What was the most powerful CA and CL in a straight duel, December 1941?

[delcyros]

The biggest single problem with the french cruisers were the limited endurance that they possessed. They were unable to mount the sustained patrols far from home that the British cruisers were able to do.

I tend to interprete it another way. The biggest problem with french CL´s were that there were not many enough to cover a larger area.

British 6" guns were undoubtedly hampered by the ammunition they used, however, IMO you are overstating the advantages of SAP rounds. British CPBC were very effective at damaging upper works, and disabling other parts of the enemy ship, without necessarily penetrating the belt. SAP ammunition often had the unfortunate habit of passing right through the target. Italian SAP ammunition also seems to have suffered from poor metallurgical treatment. Certainly on a number of occasions when it struck British armour rather than penetrating, it simply shattered. Many Italian guns also suffered from poor accuracy because of closeness of the two barrels. I have also read that the Italian turrets often were insufficiently strong, and/or the guns too closely spaced together, to permit proper salvo fire. In any event, trying to put aside the operational limits that the Italians were forced to work under, I still think that ship for ship, the British even with their inferior guns achieved better success, and inflicted more damage, even before the full impact of radar. A good example is perhaps Cape Spada

The Royal Navy showed a great expertise to use their ships with the greatest possible tactical effect. Tactics compensated technical deficiancies and are a testimony for great individual skill and leadership. Still, they cannot be used to relativate the technical inferiority in the first place.

There ar very few instances of german 5.9" engaging British 5.9s. at least in cruisers. The German Narviks used them, and there is the Koromoran vs Sydney (and a couple of othe raiders as well. Without having looked at all the examples all that carefully, I dont know that it can be said that the British were all that badly disadvantaged.

A 5.91" gun is not a 5.91" gun in the german Navy (and for sure the same is true for the Royal Navy). The Komoran was an auxilary cruiser, an old merchant equipped with 5.91"cal 45 guns of the 1906 model. The Narvik cruisers used a 55 cal. twin mounted gun of a much newer model, altough I am sure that the Narvik class itself cannot be considered a successful design.
The CL´s finally had a very potent 5.91" 60 cal length model of this gun, in biaxially stabilized fully enclosed turrets on barbettes giving them high accurateness, a comparably long range, flat trajectory and corresponding high muzzle velocity for low dispersion patterns. The Nürnberg triple turrets are in my view the best CL weapon of ww2, mostly due to their supply with true APC, SAP and HE ammunition and the extraordinary semiautomatic shell handling arrangements. That does not say that the british were at an disadvantage tactically, they always enjoied numerical superiority and n^2 rule usually overtakes technical superiority. Quantity has a quality of it´s own.

The reason I think is because the disabling of a ship is not so much linked to the penetration of the belt, as the destruction of the control positions and the like. This was certainly how the Bismarck was silenced so quickly, and was the general pattern of events in many engagements, particulalry the Pacific

But Bismarck was not silenced by NON PENETRATING hits. Bismarck was silenced by close range PENETRATING hits through CT, upper works, barbettes and turrets. "8" and 6" hits did not contributed other than rearranging debris of prior impacts" (Bill Jurens). This statement does not give credit to an 8" hit destroying the secondary rangefinder (which only had splinter protection) but 8" SAP and 6"CPBC could hardly inflict this kind of damage against the more heavily armoured structures like main or upper belt, secondary main turrets, CT and barbettes.
Guadacanal does not support Your point of view here either.
Against an armoured ship, You needed penetrating hits to disable it altough non penetrating hits could still jamm a turret or cause light leakages behind the belt due to armour plates driven in, fastings beeing torn up and fractures. It is important for ships with long endurance missions.

I have looked up Koop / Schmolke again, which appears to be the most comprehensive source for the Panzerschiffe. The details of protection for all three ships are very different but Graf Spee´s side protection does consist of a 13 degrees inclined, 100mm KNC belt (not 50-80mm as in Deutschland and Scheer), augmented with an equally inclined 40mm Ww armoured torpedo bulkhead behind running the full depth from bottom to 40mm Wh main armour deck, which is placed on top of the belt. Above the main armour deck there are two 20mm longitudinal splinter bulkheads going up to the weatherdeck in the area of the funnelbase.

I agree that the French CLs would have had a better chance of penetrating the GS belt and deck, with their SAP ammunition, although I hesitate when you describe it as "easy". The superficial damage inflicted by the Brit cruisers was not insignificant, but I am not convinced that it was lethal either, despite certain reports that I have read to the contrary (you mention them yourself, but i sense you are a bit doubtful as well, perhaps i am mistaken)

I don´t want to be misunderstood when I prefer french cruisers. The reason lies solely in the ammunition and I am convinced that the rather simple measure of manufacturing a proper shell would make the british force an even more dangerous opponent for Graf Spee. It´s not that I share the opinion that Graf Spee was at decisive advantage. Tactically spoken, the Royal Navy should be expected to win this engagement in 5 to 7 out of 10 engagements. The damage inflicted by 6" CPBC ammunition was insignificant to the best of my knowledge. 8" SAP and 8" practice ammunition was able to inflict some sort of significant damage, related to the destruction of the Diesel fuel oil pre processioning plant, altough equal damage could have been inflicted by 6" common ammunition as this plant was not protected by armour thicker than splinter protection (20mm longitudinal bulkheads).
Again, at closer distances, or with a proper APC projectile, the british cruiser force should be much more dangerous to Graf Spee.

There are, of course many variables at play that might wreck thi otherwise simple comparison

Very true indeed!

How then do you explain the british reluctance to close in the stern chase that followed the battle.

I rate it as a poor tactical decision. Harwood shouldn´t leave initiative and desired fighting range to Langsdorffs best whishes as long as he had the instruments to choose on his own.

 

[parsifal]

I tend to interprete it another way. The biggest problem with french CL´s were that there were not many enough to cover a larger area.

They suffered from both problems. there were not enough of them, AND they had a poor turn of range. The French AND the Italians got into something of a speed race in the twenties and thirties, which led to many design faults in the ships from both countries, particularly the DDs and cruiser designs

The Royal Navy showed a great expertise to use their ships with the greatest possible tactical effect. Tactics compensated technical deficiancies and are a testimony for great individual skill and leadership. Still, they cannot be used to relativate the technical inferiority in the first place.

Cannot agree with the general thrust being put forward here. I interpret what you are saying, as a rather sophisticated permutation of "we lost the war because we were outnumbered" theories. Sorry, but that just is not true. The Royal Navy was excellently led, and its crews were okay. However its ships in most cases were also superior to nearly all their opposite numbers. The exception MIGHT be Bismarck, but even here I am unconvinced, and unimpressed. I will also concede the superiority of the German CAs and the CSs (Pocket battleships), and even the theoretical superiority of some of the Italians CAs. However, for the DDs, and CLs, the British, in my opinion had the general lead over both their Axis opponents, for any number of reasons, including superior ship design. I am afraid we have a major difference of opinion here. I just do not share your seemingly unshakeable belief in the superiority of SAP over CPBC ammunition, which in any case is a VERY minor point in determining the superiority of an overall design for a light ship. You have not looked at such things as radar, AA fitouts, gunnery control, the strength of the mountings, the reliability of the machinery, the layout and compartmentalisation of the internal spaces, the seaworthiness, the ability of the type to complete the intended mission profile for that type etc. I fail to see how a Nurnberg, or a Koln, or even an Abruzzi class, can be seen as superior to a Sheffield, or Fiji or a Blake, when all of the factors are considered. If for example a Sheffield was ranged against a Koln, in 1939-40, my money is firmly on the Sheffield, for a number of reasons.

A 5.91" gun is not a 5.91" gun in the german Navy (and for sure the same is true for the Royal Navy). The Komoran was an auxilary cruiser, an old merchant equipped with 5.91"cal 45 guns of the 1906 model. The Narvik cruisers used a 55 cal. twin mounted gun of a much newer model, altough I am sure that the Narvik class itself cannot be considered a successful design.
The CL´s finally had a very potent 5.91" 60 cal length model of this gun, in biaxially stabilized fully enclosed turrets on barbettes giving them high accurateness, a comparably long range, flat trajectory and corresponding high muzzle velocity for low dispersion patterns. The Nürnberg triple turrets are in my view the best CL weapon of ww2, mostly due to their supply with true APC, SAP and HE ammunition and the extraordinary semiautomatic shell handling arrangements. That does not say that the british were at an disadvantage tactically, they always enjoied numerical superiority and n^2 rule usually overtakes technical superiority. Quantity has a quality of it´s own.

I will leave my reply about the turrets in the Nurnbergs until after I get hold of my cruiser book. Even if the turret can be shown to be a good design), the overall design of the Nurnmbergs was in my opinion extremely ordinary. They certainly could not complete their designed mission of guerre de course, and were extremely lightly built. OKM evidently did not consider them worthwhile the fuel oil expenditure on any of their Post 1941 forays into the arctic (when there was just one even close to operational). They never fully repaired one of the ships in this general class, and the remaining three were lost very easily. Neither their operational deployment, nor their design critique stands up to any sort of claim that they were superior ships.

A 5.9" is a 5.9" is a 5.9" as far as I am concerned. I know there were huge differences in individual performances, but we were not being so choosy in our initial discussions, but now all of a sudden we are zeroing in on one kind of 5.9". I could do the same and start bringing into the discussion spurious arguments about the myriad of gun sub-types available in a given calibre on the British side if you like, which will essentially stall the debate. This is a generalized discussion as i understnd, about the superiority of different classes of warship

But Bismarck was not silenced by NON PENETRATING hits. Bismarck was silenced by close range PENETRATING hits through CT, upper works, barbettes and turrets. "8" and 6" hits did not contributed other than rearranging debris of prior impacts" (Bill Jurens). This statement does not give credit to an 8" hit destroying the secondary rangefinder (which only had splinter protection) but 8" SAP and 6"CPBC could hardly inflict this kind of damage against the more heavily armoured structures like main or upper belt, secondary main turrets, CT and barbettes.
Guadacanal does not support Your point of view here either.
Against an armoured ship, You needed penetrating hits to disable it altough non penetrating hits could still jamm a turret or cause light leakages behind the belt due to armour plates driven in, fastings beeing torn up and fractures. It is important for ships with long endurance missions.

I never said that they were. please re-read my post. And my sources do NOT support the claim that Bismarck was penetrated by close range main armament hits. Barnett describes that at 0854 Rodney landed two hits on the Bismarck, at over 15000 yards, one hitting the forecastle area, and the second hitting the supestructure amidships. By definition these cannot be belt penetrations. At 0902 Rodney again hit the Bismarck with a 16" shell, this time at the base of the A Turret. This may have been a belt penetration, and did have the effect of knocking out both foreward turrets (I do not know the reason why B-Turret was knocked out by a hit to A-turret, but it was observed to cease fire after that point). My point is that with respect to the Bismarck, it appears that her guns were silenced very quickly (last salvo was 0931, but she fired less than 6 rounds from 0904 until 0931).This appears to be more the result of the heavy damage to her upper works and control positions, and not to any critical belt pentrations. She may have stopped firing some of her guns due to a single belt penetration, but this did not leave her sinking. At 1025, Tovey signalled Somerville, "she is still afloat" Try as they might, the British could not penetrate her vitals. This was confirmed by a further signal three minutes later "I cannot sink her by gunfire" .

Something like 2000 shells of 5.25 " calibre and above were expended in that final action, so Bismarcks upper works were a total shambles by that stage...

Graf Spee´s side protection does consist of a 13 degrees inclined, 100mm KNC belt (not 50-80mm as in Deutschland and Scheer), augmented with an equally inclined 40mm Ww armoured torpedo bulkhead behind running the full depth from bottom to 40mm Wh main armour deck, which is placed on top of the belt. Above the main armour deck there are two 20mm longitudinal splinter bulkheads going up to the weatherdeck in the area of the funnelbase.

Surely you agree that this level of armour protection was greatly superior to anything in the RNs cruisers, but in particular those that fought on the day

Tactically spoken, the Royal Navy should be expected to win this engagement in 5 to 7 out of 10 engagements. The damage inflicted by 6" CPBC ammunition was insignificant to the best of my knowledge. 8" SAP and 8" practice ammunition was able to inflict some sort of significant damage, related to the destruction of the Diesel fuel oil pre processioning plant, altough equal damage could have been inflicted by 6" common ammunition as this plant was not protected by armour thicker than splinter protection (20mm longitudinal bulkheads).

I cannot see how you think the RN could have the advantage in this battle. They were outgunned, out-armoured (to the extent that it DID make a difference) and german gunnery was superior which was excacerbated by the ammunition issue.

Again, at closer distances, or with a proper APC projectile, the british cruiser force should be much more dangerous to Graf Spee.

I think that closing to point blank range (effectively) would have been disastrous for the British ships involved, with or without SAP ammunition. But for the moment we have to deal with the historical. the Brit ships did not possess SAP loads, so it is a mute point

I rate it as a poor tactical decision. Harwood shouldn´t leave initiative and desired fighting range to Langsdorffs best whishes as long as he had the instruments to choose on his own

I disagree, I believe that Harwood fought a near textbook perfect cruiser action. I believe that in terms of weight of shell, accuracy, and protection, all of the cards were held by Langsdorf. I also believe that Langsdorf had actually won the battle at the conclusion of the shooting part of the action, but he could not see it. I believe the senior officers reports aftger the war, over this claim made much late about the fuel feeds, ie, that the extent of damage was not nearly so severe as langsdorf believed. I believe the crucial failure was in Langsdorf himself. he msread the situation badly, and lost a major unit of the KM as a result

 

[Glider]

Re how effective the British designed cruisers were compared to the Italian, this may be of interest.

In the Battle of Cape Spada in the Greek Islands in July 1940 HMAS Sydney with a British destroyer squadron in company, engaged the high-speed Italian light cruisers Bartolomeo Colleoni and Giovanni dalle Bande Nere. In the running battle which followed, Bartolomeo Colleoni was wrecked and later sunk by torpedoes from the destroyers, while the high speed of Giovanni dalle Bande Nere enabled her to escape a similar fate. During this battle, Sydney received the only damage of her Mediterranean campaign, when a shell penetrated one of her funnels

 

[parsifal]

Hi glider

I am betting that the argument to be presented will be along the lines of the operational constraints that supermarina were operating under at the time (Mussolini was wanting to preserve his fleet a much as possible...it was basically a gigantic show pony). However, this is a load of bollocks for the battle mentioned. Captain Maugeri was one of the freest thinking officers in the Supermarina, and attacked aggressively until the arrival of Sydney more than an hour after battle had been joined. Sydney almost single handedly bested both Italian cruisers in short order. whilst I am the first to point out the generally superior captaincy on the part of the Australian cruiser, it can only answer in part the outcome of that day. The Italian gunnery was attrocious for a start, which was in part a function of their turret design. Their armour protection for these ships was found to be badly wanting, despite these claims about the inadequacy of the CPBC ammunition, and the amount of damage to the upper works vastly more serious than anything suffered by the Sydney (in addition to the single shell hit, she also suffered splinter damage from shell hits that simply shattered on her armour belts). But you can rest assured that these people will have some half baked excuse as to why the RAN had the upper hand, despite being outnumbered 2:1

 

[Glider]

Parsifal
We will see how the debate progresses but there is one aspect of the Italian LC which doesn't seem to have been mentioned, is the very poor and in some cases almost zero protection they had. The later ones were very good and as good as most but the majority were well below standard.

Having the guns close to each other wouldn't help accuracy for certain but lack of training and poor fire control probably had a bigger impact.

 

[delcyros]

Re how effective the British designed cruisers were compared to the Italian, this may be of interest.

In the Battle of Cape Spada in the Greek Islands in July 1940 HMAS Sydney with a British destroyer squadron in company, engaged the high-speed Italian light cruisers Bartolomeo Colleoni and Giovanni dalle Bande Nere. In the running battle which followed, Bartolomeo Colleoni was wrecked and later sunk by torpedoes from the destroyers, while the high speed of Giovanni dalle Bande Nere enabled her to escape a similar fate. During this battle, Sydney received the only damage of her Mediterranean campaign, when a shell penetrated one of her funnels

This action is an example for the problems confronted within the italian heavy cruiser design: errorneous weight saving measures, spacing the barrels to closely together (resulting in excessive dispersion patterns), inconsistant shell quality. The operational constraints and the fact that HMAS Sydney also was handled excellently.
Parsifal fails to mention that HMAS Sysdney was using SAP and HE ammunition as 8" CPBC was never operationally issued by the Royal Navy and therefore cannot be used to determine CPBC qualities.

 

[Glider]

Delc
The Sydney had 6in with CPBC not 8in with SAP.

 

[delcyros]

I stand corrected. Sydney used 6" CPBC ammo. mea culpa.

 

[parsifal]

This action is an example for the problems confronted within the italian heavy cruiser design: errorneous weight saving measures, spacing the barrels to closely together (resulting in excessive dispersion patterns), inconsistant shell quality. The operational constraints and the fact that HMAS Sydney also was handled excellently.
Parsifal fails to mention that HMAS Sysdney was using SAP and HE ammunition as 8" CPBC was never operationally issued by the Royal Navy and therefore cannot be used to determine CPBC qualities

Del,

Are you aware that Sydney was a Leander class CL, with Mark XXIII 6" main armament, which have previously advised were never SAP equipped? This is a position confirmed by Campbell, and others, so I am at a loss as to where all of a sudden they became SAP capable.

Now i am lost a well...are you saying that the 6in guns of the Leanders are capable of firing SAP or not???

 

[parsifal]

I see the issue already is corrected....so now we can move forward with the debate hopefully

 

[delcyros]

L

there were not enough of them, AND they had a poor turn of range.

I am particularely interested in how You quantify the latter. Define range. UK and US long range figures were regularely achieved with caged boilers and the most economic setting while the (continental european) range estimation were done with a higher degree of readiness, resulting in more lit up boilers and a substantial higher fuel consumption at low speeds.
Only few british CL-classes had a notably higher range, altough such cases exist and can be named. The generalization expressed by Yourselfe, however, has to be rejected.

The Royal Navy was excellently led, and its crews were okay. However its ships in most cases were also superior to nearly all their opposite numbers. The exception MIGHT be Bismarck, but even here I am unconvinced, and unimpressed. I will also concede the superiority of the German CAs and the CSs (Pocket battleships), and even the theoretical superiority of some of the Italians CAs. However, for the DDs, and CLs, the British, in my opinion had the general lead over both their Axis opponents, for any number of reasons, including superior ship design. I am afraid we have a major difference of opinion here.

I do not think we are decisively different here. There is little disagreement from my side. The RN had some excellent CL and DD classes altough there still were numerous ships beeing suboptimal in design (were Exeter or the Dido´s dreadful?). My original point remains unchanged, esspeccially towards the fitting with suboptimal ordenance.

I just do not share your seemingly unshakeable belief in the superiority of SAP over CPBC ammunition, which in any case is a VERY minor point in determining the superiority of an overall design for a light ship.

As long as You are engaging any unarmoured ship, the difference is negliable (altough even here a true HE projectile would be better than a common type), but against armoured ships, like Graf Spee and most opposition in the North Atlantic theatre You need to pierce armour -not necessarely the belt- to inflict substantial damage. If your projectile is not able to do this, as was the case with 6"CPBC against Graf Spee at their distances, I rate it as a disadvantage.
It´s not that it would be overly difficult to supply a proper HE and APC projectile nor can it be said that Britain was lacking expertise to do so. It´s a questionable decision made by the directors of ordenance which is not followed by non commonwealth nations for reasons.

You have not looked at such things as radar, AA fitouts, gunnery control, the strength of the mountings, the reliability of the machinery, the layout and compartmentalisation of the internal spaces, the seaworthiness, the ability of the type to complete the intended mission profile for that type etc.

Indeed. Here You is Your opportunity to compare them. But to what degree of agreement can we come if You relativate differing shell abilities, differing gun-design and n^2 issues in the first place?

A 5.9" is a 5.9" is a 5.9" as far as I am concerned.

Both are guns, at least. The 5.91"L45 of Komoran fired HE base and HE nose fused projectiles only at a muzzle velocity of 2.740 fps.
NÜRNBERGS 5.91"L60 fired HE nose and base fused + true APC at a muzzle velocity of 3.150 fps.

And my sources do NOT support the claim that Bismarck was penetrated by close range main armament hits.

Bismarcks armour was penetrated in barbettes (2), main belt (2+ 1 burst in holing), CT (4+) and turrets (2) by main armement hits. Please read Bill Jurens article on this. This damage silenced Bismarck, not the superficial damage on the upper works.

At 0902 Rodney again hit the Bismarck with a 16" shell, this time at the base of the A Turret. This may have been a belt penetration, and did have the effect of knocking out both foreward turrets (I do not know the reason why B-Turret was knocked out by a hit to A-turret, but it was observed to cease fire after that point).

One or more shells from this salvo straddled the foreship around turret A. Turret A was knocket out, turret B was temporarely out of action as a result of this hit.
Note that belt penetrations were not necessary here. one or two barbette hits could do the same. But it was necessary to engage heavy armour here.

My point is that with respect to the Bismarck, it appears that her guns were silenced very quickly (last salvo was 0931, but she fired less than 6 rounds from 0904 until 0931).This appears to be more the result of the heavy damage to her upper works and control positions, and not to any critical belt pentrations.

Bismarck was indeed silenced but not very quickly. Rodney opened 08:47 and D- turret was silenced 09:31, a good 44 minutes later. The statement of Rodneys ammunition expandeture between 09:04 and 09:31 is showing substantial incorrectness.
The critical hits were: 0859 1 - 16 inch, 0900 1 - 16 inch, 0902 1 - 16 inch, 0910 5 - 14 inch and 1 - 16 inch for a total of 5 14 inch and 4 16 inch hits - nine shells in all. In addition there were two critical 8 inch hits in this period, taking out the main RF equipment. Successive hits took out A and B turrets, the primary director, the secondary director, wrecked the CT. C and D turrets were operational until later in the action.
The ammunition expandeture figures for Rodney and KGV show that their outfit of APC projectiles was depleted in the course of the action.
You are right that little of the damage is relative to belt penetrations (altough as many as 18 impacts on the main belt are recorded) but they are nevertheless penetrations of the exposed vitals under heavy armour which lead to the silencing of the ship, not secondary gun hits or common hits with wrecking effect. A task which would be difficult to perform without proper APC projectiles.

She may have stopped firing some of her guns due to a single belt penetration, but this did not leave her sinking. At 1025, Tovey signalled Somerville, "she is still afloat" Try as they might, the British could not penetrate her vitals. This was confirmed by a further signal three minutes later "I cannot sink her by gunfire" .

There is every reason that the belt-slope combination of Bismarck worked as intended and not only kept her afloat but also successfully protected her embedded vitals (magazines, machinery and ship controll). This is a significant difference to other BB constructions.

Something like 2000 shells of 5.25 " calibre and above were expended in that final action, so Bismarcks upper works were a total shambles by that stage...

The effect of these hits were largely irrelevant compared to the aforementioned heavy hits. They did not affected any of the key aspects (ship controll, main batteries, firecontroll, floatation, stability) of the already doomed ship and their contribution is linked with starting fires and rearranging debris.

I cannot see how you think the RN could have the advantage in this battle. They were outgunned, out-armoured (to the extent that it DID make a difference) and german gunnery was superior which was excacerbated by the ammunition issue.

Who was outgunned? In case Graf Spee disengages straight, she can bring to bear only her aft triple turret. Against what? 4 8" guns and 8 6" guns respectively? Even in a broadside condition, where Graf Spee could not even attempt to dictate the range, Graf spee will find herselfe badly outgunned. in a theoretical period of 10 minutes rapid firing with 50% max. output, Graf Spee fires 75 11" rounds and 140 5.91" rounds against 120 8" and 360 6" rounds of the british force. The weight of shell in a given period is in significant favour for the british force. This can be compensated by the higher accuracy of the Panzerschiffs FC but only at medium to long range where such issues make a difference and her armour protection provides a reasonable margin of protection. The Panzerschiff, however, was not in a position to dictate the range and had to split her battery to three individual targets.

Harwood made the poorest of all choices. He could shadow her or engage her agressively but instead he choosed to stay at the for his force most ineffective range. Langsdorff was little better, he risked his ship disobeying standing orders not to attack any warships. These orders were issued to prevent german lightly armoured PBB´s (merchant raiders) to engage enemy cruisers owing to their incomplete protection against 6" and 8" guns (they hardly could know that the RN was never issuing a proper APC projectile as did the french). And even light damage at remote places would effectively risk the ship as demonstrated.

 

[parsifal]

I am particularely interested in how You quantify the latter. Define range. UK and US long range figures were regularely achieved with caged boilers and the most economic setting while the (continental european) range estimation were done with a higher degree of readiness, resulting in more lit up boilers and a substantial higher fuel consumption at low speeds.
Only few british CL-classes had a notably higher range, altough such cases exist and can be named. The generalization expressed by Yourselfe, however, has to be rejected.

The Cruiser book by Whitney gives excellent breakdowns of ranges with various loads and speeds, however for now I only have acces to Janes and Conways, but these i am sure are adequate for this discussion

French cruisers have the following fuel loads and ranges at economic speed, which is universally accepted as carrying a deep load displacement, and with full fuel, with a surface speed of around 14 knots.

Sampling the french cruisers

Georges Leygues: 9120 full load, 1569 t oil, 7000/6800/5500/1650 nm @ 12/14/18/32 kts
Emile Bertin : 8480 full load 1360 t oil: 3600/1100 nm @ 14/30 kts
Jeanne De Arc: 8950 t full load 1400 t oil, Radius @ 11 kts 5200 nm, att full power 3200 nm (but max sea speed was only 22 kts)l
Duquay Trouin : 9350 t 1500 t oil, 4500/3000/900 @ 15/20/33 kts
Tourville : 12200 t, 1820 t oil, 4500/1900 @ 15/30 kts
Suffren : 12780 t 1800 t oil (plus 600 t coal in two), 5300 (coal ships only)/4600/3200 @ 10/15/20 kts
Algerie : 13900 t 3186 oil, 8700 nm @ 15 kts

Note the additional fuel load of the Algerie, which approaches that carried by the british CAs. Her range is approaching that of the british cruisers, suggesting that the method used by Conways to determine range is a fair one, when comparing the ranges of the brit ships with those of the french

Now for the brits

Kent: 13540 t, 3400 t oil: (Janes, 10400 @ 11-14 kts, estimated at 14 kts to be 9200 nm)
London : 13315 t, 3210 t oil range unknown at this stage, but similar to Kents
Norfolk : 13425 t 3210 t oil, range similar to Kent
York : 10350t 1900 oil, unknown but less than the larger CAs
Exeter : 10490 t, 1900 t oil, range similar to Yorks
Perth : 9150 t, 1840 t oil, 10300/7000/6200 nm @ 10/14/20 kts (World War 2 Cruisers)
Sheffield : 11350 t , 2070 t, 12100 @ 12 kts (source as above)
Edinburgh :13175 t, 2250 oil, 12000@ 12 kts

I could continue, but its getting late. The point is that the modern 9ie post 1920) RN cruisers all had substantially higher fuel loads than their continental cousins, not just a few, as you suggest

I consider Conways Janes and the WWII cruiser site (World War 2 Cruisers) to be secondary when compared to Whitneys cruiser book. I should be able to retrive it from my friends place by Thursday. However this authoritative work on cruisers is only going to reinforce my position

The message should be loud and clear, British cruisers built post WWII were built with trade protection as their primary mission, whereas the french cruisers were principally built as auxiliaries to the gunline. French cruisers were more lightly built (often, the exception being the Leygues and the Algerie clases), but all of them were far shorter ranged than their equvalent RN opposite numbers, even allowing for "creative accounting"

As long as You are engaging any unarmoured ship, the difference is negliable (altough even here a true HE projectile would be better than a common type), but against armoured ships, like Graf Spee and most opposition in the North Atlantic theatre You need to pierce armour -not necessarely the belt- to inflict substantial damage. If your projectile is not able to do this, as was the case with 6"CPBC against Graf Spee at their distances, I rate it as a disadvantage.
It´s not that it would be overly difficult to supply a proper HE and APC projectile nor can it be said that Britain was lacking expertise to do so. It´s a questionable decision made by the directors of ordenance which is not followed by non commonwealth nations for reasons.

I dont disagree that the british would have been better served if they had adopted a proper SAP round. however, I do disagree that it was a major factor. The proof of this are in the actions that the RN found itself against germany and Italy. In both cases, there are numerous examples of the RN taking on numerically superior forces, and either defeating them, or at least holding their own. The facts just simply dont support your assertions. Do i need to go further?


Indeed. Here You is Your opportunity to compare them. But to what degree of agreement can we come if You relativate differing shell abilities, differing gun-design and n^2 issues in the first place?
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Im comparing results, not theory. The results speak for themselves.....

Both are guns, at least. The 5.91"L45 of Komoran fired HE base and HE nose fused projectiles only at a muzzle velocity of 2.740 fps.
NÜRNBERGS 5.91"L60 fired HE nose and base fused + true APC at a muzzle velocity of 3.150 fps.

And your point is?????

Bismarcks armour was penetrated in barbettes (2), main belt (2+ 1 burst in holing), CT (4+) and turrets (2) by main armement hits. Please read Bill Jurens article on this. This damage silenced Bismarck, not the superficial damage on the upper works.

One or more shells from this salvo straddled the foreship around turret A. Turret A was knocket out, turret B was temporarely out of action as a result of this hit.
Note that belt penetrations were not necessary here. one or two barbette hits could do the same. But it was necessary to engage heavy armour here.

Bismarck was indeed silenced but not very quickly. Rodney opened 08:47 and D- turret was silenced 09:31, a good 44 minutes later. The statement of Rodneys ammunition expandeture between 09:04 and 09:31 is showing substantial incorrectness.

I was referring to Bismarcks fire, not Rodneys. From 0904 until 0931 BISMARCK fired hardly at all (my accounts conflict, some say two rounds, some day 6, but it was just a few, compared to roughly 100 by Rodney in that same time frame).

Bismarck was substantially silenced by 0904. From 0904 until 0931 she shot off just 6 rounds of her main armament (at maximum, according to the RN report). In that regard she was despatched in record time, just 13 minutes. Her ability to resist from 0904 was extremely slight, and according to Barnett and the RN report was the result of just one hit from a heavy shell (which is at odds with your source, we will both need to dig further to get to the truth of that one)

The critical hits were: 0859 1 - 16 inch, 0900 1 - 16 inch, 0902 1 - 16 inch, 0910 5 - 14 inch and 1 - 16 inch for a total of 5 14 inch and 4 16 inch hits - nine shells in all. In addition there were two critical 8 inch hits in this period, taking out the main RF equipment. Successive hits took out A and B turrets, the primary director, the secondary director, wrecked the CT. C and D turrets were operational until later in the action.

Apart from the disparity in reported hits prior to 0904, this substantially correlates to my sources. I am not going to die in a ditch over whether it took one or two hits to silence the bismarcks heavy guns (substantially) but the point is this, despite all those hits, NOT ONE penetrated the main belt. Perhaps our definition of critical hits is differeent. Whilst i agree that the hits suffered were more than enough to silence the great ship, they were not enough to start the ship sinking, as evidenced by toveys signals Bismarck was NOT defeated by hits that penetrated to her vitals. i know that you know that, but for some reason you wont concede the point. What defeated her were the hits that may have penetrated, but not to areas traditionally identified as "vitals". I am actually giving credit to the main belt armouring scheme of the ship (but remain critical of her overall scheme), so in a way you should be happy. I am having to concede a point you made in some of our earlier discussions....

The ammunition expandeture figures for Rodney and KGV show that their outfit of APC projectiles was depleted in the course of the action.
You are right that little of the damage is relative to belt penetrations (altough as many as 18 impacts on the main belt are recorded) but they are nevertheless penetrations of the exposed vitals under heavy armour which lead to the silencing of the ship, not secondary gun hits or common hits with wrecking effect. A task which would be difficult to perform without proper APC projectiles.

I never said that the secondaries were responsible for silencing the ship, but you are drawing a very long bow in your definition of what is a vital. The hits that caused the silencing of the ship, were of heavy calibre but did not penetrate the main belt. it would be a strange design that places vital areas outside the main belt protection. So i maintain my point that the silencing of the ship was due to hits that did not penetrate the main belt.

There is every reason that the belt-slope combination of Bismarck worked as intended and not only kept her afloat but also successfully protected her embedded vitals (magazines, machinery and ship controll). This is a significant difference to other BB constructions.


I agree the bismarck was exceptionally well protected in these areas. But the scheme was not able to succeed in keeping her armament firing, which was silenced quickly

 

[parsifal]

The effect of these hits were largely irrelevant compared to the aforementioned heavy hits. They did not affected any of the key aspects (ship controll, main batteries, firecontroll, floatation, stability) of the already doomed ship and their contribution is linked with starting fires and rearranging debris.
Quite probable. My whole point about raising the bismarck issue was that she was neutralized by non-lethal hits, not tha calibre of the guns that did it

Who was outgunned? In case Graf Spee disengages straight, she can bring to bear only her aft triple turret. Against what? 4 8" guns and 8 6" guns respectively? Even in a broadside condition, where Graf Spee could not even attempt to dictate the range, Graf spee will find herselfe badly outgunned. in a theoretical period of 10 minutes rapid firing with 50% max. output, Graf Spee fires 75 11" rounds and 140 5.91" rounds against 120 8" and 360 6" rounds of the british force. The weight of shell in a given period is in significant favour for the british force. This can be compensated by the higher accuracy of the Panzerschiffs FC but only at medium to long range where such issues make a difference and her armour protection provides a reasonable margin of protection. The Panzerschiff, however, was not in a position to dictate the range and had to split her battery to three individual targets.

It is not valid to compare the Spees broadside in a stern chase situation, although i admit thats what happened. at any time the Spee could heave to, and present her full broadside, if she had wanted to fight it out. The British ships almost certainly would have had to answer by also heaving into line, to also present a full broadside (if they dont, and charge in the style of a latter day Nelson they will be at an even greater disadvantage.

The SKC /28 fires a 661.4 lb projectile, with a firing cycle of 3.0 rounds per minute per gun. With six barrels she can theoretically deliver 12000 lbs of projectiles per minute. The 4 x 5.9 MPLC/28 can deliver a further 32 rounds of 100.3 lbs of projectile each minute, for a subtotal of 3209 pounds. The total main and secondary broadside of the Spee was therefore theoretically 15210 lbs per minute
Statistically 100% of the rounds fired are capable of penetrationof any target. therefore the Spees broadside must be considered 100% efficient (at ranges of 13000 yds (assuming all projectiles hit)

By comparison, the full broadside of the RN force was as follows.

(6" mk XXIII turrets) 16 x 112 x 8 (rounds per min) = 14336 lbs per minute
Unfortunately at 12500 yds or more, these guns were unlikely to penetrate the Spees armour belt, and therefore unlikley to sink her, before being sunk themselves. A Deck penetration at that range was about 16% likely, and able to penetrate about 45 mm. this was still insufficient to penetrate the the Spees armour belt, except at point blank range. Lets assume that the cruisers close to 5000 yds. in that time they will be subjected to at least three minutes of continous full barrage fire from the Spee, with little opportunity for return fire. More than enough time for the Spee to sink one or both her attackers.

The 8 in round does have the ability to penetrate the armour belt, as it did, but the extent of damage is going to be limited, on average, by the inner protection provided for the Spee. By comparison, the heavy guns of the Spee are able to inflict very heavy damage on the Exeter for each hit. Whilst the Spee is firing more slowly, she is more accurate. I dont see the problem with my asserion that the Spee had anheavier effective broadside over her opponents.

Harwood made the poorest of all choices. He could shadow her or engage her agressively but instead he choosed to stay at the for his force most ineffective range. Langsdorff was little better, he risked his ship disobeying standing orders not to attack any warships. These orders were issued to prevent german lightly armoured PBB´s (merchant raiders) to engage enemy cruisers owing to their incomplete protection against 6" and 8" guns (they hardly could know that the RN was never issuing a proper APC projectile as did the french). And even light damage at remote places would effectively risk the ship as demonstrated.

Lightly armoured...you gotta be kidding me. She was far better protected than her opponents. Incomplete, I will grant you that, but the evidence from the battle if anything suggest that she was more than capable of looking after herself. Her own officers have gone on record as saying that the daage she suffered was far less than suggested by Langsdorf, and the notion she suffered some sort of damage to her fuel feeds was an add on added to the revisionist histories many years after the event....for what purpose? I agree that there was a risk of damage to her, and that her standing orders were to avoid conflict, but langfsdorf apparently (I say apparently because I have not seen this in his log), was not concerned about engaging enemy ships, of lesser size, as he was on his way home anyway. And as far as i know, the germans were likely to know the characteristics of the British Mk XXIII although again i dont claim to actually be sure of this.

 

[delcyros]

You have not adressed my critique, my firend. The issue noted by myselfe is properly adressed in Jean Lassaque (2004) Le croiseur Emile Bertin 1933-1959, Marines éditions, ISBN 2-915379-05-X
Speed, displacement and load are defined but the status of the boilers is not.

I do also think You are a bit unfair to french ships saying that they were unable to mount sustained patrols. Evidence from historic records of the french Force de Raid showed clearly that french cruisers participated in partols in the Nort Atlantic theatre from outbreak of the hostilities.

The point is that the modern 9ie post 1920) RN cruisers all had substantially higher fuel loads than their continental cousins, not just a few, as you suggest

Let´s look into the facts and keep a more comprehensive view of the cruisers avaiable 1940:

Caledon class: unknown
Cairo-class: unknown
Ceres class: unknown
Cavendish-class: 2.150t.
Dauntless-class: unknown
E-class: 1746t., range unknown
Kent-class: 3.400t.
London/Dorsetshire class: 3.290t.
York-class: 1.900t.
Arethusa-class: 1.325 t.
Leander-class: 1.800t.
Sydney-class: 1.800t.
Southhampton-class: 2.050t.
Gloucester-class: 2.075t.
Edinburgh-class: 2.250t.
Dido-class: 1.100t.
Fiji-class: 1.700t.
Ceylon-class: 1.700t.

Correct me if I am wrong but it looks for me that Kent and London-classes CA were the exception rather than the rule.

I dont disagree that the british would have been better served if they had adopted a proper SAP round. however, I do disagree that it was a major factor. The proof of this are in the actions that the RN found itself against germany and Italy. In both cases, there are numerous examples of the RN taking on numerically superior forces, and either defeating them, or at least holding their own.

it is a factor of comparison. There are multiple examples for these and other engagements. But we should be very careful with selective perceptions of historical engagements. Cause and interpretation do not always coincide.

And your point is?????

We compared cruisers, didn´t we? The only cruiser gun in the german Navy was the 5.91"/60 which was way more powerful than what you considered. There were no 5.91"/45 or 5.91"/55 in german CL´s (safe the training CL Emden, which had 5.91"/45) or CA´s (safe the PBB´s 5.91"/55 in deck mounts with shields). A 15% difference in muzzle velocity is a very serious issue, which cannot be ignored. to put this into comparison: Use of supercharges in british warships offered an increase of 7 to 8% in muzzle velocity for the same projectile.

NOT ONE penetrated the main belt. Perhaps our definition of critical hits is differeent. Whilst i agree that the hits suffered were more than enough to silence the great ship, they were not enough to start the ship sinking, as evidenced by toveys signals Bismarck was NOT defeated by hits that penetrated to her vitals. i know that you know that, but for some reason you wont concede the point. What defeated her were the hits that may have penetrated, but not to areas traditionally identified as "vitals".

I think differing definitions of vitals are a serious point of departure in our opinions.
I used to define vitals as the following:
1.) embedded vitals:
"hull vitals"- that are the main and secondary magazines, main and secondary ship controll room and firecontroll center + turbines, boilers and auxilary machinery as well as steering gear (all these are under the Main armour deck and protected by deck + belt)
2.) exposed vitals:
"upper structures" which are necessary for communication (armoured comm tubes, radio station, bridge) controll (firecontroll room with rangefinder and electronic equipment) and gunnery (main secondary guns + their barbettes). Exposed vitals are usually screened by very thick armour (except in the british KGV-class) to keep them operational.

The former helps to keep the mobility, floatation and stability of the ship while the latter is linked to it´s offensive abilities and was what suffered from close range penetrating hits. It´s not necessary to defeat the belt in the first place to achieve critical hits on the vitals summarized under 2.)

I agree the bismarck was exceptionally well protected in these areas. But the scheme was not able to succeed in keeping her armament firing, which was silenced quickly

Agreed. The exposed vitals, unlike the embedded ones, were not protected to repel close range major impacts. I wonder which ship had such a level of protection for the exposed vitals? Yamatos turret faces are impenetrable but her barbettes and CT, the comm tubes and sec. batteries would suffer equally here.
South Dakota at Guadacanal was heavily engaged in medium to close range from mostly 8" (a very few 14"ers, too) and prooved to be soundly protected for her exposed vitals in the course of the action but the test was much less severe than that of Bismarck.

My whole point about raising the bismarck issue was that she was neutralized by non-lethal hits, not tha calibre of the guns that did it

I have a differing opinion. Hits on the exposed vitals, even if they do not interfere with the waterplane or hull are potentially lethal. Invincible, Queen Mary and Indefatigable were not sunk by hits on the embedded vitals but by those of the exposed. HMS Hood is another candidate for this kind of damage. But to achieve this, you need to pierce the armour of the exposed vitals first (well, or you have luck and the target CT / barbettes / turret is not or insufficiant armoured either...).

The SKC /28 fires a 661.4 lb projectile, with a firing cycle of 3.0 rounds per minute per gun. With six barrels she can theoretically deliver 12000 lbs of projectiles per minute.

The cyclic rate of fire according to Krupps own documentation (as well as Schmolke, Breyer, Campbell and navweaps) is only 2.5 rpm for the Panzerschiffes 11.1"/52 and 3.5 rpm for the Scharnhorsts 11.1"/54. The principal reason for the differences are improved shell handling arrangements and hoist limits. Graf Spee couldn´t fire 3.0 rpm. Her theoretical output in weight of ordenance thus needs to be reduced to 9.921 lbs per minute instead of 12.000 for the main battery. The single pedestal 5.91" mounts without hoists could deliver 6-8 99.87lbs projectiles per minute only as long as the eight ready shells were not used up. Cyclic rate of fire then drops to 4-6 rounds per minute (taking 6 as average). the theoretical netto broadside output of Graf spee stands corrected to only 12.318lbs instead of 15.210 lbs.

Statistically 100% of the rounds fired are capable of penetrationof any target. therefore the Spees broadside must be considered 100% efficient (at ranges of 13000 yds (assuming all projectiles hit)

Only the 11.1"ers will be 100% effective. The same is not true for the 5.91"/55 when firing nose or base fused HE-shells.

(6" mk XXIII turrets) 16 x 112 x 8 (rounds per min) = 14.336 lbs per minute

That are Ajax and Achilles only. Feel free to add Exeters main battery output to Harwoods cruiser force. Maximum sustained rof for the 8"/50 was 4 rpm:
6 x 256lbs x 4 = 6.144 lbs.
------------------theoretical netto output:
Langsdorff: 12.318lbs
Harwood: 20.480lbs
------------------------------------------
As you see, Harwoods cruiser force outguns Graf Spee by a significant margin in terms of broadside weight in a given period. You could add Graf spees 4.1" DP guns to this but it wouldn´t change much, if anything to his advantage and Harwood does have secondary guns at his disposal, too.

A Deck penetration at that range was about 16% likely, and able to penetrate about 45 mm. this was still insufficient to penetrate the the Spees armour belt, except at point blank range.

At the distance in question (13.000yards, IIRC), deck penetration is unlikely to happen. The angle of fall (13 deg.) is to small and any projectile would be deflected away by the 40mm deck at such large impact obliquities. The 6"ers will not defeat the belt but they can defeat the upper hull, the side blisters, the ship ends, the secondary guns and take out RF equipment. At closer range (6.000 yards or less), they should be sufficiantly powerful to defeat the main belt, even with CPBC.

Lightly armoured...you gotta be kidding me. She was far better protected than her opponents.

Granted, Graf spee was. But it also was the best protected of the three PBB´s in service and not invulnarable to damage.

Her own officers have gone on record as saying that the daage she suffered was far less than suggested by Langsdorf, and the notion she suffered some sort of damage to her fuel feeds was an add on added to the revisionist histories many years after the event....for what purpose?

I would be very careful with such an accusation, Parsifal. At least without having read the relevant sources (account of chief engeneer Klepp) first hand.

And as far as i know, the germans were likely to know the characteristics of the British Mk XXIII although again i dont claim to actually be sure of this.

The relevant source for this is "Bestimmungen zur Festlegung der Hauptkampfentfernung", issued march 1938. In this paper, the germans expected 8" and 6" APC and HE with less loss in velocity for range than used historically by the Royal Navy (they expected more streamlined projectiles).

 

[Juha]

Range of British cruisers, source IMHO the best secondary source on subject ie Raven's and Roberts' British Cruisers of WWII (p. 208 )
all at 12 kts, figures in nautical mls

Kents 13300
Londons 12700
Norfolks 12500
Leanders 10300
Mod. Leanders 10700
Arethusas 8200
Southamptons 12100
Belfasts 12200
Didos 7400
Fijis 10200

Juha

 

[parsifal]

You have not adressed my critique, my firend. The issue noted by myselfe is properly adressed in Jean Lassaque (2004) Le croiseur Emile Bertin 1933-1959, Marines éditions, ISBN 2-915379-05-X
Speed, displacement and load are defined but the status of the boilers is not.

The accepted norm for endurance is not to delve as deeply as you are suggesting. For the record, I have addressed your issue, by quoting the generally accepted texts, and not going out on some exotic limb which may or may not have some validity. I could mount counter-arguments along the lines that the french endurance trials were generally carried out in much calmer waters, or we could even get into the prevailing currents where the trials were undertaken if you like. But these, like your arguments are essentially spurious, or peripheral. In my opinion the best way to takle endurance is the way that Conways, and nearly every other accepted text deals with the issue. Thats because the endurance figures are, at best, approximations.

For the record, the accepted way to address endurance properly is to assume full load displacement, and economic cruising sppeed, usually of around 14 knots, and then work out the radius of action. If you want to hare off into some weird, obscure, and unrecognized method of determining endurance, be my guest, but I wont follow youo.

So, in my opinion I HAVE addressed your issue, by pointing out your methodology is not the accepted norm in determining endurance.

I do also think You are a bit unfair to french ships saying that they were unable to mount sustained patrols. Evidence from historic records of the french Force de Raid showed clearly that french cruisers participated in partols in the Nort Atlantic theatre from outbreak of the hostilities.

I NEVER SAID THAT. PLEASE DO NOT MISQUOTE ME. What I did say was that French cruisers were short ranged, which they are. Patrols into the near waters of the North Atlantic can in no way be compared to the type of tireless long range patrolling that the RN carried out day in day out.

Let´s look into the facts and keep a more comprehensive view of the cruisers avaiable 1940:

Caledon class: unknown
Cairo-class: unknown
Ceres class: unknown
Cavendish-class: 2.150t.
Dauntless-class: unknown
E-class: 1746t., range unknown
Kent-class: 3.400t.
London/Dorsetshire class: 3.290t.
York-class: 1.900t.
Arethusa-class: 1.325 t.
Leander-class: 1.800t.
Sydney-class: 1.800t.
Southhampton-class: 2.050t.
Gloucester-class: 2.075t.
Edinburgh-class: 2.250t.
Dido-class: 1.100t.
Fiji-class: 1.700t.
Ceylon-class: 1.700t.

Correct me if I am wrong but it looks for me that Kent and London-classes CA were the exception rather than the rule.

I will correct you, and you are wrong. The C-class carried 950 tons of fuel oil, but I will not be able to advise on their ranges until Thursday. Whilst you are correct to say that only the big cruisers carred 3400 tons of oil, the advantage held by the lighter cruisers is not to be scoffedd at. The Leanders, for example, with a similar displacement to the Leygues (before fuel) carried 1800tons of oil, to 1569 tons. The range of the Leygues was 5500 miles @ 14 Knots, to the leanders 7000 @ 12 knots. If you were to give the leygues the same amount of fuel as the Leanders, the estimated endurance of the ship would increase to 6300 miles @ 14 knots, which is very close to that of the Leanders.

If I were to select the more modern cruisers, the fuel capacity would go up, as well as the endurance difference. Keep in mind that the leygues was about as good as the french get, range wise, whereas the Leanders are just average. l


We compared cruisers, didn´t we? The only cruiser gun in the german Navy was the 5.91"/60 which was way more powerful than what you considered. There were no 5.91"/45 or 5.91"/55 in german CL´s (safe the training CL Emden, which had 5.91"/45) or CA´s (safe the PBB´s 5.91"/55 in deck mounts with shields). A 15% difference in muzzle velocity is a very serious issue, which cannot be ignored. to put this into comparison: Use of supercharges in british warships offered an increase of 7 to 8% in muzzle velocity for the same projectile.

Ah no, my original post regarding this strand was about the instances that British cruisers engaged 5.9 armed cruisers, not that the Kormoran was representative. AFAIK there are no instances of british 6 in cruisers engaging proper 5.9 in German cruisers


I think differing definitions of vitals are a serious point of departure in our opinions.
I used to define vitals as the following:
1.) embedded vitals:
"hull vitals"- that are the main and secondary magazines, main and secondary ship controll room and firecontroll center + turbines, boilers and auxilary machinery as well as steering gear (all these are under the Main armour deck and protected by deck + belt)

I agree, because penetrations to these parts of the ship will generally lead to the loss of the ship.

2.) exposed vitals:
"upper structures" which are necessary for communication (armoured comm tubes, radio station, bridge) controll (firecontroll room with rangefinder and electronic equipment) and gunnery (main secondary guns + their barbettes). Exposed vitals are usually screened by very thick armour (except in the british KGV-class) to keep them operational.


Never heard of these parts of the ship being referred to as vitals. In naval circles these are generally referred to as upper works or superstructure (more loosely). But in my experience they are seldonm referred to as vitals. because a hit against these parts are not generally going to cause the rapid loss of the ship. I am not saying that this always happened, sometimes things just went wrong, but it is the generalized approach adopted in most naval circles.


The former helps to keep the mobility, floatation and stability of the ship while the latter is linked to it´s offensive abilities and was what suffered from close range penetrating hits. It´s not necessary to defeat the belt in the first place to achieve critical hits on the vitals summarized under 2.)


Only if accept the armour around the upper works as vitals, which i, and every other naval officer i have ever talked to would disagree with you on

Agreed. The exposed vitals, unlike the embedded ones, were not protected to repel close range major impacts. I wonder which ship had such a level of protection for the exposed vitals? Yamatos turret faces are impenetrable but her barbettes and CT, the comm tubes and sec. batteries would suffer equally here.
South Dakota at Guadacanal was heavily engaged in medium to close range from mostly 8" (a very few 14"ers, too) and prooved to be soundly protected for her exposed vitals in the course of the action but the test was much less severe than that of Bismarck.
Bismarcks protection of her upper works was not great, as evidenced by the rapid demise of her main armement in her final engagement. one/two hits to virtually knock out the main armament is not a ringing endorsement of her upper works protection scheme.

the theoretical netto broadside output of Graf spee stands corrected to only 12.318lbs instead of 15.210 lbs.


Only the 11.1"ers will be 100% effective. The same is not true for the 5.91"/55 when firing nose or base fused HE-shells.


That are Ajax and Achilles only. Feel free to add Exeters main battery output to Harwoods cruiser force. Maximum sustained rof for the 8"/50 was 4 rpm:
6 x 256lbs x 4 = 6.144 lbs.
------------------theoretical netto output:
Langsdorff: 12.318lbs
Harwood: 20.480lbs
------------------------------------------
As you see, Harwoods cruiser force outguns Graf Spee by a significant margin in terms of broadside weight in a given period. You could add Graf spees 4.1" DP guns to this but it wouldn´t change much, if anything to his advantage and Harwood does have secondary guns at his disposal, too.

Only if you accept that every hit by the RN ships are going penetrate and cause a degree of lethal damage. We both know that they cannot. Putting aside the 8 in rounds, perhaps 20% of the british 6" rounds can be expected to penetrate something. Reduce the effective broadside of the 6in component to 20% (or some other reasonable estimate), and then you have a true picture of the fpf factors ast work here. The penduluim swings firmly infavour of the Spee if you do.


At the distance in question (13.000yards, IIRC), deck penetration is unlikely to happen. The angle of fall (13 deg.) is to small and any projectile would be deflected away by the 40mm deck at such large impact obliquities. The 6"ers will not defeat the belt but they can defeat the upper hull, the side blisters, the ship ends, the secondary guns and take out RF equipment. At closer range (6.000 yards or less), they should be sufficiantly powerful to defeat the main belt, even with CPBC.

The problem is getting to that range. Even going full tilt, it will take 3 minuts at least to close the range. In reality the time is going to be two to three times that. More than enough time for the Spee to sink one or both of them

 

[parsifal]

Range of British cruisers, source IMHO the best secondary source on subject ie Raven's and Roberts' British Cruisers of WWII (p. 208 )
all at 12 kts, figures in nautical mls

Kents 13300
Londons 12700
Norfolks 12500
Leanders 10300
Mod. Leanders 10700
Arethusas 8200
Southamptons 12100
Belfasts 12200
Didos 7400
Fijis 10200

Juha

The problem Juha is that Del is disputing these figures, saying essentially that they are "cooked". Its the old chestnut again...everything the allies say that dont fit the intended outcomes are lies, everything that do is gospel truth. In case you havent noticed, we've see this before.....

 

[Kurfürst]

The problem Juha is that Del is disputing these figures, saying essentially that they are "cooked". Its the old chestnut again...everything the allies say that dont fit the intended outcomes are lies, everything that do is gospel truth. In case you havent noticed, we've see this before.....

... and here my friend, you are entering the realm of rhetorics and demagoghy and leave the realm of reasoned arguements behind.

 

[delcyros]

For the record, the accepted way to address endurance properly is to assume full load displacement, and economic cruising sppeed, usually of around 14 knots, and then work out the radius of action.

Parsifal, this statement is testimony of a poor understanding of range and endurance issues.
The best cruise speed depends on ship design and is also linked with a number of optimal wavelengths and the ready status of the boilers and not only with load, specific fuel consumption and buncerage as You suggest.
I pointed to grave, and I mean REALLY GRAVE differences in those definitions between navies and often even between classes of ships which are not reflected in Your source.

I do also think You are a bit unfair to french ships saying that they were unable to mount sustained patrols. Evidence from historic records of the french Force de Raid showed clearly that french cruisers participated in partols in the Nort Atlantic theatre from outbreak of the hostilities.

I NEVER SAID THAT. PLEASE DO NOT MISQUOTE ME.

Actually, Parsifal, You exactly said this in post 59, I will compensate Your losses in short time memory:

The biggest single problem with the french cruisers were the limited endurance that they possessed. They were unable to mount the sustained patrols far from home that the British cruisers were able to do.

Perhaps my poor english can be blamed for this but this sentence appears to be in strong contradiction to what You wrote above. It isn´t even a comparison.

Whilst you are correct to say that only the big cruisers carred 3400 tons of oil, the advantage held by the lighter cruisers is not to be scoffedd at. The Leanders, for example, with a similar displacement to the Leygues (before fuel) carried 1800tons of oil, to 1569 tons. The range of the Leygues was 5500 miles @ 14 Knots, to the leanders 7000 @ 12 knots. If you were to give the leygues the same amount of fuel as the Leanders, the estimated endurance of the ship would increase to 6300 miles @ 14 knots, which is very close to that of the Leanders.

Without having access to specific fuel consumption figures and the ships cruise profile, I would be very careful with such statements. Bottomline is that you don´t know the range of Leander at 14 Kts cruise speed, You ASSUME it to be 7.000. It can be 6.000nm or 5.000nm or something else. Certainly, Leanders range will be LESS than 7000nm at 14 Kts because it takes an unknown amount of SHP to add two knots cruise speed. Additional power requires additional fuel consumption. Depending on the specific fuel consumtpion graph for the machinery, the total fuel consumtion or both, the total and specific fuel consumption will raise. It´s an engeneering question.
The key question is: Does these number accurately confirm Your postulated unability of french cruisers to mount sustained patrols? I am firm to give opposition here.

AFAIK there are no instances of british 6 in cruisers engaging proper 5.9 in German cruisers

Exact.

to 1.) embedded vitals: I agree, because penetrations to these parts of the ship will generally lead to the loss of the ship.

You agreed but Your explenation for this is the worst sort of nonsense. Ever heard of redundancy as a concept in warship design? Try to proof that the loss of a ship will follow any penetration into these vitals GENERALLY! I have filed down enough examples to disproove your explenation on a statistically meaningful base. Penetrations into the vitals are serious issues but not generally linked with the destruction of the ship (compare HIPPER for a boiler hit and USS BOISE for a magazine hit).

Never heard of these parts of the ship being referred to as vitals. In naval circles these are generally referred to as upper works or superstructure (more loosely). But in my experience they are seldonm referred to as vitals. because a hit against these parts are not generally going to cause the rapid loss of the ship.

Superstructures and upper works are not precise and may refer to multiple unarmoured parts like masts, funnels, bridge, hangars and other spaces above the weather deck, which are not related to the exposed vitals.
You will find a detailed discussion about these parts of the ship to be considered as "vitals" and put under at least comparable degree of armour protection in the design history of the Nevada-class well documented in english. I can cite german and french articles for further readings in case You are familar with these languages.

Bismarcks protection of her upper works was not great, as evidenced by the rapid demise of her main armement in her final engagement. one/two hits to virtually knock out the main armament is not a ringing endorsement of her upper works protection scheme.

Your account is inaccurate: 1-2 hits knocket out turret B and temporarely turret A, not the whole main armement of Bismarck, whether virtually or not.
However, I do firmly second that the exposed vitals of Bismarck had only an average degree of protection (on the level of Washington-class). By pure means of comparison they must be described as poor. The only modern BB-classes suffering from an even worser protection in this respect are Dunkerque and KGV.
Even a non penetrating impact on the barbettes f.e. may jamm the turret (compare South Dakota at Guadacanal) temporarely but a penetration of the barbettes in a condition fir to burst has the potential to destroy the entire ship. It doesn´t need to happen generally, by standarts of ww2 with improved anti flash protection compared to those of ww1, but such cases exist.

Only if you accept that every hit by the RN ships are going penetrate and cause a degree of lethal damage.

They don´t need to penetrate in order to degrade Graf Spees fighting ability with hits on the aforementioned but unarmoured parts of the ship. They may not deal out lethal damage but they can degrade her combat and mobility related abilities by a substantial degree. You have failed to acknowledge that Your maths are on the level of speculation and failed to include HMS Exter in the first place. Harwood choosed to accept the engagement and he was certainly not thinking he was outgunned.

The problem is getting to that range. Even going full tilt, it will take 3 minuts at least to close the range. In reality the time is going to be two to three times that. More than enough time for the Spee to sink one or both of them

I seriously think You are exaggerating Graf Spees abilities. With Glowworm vs. Hipper and Scharnhorst+Gneisenau vs Acasta Achates in mind, Your estimation does appear to be grossly overexaggerated. Or- in case they are not, You underestimate the ability of british cruisers to take damage beyond any reason.
Graf Spee has two main turrets. Her 5.91" single pedestal mounts achieved how many hits at River plate? Yes, the number is negliable.
Point is You have three approaching cruisers. If Graf Spee engages one of those each with a single turret (it cannot split her battery to all three targets, so one cruiser will be always unengaged), her hitting rate will drop over proportionally. In order to achieve a high hit rate Graf Spee needs to concentrate her main battery on ONE target. Leaving two cruisers unengaged. Target change always ruines FC solutions at first. Graf Spee is badly handicapped. She finds herselfe on a remote place, outgunned, outnumbered and unable to disengage. She is well protected at long to medium ranges but the initiative to choose the range is not up to her.
Her advances are firecontroll, radar, ability to deliver critical hits at very long range and certainly some level of high crew training as well.

I personally have no intention to overexaggerate Graf Spees abilities, nor those of any other warship. I do not even see how this can be justified. Differences exist and can be identifed. It is normal and welcome when those differences are subject to differing interpretations.

 

[Aussie1001]

Well i thought this was a forum not a novel writing contest, they would be nearly the biggest post i have ever seen.....