Which aircraft would you cancel?

[stona]

Sometimes decisions are made for many reasons. some large and some small.

Whilst I agree with all of that I can only say that weight does not appear in any of the discussions which I know of prior to the issue of F.9/35. That doesn't mean it didn't happen.
I believe that it was the fundamental change in the concept of the turret fighter from a twin to a single engine type which was the basis for the decision to delete forward firing armament. A midships turret on a single engine type could never cover the 'forward hemisphere' for obvious reasons. It was this that resulted in the overturning of several years of thinking about turret fighters, really as a simple economic expedient. The only option would be fixed wing mounted armament of some type and not everyone was convinced that this was the right type of armament for any fighter at the time. It was just easier to delete it and justify it with some nonsense about splitting the armament.

As for control, imagine the problems with some of the earlier concepts in which not only would different armament be brought to bear in different scenarios, but control of the aircraft would pass between two different pilot/gunners (and positions) depending on that scenario.
Ellington (again)

"What I think is wanted is an aeroplane that can be fought against attack from both the front and from behind in formation; and for this a two pilot aircraft is required, so that one pilot can maintain the place of his aircraft in the formation while the other fights the front or rear gun or guns as the case may be."

We could have lost the war

As a BTW this obsession with rigid formation fighting, principally in an effort to multiply the fire power of individual aircraft, which was deemed inadequate, continued to effect the tactics for the fixed gun single seat aircraft at the beginning of WW2. The various rigidly controlled fighter attacks that all RAF pilots learned as part of 'Fighting Area' tactics are a reflection of this.

Cheers

Steve

 

[merlin]

Some interesting historical info here. Re; underemployed design staff - I think that was one of the reasons why Shorts were invited to submit a design - which became the Stirling, on the other hand they could just as easily been engaged in a military version of the S.25 flying boat.
Re: the Defiant - I think with older RAF people there was a danger of being pessimistic over the pressures the pilot would be under as aircraft got faster! Hence, the need for a gunner - because the pilot was too busy trying to fly the plane. Rather than the pilot becoming a glorified taxi driver. Dowding - I remember a post on this forum - wrote in 1939 that he wasn't in favour of the aircraft, though the contradiction here is - why weren't they stationed away from '109' range? Better, to have them in the Midlands, or if down South, then scramble not intercept incoming, but outgoing - to deal with the stragglers - after the 109s had gone.

 

[stona]

Yep, agree that the Air Staff generally seem to have under estimated the abilities of their air crew.

The drive towards two seat fighters was due to a combination of two interlinked factors. The quest for fire power and the need to fly in formation to achieve it.
A separate gunner (or gunners, several three seat aircraft were proposed in the 1930s) was considered essential as the pilot would need to concentrate on keeping the aircraft in place in the formation.
The pilot was not expected to maintain a formation and aim a gun or guns.

With hindsight we know that fighters typically did not attack simultaneously in large formations but much smaller units, between 2 and 4 aircraft in a loose 'formation'. This enabled the pilots of fixed gun fighters to aim their aircraft and guns at the same time and is a major factor in the eventual dominance of this type. It was by no means obvious in the mid 1930s.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Some interesting historical info here. Re; underemployed design staff - I think that was one of the reasons why Shorts were invited to submit a design - which became the Stirling, on the other hand they could just as easily been engaged in a military version of the S.25 flying boat.

The S.25 was the Sunderland.
The S.26 was the "G" class and first flew about 2 months after the first flight of the Stirling so I doubt the Stirling delayed it much at all.
The RAF buying long range patrol planes instead of bombers is a whole different saga.
I would also note that planning to close the mid Atlantic gap in 1936-37 calls for a tremendous amount of foresight as at that time the RAF was having a great deal of trouble buying planes to close the "coastal gap" let alone the "Western Approaches gap". I would also note that while very long range patrol planes did help close the mid Atlantic gap, what really sealed it was the escort carrier.

Shorts may have gotten the contract for the Stirling because they had the most experience with large 4 engine monoplanes, little as that was. First S.23 empire class flying boat flying in July of 1936. About one month after the Handley Page Hampden. Avro's design "expertise" being showcased by the Anson in 1935-36.

The Stirling was the quick, low risk way to get a 4 engine bomber into production/service. It weighed, empty, almost 4 times as much as a Hampden and about 2 1/2 times as much as an early Wellington.
The Halifax and Lancaster could both draw on experience gained with the Stirling and both were ordered "off the drawing board"instead of the normal development pattern. Shorts even building a flying 1/2 scale model of the Stirling to check the aerodynamics. While Shorts may not have shared much actual design work with other aircraft companies that doesn't apply to parts suppliers, like landing gear makers, brakes, wheels/tyres, hydraulic suppliers and so on were working the accessories that big planes would need.
Being "first" usually means a longer development time and having problems that 2nd and 3rd don't have.

Please note that I am not claiming the Stirling was a truly great aircraft or equal of the later bombers. Just that it is a lot harder to be the first type of aircraft in an era and/or country than some people think.

 

[merlin]

Ah yes, my mistake re. S.25. The 'C' Class Empire flying boats were part financed on the understanding (as I recall) the a military version would be based on it - this became the Sunderland. Whilst the 'C' Class was a success to India & Australia, there was a need to compete with the US on the Atlantic. Hence, the design for the 'G' Class - in the normal course of events as part of Government support, a military version would have been also been designed, whereas in OTL civilian 'C' Class flying boats were converted to military use, so were the three civilian 'G' Class aircraft.
So, to me, it seems plausible that the civil & military version gets built (perhaps call it Swansea), Maybe Bombay production is switched there earlier.

 

[stona]

Why was the Hampden produced at all?
The Air Ministry acknowledged that the best aircraft to Specification B.9/32 was the Vickers Wellington. 360 were required under Scheme F.
The Wellington's geodetic construction required a specialised rolling and milling plant only available at its Weybridge plant. Vickers already had contracts for the Wellesley and could only produce 180 Wellingtons by April 1939. The Air Ministry's options were further limited because geodetic construction was considered so revolutionary that it would have to be 'proved' at Weybridge before any sub-contracting would be permitted.
The Air Ministry's solution was to order the other B.9/32 as well, the Handley Page Hampden and the long term result of this was that resources were split between the two until late 1941.
These decisions were not always taken simply on the basis of which aircraft was the best. This was seldom the overriding reason. Like the decision to produce the Hampden, it could be taken on the basis of which aircraft could be made available in sufficient numbers to fulfill production plans.
If you cancel the Hampden, what replaces it in time to meet the requirements of rearmament and Scheme F? You can't have more Wellingtons.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tomo pauk]

I have the soft spot for the Hampden. Too bad it was not produced in Austin factory, instead the Battles.
Yes, I know that it would require an 'overhaul' of then-current expension scheme.

 

[Shortround6]

A very good point.

And once you have one (or more) factories tooled up to make Hampdens and the international situation is getting worse, when do you shut down the Hampden production and re-tool for Wellingtons (or what evers)?
In Sept 1939 there were 9 squadrons equipped with Hampdens of which only 5 were "declared" operational. The other four were still crew training.
There were only 8 squadrons of Wellingtons operational in Sept 1939 and those were 'day' squadrons. NONE had been officially declared operational by night.
There were only 7 squadrons equipped with Whitleys and 4 of them had MK III's with Tiger engines were so far from being satisfactory that they were pretty much banned from long over water flights.

Any 'scheme' that cuts down total production during this time (or for most of 1940) is running a gamble of more/better aircraft later for fewer at the beginning of the war.
Had the war started 6 months sooner the British bomber numbers would have been truly pathetic.

 

[Shortround6]

A lot of the RAFs troubles in the first few years of the war was more due to a lack of proper training rather than major defects in the aircraft.
Lack of gunnery training for pilots, a few days a year at a gunnery range away form the home base doesn't cut it.
A lack of experiments in air combat (dog fighting) vs the doctrine of formation attacks might have shown that pilots could fly and aim at the same time
Lack of bombing practice for bombers. Lack of navigation practice, both day and night.
Of course realistic exercises would have shown that many of the RAFs "claims" as to ability were pretty hollow.
Unfortunately "realistic exercises" like actually flying your night bombers at night increase the accident rate.

The other main failing was the armament or lack thereof. Inadequately tested bombs. Bombs of the wrong size (common mistake in the 30s) lack of even enough .303 machine guns to equip the planes being built so may planes went to war with Lewis guns taken out of storage. Lack of torpedoes has been mentioned in another thread. Shortage of good ammo even for the .303 guns with BoB fighters carrying 37.5% "Ball" ammo. etc.

 

[stona]

Here's some more food for thought for all those keen on cancellations.
British aircraft production was to be organised into Groups (I mentioned this somewhere else). Each group would manufacture a particular type of aircraft and only one type would be ordered from each operational class. There are many reasons this wasn't adopted at the start of Scheme F, as some had hoped, not least because the government had no powers of compulsion and initial expansion of the aircraft industry was financed by private capital giving the Air Ministry much less influence.
Fast forward a few years as the group schemes are supposed to be implemented and the Air Ministry finds that not one but three heavy bombers have flown, Stirling, Halifax and Manchester. The Air Ministry was keen to concentrate production on one model but there was concern that the wrong one might be selected, none had yet been properly tried in combat. The three companies were understandably keen to carry on their own projects.
The result was that groups were organised for all three aircraft. This was an expensive and inefficient way of going about bomber production but it ultimately ensured that Britain produced a great heavy bomber. The intention was to later concentrate on only one design, but for a variety of reasons this never happened. Had the decision been taken in 1939/40 to cancel one of the three it would very likely have been the Manchester which was not showing much promise. No Manchester equals no Lancaster.
Germany gambled everything on one design, the He 177, and look how that ended up.
I post this to illustrate how the precipitous early cancellation of one programme can have unintended effects on other future projects.

It also proved impossible to concentrate production in just one fighter group.
Initially a group was to be set up for the new Hawker fighter (Typhoon/Tornado) which was to replace the Hurricane AND Spitfire in 1941. The engine issues are well documented and it became apparent in 1939 that a Spitfire with a more conventional and proven engine would equal the performance of the Hawker fighter
New expansion schemes announced in 1938 provided for an increase in fighter strength nearly double that of Scheme F. The Air Ministry had to commit resources to fighters already in production. A Spitfire shadow factory (Castle Bromwich) was sanctioned and Supermarine's capacity enlarged. A Hurricane group was set up comprising Hawker, Gloster, two Scottish engineering companies and the Canadian Car and Foundry Company (Montreal).
At the outbreak of war Britain had made a commitment to all three fighters. Once again it was intended that all resources would eventually be concentrated in the new Hawker fighter, but the performance and development of the Spitfire meant that this never happened.
In refusing to standardise airframe production the Air Ministry was doing what it as often been accused of failing to do, putting quality before quantity.
The success of two similar designs might frustrate efforts for concentration, but the failure of other projects did advance the process. It's why companies like Westland, Blackburn, Saunders-Roe, and Boulton Paul spent most of the war building other people's designs.
The group system was revised from time to time, principally between 1939 and 1941, but the five groups established to produce the Wellington, Halifax and Manchester bombers and for the Merlin and Hercules engines, accounted for half the resources of the British wartime aircraft industry.
Cheers
Steve

 

[rinkol]

Here's some more food for thought for all those keen on cancellations.
British aircraft production was to be organised into Groups (I mentioned this somewhere else). Each group would manufacture a particular type of aircraft and only one type would be ordered from each operational class. There are many reasons this wasn't adopted at the start of Scheme F, as some had hoped, not least because the government had no powers of compulsion and initial expansion of the aircraft industry was financed by private capital giving the Air Ministry much less influence.
Fast forward a few years as the group schemes are supposed to be implemented and the Air Ministry finds that not one but three heavy bombers have flown, Stirling, Halifax and Manchester. The Air Ministry was keen to concentrate production on one model but there was concern that the wrong one might be selected, none had yet been properly tried in combat. The three companies were understandably keen to carry on their own projects.
The result was that groups were organised for all three aircraft. This was an expensive and inefficient way of going about bomber production but it ultimately ensured that Britain produced a great heavy bomber. The intention was to later concentrate on only one design, but for a variety of reasons this never happened. Had the decision been taken in 1939/40 to cancel one of the three it would very likely have been the Manchester which was not showing much promise. No Manchester equals no Lancaster.
Germany gambled everything on one design, the He 177, and look how that ended up.
I post this to illustrate how the precipitous early cancellation of one programme can have unintended effects on other future projects.

It also proved impossible to concentrate production in just one fighter group.
Initially a group was to be set up for the new Hawker fighter (Typhoon/Tornado) which was to replace the Hurricane AND Spitfire in 1941. The engine issues are well documented and it became apparent in 1939 that a Spitfire with a more conventional and proven engine would equal the performance of the Hawker fighter
New expansion schemes announced in 1938 provided for an increase in fighter strength nearly double that of Scheme F. The Air Ministry had to commit resources to fighters already in production. A Spitfire shadow factory (Castle Bromwich) was sanctioned and Supermarine's capacity enlarged. A Hurricane group was set up comprising Hawker, Gloster, two Scottish engineering companies and the Canadian Car and Foundry Company (Montreal).
At the outbreak of war Britain had made a commitment to all three fighters. Once again it was intended that all resources would eventually be concentrated in the new Hawker fighter, but the performance and development of the Spitfire meant that this never happened.
In refusing to standardise airframe production the Air Ministry was doing what it as often been accused of failing to do, putting quality before quantity.
The success of two similar designs might frustrate efforts for concentration, but the failure of other projects did advance the process. It's why companies like Westland, Blackburn, Saunders-Roe, and Boulton Paul spent most of the war building other people's designs.
The group system was revised from time to time, principally between 1939 and 1941, but the five groups established to produce the Wellington, Halifax and Manchester bombers and for the Merlin and Hercules engines, accounted for half the resources of the British wartime aircraft industry.
Cheers
Steve

The Napier Sabre engine must have been much more expensive than the Merlin/Griffon and,at least in the versions available during the war, left something to be desired in the way of high altitude performance. Presumably the priority assigned to the Typhoon must have owed something to superficial arguments to the effect that, the Typhoon had to offer decisive performance advantages given the availability of almost twice the engine power..

One thing that always mystified me was how it could be that companies such as Blackburn were allowed to continue so long as independent entities.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Typhoon was supposed to make 460 mph, the AM believed Hawker's estimates, while Hawker believed aerodynamicists that saw no disadvantage in thick wing profile. The Sabre never have had more than 40% power than the Merlin of same date - eg. in 1942 it is ~2000 HP vs. ~1500 HP.

 

[stona]

Blackburn ended up building the Barracuda and Swordfish for Fairey and I think the Sunderland for Shorts, none of which were their own designs.
Fairey Aviation was the biggest of the big two in terms of market share into the 1930s, the other being Vickers, and was intimately connected to the Air Ministry and military production. So much so that Sir Richard Fairey had argued that military aircraft construction required so much concentration that civil types could not be produced as well. The civil market was dominated by De Havilland.

Blackburn survived post war to build the Buccaneer, albeit as part of the Hawker Siddeley Group.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

Blackburn also built what the customer requested. If the customer has some rather bizarre requests is it up to the company to tell them they are wrong (and have them go to another supplier?).

De Havilland dominated the civil market in part because the British civil market was too small to support more than one major company.

Costs of sleeve valve engines have remained pretty much a mystery unless recently declassified?

 

[stona]

There was a significant civil market developed by De Havilland by concentrating on relatively cheap, low performance aircraft. Between 1930 and 1934 De Havilland's average annual sales in the civilian market compare closely with those of Vickers in the military market (£500,000 to £580,000). De Havilland also had a significant demand from foreign markets, unlike its military competitors who were building almost exclusively for the RAF, and the companies total production was only limited by the common practice of granting licenses to produce De Havilland products abroad. Some kind of license agreement was often a condition of purchase imposed by foreign governments at this time.
The Wright Corporation was licensed to build De Havilland engines in 1928. Subsidiary companies were established in some Commonwealth/Dominion countries and the USA (Moth Aircraft Corporation of America). Licenses were granted to companies in France and Norway.
In the ten years preceding the war De Havilland produced well over 3,000 civil aircraft in the UK, many more were produced under various arrangements abroad.
In 1924 De Havilland sales amounted to £138,495, by 1935 this had increased to £1,018,318. I would suggest that the company had found a significant and viable market for its civil aviation products and had exploited it successfully.
Cheers
Steve

 

[yulzari]

I will make a controversial offer on what RAF aircraft I would cancel. The Vickers Wellington.

Unable to operate in daylight without fighter cover it was less able to deliver bombs at night than the Whitley (weight for a given range) and used a construction method that could not be readily turned over to stressed skin alternatives. Vickers pleaded that their workforce and machinery could not be so changed and were allowed to carry on making Wellingtons until the war ended but they were quick enough to change when commercial sales demanded stressed skin construction (Viking etc.)

I would give Vickers production over to making Whitleys until a 4 engined successor comes along and then switch to making those. The Whitley was designed as a heavy (for the period) night bomber. Like most night bombers it would probably have been better off with no turrets which translates into some combination of increased range, bomb load or reduced time in the danger area through extra speed/height plus a smaller crew. Any extra performance also increases it's winter bombing range as the length of daylight determines it's maximum safe range. For the same investment in manpower, materials and engines you get a higher bomb load delivered over a wider range.

By late 1943, instead of churning out updated 1937 Wellingtons and occasional Warwicks they could have been turning out Lancasters in quantity. Enough quantity to cover a shortfall whilst Shorts cease making Stirlings and go over to Lancasters and maybe even do the same together to allow Halifaxes to be replaced by Lancasters in production too by 1944.

When you look at the use of Wellingtons in the Mediterranean theatre in 1944/45 they are operating in the same conditions as unarmed Dakotas except over Northern Italy where they are meeting radar equipped nightfighters and relying on RAF Mosquitos and USAAF Beaufighters to meet the threat. Increased Lancaster production would let the same tasks be undertaken with better effect and reduced losses. Even bombing Southern Germany etc. from Italy.

Now the Wellington was not a bad aeroplane but there was nothing it could do that a Whitley could not. I will grant that it looked prettier but the concept was a dead end as the Windsor demonstrated. Also the Whitley was specifically designed to be made in sections by dispersed contractors.

Taking off my hindsight goggles; I am aware that the RAF thought that it could operate Wellingtons unescorted in daylight with the combined defensive fire of a formation and that the Wellington was not ordered as a night bomber. One raid in 1939 blew that idea away.

 

[stona]

With the benefit of hindsight that's not a bad plan, anything to get more Lancasters works for me

I would like to put the decisions into some historic perspective, I know you are aware that the Wellington was never going to be axed. There were several reasons for this. Prior to the start of Scheme L capital investment and production plans had been formulated largely in isolation. The government gave out contracts an depended on the individual firms to provide the necessary floor space etc to meet them. After 1938 two principle factors changed this. First there was a clarification of long term government requirements and secondly the Air Council Sub-Commitee on Supply was created. This led to much closer relations between the firms and the Ministry. With this a close correlation of investment and production programmes was established.
It was the Supply Committee's discussions with Hawker Siddeley and Handley Page that revealed that the development of the Manchester and Halifax aircraft was going to be longer than previously anticipated and that consequently the weight of bomber production would be borne by the proposed Wellington group. In May 1938 Vickers were unable to release completed drawings for the Wellington to other firms in the group and consequently none of them (Gloster, Armstrong Whitworth, Austin) would commit themselves to Wellington production in 1939. There were other reservations about the tooling and techniques needed for the construction too. As a result of all this only Vickers could supply the Wellington in any significant, though inadequate numbers. There was no way in 1938/9 it could be cancelled.

As a by product of this the Wellington group was reorganised. Gloster was instructed to join Hawker to build the Hurricane. Factory capacity for the new heavy bombers was sanctioned, but until these types could be introduced, Handley Page, Armstrong Whitworth and Austin were instructed to continue building the Hampden, Whitley and Battle.

All Wellington production was undertaken by Vickers-Armstrong, parent company of the two Vickers aircraft firms.
An aerodrome and erecting shops were built at government expense, the highest possible level of component manufacture was sub contracted, the existing Vickers-Armstrong subsidiaries were absorbed for management purposes, Sir Robert McLean was fired and both Vickers Aviation and Supermarine were formally wound up ( the Spitfire became officially the Vickers Supermarine Spitfire.) During 1939 extensive networks were set up to supply assembly factories in Chester and Blackpool. Capacity at the original Weybridge factory was also increased. Excluding sub contractors this all amounted to an increase in the productive floor space for Wellington construction of 450%. Target production for the Chester and Blackpool factories was raised to 150 aircraft a month in 1939.
After all that there was no possibility of the Wellington being abandoned or of it not being produced in sufficient numbers to form a mainstay of Bomber Command until the introduction of the new heavy types.

Cheers

Steve

 

[Shortround6]

There was a significant civil market developed by De Havilland by concentrating on relatively cheap, low performance aircraft. Between 1930 and 1934 De Havilland's average annual sales in the civilian market compare closely with those of Vickers in the military market (£500,000 to £580,000). De Havilland also had a significant demand from foreign markets, unlike its military competitors who were building almost exclusively for the RAF, and the companies total production was only limited by the common practice of granting licenses to produce De Havilland products abroad. Some kind of license agreement was often a condition of purchase imposed by foreign governments at this time.
The Wright Corporation was licensed to build De Havilland engines in 1928. Subsidiary companies were established in some Commonwealth/Dominion countries and the USA (Moth Aircraft Corporation of America). Licenses were granted to companies in France and Norway.
In the ten years preceding the war De Havilland produced well over 3,000 civil aircraft in the UK, many more were produced under various arrangements abroad.
In 1924 De Havilland sales amounted to £138,495, by 1935 this had increased to £1,018,318. I would suggest that the company had found a significant and viable market for its civil aviation products and had exploited it successfully.
Cheers
Steve

De Havilland did do a rather good job of it but splitting the British (and to some extent the commonwealth market) between two or more major companies would have seen the failure of one of them. At least until the late 30s when contracts for primary trainers became large but then those might be military sales? By the figures you provide during the height of the depression De Havilland was making about 62-63,000 pounds per year in the civil market. Split that in two and see if it is enough for a major company to survive. The British did have a number of small companies competing for the 'civil' (private) market and some other companies trying for the commercial market.
I believe Wright licensed the the Gypsy engine in the late 1920s, Wright was trying to dominate the US market/s at the time and had no engine in the low power class (under 100hp) and their own Challenger engine of 150-180hp was pretty much a disaster. They built (or shipped) 88 Gypsy engines from 1927 to 1934.

 

[Shortround6]

Something that I tend to harp on (and without hard numbers on British aircraft to back it up) is the poor situation in regards to propellers on early British aircraft.
At this point in the thread I bring it up because of the suggestion to build Whitleys instead of Wellingtons. Whitleys as built could not maintain height on one engine, an all too common condition for British twin engine aircraft (bombers) in the late 30s and beginning of the war. Now "maintain height" covers a lot of ground as most (or all) twin engine aircraft can not maintain anywhere near their normal service ceiling on one engine. The question becomes what height they can maintain one one engine. SOME twins cannot stay in the air at all with one engine. They descend slowly (10-200ft per minute) to the ground even with the remaining engine at full power.
Jettisoning weight does help (dropping bombs, dumping fuel).
As one example of what propellers could do the Boeing 247 airliner had an absolute ceiling of 2000ft on one engine using fixed pitch props. Going to variable pitch props increased the absolute single engine ceiling to 10,000ft.
Granted British bombers had two pitch props or controllable pitch props but it took a long time to get fully feathering props on British aircraft.
Think of props a bit like a manual transmission on a car. Fine pitch for take-off is like low (1st gear) and coarse pitch is like high gear (4th/5th) Two pitch props have nothing in between while variable pitch props do. With an engine out you are dragging (pushing) the dead engine. With a fully feathering prop it is like putting the car in neutral instead of trying to push/pull it in high gear.
The British lost a lot of planes and crews because they couldn't make it back to base on one engine.
Lockheed Hudsons (along with some other aircraft) got the reputation of "old boomerang" on their ability to make it back to base despite battle damage (and engine out situations). the Hudson having a good power to weight ratio and having fully feathering propellers.

BTW leaving the turrets out of a Whitley really isn't going to do much. Since all there was were nose and tail turrets there was no high drag dorsal turret. Whitley had a high drag wing and that cocked fuselage was certainly no help. Sticking a pointy nose and tail on a Whitley is like putting lipstick on a pig.

Had the Whitley gotten Merlin XX engines instead of Merlin X and gotten fully feathering props in 1939/40 it might have done a bit better.

 

[CarlAce]

Blackburn Botha, underpowerd, and unreliable.