What would Japan have done if Malaya well defended?

[Admiral Beez]

??

Yes, as I said, refuted.

Those posts required a hypothetically earlier start of both Canadian-made Valentines and Hurricanes.

 

[swampyankee]

FDR was forced into the European war by Hitler's declaration of war on the USA on Dec 11, 1941. I'm not convinced that FDR would have joined The European war at all otherwise. Instead, as the new arms dealer to the world and apparent king maker, the USA will sit back and provide the weapons and fuel the Europeans need to destroy one another.

Germany will still lose in Russia and North Africa, as US-provided arms will make sure the British and Russians have the necessary kit to send the Axis packing. The big problem for Europe, is without D-Day and American boots on the ground in Europe, after taking Berlin, Russia is going to march right to the English Channel. At that point, if I was Japan, I'd be offering to renew the 1902 relationship with Britain, since Russia will be looking southward for new conquest. But now we're getting into deep alternative history fantasy, so I'll stop here.

This is something I keep seeing, but I disagree. The USA, under an openly isolationist president, entered the Great War due to German submarine warfare. If anything, Hitler's navy was more aggressive than the kaiser's. My prediction is the USA would enter a war against the Axis by mid- to late 1942.

To some extent, the USSR's foreign policy was an extension of the tsars', with the Soviet attacks on, for example, Ukraine and Finland being as much revanchism as ideology.

 

[Freebird]

Yes, as I said, refuted.

Those posts required a hypothetically earlier start of both Canadian-made Valentines and Hurricanes.

Canadian Valentines refuted how?
Please elaborate

 

[Admiral Beez]

Canadian Valentines refuted how?
Please elaborate

No, my what'if scenarios on those two links above, they were both debated and refuted, or disproven to have been feasible. I only include them in this discussion because of the mention of Canadian Valentines above.

 

[Shortround6]

FDR was forced into the European war by Hitler's declaration of war on the USA on Dec 11, 1941. I'm not convinced that FDR would have joined The European war at all otherwise. Instead, as the new arms dealer to the world and apparent king maker, the USA will sit back and provide the weapons and fuel the Europeans need to destroy one another.

See the US "Neutrality Patrol" and see the
USS Reuben James.
USS Kearny.
USS Greer.

It was only a matter of time.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I always like your what-ifs, Beez.

Good points:

1) Sending some tanks to Malaya, so long as they get decent training for operations in local conditions, along with the logistics to maintain them in an environment hostile to complex machinery.

2) Beefing up both RN and RAF units available. Having Hermes available as CAP carrier would have given the RN organic air defense, too, simplifying command and communications (which difficulties were a factor in the loss of Force Z).

3) Stationing Army units in FIC before the Japanese got there.

Tough gos:

1) The Japanese would likely be loath to attempt the conquest of Indonesia with both flanks of the sealanes (FIC, PI) under the control of hostile powers.

2) IIRC, Toland reported that IJN in Oct 1941 was down to 18 months' oil reserves at peacetime usage, and 6 months' if at war. The Japanese needed Indonesian oil after the American embargo.

3) With those two points in mind, had the IJA approved, Malaya would still be attacked, and perhaps the PI as well. If the Japanese accepted American neutrality and a neutral PI as a necessary risk, that would free up many necessary forces to overcome the British reinforcements.

Under those conditions, once Malaya and Indonesia are under control, the Philippines are themselves flanked on three sides, and the Japanese are free to reorganize forces for prosecuting an attack on them should it prove necessary.

None of this takes into account the ramifications on American political trends, which might well become more bellicose.

 

[Glider]

If they are wise then if Malaya was well defended then they would have been wise to rely on their navy, defend and not launch the attack on Pearl Harbour. The USA would have joined the war but the Japanese may well have had enough time to get control of the raw materials it so desperately needed

 

[swampyankee]

FDR was forced into the European war by Hitler's declaration of war on the USA on Dec 11, 1941. I'm not convinced that FDR would have joined The European war at all otherwise. Instead, as the new arms dealer to the world and apparent king maker, the USA will sit back and provide the weapons and fuel the Europeans need to destroy one another.

Germany will still lose in Russia and North Africa, as US-provided arms will make sure the British and Russians have the necessary kit to send the Axis packing. The big problem for Europe, is without D-Day and American boots on the ground in Europe, after taking Berlin, Russia is going to march right to the English Channel. At that point, if I was Japan, I'd be offering to renew the 1902 relationship with Britain, since Russia will be looking southward for new conquest. But now we're getting into deep alternative history fantasy, so I'll stop here.

German diplomacy was able to bring the USA, led by Wilson, who was much more isolationist than Roosevelt, into the Great War. I suspect it would manage equally well in 1942.

 

[Admiral Beez]

I always like your what-ifs, Beez.

Thanks. My masterpiece on defence of Malaya is the Great Imperial Railway. I triggered half a dozen contrarians and got myself banned somehow, but they ban many each month there, c'est la vie.

My railway from Calcutta to Singapore through Thailand (or land seized from Thailand) would be Indian broad gauge from end to end, allowing trains carrying troops, provisions, munitions, artillery and armour to quickly move between India, Burma and Malaya without needing to change carriages. Heck, I'd even invite the French to make a connection from FIC.

Now, building this railway through Burma will be immensely difficult and expensive, and very hard to justify in this era of huge British merchant marine. Even today there's no rail connection between Kolkata and Yangon, though it's in the works, Trans-Asian Railway - Wikipedia. As for the train from Malaya to Burma, the Japanese managed to build that.

 

[Glider]

At that point, if I was Japan, I'd be offering to renew the 1902 relationship with Britain, since Russia will be looking southward for new conquest. But now we're getting into deep alternative history fantasy, so I'll stop here.

This part of the posting was closer to reality than one might think. The Japanese Political and senior Government officials were very much against Japan joining the German and Italian governments Axis Alliance, signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 with Germany and the Tripartite Act in 1940. Yoshida Shigeru an ambassador in the UK wrote that he believed the Japanese Military had seriously overestimated the strength of Germany. He pointed out that Germany had been seriously beaten in WW1 and suffered huge economic damage in the recession only 20 years before and their development, remarkable as it was, could not compare to the economic strength of the UK and USA who has access to resources across the world.

Clearly the Military hierarchy overruled them but it was a closer decision than most people realise. Had the UK shown a stronger presence in the area and made serious provision to defend the region, then there is a fighting chance that the debacle wouldn't have started. Instead they saw the UK's view of the area as being an afterthought, always getting the second best equipment and men. This plus Germany's unexpected success in France and Britain's understandable concentration on its defence gave them the chance.

 

[wlewisiii]

Reading through this, I think that the Japanese response to a more heavily defended Malaya would have been that it would be harder fought and cost more but the oil was still absolutely necessary. Without it, they're nothing.

December 41:
1) Continue with the attack at Pearl Harbor to minimize the risk of US Naval intervention
2) Attack the air fields on the PI to minimize the risk of US air intervention.
3) Roll all the forces that would have been used to invade the PI into the invasion of Malaya

Feb 42:
4) Use a naval strike force of carriers and battleships to draw out the British naval forces to the slaughter.

May 42:
5) After the fall of Malaya, try to sue for peace with the US. If it fails (probably due to psych of Pearl Harbor) invade PI

July ~ September 42:
6) Use that to try to bait a set piece naval battle with the US such as they always planned for to crush the US Pacific fleet.

The important thing to remember is that the Japanese need the US & Britain out of the picture by late 42 so they can consolidate their gains. If the US codebreakers are as successful in this timeline as in the prime, then 6) could turn into a "Midway" scenario and the long but inevitable defeat of the IJN begins because, just like Germany in Europe, they don't have the resources to win.

I think that no matter how it plays out, the end is still a defeat for the Axis, it just takes longer - perhaps until 1948 - and costs many more lives but the resources of the western hemisphere would still be overwhelming.

 

[Admiral Beez]

it would be harder fought and cost more but the oil was still absolutely necessary. Without it, they're nothing.

Agreed, but for all their focus on oil, Japan had no plans in place to transport, refine or use the oil once they captured the DEI. During Japan's occupation oil extraction dramatically dropped, and there were few oilers to transport the oil to Japan.

Oil and Japanese Strategy in the Solomons: A Postulate

"...let's examine Japan's situation with respect to petroleum production at this stage in the war. In the fourth quarter of 1942, Japanese oil production (which was almost entirely concentrated in her conquered territories, such as the Indies) was 1,194,000 tons. Of that, only 643,000 tons made it to Japan (which is where practically all the refineries were), the rest being either lost to attack, or consumed in the conquered territories. So roughly 214,000 tons of oil per month was making it to Japan. However, the Imperial Navy alone was consuming about 305,000 tons of heavy oil (in the form of fuel oil) per month by this stage in the war (Parillo, p. 237). Keep that figure in mind: 305,000 tons.

Furthermore, by this time (October-November 1942) it must have been begining to become clear to the Japanese that the oilfields in Java and Sumatra were notgoing to be brought back into production at nearly the rate that pre-war estimates had counted on. The Dutch and their Allies had done a much more thorough job of demolition in the oilfields than the Japanese had hoped. This, coupled with the sinking of a transport filled with equipment and valuable refinery personnel, meant that Japanese efforts to get the production field back into production were doomed to be much slower than hoped by the Japanese military. The fact that the Imperial Navy had built up large stocks of petroleum before the was could not compensate for this sobering knowledge, especially given the high rate of fuel consumption thus far in the war. The week-long Battle of Midway alone had consumed more fuel than the Japanese Navy had ever used before in an entire year of peacetime "

 

[wlewisiii]

Very much so. They also underestimated the US submarine force against their merchant fleet because they saw submarines as being for combat against enemy fleet elements. The US submarines destruction of their merchant marine did as much if not more than any other single element in their loss to the US.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Very much so. They also underestimated the US submarine force against their merchant fleet because they saw submarines as being for combat against enemy fleet elements. The US submarines destruction of their merchant marine did as much if not more than any other single element in their loss to the US.

But even without losses, the Japanese did not have sufficient oil tanker vessels to transport the DEI oil to their refineries in Japan.

Look here, they didn't start producing new oilers until it was too late, Kawasaki-type oiler - Wikipedia

Japan clearly didn't think this through.

 

[swampyankee]

But even without losses, the Japanese did not have sufficient oil tanker vessels to transport the DEI oil to their refineries in Japan.

Look here, they didn't start producing new oilers until it was too late, Kawasaki-type oiler - Wikipedia

Japan clearly didn't think this through.

For some reason or another, the IJN gave almost no thought to commerce warfare. Considering that a) they had a long relationship with the RN and b) were reliant on imported raw materials, this seems to be an incredibly basic blunder.

 

[SaparotRob]

That was a fortunate hit on the merchant ship carrying equipment and crew for the oilfields (for the Allies). Was it an American torpedo that sank it? I'm not too familiar with that part of the conflict.

 

[Admiral Beez]

That was a fortunate hit on the merchant ship carrying equipment and crew for the oilfields (for the Allies). Was it an American torpedo that sank it? I'm not too familiar with that part of the conflict.

True, but one sinking has such an impact? Talk about putting all your eggs in one basket. And this demonstrates how behind Japan was in the scale of its petrochemical engineering industry. Had that been a British or US transport of BP or Standard Oil engineers and equipment sunk there'd be a replacement vessel, personnel and equipment despatched the next day.

 

[ClayO]

Ironically for Japanese desire for oil if only they had known that the Sakhalin Islands might be one of the biggest oil fields ever. I have read that it potentially has 7 billion barrels of oil plus gas.

I doubt the technology existed to exploit the oil fields but it could have made Japan very rich if it had been developed.

One more way that Japan would have been better off not to have started the war at all.

 

[SaparotRob]

I just read the link on the oilers. I'm going to look up the Akebono Maru which was at the Battle of Midway. I want a better idea about their tanker fleet. I imagine the ship construction featured in the link represents about one year of American tanker construction.

 

[ClayO]

Let's give Malaya the Dobbie/Bond requested 500 combat aircraft (likely Mohawks, Buffaloes, Hurricanes, Hudsons, additional Blenheims, plus Beauforts replacing the Vilderbeests), with radar fighter direction (I visited the plotting table In the Battle Box, let's put it to use) and properly located, prepared and defended airfields.

Next, we keep at Malaya all the ships withdrawn in/about Sept 1939 the three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, sixteen sloops, nine minesweepers, sixteen submarines and the monitor HMS Terror plus HMS Hermes and her 12-16 Swordfish.

Next, the 130,000 troops that were in place in Feb 1942 are in place in October 1941. With them are bicycle regiments, mortars, artillery and much of the kit that was needed. Tanks are still unlikely, IMO. And a better pre-war commander, Percival being replaced by Monty or equivalent.

I know the tendency will be to debate the how (clearly there's a much higher assessment of Japanese threat and more accurate predicted timing...) but I'm more interested in the what.... what does Japan do if this force is in place? How will Japanese strategy deal with this? They still need the DEI oil.

And then the flip side of this is, where did all of those ships, planes and personnel go? If they went to fight the Battle of the Atlantic, then what would have happened without them? England was holding on by a thread as it was, so those ships could have helped a lot. If they got thrown in to the debacle in Norway, then I agree, they would have been better off staying where they were.