Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
Meh, it's only war, what's two or three weeks?
What if the Germans had radar proximity fused AA shells?
- Thread starter Admiral Beez
- Start date
Meh, it's only war, what's two or three weeks?
When weighed against the possibility that the war in Europe could be over by Christmas 1944?
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
When you weigh the difficulties involved, promising a "full-throated drive to Berlin" (paraphrasing what Monty told Eisenhower) seems pretty unrealistic, and there goes peace by Christmas. You're not getting far without supplies, and that problem had already showed up before M-G. Not to mention -- the basic premise of M-G, that the Heer in the west was finished as a fighting force, was shown wrong. An offensive stalled for logistics, with a long, open southern flank, strikes me as a great way to lengthen the war.
Of course, I'm no field marshal or general -- and I admittedly have hindsight regarding German morale. That doesn't, however, mean that these errors cannot or should not be brought up, especially the waving-away of the supply problems that was already a known issue.
wiking85
Staff Sergeant
You do realize that the Ju87 was used exactly for that, right? And infrastructure includes much more than just bridges. Things like rail hubs, trains in motion, road networks, etc. were all targeted. And yes that is exactly what the Germans did. You might find this very useful:
My point was they over did the bombing of infrastructure throughout France and then advanced further than logistics could sustain and even then bypassed a major port near the front that could have solved the supply issue, since all the other ports were fortified and held by German garrisons. Also much effort was wasted on ports away from the front in Britany when the rail lines were too bombed to even make them useful if they were captured intact. Cherbourg was a special situation.
Sure, I was referring to them hitting everything repeatedly and then being flabbergasted that they couldn't move supplies up to chase the Germans to the border. Again the Germans were able to do it in 1940 without an issue, the US in particular seemed to love going overboard with bombing even when counterproductive.
Ok, then we agree. When I said not capturing Antwerp I meant all the terrain necessary to get it functional.
Sure. There is a difference between the necessary bombing to get the invasion to succeed and wrecking all the infrastructure they'd need to advance upon breakout. Of course they assumed the conquest of France would be a process of 12 months for some reason, so they made some poor choices, but as the review I had posted of a book on Allied logistics pointed out the NWE logisticians were quite inexperienced with combat operations and made some mistakes that could have been remedied had they consulted with the Mediterranean crew. Still, even there those guys were mainly focused on shipping rather than inland operations, though the North Africa experience would have been helpful to planning the invasion and breakout in France.
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wiking85
Staff Sergeant
How so? Also remember in 1939 the Brits had captured German naval radar from the Graf Spee.
Sure, but keep in mind the Germans were focused on aerial and land warfare, the Brits on naval. After all the KM had about 20% of German military spending and kept their radar program separate from the Luftwaffe's. IIRC the Brits spent about 50% of their war spending on the navy.
Again thanks to US help with development and production of the lab toy that the Brits had invented in early 1940. The Germans certainly messed up by not pursuing the cavity magnetron until late in the war.
Yoji Ito - Wikipedia
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
Yes, I'm aware of other bits of infrastructure, and have indeed referred to railyards and so on. I don't have the numbers to hand; how many bridges in France did Stukas drop? Trains, rolling stock, and so on? What I've read indicates the Stuka was used more in a direct-support role, while the twins worked over troop concentrations, dumps, and other tactical targets mostly. Not to say they didn't strike marshalling yards, bridges, rolling stock, but that combat support of the Heer was the primary mission of LW bombers.
I don't really care for your condescension. Might we dial that back a little?
Sure. I think SHAEF and others thought the French ports would all much quicker than actually happened. Even so, their concern over logistics shows in the emplacement of the Mulberries.
Again, they didn't want to stake the whole invasion to such a risky, last-minute campaign. They knew that the defeat of Overlord would set back the war two or more years, and so allowed for safer margins than you appear to think necessary.
Right, glad that's squared away.
Sure. It's war. Mistakes are made, in logistics as well as other fields.
I think they figured 12 months for France because the Germans had put up great fights in other theaters. I'd rather overestimate than underestimate my enemy, too. Seeing the invasion force safely ashore and able to operate starts with seeing them safely ashore. Without that, those intact bridges are nugatory -- or worse, used against you to push those troops into the sea.
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33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,356
- Jan 31, 2021
And the Battle of Britain showed that operating the Ju 87 without ample fighter escort resulted in a lot of Ju 87s being shot down. Dive bombers were quite vulnerable to enemy fighters. Hence the shift in the USAAF later in the war to fighter-bombers as those could defend themselves after dropping the bombs.
Monty expected the Allied Armies to cross the Seine and threaten Paris about 3 months after D-day but this was based upon the expectation that the German Army would conduct a fighting retreat to preserve it's strength and maintain a continuous front, hence the expected year long fight to take all of France. In the event Hitler ordered a suicidal no-retreat stand in front of Caen and Hedgerow country to the south. Hitler's order made the front static for about 2 months before the inevitable German collapse after which began a rapid advance for which the Allies were unprepared and, realistically, they couldn't have foreseen.
wiking85
Staff Sergeant
There is not a study that I'm aware of that has specific numbers, just some references in the book I linked and ER Hooton's Phoenix Triumphant. The Stuka had tactical and operational level bombing missions, but it was not a CAS bomber. It was designed as a precision operational bomber, per the James Corum book I linked.
I apologize, I'm frustrated with the actions of several people on this forum and I took it out on you. I'll be more respectful in my responses since you haven't done anything to me.
Likely, but a badly misguided perspective given how Cherbourg turned out.
I mean they considered logistics of course, but did a demonstrably bad job of it compared to their Mediterranean compatriots, even when things were restricted to near the beaches.
Sure and I'm not saying they should have, just not overdone the bombing, as that hampered their ability to advance later on. Granted they also planned on things taking a lot longer and the German reserves holding out longer.
Of course, I think we've just gotten away from the reason I was criticizing Allied performance in logistics in NWE: they usually hold that up as a sterling example of how they were so much better than the Germans, especially in comparison to Barbarossa, when the reality is much different than that propaganda. I'm a truth-autist on this stuff and so much propaganda has seeped into the narratives that most people have a cartoonish view of what the war actually was.
Indeed, but they apparently didn't accurately take into account German reserves despite their vaunted intelligence apparatus (which fell down several times).
Right, they were overly cautious when they shouldn't have been and were overconfident when they shouldn't have been and had Hitler not made poor choices it could have badly backfired on the Allies. That it didn't is their luck.
Again I'm not saying their logistical attacks nearly the bridgehead were poor choices, I'm saying the inland stuff was way overdoing it, which created massive problems by August-September.
wiking85
Staff Sergeant
And? That really doesn't have anything to do with my point.
wiking85
Staff Sergeant
All things considered that stand was the right way to go. James Holland's Normandy campaign book agrees. Where Hitler messed up was trying to counterattack once the Allies broke through and not retreating in good order at that point, which led to Falaise and a ton of unnecessary equipment and manpower losses. After all per Zetterling's study on Normandy the Germans inflicted ~2.5:1 losses in Normandy before Falaise (the Allies wildly lied about German casualties, more than doubling the actual number lost in Normandy and Falaise) and even then losses would have been substantially less severe had Hitler allowed an orderly retreat instead of Operation Luettich in August. Though that gets into what if-ery, the Allies would have been in an even worse situation overall had that happened, but logistically wouldn't have gotten overextended due to the intact German line.
BarnOwlLover
Staff Sergeant
Point is that dive bombers and similar tactical attack aircraft only work (at least well) when the side wanting to use them has air superiority or air supremacy. Granted in 1944 over much of the Western Front, that wasn't a major problem for the Allies. But they aside from some aircraft like say the A-20 and A-26 (which were often used as level bombers instead of attack bombers), the Allies ditched tactical attack aircraft that were purpose built for the role for land based aircraft in favor of fast bombers (A-20/A-26, Mosquito, Beaufighter, etc) or fighters modified for CAS and attack aircraft.
But yes, the Allies in general had air superiority in the west, but even then they favored their bets on fighter-bombers and fast attack bombers mostly. Which in fairness could've been used in pin-point attacks, though German AA was still formidable when it was in good shape (a bit reason for that favoring in the first place). Not to mention that aside from immediate battlefield needs, with the exception of before the Normandy Landings, the strategic bombing of Germany typically took first priority (though the west has the 9th Air Force for the USAAF and the RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force).
But yes, the Allies in general had air superiority in the west, but even then they favored their bets on fighter-bombers and fast attack bombers mostly. Which in fairness could've been used in pin-point attacks, though German AA was still formidable when it was in good shape (a bit reason for that favoring in the first place). Not to mention that aside from immediate battlefield needs, with the exception of before the Normandy Landings, the strategic bombing of Germany typically took first priority (though the west has the 9th Air Force for the USAAF and the RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force).
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 1,271
- Sep 30, 2021
During the Overlord planning one supply officer wrote a parody called "Operation Overboard" with "The general principle is that the number of divisions required to capture the ports required to maintain those divisions is always greater than the number of divisions those ports can maintain."
A note on port capacity, it is the smallest of the number of berths, or the capacity to unload cargo or the ability of land transport (or barges) to move the cargo from the port. Then the local depots need to be able to sort and move the cargo out at the same pace, then the transport system needs to be able to carry the loads away at the same pace, then the receiving depots need to unload the cargo and return the transport at the same pace. When Antwerp opened it firstly jammed the local area, then the transport network as the front line depots could not unload the cargo quickly enough, they being used to the round trip time from places like Cherbourg.
Even before that on 20th November Eastbound trains occupy every rail block from the Belgian border to Namur, within a few days the entire Belgian network is so congested trains have to unload at the French border. A similar situation has developed in the Verdun area and V weapon strikes on Liege disrupt rail movement there in the last 10 days of November. The armies are keeping too much of their supplies on wheels and the forward depots are not able or expected to be able to normally handle the bulk shipments they are receiving.
Going back to August Sailings from the US to the ETO are cut by 60 per month due to the backlog of ships awaiting discharge in theatre, the pressing need is for more deep water berths to take the ocean going ships and release the coastal shipping needed elsewhere.
In early September there are over 100 liberty ships in theatre awaiting unloading and the tonnage unloaded was greater than the capacity to clear the cargo from the ports. At the end of September there are now around 280 merchant ships assigned to the theatre, around 160 waiting their turn to unload.
In early October, in view of the large backlog of unloaded ships in theatre, sailings from the US for the next three months would be programmed on the basis of demonstrated ability to unload the ships.
In mid November, a concerted drive is launched to increase ship unloading rates, the hatch rate is raised from 327 tons per ship per day in November to 457 tons per ship per day in December.
On 22nd November General MacArthur is informed the President had been notified of the world wide shipping shortage and a directive has been issued to the Joint Chiefs to take immediate action on the problem. MacArthur has around 476 ships, Europe has around 220. In Europe's case the number of ships awaiting discharge has begun to fall, down to around 130 from 190 at the start of the month, but this was mainly due to the decrease in the ships being sent. Even so the US orders 61 MTV ships to be returned to the US to help ease the shipping shortage
On 30th November start of ABC (American British Canadian) or (Antwerp Brussels Charleroi) run from Antwerp, around 90 miles, it will shift 245,000 tons of cargo using only 4/5 ton truck tractors with 10 ton semi trailers before it ends on 26th March, using an average of 16 truck companies, 2 of which do nothing but shuttle between the port and the truck marshalling yard, there are 2 trailers for each prime mover, one in use, one being loaded or unloaded. Average truck load 8.7 tons and average round trip 20 hours. Some 23,000 tons of supply has been forwarded east of the Seine by rail but large rail jams have been formed often due to a desire by the combat units to keep the supplies on wheels, instead of in dumps. V weapon strikes on Liege are a problem since it is a rail bottleneck. There are some 11,000 loaded freight cars east of Paris awaiting unloading.
By mid December Antwerp is handling over 30 US Army ships at a time, taking around 10 to 11 days to turn a ship around, unloading around 19,000 tons/day but clearances from the port are lower and 85,000 tons have accumulated, when a backlog of 15,000 tons was considered to hamper operations.
The allies lost nearly 3 weeks between the capture of Antwerp and assigning priority to open the approaches. The German surrender in the area allowed the port to open 3 weeks later, and the US Army took around another 3-4 weeks to have the supply system running smoothly, after which the build up of supplies and troops could commence for the next attack. In the roughly 17 weeks September to December 1944 the US landed 23 divisions in France (including the returning airborne ones), starting things 3 weeks earlier is starting things with 1 less corps.
In summary,
1) The US Army had never done supply of such a large force so far from ports in the 20th century, since much WWI supply came from the British and French
2) Key support units arrived late, with problems with training and equipment.
3) The plan never had the concept of pursuit operations.
4) The Army had a theoretical system that inevitably had problems, then add inexperience, by both the combat and supply troops.
5) The breakdown in September 1944 was to an extent deliberate, the armies went as far as they could, but no one expected the system to "shatter" as the shortages created negative feedback loops, making things worse.
6) The September problems were compounded by the expected loss and consumption rates being set too low.
7) The distance from the US meant problems could not be fixed quickly, and the need for proof meant there was further delay before increases in production were ordered. Even in the 1944 US it was hard to obtain extra production or manpower.
8) The "mood" also helped, sticking to the original supply plan during the pursuit, assuming it would soon stop, and then sticking to the improvised "pursuit" system after the pursuit had stopped, assuming it would soon start again.
9) The performance in February to May 1945 indicates the army had learnt many lessons. It appears 21st Army Group did better in 1944.
About early September the supply officers do a calculation on a thrust to Berlin, assuming the allies make the Rhine by 15 September and Antwerp is open at 1,500 tons per day. It needed 489 truck companies, 347 were available, stripping other divisions would give 181 truck companies, airlift would give the equivalent of another 60 truck companies (2,000 tons/day). Three British and 2 US corps, 3 to Berlin, 1 to Bremen-Hamburg, and 1 to Frankfurt-Magdeburg. Ten US divisions (1 in Paris, 9 in Normandy) grounded and 12 "quiescent" (6 in Brittany, 3 in Frankfurt-Metz, 3 in Rhur-Koblenz). One US corps would make it to Berlin on reduced rations.
As of 25 July the US First Army in Normandy, the only US ground forces then operational against the Germans in Normandy, had 269,560 effectives and 1,102 M4 75mm, 168 M4 76mm, and 66 M4 105mm Medium Tanks, and 712 M5 Light Tanks operational, 2,048 tanks operational in total. British, Commonwealth, and Allied forces operational totalled 422,983 as of 0600 26 July, with another 105,061 LOC troops present, plus about 2,900 tanks of all types operational (as of 25 July). Thus about 700,000 combat troops committed. German operational forces as of 23 July may be estimated as the roughly 490,000 committed, less about 99,000 casualties so roughly 391,000. The actual "odds" were about 1.79:1 in terms of manpower, but were higher in terms of armour and artillery support.
If you want to count total force potential the short version of what the German strength in Ob. West was.
Two data points exist for 1 March:
Müller-Hillebrand, "Ration Strength in the West", 1 March 1944
Heer: 806,927
SS and Police: 85,230
Foreign volunteers, mainly Eastern troops: 61,439
Allies: 13,631
Luftwaffe: 337,140
Kriegsmarine: 96,084
Wehrmachtgefolge: 145,611
Total: 1,546,062
and
MGFA, "Ration Strength Report Heeresgruppe B", 1 March 1944
Heer: 865,180
Luftwaffe: 326,350
Marine: 102,180
SS and Police: 102,610
Sonstige: 91,110
Wehrmachtgefolge: 157,210
Total: 1,644,640
The two are actually likely the same, but probably differ in what units they count (Possibly the first does not include all troops assigned to the Militärbefehlshaberen, but that is uncertain, Müller-Hildebrandt does state that the Wehrmachtsgefolge he gave includes civil servants of the Wehrmacht).
Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944, Jodl, Vortrag 5.5.1944, (referenced to BAMA, N69/18) gives a figure of 1,873,000 as of 5 May 1944 (probably for circa 30 April/1 May 1944). That indicates a two-month growth of roughly 229,000 to 327,000. Given there were no major withdrawals of troops in May, or losses, and some accessions, it seems likely the strength as of 1 June was somewhere in the range of 1.9 million and likely considerably more.
Using individual reports and estimations for Wehrmacht strength as of 1 June we can also derive an estimate that would constitute the lower range of possibility. Thus, the possible total strength of Heer, Waffen-SS, Luftwaffe, Kriegesmarine, Organization Todt (including RAD and NSKK) and Osttruppen personnel in OB.West as of 1 June and reinforcements and replacements to 23 July 1944 were:
Heer ~ 765,000 (est. 1 June)/728,000 (24 July)
SS ~ 75,563 plus reinforcements of 36,479 for a total of 112,042 committed
Luftwaffe Fallschirm-Armee ~ 39,476 plus reinforcements of 12,031 for a total of 51,507 committed
Luftwaffe Flak-Einheiten, including III Flak-Korps and other battalions ~ 94,444
Luftwaffe Flieger-Einheiten ~ 120,000
LuftwaffeBoden-Einheiten ~ 80,000-90,000
Kriegesmarine ~ 100,000
OT/RAD/NSKK ~ 70-90,000
HiWi and Ostruppen ~ 67,000
Again, the major differences are likely due to an under count of those troops assigned to the Militärbefehlshaberen, but it seems unlikely that the total was much less than 1.6-million and even that requires the disappearance of some 300,000 men. Note that the 880,000 figure given as of 1 June included Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground troops in Ob.West (OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt. Nr. I/18941/44 g.Kdos. v.7.9.44, NARA RG242, T78, R414) from which we can derive a Heer estimate of the same date of about 765,000. Even after losses, by 1 July with the appearance of II SS Panzerkorps the strength in Ob. West could not have been much less than the 1.6-1.9 million range, but by the end of July was probably falling into the lower range of 1.6-million.
You can compare that to the total Allied strength, which was American assigned strength on the Continent as of 31 July was 860,649, of which 563,638 were field forces, 88,251 air forces, 181,548 COM-Z and the rest "non-operating" forces, mostly casuals and hospital patients. So ground forces totalled 745,186. Add in 522,084 for the British Army strength as of 26 July and you get roughly 1,267,270. If you assume the RAF contingent ashore was about the same as the USAAF then at most you can add 176,000. Thus, "at the end of the campaign" six weeks in there were about 1.4-million-odd allies ashore.
A rough breakdown of the German casualty distribution, as taken from the German records is (US/UK):
1-10 June - 4,176/7,076 (allotting 1/2 of 352. ID each and 2/3 of 716.ID to the UK and 1/3 to the US)
11-20 June - 4,296/4,910
21-30 June - 23,666/4,278 (Cherbourg)
1-10 July - 6,496/Data incomplete
11-20 July - 7,750/9,729
21-31 July - 3,251/Data incomplete
Totals thus were approximately: 49,635/42,786
We may also look at the PW reported by the US/UK:
June 17,017/12,683
July 69,386/13,134
August 176,284/55,239
The total number of AFV (Panzer, Jagdpanzer and Sturmegeschutz) committed through 31 August 1944 with units and as replacements was about 2,336. Replacements sent in September totalled 781, and units committed in September totalled about 600. The account of losses varies a bit. One report gave 481 (as of 27 July), another 486 (as of 31 July). The third and most complete report by the Quartermaster General of the Army gave losses as 252 (June), 367 (July), 222 (August) and 1,801 (September, obviously "catching up" on many of the losses from August, but also including a type that never arrived in "Normandy" - 71 JgPz 38(t) - so obviously including substantial losses from September as well).
On the eve of NEPTUNE the US was "behind" on Lend-Lease shipments to the tune of some 318 (IIRC) M4 - ETOUSA drew some 300+ tanks from their theatre reserve stocks to transfer to the British, the British reserve tank policy required at least a 50 percent reserve stock (every Commonwealth armoured and tank brigade had an attached forward delivery squadron with 31 tanks and crews when it landed on the continent).
A note on port capacity, it is the smallest of the number of berths, or the capacity to unload cargo or the ability of land transport (or barges) to move the cargo from the port. Then the local depots need to be able to sort and move the cargo out at the same pace, then the transport system needs to be able to carry the loads away at the same pace, then the receiving depots need to unload the cargo and return the transport at the same pace. When Antwerp opened it firstly jammed the local area, then the transport network as the front line depots could not unload the cargo quickly enough, they being used to the round trip time from places like Cherbourg.
Even before that on 20th November Eastbound trains occupy every rail block from the Belgian border to Namur, within a few days the entire Belgian network is so congested trains have to unload at the French border. A similar situation has developed in the Verdun area and V weapon strikes on Liege disrupt rail movement there in the last 10 days of November. The armies are keeping too much of their supplies on wheels and the forward depots are not able or expected to be able to normally handle the bulk shipments they are receiving.
Going back to August Sailings from the US to the ETO are cut by 60 per month due to the backlog of ships awaiting discharge in theatre, the pressing need is for more deep water berths to take the ocean going ships and release the coastal shipping needed elsewhere.
In early September there are over 100 liberty ships in theatre awaiting unloading and the tonnage unloaded was greater than the capacity to clear the cargo from the ports. At the end of September there are now around 280 merchant ships assigned to the theatre, around 160 waiting their turn to unload.
In early October, in view of the large backlog of unloaded ships in theatre, sailings from the US for the next three months would be programmed on the basis of demonstrated ability to unload the ships.
In mid November, a concerted drive is launched to increase ship unloading rates, the hatch rate is raised from 327 tons per ship per day in November to 457 tons per ship per day in December.
On 22nd November General MacArthur is informed the President had been notified of the world wide shipping shortage and a directive has been issued to the Joint Chiefs to take immediate action on the problem. MacArthur has around 476 ships, Europe has around 220. In Europe's case the number of ships awaiting discharge has begun to fall, down to around 130 from 190 at the start of the month, but this was mainly due to the decrease in the ships being sent. Even so the US orders 61 MTV ships to be returned to the US to help ease the shipping shortage
On 30th November start of ABC (American British Canadian) or (Antwerp Brussels Charleroi) run from Antwerp, around 90 miles, it will shift 245,000 tons of cargo using only 4/5 ton truck tractors with 10 ton semi trailers before it ends on 26th March, using an average of 16 truck companies, 2 of which do nothing but shuttle between the port and the truck marshalling yard, there are 2 trailers for each prime mover, one in use, one being loaded or unloaded. Average truck load 8.7 tons and average round trip 20 hours. Some 23,000 tons of supply has been forwarded east of the Seine by rail but large rail jams have been formed often due to a desire by the combat units to keep the supplies on wheels, instead of in dumps. V weapon strikes on Liege are a problem since it is a rail bottleneck. There are some 11,000 loaded freight cars east of Paris awaiting unloading.
By mid December Antwerp is handling over 30 US Army ships at a time, taking around 10 to 11 days to turn a ship around, unloading around 19,000 tons/day but clearances from the port are lower and 85,000 tons have accumulated, when a backlog of 15,000 tons was considered to hamper operations.
The allies lost nearly 3 weeks between the capture of Antwerp and assigning priority to open the approaches. The German surrender in the area allowed the port to open 3 weeks later, and the US Army took around another 3-4 weeks to have the supply system running smoothly, after which the build up of supplies and troops could commence for the next attack. In the roughly 17 weeks September to December 1944 the US landed 23 divisions in France (including the returning airborne ones), starting things 3 weeks earlier is starting things with 1 less corps.
In summary,
1) The US Army had never done supply of such a large force so far from ports in the 20th century, since much WWI supply came from the British and French
2) Key support units arrived late, with problems with training and equipment.
3) The plan never had the concept of pursuit operations.
4) The Army had a theoretical system that inevitably had problems, then add inexperience, by both the combat and supply troops.
5) The breakdown in September 1944 was to an extent deliberate, the armies went as far as they could, but no one expected the system to "shatter" as the shortages created negative feedback loops, making things worse.
6) The September problems were compounded by the expected loss and consumption rates being set too low.
7) The distance from the US meant problems could not be fixed quickly, and the need for proof meant there was further delay before increases in production were ordered. Even in the 1944 US it was hard to obtain extra production or manpower.
8) The "mood" also helped, sticking to the original supply plan during the pursuit, assuming it would soon stop, and then sticking to the improvised "pursuit" system after the pursuit had stopped, assuming it would soon start again.
9) The performance in February to May 1945 indicates the army had learnt many lessons. It appears 21st Army Group did better in 1944.
About early September the supply officers do a calculation on a thrust to Berlin, assuming the allies make the Rhine by 15 September and Antwerp is open at 1,500 tons per day. It needed 489 truck companies, 347 were available, stripping other divisions would give 181 truck companies, airlift would give the equivalent of another 60 truck companies (2,000 tons/day). Three British and 2 US corps, 3 to Berlin, 1 to Bremen-Hamburg, and 1 to Frankfurt-Magdeburg. Ten US divisions (1 in Paris, 9 in Normandy) grounded and 12 "quiescent" (6 in Brittany, 3 in Frankfurt-Metz, 3 in Rhur-Koblenz). One US corps would make it to Berlin on reduced rations.
Given the ETO armies did not have to do much retreating in September/October 1944 and did several attacks they did not advance beyond supply capacity, they did advance beyond supply capacity to continue a pursuit or easily break the new German defensive lines, while thinning out over a larger front. And bypassing is defined as waiting under 3 weeks while there was one further major attack. Start of minesweeping operations to US army supply system is working well was about 2 months, except it was not thanks to the disruption caused by the Ardennes attack.
The allies were not flabbergasted about moving the supplies, they paid the price for stopping easy German reinforcement of the front line, and places like Southern France were not heavily bombed, that was German sabotage. The Germans in 1940 had supply issues, one reason for the pauses, they did not need to disrupt the rail network for military operations, the allies were not making much use of it, nor did the Germans have to move supplies from ships.
The Mediterranean gave a lot of combat lessons but fewer supply lessons, the two big ones, both from Sicily, were if an army comes ashore and operates away from the beaches an army supply system has to come ashore, if you expect to lose lots of landing craft you build them as one shot items, if the losses are low they need to be built more robustly as they can be very useful landing supplies long after the invasion, as long as there is a repair system. The Mediterranean did not have to cope with a steady stream of supply ships needing major ports repaired and working almost as soon as the invasion began, in order to fight German Army Group level formations, there were no major ports in Sicily for example, but plenty working in North Africa, the initial US army operations in North Africa were limited and had intact ports from the start. The US Army in the Mediterranean peaked at 9 divisions, initially using 6 in Sicily, the US Army in Normandy was 13 divisions by end June 1944 and 18 end July, after the 2 airborne divisions had been withdrawn.
Why does so much allied stuff come with this sort of adjective? Were the Soviet and Japanese versions also lab toys, when did German radar graduate from lab toy status? And the US help claim ignores the British designs. Pre war the British came up with radar designs assuming something like the cavity magnetron would appear.
The MTO never had to do pursuit operations and did a lot wrong at Sicily, with the supply plan contributing to the problems, lots of MTO lessons were sent on but not really absorbed.
At a tactical level the Germans in Barbarossa had the 1939 to May 1941 campaigns to learn from with almost the whole army having some combat/campaign experience. On a strategic level the German plan assumed the Red Army would fight where the Germans could supply, not repeat the Napoleon experience. The Germans lost the war by under estimating the task at hand, the allies in 1944 missed pursuit opportunities by over estimating the opponent.
There is that adjective again, and along with hey it was not perfect. What are the reserves being talked about?
As of 25 July the US First Army in Normandy, the only US ground forces then operational against the Germans in Normandy, had 269,560 effectives and 1,102 M4 75mm, 168 M4 76mm, and 66 M4 105mm Medium Tanks, and 712 M5 Light Tanks operational, 2,048 tanks operational in total. British, Commonwealth, and Allied forces operational totalled 422,983 as of 0600 26 July, with another 105,061 LOC troops present, plus about 2,900 tanks of all types operational (as of 25 July). Thus about 700,000 combat troops committed. German operational forces as of 23 July may be estimated as the roughly 490,000 committed, less about 99,000 casualties so roughly 391,000. The actual "odds" were about 1.79:1 in terms of manpower, but were higher in terms of armour and artillery support.
If you want to count total force potential the short version of what the German strength in Ob. West was.
Two data points exist for 1 March:
Müller-Hillebrand, "Ration Strength in the West", 1 March 1944
Heer: 806,927
SS and Police: 85,230
Foreign volunteers, mainly Eastern troops: 61,439
Allies: 13,631
Luftwaffe: 337,140
Kriegsmarine: 96,084
Wehrmachtgefolge: 145,611
Total: 1,546,062
and
MGFA, "Ration Strength Report Heeresgruppe B", 1 March 1944
Heer: 865,180
Luftwaffe: 326,350
Marine: 102,180
SS and Police: 102,610
Sonstige: 91,110
Wehrmachtgefolge: 157,210
Total: 1,644,640
The two are actually likely the same, but probably differ in what units they count (Possibly the first does not include all troops assigned to the Militärbefehlshaberen, but that is uncertain, Müller-Hildebrandt does state that the Wehrmachtsgefolge he gave includes civil servants of the Wehrmacht).
Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944, Jodl, Vortrag 5.5.1944, (referenced to BAMA, N69/18) gives a figure of 1,873,000 as of 5 May 1944 (probably for circa 30 April/1 May 1944). That indicates a two-month growth of roughly 229,000 to 327,000. Given there were no major withdrawals of troops in May, or losses, and some accessions, it seems likely the strength as of 1 June was somewhere in the range of 1.9 million and likely considerably more.
Using individual reports and estimations for Wehrmacht strength as of 1 June we can also derive an estimate that would constitute the lower range of possibility. Thus, the possible total strength of Heer, Waffen-SS, Luftwaffe, Kriegesmarine, Organization Todt (including RAD and NSKK) and Osttruppen personnel in OB.West as of 1 June and reinforcements and replacements to 23 July 1944 were:
Heer ~ 765,000 (est. 1 June)/728,000 (24 July)
SS ~ 75,563 plus reinforcements of 36,479 for a total of 112,042 committed
Luftwaffe Fallschirm-Armee ~ 39,476 plus reinforcements of 12,031 for a total of 51,507 committed
Luftwaffe Flak-Einheiten, including III Flak-Korps and other battalions ~ 94,444
Luftwaffe Flieger-Einheiten ~ 120,000
LuftwaffeBoden-Einheiten ~ 80,000-90,000
Kriegesmarine ~ 100,000
OT/RAD/NSKK ~ 70-90,000
HiWi and Ostruppen ~ 67,000
Again, the major differences are likely due to an under count of those troops assigned to the Militärbefehlshaberen, but it seems unlikely that the total was much less than 1.6-million and even that requires the disappearance of some 300,000 men. Note that the 880,000 figure given as of 1 June included Waffen-SS and Luftwaffe ground troops in Ob.West (OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt. Nr. I/18941/44 g.Kdos. v.7.9.44, NARA RG242, T78, R414) from which we can derive a Heer estimate of the same date of about 765,000. Even after losses, by 1 July with the appearance of II SS Panzerkorps the strength in Ob. West could not have been much less than the 1.6-1.9 million range, but by the end of July was probably falling into the lower range of 1.6-million.
You can compare that to the total Allied strength, which was American assigned strength on the Continent as of 31 July was 860,649, of which 563,638 were field forces, 88,251 air forces, 181,548 COM-Z and the rest "non-operating" forces, mostly casuals and hospital patients. So ground forces totalled 745,186. Add in 522,084 for the British Army strength as of 26 July and you get roughly 1,267,270. If you assume the RAF contingent ashore was about the same as the USAAF then at most you can add 176,000. Thus, "at the end of the campaign" six weeks in there were about 1.4-million-odd allies ashore.
The critical event for the British pursuit was the destruction of the Mons pocket, primarily by the US VII Corps, which ended German resistance in north eastern France, it essentially unhinged the resistance of 5 Panzerarmee and II SS-Panzer Corps, which had been outside the Falaise pocket, forcing them to retreat to Holland and Germany.
Does the 2.5 to 1 losses include the large number of paratroops lost not to German action? And prisoners? Also what is surprising about an average more experienced army usually on the defensive in good defensive terrain inflicting the larger proportion of casualties?
Adjective again, so when and where were these allied figures published?
A rough breakdown of the German casualty distribution, as taken from the German records is (US/UK):
1-10 June - 4,176/7,076 (allotting 1/2 of 352. ID each and 2/3 of 716.ID to the UK and 1/3 to the US)
11-20 June - 4,296/4,910
21-30 June - 23,666/4,278 (Cherbourg)
1-10 July - 6,496/Data incomplete
11-20 July - 7,750/9,729
21-31 July - 3,251/Data incomplete
Totals thus were approximately: 49,635/42,786
We may also look at the PW reported by the US/UK:
June 17,017/12,683
July 69,386/13,134
August 176,284/55,239
The total number of AFV (Panzer, Jagdpanzer and Sturmegeschutz) committed through 31 August 1944 with units and as replacements was about 2,336. Replacements sent in September totalled 781, and units committed in September totalled about 600. The account of losses varies a bit. One report gave 481 (as of 27 July), another 486 (as of 31 July). The third and most complete report by the Quartermaster General of the Army gave losses as 252 (June), 367 (July), 222 (August) and 1,801 (September, obviously "catching up" on many of the losses from August, but also including a type that never arrived in "Normandy" - 71 JgPz 38(t) - so obviously including substantial losses from September as well).
On the eve of NEPTUNE the US was "behind" on Lend-Lease shipments to the tune of some 318 (IIRC) M4 - ETOUSA drew some 300+ tanks from their theatre reserve stocks to transfer to the British, the British reserve tank policy required at least a 50 percent reserve stock (every Commonwealth armoured and tank brigade had an attached forward delivery squadron with 31 tanks and crews when it landed on the continent).
You're just forgetting one thing:
Radar-proximity fused shells implies a much greater advancement in radar technology - with much much broader - and widely more military advantageous situations than just shooting down bombers.
Think surface ships , u-boats, night fighters, intruders even bomber aircraft.
Just my 2 cents
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Maybe yes and maybe no.
the proximity fuse was a really simple idea.
Small, low power transmitter sends out a signal in all directions.
Receiver has to detect the return signal, from any direction. When the signal reaches a certain strength the fuse functions (detonates). Basically it was a range only (omnidirectional) system.
That's it. It doesn't have to know what direction the target is, or anything else really.
The problem was getting the thing to survive being fired out of gun and the need for zero maintenance for a number of months. And fit in the shell leaving room for explosives.
Just about all of the other uses for radar had much less need for compact size, or light weight,
They all needed much greater range. they often needed to figure out bearing to target. A lot of systems needed to be steerable. None used small batteries or battery packs.
Small, rugged vacuum tubes might have been an advantage but there was so much other stuff needed that saving a few pounds on tubes wasn't going to matter much.
The small tubes were not handling a lot of power and only had to last around 30 seconds or less under power.
Complex radar circuits that needed dozen of tubes might have benefited from small tubes but most of the time they needed more power and needed to last for dozens or scores of hours.
the proximity fuse was a really simple idea.
Small, low power transmitter sends out a signal in all directions.
Receiver has to detect the return signal, from any direction. When the signal reaches a certain strength the fuse functions (detonates). Basically it was a range only (omnidirectional) system.
That's it. It doesn't have to know what direction the target is, or anything else really.
The problem was getting the thing to survive being fired out of gun and the need for zero maintenance for a number of months. And fit in the shell leaving room for explosives.
Just about all of the other uses for radar had much less need for compact size, or light weight,
They all needed much greater range. they often needed to figure out bearing to target. A lot of systems needed to be steerable. None used small batteries or battery packs.
Small, rugged vacuum tubes might have been an advantage but there was so much other stuff needed that saving a few pounds on tubes wasn't going to matter much.
The small tubes were not handling a lot of power and only had to last around 30 seconds or less under power.
Complex radar circuits that needed dozen of tubes might have benefited from small tubes but most of the time they needed more power and needed to last for dozens or scores of hours.
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
I think his point was that if you've gotten to miniaturize radar to that extent, you've probably advanced your radar tech in other fields as well, with the knock-on effects that implies.
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wiking85
Staff Sergeant
Does it? I thought it had more to do with the ability to make porcelain microtubes that could fit in an AAA shell and be hard enough to withstand acceleration. Based on a 1947 report from a US army engineer about the German research establishment proliferation of projects instead of the concentration of resources badly hampered technological development. Also Germany just had a smaller electronics industry than the US alone, but with the UK+US it was a blowout in terms of resources and labor.
wiking85
Staff Sergeant
It isn't mini-radar, it's mini-tubes. Radar itself is actually pretty simple, it was invented in 1905: Christian Hülsmeyer - Wikipedia
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
They may have done better at times but they fired off thousands of rounds/fuses as quality control during production.
70% success (shell detonated) was minimal acceptance standard. Turned around that is a 30% dud rate.
The Proximity fuse was a very important feat, how important it was to other radars?
70% success (shell detonated) was minimal acceptance standard. Turned around that is a 30% dud rate.
The Proximity fuse was a very important feat, how important it was to other radars?
Thumpalumpacus
Colonel
You don't think PFs are miniaturized radars?
