What other fighters could have been made available to the marines at Battle of Midway

[tomo pauk]

Good points, Malcolm.
Lending fighters to an airfield just to see CVs left only with token fighter force makes for a 'Maginot line'-style defence, not for maneuvering warfare.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Good points, Malcolm.
Lending fighters to an airfield just to see CVs left only with token fighter force makes for a 'Maginot line'-style defence, not for maneuvering warfare.

Yep, the perfectly flat oceanic battlefield may seem a strange place to consider the application of Napoleonic manuever warfare tactics but, to some extent, attack aircraft are simply longer ranged artillery, best countered by fast moving fighters acting as a sort of ersatz cavalry on a field with only the cover that clouds and weather may provide. Landmasses provide impassable complications to the manuever options and often determine a threat axis that may become a central consideration in defining defensive or offensive options.

Of coure these comments are prompted by having recently imbibed a liter of Chimay and their validity is therefore suspect

 

[pinsog]

What about leaving all of the US carriers air compliments alone and station 100 fighters on Midway, leaving enough space for a few B17's or PBY's for recon aircraft. When the 1st wave comes in from the Japanese Carriers, it would be overwhelmed by the islands fighter defenses, leaving the US carriers for the counter attack. Midways fighters could then land, re-fuel and re-arm, and head to the Japanese aircraft carriers at the same time as a US carrier borne strike, again providing an over whelming fighter force, sweeping the Japanese cap from the sky and allowing US carrier attack aircraft in unmolested.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

You'd want to extract the aircraft that were tenants of NAS Midway before the emergency buildup which shouldn't be a problem as both the F2A-3 and SB2U-3 Wind Indicators have the range to fly back to Hawaii. In fact, according to:

Chance-Vought SB2U Vindicator, by Jack McKillop

on December 17, 1941, the SB2U-3 had flown the 9.5 hour flight from Ewa on Oahu to Midway, the longest single engine overwater flight to that point. (What was Lindbergh's flight between Nova Scotia and Ireland? Chopped Liver?) Then there are the two problems already discuessed, which fighters and how do you get them to Midway? There are about 57 F4F-3 and -3A Wildcats on Oahu and an unknown number of F4F-4 and whatever else you can cobble together (USAAF P-40?) Having figured that out, your suggestion does appear to have some merit, based upon discussions among USN Aviation affiliated Admirals after Midway and during the Guadacanal campaign . There was a debate over whether one carrier in a multi carrier task group should be a dedicated fighter carrier. A Yorktown class carrier would probably be able to carry and operate nearly 100 F4F-4 Wildcats which could be apportioned for escort or CAP. It would not be subject to the same take off and landing cycle as the other carriers with longer legged (without the TBDs) attack aurcraft. The decision was made to preserve the flexibility of the existing carrier air wings. IN the case of the Midway battle, it seems this might be the best of both worlds. Treating the island as a fourth carrier (dedicated entirely to fighters) should be able to defend itself and weaken the IJN strike capability somewhat. Projecting air control over the IJN carriers during the phase when they are being attacked is attractive. the biggest problem I see is coordination. You'd have to make sure you arrive over the carriers at the time the USN aircraft are making their runs. At that stage of the war, projecting air control was not as difficult as maintaining it for any length of time. It should be said also that coordination of operations between carrier based air and land based aircraft was a persistent probem in 1942. There are probably aspects of your suggesting I am neglecting to consider or comment on...

 

[davparlr]

Success at Midway depended on surprise. Even if the forces existed, a sudden build up of forces at Midway might indicate to the Japanese that we were on to them. It was important that things appeared as normal war preparations. I would not have changed any preparation at Midway in excess of what was already planned.

 

[Timppa]

There were Navy fighters from the other carriers, some of which could have been sent to Midway, for example:
VF-2, 30 F4F (SARATOGA)
VF-3, 22 F4F-4 (LEXINGTON)
VF-5, 18 F4F-4 (Pearl Harbor)
VF-41, 20 F4F-4 (RANGER)
VF-71, 27 F4F-4 (WASP)

Source:
http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ww-ii/loc-ac/1942/jun/4-6-42.pdf

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Success at Midway depended on surprise. Even if the forces existed, a sudden build up of forces at Midway might indicate to the Japanese that we were on to them. It was important that things appeared as normal war preparations. I would not have changed any preparation at Midway in excess of what was already planned.

I agree. There was IJN recon of Midway and activity beyond what was done (which was risky by itself) would have raised a red flag. The IJN was counting on surprise as much as the US. I suppose an argument could be made that it would have been better had the USN convinced the IJN to abandon the Midway operation, but I think that is unlikely to have happened. They were looking to draw out the USN carriers recognizing their own naval advantage in a set peice battle. The IJN miscalculation was in not carefully considering what might happen if they encountered the USN Carriers while they had forces committed to Midway.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

There were Navy fighters from the other carriers, some of which could have been sent to Midway, for example:
VF-2, 30 F4F (SARATOGA)
VF-3, 22 F4F-4 (LEXINGTON)
VF-5, 18 F4F-4 (Pearl Harbor)
VF-41, 20 F4F-4 (RANGER)
VF-71, 27 F4F-4 (WASP)

Source:
http://www.history.navy.mil/a-record/ww-ii/loc-ac/1942/jun/4-6-42.pdf

That's an interesting document but it is inaccurate and probably just out of date not having kept up with fast moving events. The Lex was sunk at Coral Sea May 8 and took about 15 F4Fs with her to the bottom in addition to those lost due to action.

Ranger and Wasp are on the East Coast and Sara has left Bremerton, WA and is speeding toward Pearl Harbor arriving around June 6.

 

[JoeB]

There were Navy fighters from the other carriers, some of which could have been sent to Midway, for example:
VF-2, 30 F4F (SARATOGA)
VF-3, 22 F4F-4 (LEXINGTON)
VF-5, 18 F4F-4 (Pearl Harbor)
VF-41, 20 F4F-4 (RANGER)
VF-71, 27 F4F-4 (WASP)

But the USN wasn't yet in the habit of stripping squadrons from carriers, which gave them such greater mobility and reach. There was already one exception to this seen in same strength documents (as mentioned they took a little time to catch up with events, so see ones from a little later). VGF-12, fighter squadron for the escort carrier USS Copahee, not yet operational, was posted to Kodiak, Alaska in the run up to Midway though didn't actually arrive until just after the Japanese carrier ops in the Aleutians, which didn't extend that far east anyway. From August of course USN fighter squadrons were used in combat ashore on Guadalcanal when their carriers were knocked out of action, and in 1943 the USN sent specifically tasked shore based F4U and F6F squadrons to the Solomons to operation alongside USMC units.

At the time of the Midway Saratoga was being hurredly readied for combat, and arrived near Midway just after the battle carrying a large composite group including VF-5, VF-72 and elements of VF-2. Wasp had completed her second Spitire ferry mission to Malta in May and departed Norfolk for the Pacific, after overhaul, around the time of Midway. Ranger remained committed to the Atlantic. IOW the bigger strategic picture was than even USN fast carrier strength hadn't been wholly committed to the Pacific up to this time.

But yes it would have been physically possible to forward USN fighter squadrons to Midway. A few squadrons not embarked on active carriers were in Hawaii at the time the Hornet, Enterprise and Yorktonw sortied from PH (some later embarked on Saratoga), and could have been carried even as deck parks in excess of those ships' practical a/c complements to be flown off to Midway just before the battle.

Joe

 

[pinsog]

You'd want to extract the aircraft that were tenants of NAS Midway before the emergency buildup which shouldn't be a problem as both the F2A-3 and SB2U-3 Wind Indicators have the range to fly back to Hawaii. In fact, according to:

Chance-Vought SB2U Vindicator, by Jack McKillop

on December 17, 1941, the SB2U-3 had flown the 9.5 hour flight from Ewa on Oahu to Midway, the longest single engine overwater flight to that point. (What was Lindbergh's flight between Nova Scotia and Ireland? Chopped Liver?) Then there are the two problems already discuessed, which fighters and how do you get them to Midway? There are about 57 F4F-3 and -3A Wildcats on Oahu and an unknown number of F4F-4 and whatever else you can cobble together (USAAF P-40?) Having figured that out, your suggestion does appear to have some merit, based upon discussions among USN Aviation affiliated Admirals after Midway and during the Guadacanal campaign . There was a debate over whether one carrier in a multi carrier task group should be a dedicated fighter carrier. A Yorktown class carrier would probably be able to carry and operate nearly 100 F4F-4 Wildcats which could be apportioned for escort or CAP. It would not be subject to the same take off and landing cycle as the other carriers with longer legged (without the TBDs) attack aurcraft. The decision was made to preserve the flexibility of the existing carrier air wings. IN the case of the Midway battle, it seems this might be the best of both worlds. Treating the island as a fourth carrier (dedicated entirely to fighters) should be able to defend itself and weaken the IJN strike capability somewhat. Projecting air control over the IJN carriers during the phase when they are being attacked is attractive. the biggest problem I see is coordination. You'd have to make sure you arrive over the carriers at the time the USN aircraft are making their runs. At that stage of the war, projecting air control was not as difficult as maintaining it for any length of time. It should be said also that coordination of operations between carrier based air and land based aircraft was a persistent probem in 1942. There are probably aspects of your suggesting I am neglecting to consider or comment on...

I would solve the coordination problem by putting the US Carriers exactly on the opposite side of Midway Island from the Japanese Carriers. Just out of sight from Japanese aircraft. The Japanese strike hitting Midway shouldnt notice our carriers 40 or so miles away since they would be busy fighting off, say, 100 Wildcats. When the Japanese strike was over, our fighters land on Midway. Refuel and rearm and as our carrier counter strike flew over Midway Island, headed to the Japanese carriers, our 100 Wildcats(however many were left) could take off and join them, escorting them all the way to the Japanese Fleet.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

There was also the problem of lack of intelligence regarding the disposition of the IJN carriers. At the time, it was believed very likely that one IJN carrier division would provde the Midway attack force while another of roughly equal size would 'hide' somewhere to the North awaiting an opportunity to ambush the ambushers, should there be any. In fact that is one explanation for the Hornet's otherwise inexplicable sojourn to the North of Kido Butai. No firm numbers of IJN carriers was recieved throughout the battle until pilots (Thach) actually returned from the scene at about 1145.

 

[Dcazz7606]

I wonder how the P-43 Lancer would have worked out over Midway. There were about 100 P-43A's availiable with 4-.50's and turbo's.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

It would appear to have been a winner, at least in comparison to the F2A-3. It should have gained altitude superiority (if the turbo worked, see below) over the A6M assuming the pilots were committed to the boom and zoom tactic. 4 x 50s is adequate boom and the zoom from a perch near its ceiling assuming it could reach that high in the roughly 30-or so minutes of RADAR/PBY advanced warning provided would have been substantial. According to the wiki it had some problems including poor or mediocre manueverability, which shouldn't have been a great disadvantage for boom and zoom. However, I don't think mainstream USAAF fighter units had yet adopted the boom and zoom although that may have been due to the P-40Es limitations in that regard; also:

"Apparently, several AVG pilots asked Chennault to keep some P-43s, but the request was denied due to the aircraft's lack of armor or self-sealing fuel tanks. In addition, the turbo-supercharger proved unreliable and the "wet wing" fuel tanks leaked constantly." Also the P-43 was apparently short legged for a US fighter."

It's main advantage appears to be its high altitude capability and speed of which the latter was probably on a par with the P-40E... Ignoring the P-38, my own (second?) choice for a readily available USAAF fighter, would be the P-40, P-40B or P-40F which were sufficient in numbers by then and were probably better performing at the altitudes fought during the Midway battles. Ideally I would have expected the best most immediate action was to continually replace the Buffs with castoff USN F4F-3s. But we've been through that in the foregoing.

If there was one experimental drop tank at Pearl it might have provided one F4F-3 the legs (probably with minimal fuel reserve) necessary to make the 1300 sm trip to Midway, without ammo and probably guns, which would then be relaced by the F2A-3 each F4F replaced. So a PBY is used to lead one F4F-3 and carry the drop tank and lead the relaced F2A back to Pearl. I am skeptical that such a plan requiring about 20 PBY round trips to the island would have been done without adequate reserve or without accidents that may have cost both plane and pilot; especially in light of the perhaps suspected but yet to be proven obsolescence of the F2A-3. Especially considering the cost of a similar ferry operation of P-40s to Java (under somewhat more benign conditions) just 5 months earlier.

 

[pinsog]

I had wondered about the P-43 myself, but I wasnt sure if there were enough available at the time.

I think my choices, if they were available at the time would have been P-38, P-43, P-39, F4F-3 and P-40 in that order. If they had stationed 100 of any of these aircraft on Midway to intercept the first wave of Japanese bombers, I think they would have decimated the incoming strike, if the Americans fighters had some decent training.

 

[Dcazz7606]

I was thinking along the same lines as oldcrowcv63. I think for that small window of time that was Midway the P-43 might have made a difference. they had been used in the war games of 1941 so they were availiable and the pilots probably had time to get to know their mounts as well as the Buffalo and Wildcat. I believe top speed was 351 mph and loitering time was 2 hours at 75% power. It might have have been known for more than keeping the Republic factory running till the Thunderbolt was ready. it might have been just the thing.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The thing is, I only see the P-43 as effective in a Midway defensive role. IMO, defending the island more effectively does not yield significant advantage and may actually contribute to a two carrier exchange or worse followed by an IJN wiithdrawal. A VERY BAD outcome for the USN. I mean, that's a defeat for the USN. If many more IJN attack and escort aircraft are lost, the IJN Midway strike aircraft recovery cycle becomes much shorter for those that return. Assume strike leader Lt. Tomonaga is shot down during the strike and no second strike request message is sent to Nagumo. Kido Butai may receive a message reporting the virtual destruction of his attack force indicating continued attack of Midway is doomed. But Midway is only one goal. The other is to sink the USN carriers and soon he will have one in his sights. He has half his entire force in readiness for a strike on an american fleet with no motivation to rearm weapons for a land attack. 0820 Nagumo learns he is facing at least one carrier. 0837 he turns into the wind to recover the dozen or so aircraft that return from the strike. His attention now focuses on the USN fleet units. he launches the ready reserve when His recovery cycle is complete about 0910 or even earlier. In fact given the few returning aircraft, he might decide to launch rather than wait. That's what I believe Yamaguchi advised. Now the Yorktown is NOT facing the historic attack by 18 divebombers with a tardy 6 A6M escort,

Instead it is facing a strike of 40+ torpedo planes, 36 divebombers covered by perhaps as many as 21 A6M Zeros. Unlike the piece meal fragmented USN strike, they are a well coordinated and integrated strike force. A strong, replenished and undiminished CAP of about 36 A6M remains covering Kido Butai. The IJN strike is going to cover a lot of the sky and won't have to play hide and seek like Tone no. 4 and Chikuma's number 5 scouts which would otherwise not discover the other US Carriers until about 1045 (?) when they are seen at some distance from the Yorktown. (I believe seen by the Chikuma no. 5 scout, but it may have been the Hiryu attack force or the D4Y Judy launched later) The american attack may disable some of the IJN carriers but without their crowded hangar decks it will not be fatal damage. At best, US ability to launch a counter strike will be reduced to approximate parity with that of the remaining IJN aerial forces. My money is now on the IJN to inflict much greater harm on the US Fleet than it can inflict in return. I don't think it matters what fighter or how many more you put on Midway. What matters is how you employ them and I believe the historical decision was the wrong one. IMO, they should have been sent to escort the Midway strike force which in your scenario doesn't exist.

The airborne USN carrier launched strike can recieve no help from the P-43's on Midway. Coordination isn't possible and they don't have the legs to be very effectve in any role but Midway defense.

Post script: The P-43 may look good in some respects on paper. I don't know enough about the plane to be convinced it would fair better than the F2A but it's hard to imagine a fighter doing any worse! The fact that Chennault rejected it may indicate it was fatally flawed in some way not immediately apparent. The question remains would the P-43 plots attempt to dogfight the Zero? I don't know the answer but if they did, I suspect they might do worse than the F2A's which was reputed to possess at least in its earlier incarnations some significant manueverability.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

While it may be counter intuitive, IMO, making Midway's defense impregnable leads directly to survival of one or more IJN carriers and loss of two or more USN carriers. That's not just an unacceptable exchange. It derails the USN South Pacific counter offensive in August and extends the war by perhaps a year or more. Midway's role in this was its status as an essentially unsinkable carrier. It's airwing could be defeated at some cost (less than anticipated) but it couldn't be sunk. It was thus possible for it to remain the focus of the IJN attack at least until the presence of USN carriers was established which to some extent was inevitable. However, the IJN anticipated their arrival in a matter of days not hours.

Drive home the fact that Midway can neither be sunk OR captured and you undermine the US strategy at its most fundamental level. IJN attention had to be focused on subduing Midway for the hours necessary to mount the hammer blow from the US carriers on the IJN carriers in a sense laid out on the Midway anvil.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

OTOH, maybe historical and strategical consistency could be preserved by changing all or some of the 20-27 Midway defending aircraft to some other fighter far more capable of simply keeping its pilot alive and carrying him back to the Island with an aircraft whose damage was sufficiently minor to have allowed its quick repair. Of the candidates, there were, as previously stated, numbers of F4F-3, -3A and -4 and P-40E and presumably other P-40 varients based on Oahu. With drop tanks and sans guns and ammo, these should have been able to just barely make the trip to Midway. The PBY's or B-17's acting as pathfinders could have carried the guns. I have been trying to determine if there were any airfields along the route (Molokai perhaps) that could have served to top off the fuel of the aircraft enroute.

WW2 era Airfield on Molokai 1940 photo: airfield used by USMC and USN.

Pacific Wrecks - Molokai Airfield (Homestead Field, Hoolehua Airport)

Pacific Wrecks - Aerial view of Homestead Field (Molokai Airport

Crap!!! *&T^*%( I meant to look at Kauai.

OK: Burns AAF about 100 miles from Oahu along the flight path to Midway is the best I could find... Not much and only shortening the trip to about 1,200 statute miles

Of course this distance is awfully long. If the winds aren't so weak as to be irrelevant or so favorable as to shorten the trip time, it is likely to be out of reach. Especially considering the trade winds between Midway and Hawaii are from the Northeast quadrant and both consistant AND strong in early June, there is likely to be a strong cross wind component, which must be neutralized to make landfall after a minimum 1200 mile trip.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Recalled that the low level wind direction during the battle was from out of the South East at about 10-15 knots: Source: Battle of Midway , Aerology and Naval Warfare, CNO Aerology Section.

The Battle of Midway: Aerology and Amphibious Warfare

Revisiting the seasonal winds in the North Pacific area around Hawaii/Mdway. The trades generally are strongest in midsummer and out of the NE, however, it appears they are lighter during late Spring and can be out of the East. This of course would have provded a tailwind assist to transiting aircraft on the Oahu/Kaui to Midway flight flying at optimal altitude (~15,000 ft?). The max range of an overload F4F-3 with 147 gallons internal fuel, is listed as 1,280 miles with max endurance of about 6.5 hours. Removing guns ammo should increase this distance to provide some reserve, assuming a weak tailwind.

The Hawaii to Midway trip might be compared to the much shorter 540 mile over water flight from Darwin Australia to Koepang, Timor made by P-40Es to reinforce the air defense of Java. The P-40 carried a 52 gallon drop tank, full armament (6 guns) and ammunition plus some personal possessions of the pilots. The 4 hour flights were characterized as very tiring and stressful due to the assumption that intercepts by IJN fighters was an ever present possibility. 8 hours is a helluva long time in a small cockpit and fatigue would be the major problem assuming no mechanical failure, but fortunately no hostile interceptors should be expected.

It seems there was some dim recognition of the shortcomings of the F2A-3 but not sufficient to motivate the USN/USMC to replace them in a timely fashion. Timely in this case is perhaps May 27th when the Yorktown pulled into port with roughly a dozen (battle weary?) F4F-3's to be exchanged for the new F4F-4s. Despite the December Wake Island reinforcement, it is clear that the deployed fleet marine squadrons remained in the early stages of transitioning to F4F-3 3A aircraft with 19 assigned to Samoa apparently arriving in early Spring. But only a few had appeared in MAG-23 custody at Ewa MCAS before late May. The F4F aircraft were evidently available, but only just before the June 4 battle probably making the staging of an extended group overwater flight to reinforce Midway a high risk operation with anticipated marginal benefit and somewhat of a diversion from the prime concerns of planners. In hindsight, it probably could have been done at cost and the F4F-3 were probably the best available aircraft, although P-40B/E's might have been able to manage the flight without guns or ammo. Not sure what weight and balance impact this would have on either aircraft. Can't help wonder if it was ever considered, or whether it was considered so risk intensive it made no sense to try it under any circumstances.

 

[Merlin Power]

Hi all. This is my first post, so be gentle! Haha

What about the F4U Corsair? By June 1942 there were 2 squadrons in the US Navy equipped with the F4U. These same planes could have been made available to the Marines on Midway. Although the Corsair at that stage been considered by the Navy to be too dangerous for carrier use, but they would have been perfect for the Marines operating from the landing strip on Midway.

A few squadrons of Corsairs might have given the Japanese something to think about, particularly if they were guided by the use of radar to intercept the Japanese planes attacking.