What is a strategic bomber?

The original question was what is a strategic bomber? You've classified the Lancaster as such above. I would agree, because a strategic bomber is one designed and developed to be part of a strategic bombing force. The objectives of that force are strategic, not tactical, and are enshrined in the doctrine of the parent air force.

The dams raid was a precision raid, but nonetheless strategic. It was an effort to disrupt German industry, an explicit objective of the RAF's doctrine for strategic bombing. Bridges, aquaducts, canals and the like were tactical targets, something Bomber Command was dragged kicking and screaming to attack in support of the invasion.

The precision Mosquito raids (Amiens, Copenhagen) were not carried out by Bomber Command but by a Mosquito Wing attached to the RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

The original question was what is a strategic bomber? You've classified the Lancaster as such above. I would agree, because a strategic bomber is one designed and developed to be part of a strategic bombing force. The objectives of that force are strategic, not tactical, and are enshrined in the doctrine of the parent air force.

The dams raid was a precision raid, but nonetheless strategic. It was an effort to disrupt German industry, an explicit objective of the RAF's doctrine for strategic bombing. Bridges, aquaducts, canals and the like were tactical targets, something Bomber Command was dragged kicking and screaming to attack in support of the invasion.

The precision Mosquito raids (Amiens, Copenhagen) were not carried out by Bomber Command but by a Mosquito Wing attached to the RAF's 2nd Tactical Air Force.

Cheers

Steve

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Like I said Stona it depends on how you see the meaning of the words. The Amiens and Copenhagen raids along with others against radio stations to shut down Goering could also be said to be part of a strategy against the Nazis and Gestapo. The dams raid had as much propaganda value as military.


Equipment changes the argument, without an advanced bomb sight and "earthquake" type bombs a Lanc would only ever be used to bomb an area. The mosquito was a light bomber which could carry surprisingly heavy loads. If it was in service in 1939 it would be a medium bomber.

pbehn said:

Strategic bombing was the product of the idea that heavy bombing could win a war. With the bombing of London by Zeppelins and of cities in the Spanish war there was an idea that this bombing alone would produce enough panic that the citizens would demand peace. Despite this not working on London and England in General it was still believed to be true. A strategic bomber is obviously part of a strategy but strategies change. American strategic bombers may have been designed to flatten cities, they were used to flatten oil plants and eventually to draw the Luftwaffe into combat. The lanc was a strategic bomber but was used in precision raids on ships dams and bridges. The mossie was a precision bomber but was also used to unload explosives over cities at night just to be a nuisance. Much is just a question of what the words mean.

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The WWI bombing of England was thought to be effective on several levels in England. In Germany the losses were seen as unduly high. Though there were other reasons –disarmament, success in Spain and such, this is perhaps one explanation for Germany's lack of motivation for a heavy strategic bomber force.

Balljoint said:

success in Spain and such, this is perhaps one explanation for Germany's lack of motivation for a heavy strategic bomber force.

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The Spanish experience reinforced the already existing Luftwaffe doctrine.

It had the opposite effect in Britain and the US where the efficacy of the bombing, notably the infamous Guernica raid, Barcelona, and also Japanese bombing of Chinese cities, combined with figures from WW1, led to wild over estimation of the potential for strategic or city bombing.
It was extrapolation from these attacks that led the British Air Staff to predict 150,000 casualties in the first week of a German air offensive against Britain. The British prepared 650,000 beds for air raid casualties, only 6,000 were ever used.

Cheers

Steve

pbehn said:

Like I said Stona it depends on how you see the meaning of the words. The Amiens and Copenhagen raids along with others against radio stations to shut down Goering could also be said to be part of a strategy against the Nazis and Gestapo. The dams raid had as much propaganda value as military.

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Can't agree with that. The precision Mosquito raids were entirely tactical raids carried out by aircraft of the 2nd Tactical Air Force in support of resistant groups in occupied Europe.

Attempting to kill an enemy leader doesn't fall into an easy category, but the method, like a sniper's, is tactical. It wasn't exactly a common use of air power in WW2, a handful out of hundreds of thousands of sorties.
It obviously could work. Was the successful attack on Yamamoto strategic? It's the same thing with a different weapon.

The dams raid was not intended as a propaganda raid. The men at the Ministry of Economic Warfare estimated that breaking all three dams would have a serious effect on hydro-electric power generation and the flooding and loss of water to canals, factories and homes would have an added deleterious effect on German industry. These were, and are, strategic objectives, hitting the enemy's means of production and hampering his war time economy.
I agree that the raid had greater value in propaganda terms after the fact. Reconnaissance photographs appeared on the front pages of British newspapers to emphasise the point, but that was not why the raid was carried out.

Cheers

Steve

stona said:

Can't agree with that. The precision Mosquito raids were entirely tactical raids carried out by aircraft of the 2nd Tactical Air Force in support of resistant groups in occupied Europe.

Attempting to kill an enemy leader doesn't fall into an easy category, but the method, like a sniper's, is tactical. It wasn't exactly a common use of air power in WW2, a handful out of hundreds of thousands of sorties.
It obviously could work. Was the successful attack on Yamamoto strategic? It's the same thing with a different weapon.

The dams raid was not intended as a propaganda raid. The men at the Ministry of Economic Warfare estimated that breaking all three dams would have a serious effect on hydro-electric power generation and the flooding and loss of water to canals, factories and homes would have an added deleterious effect on German industry. These were, and are, strategic objectives, hitting the enemy's means of production and hampering his war time economy.
I agree that the raid had greater value in propaganda terms after the fact. Reconnaissance photographs appeared on the front pages of British newspapers to emphasise the point, but that was not why the raid was carried out.

Cheers

Steve

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As I said its in the use of words. At the start many had the strategy of using heavy bombers to bomb the populace into submission or smash their industry. The bombers to be used are named "strategic" bombers, though I don't know when the word was first used. The british had a strategy of assisting resistance forces which had many facets. Raids against Gestapo head quarters were part of that strategy destroying records freeing prisoners and killing Gestapo members. The actual air raids may have been by a tactical force but were part of a strategy.
The transport plan was to destroy the rail system heavy bombers in massed raids on marshalling yards down to fighter bombers targeting trains and even resistance fighters blowing lines after D Day. That doesnt make the heavy bombers tactical or the fighter bombers strategic. They were aircraft executing a strategy.

The dams raid was as you say part of an overall strategy to destroy infrastructure hydro power etc but was a precision raid. If they had got the Sorpe dam then it would have been a major success but there was almost no chance of that ever being blown with an upkeep mine. That is why Harris opposed it its effect was mainly propaganda and involved the loss of many of our best aircrews.

Personally I think they should have stuck with "heavy" bomber.

I think we'll have to differ

The aim of any nation at war is to defeat the enemy and it will develop many strategies to do this. Strategic bombing was one of them in the case of the UK and US. To confuse other types of bombing (tactical, CAS etc) with strategic bombing simply because it is part of a larger plan or strategy, that of winning the war, is simply incorrect in my opinion.

There is absolutely no reason why a 'precision' raid might not be strategic raid. Strategic bombing and area bombing ('city bombing' or 'city-area-like raids' as the USAAF later called them) are not necessarily the same thing.
The USAAF laboured under the illusion for some time that all its strategic raids were also precision raids, as did the RAF though rather more briefly.

Cheers

Steve

"Precision raids" have a lot more to do with the accuracy (or lack thereof) of the attack than the "type' of attack, and even that is not phrased well. One might say that the decision to use precision raid(s) vs 'area raids' is a question of of the tactic to be used in pursuing a strategic goal.
Tactics and strategy both have more than one meaning and even if used to have one meaning can have several levels. One can find articles (if not books) on both grand strategy and grand tactics let alone lower level/s of strategy and tactics and authors sometimes disagreed were tactics left off and strategy began.
A mine field might be described as a tactic used in the strategy of a naval blockade as part of a larger overall strategy to deny an enemy raw materials to run his war machine on. Or is the naval blockade "grand tactics". Low level tactics is how you get the mine field in place. Number and type/s of minelayers (submarine, fast minelayer, slow or aircraft), number of missions and times/weather conditions.

The terms shifted in usage between countries and over time.

It has been claimed that in Jan 1 1935 Britain did NOT have ONE bomber in service ( what was on drawing boards is different) , capable of flying from English soil, dropping a 500lb bomb on ANY part of Germany and returning to England. Now perhaps there were a few that could carry 250lb bombs, even in multiple, I don't know. But just 9 1/2 years later the Avro Lincoln made it's first flight (9th June 1944) even if if would not go into service until a year later and the B-29 made it's first raid (77 strong) just 4 days earlier. What people considered a "strategic bomber" had made a a considerable change in 9 1/2 years. To judge 1937-41 bombers by 1944/45 standards and claim they were NOT 'strategic' bombers because they were not the equal of the 1944/45 bombers seems wrong.
Simply trying to build 4 engine bombers in 1935-38 to "have" an airframe you could up-engine in "what-if" scenarios later disregards the advances made in aerodynamics (air foils, etc) and structure made during that period.

Maximum speed: 200 mph at 5000 feet, 197 mph at 6000 feet, cruising speed 152 mph at 60 percent power at 6000 feet.
Range 3400 miles with 2511 pounds of bombs, maximum range 5130 miles.
Armed with two 0.50-inch and four 0.30-inch machine guns. A bomb load of four 2000 pound bombs could be carried. Maximum bombload was 12,000 pounds.
Data from Boeing XBLR-1/XB-15/XC-105
Wing area: 2,780 ft²
Wing has 60% more sq ft than a B-29 wing.

All strategic air forces wanted precision. The idea was to destroy an enemies means of production etc, not initially entire swathes of the enemy's cities. Both the British and US air forces started their campaigns with strict restrictions on what they could or could not bomb. The problem was that this sort of precision was unachievable with the technology of the day.

The RAF was forced to bomb by night. It was initially lucky if it found the correct city, let alone a specific target in it. Some crews couldn't find Germany.

The USAAF persevered with its 'precision' bombing, though it was much less precise than it hoped, right up until it was forced to bomb by radar. Radar could identify a city with a bit of luck, but certainly not individual targets within it. The city itself became the target by default. The USAAF had been scattering bombs randomly, and to little effect, particularly over secondary target cities for some considerable time before this anyway.

The greatest ally the Germans had in the face of the allied strategic air offensive was the European weather. This was only partially mitigated by Anglo-American technology in the latter stages of the war.

Cheers

Steve

A 'strategic bomber' is an aircraft with the performance attributes to deliver destructive devices in mass to an enemy target of strategic importance - if necessary, anywhere that target may exist.

Successful strategic attacks are when said bomber or bomber force actually delivers its payload sufficiently accurately and in sufficient quantity to severely damage or even destroy such target.

Lancasters, B-17s, B-24s, B-29s fit the description and context of strategic bombers because they were formidable weapon systems capable of achieving the objectives - although frequently failing to deliver strategic results on a mission by mission basis. Daylight precision bombing when the target was clearly visible in nominal atmospheric conditions with respect to winds aloft were frequently successful during WWII.

To dismiss the examples of the definition, based on spotty results when conditions were unfavorable or crews poorly trained or facing adversaries that defeated the attack is the same as dismissing infantry as a combat element incapable of achieving its mission.

Virtual elimination of Germany's petrochemical industry was achieved by strategic airpower by RAF and USSAFE. There was no other single industry more important to Germany's ability to wage war.

It was the lack of precision which forced a change in tactics, not strategy. The objective was still to attack the German economy and means of production, hopefully to force them out of the war. If this couldn't be done by attacking specific plants and factories because they couldn't be found or hit, then destroying entire sections of the cities in which they might be located was the only option open. When things went right for Bomber Command it could achieve almost unimaginable destruction of entire city sectors.
If this also led to the 'de-housing' and killing German workers, reducing their efficiency at work and lowering their morale, this was for the good.

There have been and will be endless arguments about not just the morality but also the effectiveness of the Anglo-American campaign. Leave the moral question aside. Who believes that an invasion of France in June 1944 would have been possible without it? Not me.
The Germans were not 'knocked out' of the war, but the effects of the strategic bombing campaign should not today be underestimated, just as they were historically overestimated at the time and during the immediate post war period.

Cheers

Steve

Indeed Steve, let's not forget the resources the German war machine devoted to deterring those day and night raids; fighters, AA, radar etc. Germany's resources were not infinite and they were fighting a war on multiple fronts, including over the Reich itself. The V-1 attacks against Britain in the summer of 1944 had considerable concentration of resources to stop them also.

Despite the fact that Harris was keen to promote his vision of the destruction of Germany through wasting its cities and the moral backlash this has suffered - at the time the mention of bombing raids left the cabinet a tad squeamish, particularly when Harris was so enthusiastic about it - the impact of seeing first hand the destruction that Allied bombers were doing in German population centres would have most certainly been demoralising to the Germans, partiularly those in the midsts of it. Look at photographs of the destruction of these places. German cities became urban wastelands and it was most of them that suffered the same fate. I'm not saying that the Germans were so struck by the wanton destruction that they felt like overthrowing the regime, but if you had to wake up to a massive night bombing raid in your city, you'd feel pretty glum about continuing such a war in which, although you are constantly being told that your side is winning, your entire city can still be reduced to little more than a burning pile of rubble.

Is the word strategic like the word "ballistic". When I was a child people used to talk about "ballistic missiles" all the time. I thought it meant big rockets with long range. By the definition few missiles are "ballistic" they are powered and guided ICBMs go into sub space. The expression "going ballistic" makes no sense at all even though everyone knows what it means.

There are similarities. Strategic has a specific meaning, even when used in a non-military context. Ballistic also has a specific meaning, everything from a flying missile to a thrown stone can be described as ballistic.
Both get widely misused
Cheers
Steve

Does anyone know when the term "strategic bomber " was first used. Was it a cold war term used retrospectively for WW2 activities?

stona said:

There are similarities. Strategic has a specific meaning, even when used in a non-military context. Ballistic also has a specific meaning, everything from a flying missile to a thrown stone can be described as ballistic.
Both get widely misused
Cheers
Steve

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That is what I mean Stona a missile is rarely "ballistic" by the dictionary definition. It is only "ballistic when the rocket motor burns out and if it then flies unguided. I think it just sounds like a good word to put in front of "missile"...... "Inter Continental" makes it sound even more serious.

Very interesting thread.

Until now I've always assumed a "Strategic Bomber" to be a Cold War term, believing it to be applied to a bomber that could strike anywhere in the world...

pbehn said:

Does anyone know when the term "strategic bomber " was first used. Was it a cold war term used retrospectively for WW2 activities?

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It is believed that the term "Strategic Bombing" came into being between the wars as anylists were devising strategy based on WWI lessons.

The first "strategic Bombing" mission occurred in 1914, when an Imperial German airship bombed a target in Belgium.

pbehn said:

That is what I mean Stona a missile is rarely "ballistic" by the dictionary definition. It is only "ballistic when the rocket motor burns out and if it then flies unguided. I think it just sounds like a good word to put in front of "missile"...... "Inter Continental" makes it sound even more serious.

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Ballistic missile was and is a term applied to missiles like ICBMs and those of shorter range to distinguish them from non-ballistic missiles like SAM's, cruise missiles or air to air missiles that 'motor' all the way to their target.
Many ballistic missiles are launched into sub-orbital flight at which point the motors have finished their job and the missile (or its war head(s) ) fly to the target ballistically. Shorter range missiles may stay within the atmosphere, but in both cases it's a valid use of the word.
Cheers
Steve

Ballistic refers to the trajectory of the missile, not its role.

The first "strategic Bombing" mission occurred in 1914, when an Imperial German airship bombed a target in Belgium.

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What date was this, Dave? I'd like to know more. The RNAS launched an attack against airship sheds in Germany in September 1914, but the attackers couldn't find their targets. On 8 October one had success. Reggie Marix flying a Sopwith Tabloid bombed the shed at Dusseldorf and destroyed the airship inside. The first bombing attack by the Germans against Britain took place on 21 December 1914 when a Friedrichshafen seaplane bombed Dover - attacking the pier thinking the Brits were having too much fun - "Var ist serious, no?" - and missing. Interestingly enough, on Christmas Day 1914, a single FF 29 flew up the Thames to the London dock area, but caused no damage and sent up to intercept it was a Royal Naval Air Service Albatros B II. The FF 29 was attacked by a Vickers Gun Bus however. The first strategic air raid by Imperial Navy Zeppelins was carried out on the night of 19/20 January 1915.