to do something like Plan R 4 then Germany might have gotten more countries in the Axis.

 

[GrauGeist]

Oh wow, they did really want to only have a quick war in 1939-1940 to subdue the West, and then go crazy seven years later in 1947. Thank goodness Halifax didn't win the 1940 election.

EDIT: One should add though that we honestly don't have much of a clue of what the USSR would've done in that time, though I suspect Stalin wouldn't only just sit around and wait for too long. I wonder what happens in the Pacific too.

Stalin was trying to modernize his military, how well they would have accomplished this in the time period sans Barbarossa is anyone's guess.

Would Stalin have been done with purging the ranks? Not my area of expertise (as if I have one).

Stalin's "great purge" tapered off by 1938, but still continued through the 1940's to a much lesser degree.

Of course, during the war, condemned prisoners weren't executed, they were sent to the front.

There was also the threat of falling in extreme disfavor for underperforming, both in the military and in the private sector (engineers, directors, etc.) that could see a person contract a serious case of "Stalin Flu".

 

[z42]

Both his ideology and rhetoric and the need for resources especially in light of the embargoes on Germany pretty much dictated that it would have happened as it did. Germany under Hitler got themselves into an situation that if they weren't growing through conquest they would risk failing and collapsing.

Need for resources was far lower with tanks, aircraft, halftracks and military trucks staying put.

I'd disagree on that. Especially between, say, July of 1940 and June of 1941.

The argument put forward in the book by Tooze mentioned upthread is that world+dog was rearming as fast as possible by the late 30'ies (partially or largely caused by German aggression and rearmament), and given Germany's raw material shortages and foreign exchange crisis, other powers were catching up. Thus the longer Germany waits, the worse their relative strength will be. Applies to the initial invasion of Poland that gets the whole ball rolling, as well as the timing of Barbarossa.

 

[tomo pauk]

The argument put forward in the book by Tooze mentioned upthread is that world+dog was rearming as fast as possible by the late 30'ies (partially or largely caused by German aggression and rearmament), and given Germany's raw material shortages and foreign exchange crisis, other powers were catching up. Thus the longer Germany waits, the worse their relative strength will be. Applies to the initial invasion of Poland that gets the whole ball rolling, as well as the timing of Barbarossa.

Germany's situation in early 1941 was not the same as in late 1938, for example. By 1941, they were either outright holding or were in very good (for them) relations with anyone between Portugal and Bering straits, and between North Cape and south Turkish border.
They were in better shape than Napoleon in 1811.
They decided that is not enough.
Sorta what Napoleon did in 1812.

If the Germans were in real fear that everyone will catch up soon, it is UK that needs to be dealt with so they (UK) does not catch up.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I stumbled across this podcast tonight, the first six minutes of which are germane to the discussion here (once you set aside their standard silly intro). The basic point is that the economy was overheating and this was pushing Germany towards conquest:


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wudeH4ALp0I

I think that German policy in the 30s was such that war was a predicate of their aims. Military expenditures are very unprofitable to the larger economy even if they prop up employment numbers and short-term GDP. But you can't just base such an economy in peace-time for the longer term when you're laying out resources but not getting return on investment.

As a result of both military conscription and mandatory labor service, the civilian workforce shrank, and so those military outlays became even costlier. At some point this policy would have to pay for itself, and military action was the only real avenue.

 

[andy1967]

Attached (I hope!) is a Luftwaffe strategic plan for the period 1935-1950. IMHO the most important concept in this plan was a two war sequence. I located this plan several years ago, and I believe the source was the USSBS archive files. Things have been very busy for me the last few years, but my hope is to go to DC in 2026 and do some USSBS searching as my growing belief is there is perhaps a previously unused cache of Luftwaffe documents contained therein.
If this plan had been followed there would have been a "quick" war beginning in late 1939 and ending in 1940! This would have been followed by a period of massive buildup to a Luftwaffe approximately 4 times the size of that in 1939-40. The details are not there, but my interpretation is the quick war was the acquisition of all western Europe, followed by the mobilization and integration of the captive areas into the Nazi state. By 1947, a mobilization of the "Greater Germany" forces would have engaged in a prolonged state of war lasting through 1950. I can only begin to imagine what was the goal of the "prolonged" war, perhaps world domination.
Please comment, but try to be somewhat rational and aware of geography, resources, etc.. Remember this is neither fiction nor conspiracy theory, but a plan that really existed, although it is unknown how far it actually went.
ArtieBob

I have been given this much thought and the only way this could work is if we move the 2 year time frame. If we start from the invasion of France and the Low Countries in May 1940 rather including the Invasion of Poland and the period known as the Phoney War. Hitler expected a quick victory over Russia. So by moving the time frame slightly this would eliminate the problem of Russia and the German offensive would begin in 1947 as mentioned previously.

 

[bf109xxl]

Would Stalin have been done with purging the ranks? Not my area of expertise (as if I have one).

Stalin's purges were not the most important factor in the decline in the quality of the officer corps. Undoubtedly, they had a significant impact, but first and foremost, they led to a suppression of initiative and a fear of making any decisions. The main reason for the deterioration in the quality of the officer corps was the explosive growth of the army, when completely unsuitable candidates without the necessary education and experience were appointed to high-ranking officer positions.
Kirill Meretskov, former Chief of the Red Army General Staff (removed from office for expressing his opinion about the inevitability of war with Germany in the very near future), and later Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Combat Training, was arrested on the second day of the war, and only the catastrophic situation at the front saved him from being executed. So much for Soviet absurdity.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

Undoubtedly, they had a significant impact, but first and foremost, they led to a suppression of initiative and a fear of making any decisions. The main reason for the deterioration in the quality of the officer corps was the explosive growth of the army, when completely unsuitable candidates without the necessary education and experience were appointed to high-ranking officer positions.

Exactly so.

I'd also like to add that while in especially older Western literature, and still in Western pop history, Stalin's purges get used as a MacGuffin for why the Soviet military apparatus somehow dropped greatly in quality, I'd question the quality of that apparatus before the military purges' peak in 1936-38. Perhaps I'm in the dark here and someone can enlighten me, but I've seen little to suggest especially from the air and naval side that they were noticeably more competent in 1935 than they were in 1939. For the land army I could see some argument.

Purges, by the way, had always been carried out in Lenin's and Stalin's Russia (USSR from 1922 on), and not just in the military apparatus, but in every level of society. They peaked in the 1930s and continued to a lesser extent into the 1940s, into the GPW (especially 1941), and picked up speed again in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and it seems like Stalin was gearing up for another round of larger purges when he died.

 

[bf109xxl]

I'd also like to add that while in especially older Western literature, and still in Western pop history, Stalin's purges get used as a MacGuffin for why the Soviet military apparatus somehow dropped greatly in quality, I'd question the quality of that apparatus before the military purges' peak in 1936-38. Perhaps I'm in the dark here and someone can enlighten me, but I've seen little to suggest especially from the air and naval side that they were noticeably more competent in 1935 than they were in 1939. For the land army I could see some argument.

The Soviet system was never optimal in terms of personnel policy - alongside meritocratic principles, there was very strong anti-selection based on loyalty. And when I talk about the deterioration in the quality of the officer corps, it doesn't mean I rate it highly in the 1930s. But in the early to mid-1930s, the Red Army still had high-ranking officers with experience from WWI who had received a good military education in tsarist Russia, and career was more in line with an officer's abilities and experience. As far as I can judge, the situation in the navy was worse than in the army due to higher relative losses of officers since the February Revolution and then during the Red Terror - there were practically no experienced commanders in the navy at all, but this is only my opinion, I cannot confirm it with figures.

Purges, by the way, had always been carried out in Lenin's and Stalin's Russia (USSR from 1922 on), and not just in the military apparatus, but in every level of society. They peaked in the 1930s and continued to a lesser extent into the 1940s, into the GPW (especially 1941), and picked up speed again in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and it seems like Stalin was gearing up for another round of larger purges when he died.

The scale of repression during the Great Purge (1937–1938) was incomparable to repression either before or after those years, although, of course, repression never ceased until Stalin's death.

 

[z42]

Germany's situation in early 1941 was not the same as in late 1938, for example. By 1941, they were either outright holding or were in very good (for them) relations with anyone between Portugal and Bering straits, and between North Cape and south Turkish border.
They were in better shape than Napoleon in 1811.
They decided that is not enough.
Sorta what Napoleon did in 1812.

If the Germans were in real fear that everyone will catch up soon, it is UK that needs to be dealt with so they (UK) does not catch up.

Having failed to win the BoB and thus Sea Lion being off the table, and no peace or even ceasefire in prospect with Britain, what to do? Meanwhile both Britain and USSR are cranking up their war production as fast as possible, Germany's position is getting worse and worse relative to the them.

Knocking the Soviets out would have given Germany vast agricultural areas, and access to raw materials like petroleum which would have enabled them to have another go at Britain.

Megalomanical, and ultimately suicidal, sure, but that's what you get with people like that in charge.

 

[tomo pauk]

Having failed to win the BoB and thus Sea Lion being off the table, and no peace or even ceasefire in prospect with Britain, what to do? Meanwhile both Britain and USSR are cranking up their war production as fast as possible, Germany's position is getting worse and worse relative to the them.

USSR is a friend (as it is possible back then) and a trading partner in 1940/41. Britain has no way to militarily challenge Germany in the Continent, even though UK and Germany are dishing it out in Atlantic and soon in Med and NA. Attacking USSR gives the Germany a thing that they specifically wanted not to happen - a 2-front war.
If Germany wants to up-rate their production ever more, they need to look at what they have under a direct and indirect control (manpower, industry, raw materials), and take advantage of that.

Knocking the Soviets out would have given Germany vast agricultural areas, and access to raw materials like petroleum which would have enabled them to have another go at Britain.

The 'knocking the Soviets out' is a hard part there. Everyone can loot the lands of a defeated enemy, defeating it in the 1st place is a kicker.

Megalomanical, and ultimately suicidal, sure, but that's what you get with people like that in charge.

True.

 

[Howard Gibson]

Exactly so.

I'd also like to add that while in especially older Western literature, and still in Western pop history, Stalin's purges get used as a MacGuffin for why the Soviet military apparatus somehow dropped greatly in quality, I'd question the quality of that apparatus before the military purges' peak in 1936-38. Perhaps I'm in the dark here and someone can enlighten me, but I've seen little to suggest especially from the air and naval side that they were noticeably more competent in 1935 than they were in 1939. For the land army I could see some argument.

Purges, by the way, had always been carried out in Lenin's and Stalin's Russia (USSR from 1922 on), and not just in the military apparatus, but in every level of society. They peaked in the 1930s and continued to a lesser extent into the 1940s, into the GPW (especially 1941), and picked up speed again in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and it seems like Stalin was gearing up for another round of larger purges when he died.

I have been told by Russians in Meetup forums that the generals shot by Stalin in the 1930s were just as bad as the generals in command in 1940. I find the claim hard to believe, but the Russian army in WWI was not very good.

 

[Shortround6]

According to some writers it was not just the generals, it was the colonels, majors, captains and down to sergeants.
And many of the ones who were left survived on party loyalty and not competence. Many of the survivors were promoted several levels above their existing rank/post and taking a captain (company commander) and making him a general (brigade commander) with ex lieutenants as regimental/battalion commanders is certainly not going to end well.

Some of them could learn but that would take several years which the Soviet army did not have.

 

[bf109xxl]

I have been told by Russians in Meetup forums that the generals shot by Stalin in the 1930s were just as bad as the generals in command in 1940. I find the claim hard to believe, but the Russian army in WWI was not very good.

The problems faced by the Russian army in WWI had no direct impact on the quality of the high command in 1940.
The first purge in the Red Army took place in 1930-1931, when many officers of the tsarist army who had joined the Bolsheviks were shot or dismissed. Some, incidentally, were later reinstated, only to be shot anyway during the Great Purge.
Of course, not all those shot in 1937-1938 were outstanding commanders, just as not all those who were not shot were untalented. But still, most of those who were shot had much more experience than those who took their places.
Tukhachevsky, the most prominent figure among those shot, despite all his vanity and enthusiasm for all sorts of technically dubious ideas, still learned from his mistakes and allowed discussion on army development.

 

[GrauGeist]

Uncle Joe also purged his officer ranks during the Winter War with Finland.

The great Soviet's encounter with the founding member of the FAFO club cost the Soviet Union quite a few high ranking officers in the Red Army and Air Force in spite of inconvenient German invasion.