What If...?

[plan_D]

Guderian had been studying the use of armour throughout the 1920s but he did not produce a full written report on it until the mid-1930s. Then it was publically produced in 1937, as I said. It's quite remarkable that if the Allied countries had read that book and taken it into account they would have known how Germany was going to fight the war.

Hitler was a smart man, no one can deny that. Germanys success was the work of the German General Staff though.

 

[Smokey]

Some of the Blitzkrieg tactics could be seen towards the end of WW1. Close air support of stormtroopers, and the emergence of tanks, in particular the superb Renault FT-17 tank

It is surprising that some old military leaders in Britain and France did not really seem to understand combined operations (for example having lots of fast tanks for a rapid advance, rather than slow heavy tanks). This led to disaster in France in 1940 and 5 years of war

As for Hitler, he seems to have been quite a cunning politician, and he understood the value of blitzkrieg, but he was a c**p military leader

Renault FT-17 tank
http://home.insightbb.com/~j.dapena/tanks/cipri.htm

The all metal Junkers stand out for their great strength

Junkers D1

Junkers D1
http://modelingmadness.com/scotts/w1/junkersd1preview.htm

http://www.wwi-models.org/Photos/index.ht

http://www.bredow-web.de/Luftwaffenmuseum/Historisch/Junkers_J-9/junkers_j-9.html
Number Built: 41

Junkers CL I
Number Built: 47

Junkers J.I
Number Built: 227

In late 1916, the demand for a durable observation aircraft capable of performing ground attack missions led to the introduction of the Junkers J.I. Developed in early 1917, it was the world's first all-metal aircraft produced in quantity. Eliminating the need for external bracing wires, the fuselage, wings and tail were constructed of Duralumin while the engine and two-man crew were protected by a nose-capsule of 5-mm chrome-nickel sheet-steel. Although this unique design resulted in a strong and durable aircraft capable of surviving the effects of enemy ground fire, the Junkers J.I was heavy, cumbersome and took forever to get off the ground. The only surviving example of the J.I biplane was sent to Canada in 1919 and is now part of the National Aviation Museum's collection.

There were also the Halberstadts, which which were very successful in harassing Allied troops from the Spring of 1918 until the end of the war.
http://www.wwiaviation.com/German_2seaters.shtml

Halberstadt CL-II
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWhalberstadt.htm

Halberstadt CL-IV
http://www.wwi-models.org/Photos/Ger/Halb_ClIV/

 

[plan_D]

They weren't what became known as "Blitzkrieg" they were merely effective uses of new weapons. It'd take me a long time to explain "Blitzkrieg" so just go buy Achtung! Panzer! it's not that expensive.

 

[Smokey]

I know, thats why I said some of the Blitzkreig tactics could be seen towards the end of WW1.

These are some of the missing elements:

-a relatively narrow front of advance
-encirclement and trapping of large armies
-distraction attacks to create a sense of a relatively huge front of attack and hence panic
-reaching and capturing the capital city as soon as possible
-excellent coded radio communication between land, naval and air forces
-dedicated tank escort troops
-superb close air support with agile fighterbombers able to carry a relatively large bombload
-tanks with a good balance of speed, armour and firepower
-motorized, accurate artillery which can keep up with the advance
-accurate long range infantry weapons (for example MG34), accurate mortars, rifle grenades
-avoid sending tanks into urban areas/thick vegetation
-all round infantry weapons (later it was assault rifles such as the MP44, earlier it was a mix of submachine guns and rifles)

 

[plan_D]

Really, man, go buy Achtung! Panzer!

"-a relatively narrow front of advance"

Wrong! The attack needs to be on a wide front, in great depth to avoid enemy flanking attacks.

"-encirclement and trapping of large armies"

Correct.

"-distraction attacks to create a sense of a relatively huge front of attack and hence panic"

Wrong. Blitzkrieg requires surprise but does not have distraction written into the doctrine. The false moves by the Wehrmacht in Fall Gelb were merely an idea of the German General Staff, not a part of the "Blitzkrieg" doctrine.

"-reaching and capturing the capital city as soon as possible"

Wrong, wrong, wrong! Blitzkrieg is based on the idea to fight over land, not for it. The idea is to capture/destroy the enemies army, not their cities. Paris was never an objective in Fall Gelb.

"-excellent coded radio coomunication between land, naval and air forces"

Communication is a vital part of any war effort. Blitzkrieg states close co-operation between every arm of service.

"-dedicated tank escort troops"

There are no "tank escort troops" what you are refering to is the infantry as a whole. Blitzkrieg states close co-operation and support for the tank from infantry.

"-superb close air support with agile fighterbombers able to carry a relatively large bombload"

Again, it's merely close co-operation. The supporting Air Force must be able to conduct raids close to their own forces. The specifications of the aircraft is something for the designer to consider.

 

[vanir]

Was hearing on Clash of Wings the other day very few air forces even worked in close conjunction with the army, Great Britain specifically mentioned notably. The USSR apparently treated their air force as an extension of the artillery corps but this brought about its own problems, though it gave rise to the prominance of the namesake to my favorite game, Sturmovik and it was an effective enough tactic that German soldiers apparently called the IL2 the "black death." Plus anyone who puts cute chicks in fighter cockpits can't be all bad.

Anyway they were also mentioning German tanks were in direct communication with individual Stuka pilots and thus could call precision strikes at will. The narrator calls it an early "smart weapon" in effect. I can easily see the point of view and liked the appraisal.

 

[plan_D]

I have never heard that German tanks were in contact with the individual pilots. It seems a little over the top, to be honest. What the German units did have though was an air liasion officer attached to every unit.

The RAF provided many close support operations, especially in Burma. So, the specific mention of Britain is just plain wrong.

 

[Smokey]

"-a relatively narrow front of advance"

Wrong! The attack needs to be on a wide front, in great depth to avoid enemy flanking attacks.

Sorry, I meant many attacks along a wide front, but each of the spearheads is relatively narrow, with ground units and aircraft on the flanks to provide protection

"-reaching and capturing the capital city as soon as possible"

Wrong, wrong, wrong! Blitzkrieg is based on the idea to fight over land, not for it. The idea is to capture destroy the enemies army, not their cities. Paris was never an objective in Fall Gelb.

I meant capturing the capital after the rival armies had been destroyed, surrounded and captured or had fled

"-dedicated tank escort troops"

There are no "tank escort troops" what you are refering to is the infantry as a whole. Blitzkrieg states close co-operation and support for the tank from infantry.

I know, I was referring to the Panzer Grenadiers, who seemed to specialise in escorting the Panzers

 

[plan_D]

The main axis of attack was the punch and the most powerful units attacked there.

The capital is never important unless it has some industrial or transport base. The only reason Moscow was an objective during Operation Barbarossa was because it had a massive transport network, it was a rail and road center. Capturing Moscow would have increased German transport while decreasing the Soviet movement of reserves. Cast the idea of the capital being important because it just isn't.

Panzer Grenadiers were merely infantry inside Panzer Divisions, that's all. They weren't any better or worse than normal infantry.

 

[Smokey]

The only reason Moscow was an objective during Operation Barbarossa was because it had a massive transport network, it was a rail and road center.

Yeah, I heard that apparently a huge proportion of Soviet factories were in the Moscow area, which seems like putting all your eggs in one basket

Panzer Grenadiers were merely infantry inside Panzer Divisions, that's all. They weren't any better or worse than normal infantry.

I didn't think they were any better than other infantry, I was just saying that tanks depended on infantry protection and vice versa

 

[plan_D]

Soviet factories were located all over the western part of the Soviet Union. That's what the Wehrmacht hoped to capture and crush; the industrial heart of the Soviet Union.

They are just not "tank escort troops" as you called them. They just support the armour like all infantry does. It is close co-operation between man and machine, that is all.

 

[vanir]

I'd never heard of the direct panzer communication either before seeing this recent documentary series, Clash of Wings. It's presented well, the German aircraft by Ekhard Tolkhan (sp?), and its assertions clear and unambiguous.

It makes good tactical sense, considering the relative lightness of Germany's early war tanks and yet their importance in Wehrmacht strategy. It also displays the nature of the often remarked, unusually close relationship between Luftwaffe and ground forces, when as you mention, other air forces certainly did provide ground support...so what was the difference? According to this circa. 2000 documentary the Stukas were in direct individual contact with panzers, who called pinpoint strikes at will.
"..it was in a sense, a smart-weapon," to quote Ekhard.

As for England, their British narrator asserts a lack of cooperation between ground units and the RAF, giving examples of different doctrines and strategic approaches directly in competition with each other. And of course we know the competition even between individual field commands within the RAF during the BoB, but this was played off well by HC.
I'm not challenging the exemplary and pioneering centralised organisation of the RAF, don't get me wrong. It wasn't until 1942 I think, Germany replicated it in the Luftwaffe.

However the closest direct comparison to such air force/ground forces closeness might be the USSR's doctrine that the air force was an extension of the artillery corps, but this left their interceptor, escort, bomber and fighter squadrons playing catchup to the very well equipped ground attack classes at the start of the Great Patriotic War.
As far as I know even the so named US Army Air Force regarded itself as prone to completely seperate tactical organisation from ground forces.

GB, the US, France and other nations were apparently often at odds between what their air force and army commanders thought was the best way to go about any given objective.

It all sounds very plausable to me...nice simple facts that all by themselves would work precisely as the historical example.

Who knows?

 

[plan_D]

There was always inter-service rivalry, that is true. Definately in Burma though the RAF had to be there when and where the ground forces needed them. The Chindits and Marauders would not have been able to survive without close air support and air drops.

In 1944-'45, over NW-Europe, the RAF and USAAF had aircraft circling constantly just waiting for ground troops to request assistance. Once it had been called six or so aircraft would swoop down to area and "give 'em hell".

 

[vanir]

I do somewhat agree with you D, although the 1944-45 incidence can easily be attributed to the total air superiority allies enjoyed.
It has been stated, "...their numbers were so great fighter-bombers literally had to wait in line to attack targets."
It may be equally likely strict air force targets took precedence over reactive ground support...but since some are just waiting around...

Would it be fair to say at the beginning of the war the Luftwaffe was one of the few air forces in western Europe which practised a determinedly reactive ground support as a primary objective, to good effect?

I mean I wouldn't go so far as to say the allies were stagnant tactically, throughout the war by any measure. Quite the contrary, I place many of them in precisely the same basket as I do Nazis and Stalinists in any capacity.

WW2 Germany definitely had the best looking array of uniforms though. Wide shouldered Field Marshalls in leather signing the VE treaty in front of cap wearing scots, it's almost a shame not to see them punch 'em in the mouth and then sign. Just kidding.

Whilst axis and allied powers are much of a muchness in political ends, I observe they most certainly aren't on the tactical battlefield.
It would appear we have fundamentally oppositional outlooks, you and I.

 

[plan_D]

It certainly would be fair. The Luftwaffe was based around the sole purpose of ground support. In fact, it was so perfectly tuned to that role that when it came to change to a strategic bomber campaign, it failed.

On that though, the RAF were one of, if not, the most well-rounded air force of the Second World War. The RAF served in every theatre, in every role, with every kind of aircraft and they did it well. The vast array of equipment the RAF had, along with tactical prowess allowed them to conduct any kind of operation.

 

[vanir]

Well except for sustained daylight bombing (which the US could probably only do by attrition anyway), and I think they got their precision bombsights from the US, but the bomber campaign was a carpet one...

Anyway you're right, the RAF was simply a better strategic organisation than the Luftwaffe. Due to the nature of the war I don't seriously think any military force involved could be understated.
You'd all be married to frighteningly muscular women named Helga and sending your kids to "white" school if it wasn't for the RAF. Now maybe things are different in the land where even the stones stand on end due to the cold, but I like my women slight and friendly.

 

[plan_D]

The wonderful creation; the P-51 kept the daylight offensive alive for the USAAF. It's something that the RAF never had in large enough numbers to secure a place in daylight raids. That said, by the time the Mustang arrived it had already been agreed; RAF by night, USAAF by day.

The RAF had bombsights good enough to do the job. The problem was navigation and the RAF soon developed aids to help them with that.

 

[vanir]

love the underfuselage radome on lancs.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

You'd all be married to frighteningly muscular women named Helga

Hey now my wife is not named Helga and she is actually small and petit like most German women.

 

[the lancaster kicks ass]

and yes i agree, the H2S radome is very attractive, and all our bombsights were out own, the problems with bombing accuracy came about from navigation, not the bomb sights...........