What would Japan have done if Malaya well defended?

[Admiral Beez]

Let's give Malaya the Dobbie/Bond requested 500 combat aircraft (likely Mohawks, Buffaloes, Hurricanes, Hudsons, additional Blenheims, plus Beauforts replacing the Vilderbeests), with radar fighter direction (I visited the plotting table In the Battle Box, let's put it to use) and properly located, prepared and defended airfields.

Next, we keep at Malaya all the ships withdrawn in/about Sept 1939 the three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, sixteen sloops, nine minesweepers, sixteen submarines and the monitor HMS Terror plus HMS Hermes and her 12-16 Swordfish.

Next, the 130,000 troops that were in place in Feb 1942 are in place in October 1941. With them are bicycle regiments, mortars, artillery and much of the kit that was needed. Tanks are still unlikely, IMO. And a better pre-war commander, Percival being replaced by Monty or equivalent.

I know the tendency will be to debate the how (clearly there's a much higher assessment of Japanese threat and more accurate predicted timing...) but I'm more interested in the what.... what does Japan do if this force is in place? How will Japanese strategy deal with this? They still need the DEI oil.

 

[Shinpachi]

There would have been no Pacific War.

 

[Snautzer01]

Off course there would be. Higher odds but no doubt in my mind Japan would go for it.

 

[Admiral Beez]

There would have been no Pacific War.

That seems unlikely. Japan still attacked Pearl Harbour and the Philippines when both were well defended. The latter had 30,000 troops, two cruisers, thirteen destroyers and twenty three submarines. The former was of course the USN's primary PacFleet base. And Japan needs oil, desperately, and must seize the DEI by early 1942 or be starved into submission.

Had Malaya been defended, IMO the IJA would have planned a preemptive strike to neutralize the RN at Singapore and in the Gulf of Thailand. Once the RN was neutralized, the Japanese could ignore Malaya, seize the Philippines and DEI, regroup and then go for Malaya and Burma with a concerted IJA/N effort.

 

[Shinpachi]

As a basic fact, IJA was unwilling to extend its battleline to the Pacific because the oil embargo was not necessarily serious issue for the army in China while IJN was eager for the oil to "patrol" in the Pacific and thinking to reach the oil fields in Java through Philippine and Celebes as Malaya was risky but it was impossible for the navy to carry out this plan without the army's help. IJA's most concern was always in China and the Soviet border. If the defense of Malaya had been so tough as you suggest, IJA would have re-thought the plan.

 

[Admiral Beez]

As a basic fact, IJA was unwilling to extend its battleline to the Pacific because the oil embargo was not necessarily serious issue for the army in China

Malaya was nearly an entirely IJA affair, with the IJN focusing on troop transport and maritime strike against Force Z. If Malaya was a necessity for seizing DEI oil for the IJN, what's in it for the IJA? I suppose the IJA couldn't confidently go into Burma with non-engaged British troops are on their southern flank.

Circling back to my original premise of greater British preparation, I'd like to see Britain get into FIC before the IJA arrives in Sept 1940 after the Fall of France. Make it a condition of the BEF going to France in 1939-40, that a few brigades of Indian or other 2nd line troops, some Vilderbeests and RN ships are permitted to base in FIC. Anything that can show the British flag to discourage Japan from walking into FIC. With British forces in FIC, even in a tiny force, Churchill then warns Japan that any move into FIC is equal to an attack on Malaya. Britain was certainly willing to attack or seize other French territory, including Algeria and Madagascar.

 

[fastmongrel]

Ironically for Japanese desire for oil if only they had known that the Sakhalin Islands might be one of the biggest oil fields ever. I have read that it potentially has 7 billion barrels of oil plus gas.

I doubt the technology existed to exploit the oil fields but it could have made Japan very rich if it had been developed.

 

[Shinpachi]

If Malaya was a necessity for seizing DEI oil for the IJN, what's in it for the IJA? I suppose the IJA couldn't confidently go into Burma with non-engaged British troops are on their southern flank.

Here would be a clue in a scene of the General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo dated November 2, 1941.
General Honma as new commander of the 14th army for Philippine asked Chief of the General Staff Sugiyama with slight resistance "Who at all made this plan and schedule for us, Sir ?"
Sugiyama answered nothing but gazed at Honma with surprise.
General Imamura as new commander of the 16th army for Java admonished Honma "We only have to obey order and do our best."
General Yamashita as new commander of the 25th army for Malaya accepted order with mixed feelings as he knew Tojo hated him.

"We only have to obey order and do our best." would have been all.

Source: 山下将軍とその兵団

 

[Admiral Beez]

General Yamashita as new commander of the 25th army for Malaya accepted order with mixed feelings as he knew Tojo hated him.

"We only have to obey order and do our best." would have been all.

Considering Yamashita handed Britain its worst defeat on land since Yorktown, he did just fine.

But what would the IJA generals and IJN admirals, tasked with "doing their best" do if faced with a well defended Malaya? My guess, postpone the Philippines attack, and maybe Pearl Harbour as well. Build up forces in Formosa and FIC, and concrete the attack on Malaya through Thailand. A reinforced Malaya would require a Britain first strategy. With Germany roaring across Russia, and Britain pushed into a corner in North Africa by Rommel, this would seem a sound plan for Japan.

 

[Shinpachi]

That's true, Beez.
As there were several small oil fields in Japan and Manchukuo beside the oil stock for a few years, the embargo by US was not necessarily imminent crisis. Tougher defense of Malaya would have been a good chance for Japan to recover from the panic.

 

[Admiral Beez]

That's true, Beez.
As there were several small oil fields in Japan and Manchukuo beside the oil stock for a few years, the embargo by US was not necessarily imminent crisis. Tougher defense of Malaya would have been a good chance for Japan to recover from the panic.

If the Japanese can hold out just another year, to end 1942 when Germany's offensive in Russia has been irreversibly destroyed and the British victorious in North Africa, they'll thank their good fortune.

 

[Shinpachi]

If the Japanese can hold out just another year, to end 1942 when Germany's offensive in Russia has been irreversibly destroyed and the British victorious in North Africa, they'll thank their good fortune.

This might be another what-if and I do not want to expand it but, according to our reports, the Allied soldiers of not only Malaya but DEI and Philippines showed little fighting spirits costing their lives. Do you think the war in Europe was still advantageous to the Allies without Pearl Harbor?
I am curious a little bit.

 

[Admiral Beez]

This might be another what-if and I do not want to expand it but, according to our reports, the Allied soldiers of not only Malaya but DEI and Philippines showed little fighting spirits costing their lives. Do you think the war in Europe was still advantageous to the Allies without Pearl Harbor?

FDR was forced into the European war by Hitler's declaration of war on the USA on Dec 11, 1941. I'm not convinced that FDR would have joined The European war at all otherwise. Instead, as the new arms dealer to the world and apparent king maker, the USA will sit back and provide the weapons and fuel the Europeans need to destroy one another.

Germany will still lose in Russia and North Africa, as US-provided arms will make sure the British and Russians have the necessary kit to send the Axis packing. The big problem for Europe, is without D-Day and American boots on the ground in Europe, after taking Berlin, Russia is going to march right to the English Channel. At that point, if I was Japan, I'd be offering to renew the 1902 relationship with Britain, since Russia will be looking southward for new conquest. But now we're getting into deep alternative history fantasy, so I'll stop here.

 

[Shinpachi]

Excellent perspective.
Thank you very much, Beez.

 

[Freebird]

Let's give Malaya the Dobbie/Bond requested 500 combat aircraft (likely Mohawks, Buffaloes, Hurricanes, Hudsons, additional Blenheims, plus Beauforts replacing the Vilderbeests), with radar fighter direction (I visited the plotting table In the Battle Box, let's put it to use) and properly located, prepared and defended airfields.

Beauforts aren't likely to be available in the autumn of 1941 for Singapore, from early 1941 there are two Beaufort squadrons operational in the UK (22 & 42) with two more (86 & 217) from the summer of '41.

Better options might be Hampdens from Canada and Bostons from the US.
Some Swordfish squadrons could have been invaluable.

Next, we keep at Malaya all the ships withdrawn in/about Sept 1939 the three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, sixteen sloops, nine minesweepers, sixteen submarines and the monitor HMS Terror plus HMS Hermes and her 12-16 Swordfish.

These ships wouldn't be of much use vs superior Japanese naval power, they'd just be targets while based in Malaya.
Better to send them to Ceylon or DEI until needed for operations.
The Swordfish should have been landed in Malaya as a torpedo strike squadron, and Hermes sent to Canada or Ceylon to equip with Sea Hurricanes as a CAP carrier

Next, the 130,000 troops that were in place in Feb 1942 are in place in October 1941.

There were never 130,000 "troops" in Malaya/Singapore.
This number represents the total number of Commonwealth personnel surrendered, which includes dockworkers, airfield repair & maintenance, medical staff, signals intelligence staff, logistics personnel, Far East Command staff etc.

The Imperial conference in 1940 had recommended 48 trained & equipped combat battalions, which could give a 4 + 4 arrangement (4 divisions + 4 brigades)
Instead by Nov 1941 there are only 31 battalions, which would give 3 + 1 (divisions/brigades)
Another 16 or 17 battalions arrived by Feb, however at least 4 of the brigades (2nd Maylay, 28th, 44th & 45th Indian) are so poorly trained and equipped as to be nearly useless in the defence

The 4th division is critical to the proper defence.
Had Churchill & Cabinet simply followed the recommendations and send 4 + 4 well trained & equipped to Malaya, they could have put up a credible defence, and likely stopped the IJA advance.

With them are bicycle regiments, mortars, artillery and much of the kit that was needed. Tanks are still unlikely, IMO.

Tanks are critical.
Even a couple of squadrons of Valentine tanks (32 tanks) could have been decisive in stopping the Japanese advance.
Considering that 450+ tanks were sent to the Soviets in 1941, sending 30 or so to Malaya from Canada would have negligible effect on other theaters.

 

[Freebird]

And a better pre-war commander, Percival being replaced by Monty or equivalent.

Certainly a better command staff and operational planning would be vital.
Having the RAF and the army cooperate on a defensive plan would work wonders

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Swordfish should have been landed in Malaya as a torpedo strike squadron, and Hermes sent to Canada or Ceylon to equip with Sea Hurricanes as a CAP carrier.

Even a couple of squadrons of Valentine tanks (32 tanks) could have been decisive in stopping the Japanese advance.

All good points. Hermes' can't operate any non-folding monoplane FAA aircraft as her T-shape lifts clip the wing roots. The Buffalo would fit, but the only FAA fighter Hermes can deploy until folding Martlets are available is the Gladiator. We must remember that Hermes is in South Africa being rebuilt until November 1941, an ideal time to fix the lift dims. When Hermes was first designed her lifts were supposed to 22x45ft rectangular shaped (see builder's drawing below), just like Ark Royal, but they switched to T-shape to fix the Nimrod and other fixed wing biplanes. Had Hermes kept those original lifts she'd be able to operate every folding FAA type, up to the Tarpon.

The Canadian Valentines won't be ready to send. It's one of my favourite What'Ifs and I've studied it well, and been deservedly refuted each time.

Canadian Valentines to Malaya, Sept 1941
Canadian tanks, troops, guns and planes to Malaya, Oct 1941

 

[Admiral Beez]

When Hermes was first designed her lifts were supposed to 22x45ft rectangular shaped (see builder's drawing below), just like Ark Royal, but they switched to T-shape to fix the Nimrod and other fixed wing biplanes. Had Hermes kept those original lifts she'd be able to operate every folding FAA type, up to the Tarpon.

My mistake, Hermes' original lifts were to be 44 by 20 feet. That would be a limitation, since I don't think many folded aircraft were under 20ft wide.

 

[Freebird]

My mistake, Hermes' original lifts were to be 44 by 20 feet. That would be a limitation, since I don't think many folded aircraft were under 20ft wide.

Albacore is 17'9" wide
Fulmar is 18 feet wide.

Both are 40 feet long

 

[Freebird]

The Canadian Valentines won't be ready to send. It's one of my favourite What'Ifs and I've studied it well, and been deservedly refuted each time.

Canadian Valentines to Malaya, Sept 1941
Canadian tanks, troops, guns and planes to Malaya, Oct 1941

??

On that post you suggested sending 200 Canadian Valentines in 1941, of which there aren't that many built.
Additionally, the Allies couldn't spare that many, nor is there a need for a full armoured division in Malaya.

There are about 60 Valentines built by early Sept, with the 100th completed Nov 6th.
Certainly enough to send 24 or 32 to Malaya by early October.