What other fighters could have been made available to the marines at Battle of Midway

[oldcrowcv63]

I don't think you could pack the upper deck that full of Army aircraft, they can't be catapult launched, AFAIK. You'd need to leave part of that upper deck clear for the first few aircraft to fly off.

That's why I reduced the number of aircraft from the total number of fixed wing biplanes and SBD's in the photo from 22 to 15-20 fighters. I assumed they were roughly the same size as a P-39 or P-40: SBD Length 33 ft. compared to P-40 32 feet
SBD wing span 42 feet, P-40 37 feet.

The speed of the CVE-1 is 19 mph which helps a little as I don't beieve there is a catapult. It was able to launch a deck load of 19 F4Fs and 12 SBDs. that should give you a rough validation of the numbers.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The Hurricane had been using drop tanks from early/mid 1941.

Looks like fitted with two 45 gallon drops under each wing and 180 gallons of fuel the Hurricane did indeed have a range similar to the F4F-4.

 

[RCAFson]

Yes, it should be similar. About 900 miles with reserves, in a ferry scenario or about 250nm combat radius.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Historically, the Hurricanes never had a dream setup like the USMC had on Midway, where they had lots of advance warning and an altitude advantage prior to engaging. The Hurricane XII could outclimb, outrun, outturn and had a better ceiling than anything the Marines had at Midway and had to do better, with the same pilots against the IJNAF.

While the Hurricane XII "would have" been way better than anything deployed at Midway, if I recall only 470+ were ever built by CCF. Midway wasn't a conflict that had a lot of time to plan. Even if thought of it would have taken months to get those aircraft in theater provided they "could have" been allowed to be taken from an already contracted production line.

Aside from the poor performing aircraft, tactics also doomed the Marines at Midway.

 

[Dcazz7606]

Honestly, I don't think the US actually thought that they would neccessarily win the Battle of Midway. To send in more planes from anywhere but a carrier at a safe distance would be reckless.

 

[RCAFson]

While the Hurricane XII "would have" been way better than anything deployed at Midway, if I recall only 470+ were ever built by CCF.

AFAIK, CCF built about 1400 Hurricanes, and about half were powered by Packard Merlin 20 series engines and this site states that about 2/3 were powered by P. Merlin 28/29 engines:

K5083 - Aircraft Production Summary

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Honestly, I don't think the US actually thought that they would neccessarily win the Battle of Midway. To send in more planes from anywhere but a carrier at a safe distance would be reckless.

Cazz, I don't think the island could have held anymore than the 120 or so it was already supporting. This was essentially an all or nothing throw of the dice as far as defending the island from capture. At least up to the chance of losing the USN carriers.

In this thread, I think we are looking at what aircraft could replace the F2A and F4F fighters the marines were using to defend the island. I think the strategy was essentially to do as much harm to the IJN as possible without losing ones shirt in the process. Inflciting enough damage, the hope was the IJN would back off which is pretty much what happened. There has been a lot written on whether the Marines on the island could have been dislodged by the forces at hand, IIRC, the invasion force consisted of about 5,000 infantry which probably by itself was not sufficient however, considering that the IJN could provide something like 7 BB CB and 9 CA, they could probably have pounded the island's defenders into pumpkin sauce. OTOH having lost their air support, they would have had to weather the continual pounding from Hawaii-based B-17's that were unlikely to hit anything not stationary or nearly so. The 60 or so SBD's on the surviving two USN carriers were the main threat. As I understand it, the USN carriers didn't have any armor penetrating bombs in their magazines to equip their SBDs so they had to rely on wrecking the topsides of the armored ships. Based upon what happened to the Mikuma and Mogami, that's probably what would have happened, but at a cost difficult to calculate, each raid might have cost a few dive bombers. The Saratoga with a large airwing was on its way west from the states and could have been rushed to the scene to reinforce the Hornet and Enterprise so it probably would have been very costly for both the IJN, the USN as well as the island's defenders.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

AFAIK, CCF built about 1400 Hurricanes, and about half were powered by Packard Merlin 20 series engines and this site states that about 2/3 were powered by P. Merlin 28/29 engines:

K5083 - Aircraft Production Summary

How many were on the line in May 42' and could have been delivered to Midway by June 1

"The CC&F produced around 250 Hurricane Mk IIs. Mixed in with them were fifty Mk XIs, very similar aircraft but with some Canadian equipment. Finally, 474 Mk XIIs were built. These aircraft used the Packard Merlin 29 engine, and were used by the Royal Canadian Air Force, equipping ten squadrons based in Canada."

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_hawker_hurricaneX.html

 

[RCAFson]

How many were on the line in May 42' and could have been delivered to Midway by June 1

"The CC&F produced around 250 Hurricane Mk IIs. Mixed in with them were fifty Mk XIs, very similar aircraft but with some Canadian equipment. Finally, 474 Mk XIIs were built. These aircraft used the Packard Merlin 29 engine, and were used by the Royal Canadian Air Force, equipping ten squadrons based in Canada."

Hawker Hurricane X, XI and XII

I suspect that production averaged about 50/month in 1942.

 

[Shortround6]

Something to consider about the Hurricanes is if they were built to US/Canadian standards or British standards. Some British aircraft built in Canada were "Americanized" to some extent. American and British industrial practices were not standardized at that time and various things like hydraulic lines/fittings, electrical connections and even nuts and bolts were different. Packard Merlins were built to be pretty much interchangeable with British Merlins which means Whitworth threads and all of that sort of thing ( for those of us old enough to remember 1950s-1960s British cars and motorcycles). At teh very least any Canadian Hurricanes would need american radios and oxygen systems installed which would slow down deployment.

As far as ferrying P-40s go see this chart:

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-40/P-40TOCLC.pdf

Ferrying P-40s was done but short flight decks and under 20KTS make for a dicey take-off even with under filled tanks and no ammo.

P-39s need about ANOTHER 150 ft of flight deck.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

I found a very poor quality photo of a P-40 taking off from the Sangamon Bay (CVE-26), but using a catapult. It had a flight deck roughly 100 feet longer than the Long Island (CVE-1). Some of the P-40s were parked along the edge of the flight deck rather than packed aft. Not that any P-40s could fit in that manner on a flight deck (CVE-1)'s some 20 feet more narrow than that of CVE-26. The need for a longer run would probably cut into the number of aicraft I'd originally estimated (15-20). Less than that amount hardly consititutes a squadron and such organizational units do matter. If it would have been possible, the obvious choice would have been to replace the F2A'a with more F4F-3's, but at this point the F2A-3 was still viewed by many as a suitable fighter and, on paper at least, comparable to the F4F.

Neat site, The same site also has the P-39.

http://www.zenoswarbirdvideos.com/Images/P-39/P39TOCLC.pdf

 

[Shortround6]

The Ranger had done a Ferry operation with P-40s in April-May of 1942 but the Ranger could do 33mph (not knots) and had at least 700ft of flight deck. Obviously less was needed and as experience was gained shorter, slower ships were used. In some of these Army aircraft ferry operations plane were flown off with partially filled fuel tanks, no ammo and in some cases no guns. If you have several days to put the planes back together again it is not a problem. Assuming you have a flight deck available. it could 8-9 days for a 12 kt ship to get from San Francisco to Honolulu so even using an escort carrier from the west coast require very tight timing to use to reinforce Midway, assuming that the needed P-40s, F4Fs are in Hawaii

 

[oldcrowcv63]

... it could 8-9 days for a 12 kt ship to get from San Francisco to Honolulu so even using an escort carrier from the west coast require very tight timing to use to reinforce Midway, assuming that the needed P-40s, F4Fs are in Hawaii

I think you've hit a very important consideration as there were many F4F-3's on the West Coast. Reading between the lines in Lundstrom's Fletcher book, I get the impression the assignment of the Long Island to the west coast battle fleet was not necessarily appreciated. Nimitz also had many F4F-3 and -3A on hand at Pearl Harbor. Probably more than 20-25 of each type. However, it appears as though only the KittyHawk was only available for one trip to transport aircraft, with the 19 SBD-2s having priority over additional F4F-3s. Even given time, drop tanks and accepting considerable risk (having no reserve), it wasn't practical to fly the F4F-3s to Midway although, the F2A's with their 240 gallon fuel tanks might have flown back with relatively little risk. But there were was only one F4F drop tank at Pearl and that one was experimental. Perhaps the Kitty Hawk could have been pressed to make two trips or made them earlier.

 

[Shortround6]

According to Wiki the Long Island left the east coast on May 10th and Arrived in San Francisco June 5th, too late to do anything for Midway.

As far as the Kitty hawk goes:

"After shakedown, Kitty Hawk departed New York on 16 December 1941, for Hawaii via the Panama Canal with aircraft to replace U.S. losses in the Japanese attack, and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 8 February 1942. She unloaded her aircraft at Hickam Field and returned to the mainland on 25 February. Kitty Hawk returned to Pearl Harbor on 17 May. Intelligence reports arrived indicating that a Japanese fleet was approaching the Hawaiian Islands. Immediately, Kitty Hawk loaded the men, armament, and equipment of the 3rd Marine Defense Battalion and aircraft of Marine Air Groups 21 and 45 and sailed at top speed to reinforce Midway, escorted by the destroyer Gwin. En route, a PBY Catalina reported a submarine in the area which Gwin drove off with a heavy barrage of depth charges, enabling Kitty Hawk to deliver her vital fighting men and aircraft to Midway on 26 May.


USS Kitty Hawk (AKV-1) offloading an F4F-4 aircraft to USS Long Island (CVE-1) in August 1942.
Escorted by destroyers Gwin and Sicard, Kitty Hawk departed Midway on 29 May and arrived Honolulu on 1 June. On 5 June, she learned of the American victory in the Battle of Midway, which turned back a Japanese offensive with disastrous results to the Japanese carrier attack force. That same day, she sailed for the West Coast, arriving San Diego on 13 June."

 

[oldcrowcv63]

While the Hurricane XII "would have" been way better than anything deployed at Midway... Aside from the poor performing aircraft, tactics also doomed the Marines at Midway.

...the Long Island left the east coast on May 10th and Arrived in San Francisco June 5th, too late to do anything for Midway.

As far as the Kitty hawk goes:

"After shakedown, Kitty Hawk departed New York on 16 December 1941, for Hawaii via the Panama Canal with aircraft to replace U.S. losses in the Japanese attack, and arrived at Pearl Harbor on 8 February 1942. She unloaded her aircraft at Hickam Field and returned to the mainland on 25 February. Kitty Hawk returned to Pearl Harbor on 17 May. ... enabling Kitty Hawk to deliver her vital fighting men and aircraft to Midway on 26 May.... Kitty Hawk departed Midway on 29 May and arrived Honolulu on 1 June. On 5 June....That same day, she sailed for the West Coast, arriving San Diego on 13 June."

Well that answers the question of using either vessel. Even if the F4F had some means of replacing the F2A-3s the result would likely have been more cosmetic than substantive. As FlyboyJ said, The problem was the tactic employed.

Interesting quote in Lundstrom's first team: Capt. George Murray, CO of the Enterprise endorsement to a letter by VF-6 CO, Lt. Jim Gray dated 4/3/42:

"Under No crcumstances should our fighter pilots in F4F-4 permit themselves to become engaged in tactics involving "dog fights" with enemy fighters. Until a fighter of greatly increased performance becomes available, 'hit and run' tactics against any enemy opposition appears to offer the greatest probability of successful combat. Against Japanese 00 and 01 fighters, it is doubtful if the F4F-4 can ever obtain initial altitude advantage which is essential for hit and run tactics."

 

[pinsog]

If Commander John Thach and 25 other experienced pilots from one of the carrier airwings had been deployed on Midway Island in 26 new F4F-3's and had been the pilots that jumped the 100 plane Japanese 1st strike, would they have done signiificant damage?
Possibly turned back the 1st strike?
Or depleated it so much it would have been totally ineffective?
Or been fought off by the 18 Zero escorts?

 

[oldcrowcv63]

If Thach and his weave had been absent from the Yorktown, it is likely A6Ms would have been available to contest the SBDs diving on the Carriers. Would it have mattered? Maybe, maybe not. If Thach and VF-3, made up his own rump squadron filled out by the CORAL SEA veteran pilots of VF-42, had been at Midway Island, the Yorktown's initial and subsequent defense would have been undoubtedly more porous. The consequences of that are difficult to assess since the Yorktoewn was lost, but at great cost to the IJN attackers. There was very little left of the IJN air armada that had begun the day (27 VF, 5 VB and 5 VT, according to Lundstrom)

Employed at Midway, the Thach weave, although hurriedly implemented among pilots unfamiliar with its use, would probably have meant more CAP aircraft survived. The RADAR detection was adequate to give them altitude parity, if not superiority with the A6Ms. Their prior experience with air combat against the zeros would have helped them immensely. However, I suspect they would have struggled to get through the zeros to get at the bombers, and so very little would have changed. I reiterate that Midway, despite the bombing, was essentially operational and still very much in the fight. Defending Midway Island, was best done offensively rather than by putting up a more effective defensive CAP. I believe the marine F2A-3s and F4Fs should have been sent as escorts.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

Checking Lundstrom for the Bureau numbers of the F4F-3 and -3A aircraft that survived on the Enterprise, Yorktown, Lexington, and Saratoga until transition to the F4F-4 around April and May of 1942 prior to Midway. Presumably these earlier models from the surviving components of each carrier's embarked fighter squadrons were exchanged for F4F-4 at that time and were kept in Hawaii for a time. AFAICT these exchanged older fighters amounted to 27 F4F-3 and 30 F4F-3A. Presumably these aircraft remained at Pearl Harbor through early June, 1942.

 

[pinsog]

Why not station all aircraft from all 3 carriers on Midway? When the Japanese launched their 1st strike of 90 bombers protected by 18 zeroes, they could have been intercepted by 75 or so F4F's diving on them from a higher altitude. They would have been stationed on an unsinkable airfield. The 3 carriers could have waited on the opposite side of Midaway Island from the Japanese carriers, and retained a fighter group each for self defense, in case we saw we were going to lose and then they could have evacuated all Navy aircraft still flyable from the island.

 

[oldcrowcv63]

The number of carriers comprising Kido Butai was not surely known.... Could have been 4 or 5 (with Zuikaku or Zuiho) or even 6. The number of aircraft and escorts in the IJN Midway strike couldn't be so accurately predicted. I checked and it looks like the number of A6M escorts was 36 not 18.

Midway had space for about 120 aircraft. Getting rid of PBYs isn't an option because you need the search capability. B-17s are staged through Midway from Oahu. Combined, all three carriers carried about 233 additional aircraft. Midway could't accomodate such a large number. Also, Carriers are mobile and fast. Hard targets to get a fix on. Ideal for pulling an ambush on a lightly guarded flank.

In this case having an unsinkable aircraft carrier (Midway) as the primary target plays a vital role. Recognizing the vulnerability of any force in a similar situation haunted USN Planners and leaders at Guadacanal two months later during the period that the marines didn't have their own air force. Once that was established the game changed and the risk level subsided a bit...