delcyros
Tech Sergeant
I am convinced that KGV is in the challange for the title as of may 1941. It´s a well laid out design.
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I am convinced that KGV is in the challange for the title as of may 1941. It´s a well laid out design.
I find this notion that the Bismarck was an "antiquated design" rather parochial and simplistic. As near as I can tell, this is one of Tony Preston's ideational children… which goes hand-and-hand with his strange belief that the Germans did no real testing or R &D to speak of in matters pertaining to naval armor, gunnery, etc., between the wars. Well, this view is incorrect, and even a cursory review of the history of the times will show this to be the fact. I will address what follows in generalities, and invite interested parties to pick up on the clues and sources and see where they lead.
The Germans began cheating on the treaty of Versailles relatively early on, which is no surprise considering the dearth of active enforcement that was in place after the mid-1920s period when the IACC was being dissolved. Indeed, even before the monitors were sent home, they reported many suspected breaches of both the letter and intent of the treaty agreements by concerns such as Krupps. Of course, no one pressed the issue, and so we find continuing "special projects" being funded in German budgets – often being buried in departments which bore little semblance to anything military (see Paloczi-Horvath, 1998, for a general overview). It seems the socialist in the German government did more to expose these clandestine practices than anything done by the Allied powers. In fact, by 1930 the Reichstag became the center of a heated debate when it was noted that money was being diverted to these special projects, which was something that almost killed the panzerschiffe projects (several good reviews of naval policies in the W. era are available on this).
Well, the US was certainly aware that the Germans were still doing good R&D in armor, and thus the USN purchased some rather modestly thick plates in the early 1930s to figure out if examining the products could help improve quality control and related issues in US armor manufacture. It was also during this time frame that we find the Germans developing Wh, and other armor products – which had considerably different characteristics than did their WWI counterparts. We also see work in radar, high-pressure steam plants, infrared technology, shaped-charge weapons, and a host of other areas. These developments are just a few of the many things that confuse me about this silly claim the Germans were merely sitting on their hands between the wars.
But not only were they developing new materials, they were also experimenting with novel ways of laying out this armor to best meet a given need. Any review of the Panzerschiffe designs makes this abundantly clear, but one also sees this in documents such as ADM281/951. This text reviews the development of German APC shells, but also notes some of the many experiments that were done – such as the examination of using spaced array armor aboard warships. It is also in these documents that we get a glimpse of why the new armor's were developed, with the manipulation of shell yaw being but one example of a very intensive research program. For example, it was found that a very hard and fine-grained armor can enhance initial shell yaw effects, which makes the subsequent penetration of the shell through a subsequent plate problematic.
We know of a document that examined how this principle was applied to German warships, but, even after the passage of 55 years, this text remains classified. Why would we ever keep "antiquated" and dubious notions classified? Well, we only get incomplete tidbits of what may have been going on. For example, Gkdos 100 reports that the Germans expected long-range gunnery under suitable conditions – with the full understanding that deck protection could never be made proof at the ranges they envisioned taking place. However, we also hear of the Germans actually testing a reduced version of their multi-layered deck protection system as fitted aboard an old preDreadnought. The ranges extended beyond 25K meters, and the deck protection system resisted the 15" shells that hit the ship. We need shot by shot details of these tests, and we are hoping that some of you German readers have access to these. We have the general results, but no specifics – which are critical.
It seems to me that the Germans were onto the same general finding as the Italians, this being that single layer armor systems were not effective against modern shells. Both countries opted to take a multi-layer approach, one wherein the outer armor layers decap shells, induce yaw, slow shells, activate fusing that leads to detonations before critical areas are reached, and otherwise impede the ability of shells to do damage to an inner sanctorum that houses the engines, ammunition, etc.. Interestingly, modern bunkers are based on many of these same principles, which is one reason we see bomb sizes in the several ton ranges.
Now, I would much rather see the R D that went into evolving the multi-layered armor system than listen to the potted Polly-want-a-cracker repetition of Preston's et al.'s antiquated folly. We learn relatively little from such general statements, and rather more from the detailed research done by the designers. And I have had the good fortune to stumble across some related information in the writings of Pugliese. And believe me, this R D was years ahead of anything I've seen in the US archives relating to armor material properties and disposition. But that is a subject for a book, which is where my efforts must now turn.
But should you hear the familiar refrain, "That was an obsolete design," smile gently, and ask, "Why?" As you repeat the question, there will come a stage wherein someone appeals to authority, as in, "Preston says so." And when pressed as to why Preston would say such a thing, I don't think you'll see many references to some of the things that are presented here. Well, I hate to leave this partial case dangling, but I truly do have much work ahead. I must submerge, as it were, and pop us again in about eight months.
Looking at the Bismarck through western eyes [always a risky venture], the Bismarck's armor arrangement can be criticized for placing far too much emphasis on protecting the vitals of 'engine and magazine' to ensure the ship was relatively unsinkable....
and place a lower level of protection on the combat elements of the main battery and Command tower and directors. Since it appears German naval doctrine emphasized aggressive fighting , protecting the combat element would seem to be just as important.
Hello Psteel
to me it is difficult to see how a 14-16" shell fired from somewhere what can be descript as short distance could after penetrating 145mm upper belt of Bismarck hit the its main armour deck if the ship had not a heavy list. After all at short distance the trajectories of main armaments of WWII capital ships were rather flat. IMHO any short distance hit that hit the main armoured deck of Bismarck had to first go through 300-320mm (depending on source) main belt.
There was the limit to which to type of Bismarck's armour could be thinned. That was shown when Dunkerque was hit by 15" shells from Hood from appr. 14km distance. Dunkerque was only armoured against German 11" shells, was that from 16,5 km. One 15" shell went through the 225mm inclined belt, equivalent at least 283mm vertical, 2 bulkheads, the 50mm to 54 degree sloped down part (as in Bismarck, but in it 100mm or 110mm thick, depending on the source) of lower armoured deck, through upper part of fuel oil tank, through 30mm torpedo bulkhead and through some machinery before ending to a turbine casting.
Juha
Hello Psteel
I recommended, that you reread the page 61 in "Allied Battleships in World War II" and especially the Table 2-7. The STS was backing of the main (upper) armoured deck.
For 15" hits info and trajectories, please refer the new monograph on French battleships by Jordan and Dumas, my info is from it. It's newer and specialized to French BBs so odds are that it is more reliable on this. According to it both 3rd and 4th hits penetrated the belt.
Juha