Which popular WW2 aircraft and air combat "histories" are simply not true?

[BarnOwlLover]

The Allison P-51s weren't good for high altitude use, and (IMO sadly) there was only one Allison engine Mustang ace, and he flew the A-36 fighter/dive bomber variant interestingly. That said, the Mustang I and II was one of the few fighters equal to or superior to the Fw 190 at low/medium altitude until the Spitfire IX/VIII in 1942, and the RAF loved them for tactical fighter/recon roles. In fact, the RAF wanted more Allison P-51s for that role--but by then, production had switched to the Merlin models.

 

[drgondog]

The Allison P-51s weren't good for high altitude use, and (IMO sadly) there was only one Allison engine Mustang ace, and he flew the A-36 fighter/dive bomber variant interestingly. That said, the Mustang I and II was one of the few fighters equal to or superior to the Fw 190 at low/medium altitude until the Spitfire IX/VIII in 1942, and the RAF loved them for tactical fighter/recon roles. In fact, the RAF wanted more Allison P-51s for that role--but by then, production had switched to the Merlin models.

Mike Russo 27FG and John England P-51A (8 +2 P-51C) 311FG

 

[pbehn]

The Allison P-51s weren't good for high altitude use, and (IMO sadly) there was only one Allison engine Mustang ace, and he flew the A-36 fighter/dive bomber variant interestingly. That said, the Mustang I and II was one of the few fighters equal to or superior to the Fw 190 at low/medium altitude until the Spitfire IX/VIII in 1942, and the RAF loved them for tactical fighter/recon roles. In fact, the RAF wanted more Allison P-51s for that role--but by then, production had switched to the Merlin models.

There was no "until" between the service of the Mustang I and the Spitfire Mk IX, they were introduced at almost exactly the same time and initially at very similar rates.

 

[drgondog]

Republic equipped the P-47 for drop tanks, so they did their job. The aircraft manufacturer did NOT make or distribute drop tanks.

It was the USAAF that failed to provide P-47 squadrons with drop tanks - you'll have to look in their records for why.

True, initially a couple of D-6 equipped with pylons to carry ferry tanks and fly to UK in summer 1943. That said, the wings were not stressed for the additional load save for medium G turns. The Burtonwood BAD1 set up shop to do depot level mod to pull wings, strengthen with doublers on spars, install plumbing and external pylons, to Republic specs, in very late 1943, but the production article -15 and -16 didn't arrive until late Feb 1944. The P-47D-25 didn't arrive until May 1944 w/370gal internal tankage but not operational at squadron level until mid June 1944.

Summary - March 1942 through June 1943 was the development cycle for the 60 and 75 with production release in July, then one month later for the 110 - but Republic was far slower to design for production insertion of both wing Pylon/plumbing to carry them (Jan 1944).
By contrast Lockheed had pylon/plumbing kits December 1941, production Feb 1942) and NAA had pylon/plumbing prootype for A-36 in May 1942, production October 1942

Yes to AAF-MC failing to drive the combat tank program with a sufficient sense of urgency. AAF-Hq (Arnold) drove both the Fighter Conference (Feb 20th) and the Fighter Aircraft Range Extension Program (Fairchild) - both cited range extension as #1 priority, but Materiel Command was very sluggish in responding. Hq responded to lack of interest by requesting weekly status reports in late February, 1942. It was May before the prototype self sealing 60 and 75 gal tanks underwent gunfire testing. That said, Republic was far behind NAA and Lockheed for both wing pylon tankage and internal tankage. Even the Merlin Mustang was far ahead of Republic for Fighter Range Extension Program.

Barney Giles - Arnold CoS, drove the internal fuel increase drive in July. The first 75 gal combat tanks were emerging in August while both the Mustang (85 gal fuse) and Lightning (55gal LE) prototypes were flying in July. The drawings for the P-47D-25 370gal main/aux tank were no even released for production until December 1943

 

[drgondog]

The P-47 already had those fuel lines, if I recall.

I also recall that the US did not use drop tanks in Europe during the summer of 43. If the P-47 could use them, and it gave them the range needed for escort, why not use them?

The P-47C-2 & Subs were plumbed for C/L ferry tanks. The first missions using Ferry tanks were in latter days of Blitz Week in July 1943, using the 200gal 'tub' tank, which was not pressurized and would not feed from slaved vacuum pump above 18000 feet. Consequently it was only filled w/100 gal and extremely draggy. The reason 'why not' use them were a.) non sealed bomb carried into combat, b.) had the equivalent drag of 2x110 gal SS tanks delivered in September, 3,) were dangerous when ejected. LtC Cass Hough caused to be installed a wood 'horizontal fin' on the 200 gal tank to force it downward when ejected.

The straight line combat radius boost was about 75mi - the result = cross the German/Dutch border (barely) on a straight line, but not out of France on a course to Schwenfurt.

So, yes the 8th AF did use the 200gal in July, the new 75 gal combat tank in August (still could not get out of France during Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission) and the 110 gal combat tank in September - Summer of 1943.

The PROBLEM for the P-47C and D through the P-47D-11 series was that the capability to hang fuel tanks on the wing was problematic for three reasons. 1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing, 2.) the wing did not have either a pylon or a fuel transfer system of plumbing to transfer fuel from external rack to engine, and 3.) while a 'doable' Depot Level Mod, it was far too labor and time intensive to remove the wings, remove the skin, install the plumbing, install the necessary doublers for the spars, re-skin the wing, install the pylons - IIRC only 50+ were so converted before the -15/-16 arrived in Feb/March 1944.

Exascerbating the PROBLEM (and Greg's lack of understanding) was that during escort the Penetration and Withdrawal Escort, the ony stright line cruise was to/from the R/V or Break Escort waypoint - from that point forward, the P-47C/D is burning fuel at optimal cruise - but not in a straight line as they were tethered to the B-17 formation straight line speed. They are going fast enough to go farther on a straight line, but slow marching while weaving and 'essing' to keep pace with the bombers.

Further, Greg failed to understand the difference between Ferry calculations and Combat Radius calculations - also tested by Wright Field to develop Operating Manual.

8th AF SOP included warm up and taxi time for approximately 50 ships including spares, take off at METO in pairs (usually), climb to 3000 feet - using internal fuel, switch to externals and begin the squadron assembly from elements to flights to squadron, then repeat two times during orbit at Max Continuous Power, then climb to cruise altitude where power and RPM were reduced to cruise settings (if on time to make R/V per schedule).

Extracted from various flight test data aswell as published Wright Field documents, the 'average' fuel consumption for the P-47 R-2800 at varius MP and RPM for each stage is APPROXIMATELY
With 75 gal C/L tank
113 gal for warm up, taxi, climb to altitude (no formation consumption), begin cruise
40 gal for reserve
90 gal for 20 min combat (15min MP, 5 min WEP)
305+75 gal at Engine Start =380gal
380-243=137gal available for straight line cruise.

So optimally that P-47, independent of slowing down to effective 210mph TAS to escort bombers, at 85+ gph cruise consumption has 137/85 = 1.6 hours of total cruise time left to escort bombers and return home. The escort Effective airspeed is 210, the return after break escort and ejecting tank is closer to 300mph TAS.

The Bomb Division ops co-ordinates target info, take off times, R/V times and waypoint for escorts, etc via Frag Orders to Fighter Wings

The mission planner (Div Ops) then has to adjust the straight line example above (which BTW is not a Precision calculation) for weather, winds aloft, the true linear distance of a course with course changes while escorting, the amount of time to takeoff and form up the group.

The Fighter WingOps is performing the same calcs as it makes assignments for each group (Penetration, Withdawal, Sweep) to determine R/V and B/E waypoints -

The Fighter Gp Ops gets the Frag Order with target, R/V, B/E, Bomb Wing assignment, etc and baks out Start Engine times to accomdate estimates to get to R/V on time.

After all these deliberations, the Gp CO at briefing may caution the fighter pilots to intercept and return - do not chase, because of probable headwinds on course, or stretched escort time before B/E, or forecast weather and visibility expected upon return to base. etc, etc. All designed to ensure as much as possible fuel available for a safe return.

Summary - Greg was CORRECT, the P-47 COULD have gone to Schweinfurt BUT - everybody dies or is taken prisoner due to fuel starvation near the German/France border.

 

[Peter Gunn]

The P-47C-2 & Subs were plumbed fo C/L ferry tanks. The first missions using Ferry tanks wre in latter days of Blitz Week in July 1943, using the 200gal 'tub' tank which was not pressurized and would not feed from slaved vacuum pump above 18000 feet. Consequently it was unly filled w/100 gal andextremely draggy. The reason 'why not' use them were a.) non sealed bomb carried into combat, b.) had the equivalent drag of 2x110 gal SS tanks delivered in September, 3,) were dangerous when ejected. LtC Cass Hough caused to be installed a wood 'horizontal fin' on the 200 gal tank to force it downward when ejected.

The straight line combat radius boost was about 75mi - the result = cross the German/Dutch border (barely) on a straiht line, but not out of France on a course to Schwenfurt.

So, yes the 8th AF did use the 200gal in July, the new 75 gal combat tank in August (still could not get out of France during Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission) and the 110 gal combat tank in September - Summer of 1943.

The PROBLEM for the P-47C and D through the P-47D-11 series was that the capability to hang fuel tanks on the wing was problemation for three reasons. 1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing, 2.) the wing did not have either a pylon or a fuel transfer system of plumbing to transfer fuel from external rack to engine, and 3.) while a 'doable' Depot Level Mod, it was far too labor and time intensive to remove the wings, remove the skin, install the plumbing, install the necessary doublers for the spars, re-skin the wing, install the pylons - IIRC only 50+ were so converted before the -15/-16 arrived in Feb/March 1944.

Exascerbating the PROBLEM (and Greg's lack of understanding) was that during escort the Penetration and Withdrawal Escort, the ony stright line cruise was to/from the R/V or Break Escort waypoint - from that point forward, the P-47C/D is burning fuel at optimal cruise - but not in a straight line as they were tethered to the B-17 formation straight line speed. They are going fast enough to go farther on a straight line, but slow marching while weaving and 'essing' to keep pace with the bombers.

Further, Greg failed to understand the difference between Ferry calculations and Combat Radius calculations - also tested by Wright Field to develop Operating Manual.

8th AF SOP included warm up and taxi time for approximately 50 ships including spares, take off at METO in pairs (usually), climb to 3000 feet - using internal fuel, switch to externals and begin the squadron assembly from elements to flights to squadron, repeat two times during orbit at Max Continuous Power, then climb to cruise altitude where power and RPM reduced to cruise settings (if on time to make R/V per schedule).

Extracted from various flight test data aswell as published Wright Field documents, the 'average' fuel consumption for the P-47 R-2800 at varius MP and RPM for each stage is APPROXIMATELY
With 75 gal C/L tank
113 gal for warm up, taxi, climb to altitude (no formation consumption), begin cruise
40 gal for reserve
90 gal for 20 min combat (15min MP, 5 min WEP)
305+75 gal at Engine Start =380gal
380-243=137gal available for straight line cruise BUT approx 25 gal (minimum) consumed during warm up, taxi, and takeoff to staging altitude to switch to external tank.

So optimally that P-47, independent of slowing down to effective 210mph TAS to escort bombers, at 85+ gph cruise consumption has 137/85 = 1.6 hours of total cruise time left to escort bombers and return home. The escort Effective airspeed is 210, the return after break escort and ejecting tank is closer to 300mph TAS.

The Bomb Division ops co-ordinates target info, take off times, R/V times and waypoint for escorts, etc

The mission planner (Div Ops) then has to adjust the straight line example above (which BTW is not a Precision calculation) for weather, winds aloft, the true linear distance of a course with course changes while escorting, the amount of time to takeoff and form up the group.

The Fighter Wing is performing the same calcs as it makes assignments for each group (Penetration, Withdawal, Sweep) to determine R/V and B/E waypoints -

The Fighter Gp Ops gets the Frag Order with target, R/V, B/E, Bomb Wing assignment, etc and baks out Start Engine times to accomdate estimates to get to R/V on time.

After all these deliberations, the Gp CO at briefing may caution the fighter pilots to intercept and return - do not chase, because of probable headwinds on course, or stretched escort time before B/E, or forecast weather and visibility expected upon return to base. etc, etc. All designed to ensure as much as possible fuel available for a safe return.

Summary - Greg was CORRECT, the P-47 COULD have gone to Schweinfurt BUT - everybody dies or is taken prisoner due to fuel starvation near the German/France border.

You know, I've said this before, but if you're going to weigh in on a debate, I'd wish to God you'd elaborate more, these short, half-assed poorly researched responses you give simply won't do!

 

[Spindash64]

The P-47C-2 & Subs were plumbed for C/L ferry tanks. The first missions using Ferry tanks were in latter days of Blitz Week in July 1943, using the 200gal 'tub' tank, which was not pressurized and would not feed from slaved vacuum pump above 18000 feet. Consequently it was only filled w/100 gal and extremely draggy. The reason 'why not' use them were a.) non sealed bomb carried into combat, b.) had the equivalent drag of 2x110 gal SS tanks delivered in September, 3,) were dangerous when ejected. LtC Cass Hough caused to be installed a wood 'horizontal fin' on the 200 gal tank to force it downward when ejected.

The straight line combat radius boost was about 75mi - the result = cross the German/Dutch border (barely) on a straight line, but not out of France on a course to Schwenfurt.

So, yes the 8th AF did use the 200gal in July, the new 75 gal combat tank in August (still could not get out of France during Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission) and the 110 gal combat tank in September - Summer of 1943.

The PROBLEM for the P-47C and D through the P-47D-11 series was that the capability to hang fuel tanks on the wing was problematic for three reasons. 1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing, 2.) the wing did not have either a pylon or a fuel transfer system of plumbing to transfer fuel from external rack to engine, and 3.) while a 'doable' Depot Level Mod, it was far too labor and time intensive to remove the wings, remove the skin, install the plumbing, install the necessary doublers for the spars, re-skin the wing, install the pylons - IIRC only 50+ were so converted before the -15/-16 arrived in Feb/March 1944.

Exascerbating the PROBLEM (and Greg's lack of understanding) was that during escort the Penetration and Withdrawal Escort, the ony stright line cruise was to/from the R/V or Break Escort waypoint - from that point forward, the P-47C/D is burning fuel at optimal cruise - but not in a straight line as they were tethered to the B-17 formation straight line speed. They are going fast enough to go farther on a straight line, but slow marching while weaving and 'essing' to keep pace with the bombers.

Further, Greg failed to understand the difference between Ferry calculations and Combat Radius calculations - also tested by Wright Field to develop Operating Manual.

8th AF SOP included warm up and taxi time for approximately 50 ships including spares, take off at METO in pairs (usually), climb to 3000 feet - using internal fuel, switch to externals and begin the squadron assembly from elements to flights to squadron, then repeat two times during orbit at Max Continuous Power, then climb to cruise altitude where power and RPM were reduced to cruise settings (if on time to make R/V per schedule).

Extracted from various flight test data aswell as published Wright Field documents, the 'average' fuel consumption for the P-47 R-2800 at varius MP and RPM for each stage is APPROXIMATELY
With 75 gal C/L tank
113 gal for warm up, taxi, climb to altitude (no formation consumption), begin cruise
40 gal for reserve
90 gal for 20 min combat (15min MP, 5 min WEP)
305+75 gal at Engine Start =380gal
380-243=137gal available for straight line cruise.

So optimally that P-47, independent of slowing down to effective 210mph TAS to escort bombers, at 85+ gph cruise consumption has 137/85 = 1.6 hours of total cruise time left to escort bombers and return home. The escort Effective airspeed is 210, the return after break escort and ejecting tank is closer to 300mph TAS.

The Bomb Division ops co-ordinates target info, take off times, R/V times and waypoint for escorts, etc via Frag Orders to Fighter Wings

The mission planner (Div Ops) then has to adjust the straight line example above (which BTW is not a Precision calculation) for weather, winds aloft, the true linear distance of a course with course changes while escorting, the amount of time to takeoff and form up the group.

The Fighter WingOps is performing the same calcs as it makes assignments for each group (Penetration, Withdawal, Sweep) to determine R/V and B/E waypoints -

The Fighter Gp Ops gets the Frag Order with target, R/V, B/E, Bomb Wing assignment, etc and baks out Start Engine times to accomdate estimates to get to R/V on time.

After all these deliberations, the Gp CO at briefing may caution the fighter pilots to intercept and return - do not chase, because of probable headwinds on course, or stretched escort time before B/E, or forecast weather and visibility expected upon return to base. etc, etc. All designed to ensure as much as possible fuel available for a safe return.

Summary - Greg was CORRECT, the P-47 COULD have gone to Schweinfurt BUT - everybody dies or is taken prisoner due to fuel starvation near the German/France border.

Thank you, that genuinely helps explain it. I imagine the tech needed for such escort range COULD have been made ready on the Jugs earlier if the USAAF were willing to find it, but that's a bit more what if than the original statement I made…

 

[Capt. Vick]

I don't believe the Davis wing was not robust in its resistance to flak, as much as its aerodynamic properties where extremely susceptible to disruption from said damage. Perhaps not much of a difference now that I think about it.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I don't believe the Davis wing was not robust in its resistance to flak, as much as its aerodynamic properties where extremely susceptible to disruption from said damage. Perhaps not much of a difference now that I think about it.

Ignorant as I am, is there a comparison of wing-spars between the Davis wing and the beefy B-17 wing, and how that might have affected losses? If you don't know, perhaps S Shortround6 or others more knowledgeable than us do? I think if there is data on cause of loss there could be an answer?

We've all seen then vid and pics of B-24s going down for a broken wing, but are they actually representative, or simply recycled for being dramatic?

My understanding is that the B-17's wing was more robust, but to repeat, my own ignorance prevents a solid understanding.

 

[ThomasP]

re B-17 wing vs B-24 wing strength

_____If we assume similar construction techniques and materials, simple beam theory says that the relative strength of the wings would be related to the vertical and longitudinal dimensions of the wing. The following ratios would apply to a rectangular box with the dimensions root chord x root thickness.

____________________B-17__________B-24
root chord__________ 19' 0"_________14' 0"
root airfoil_______NACA 18%_____Davis 22%
root thickness________3' 5"__________ 3' 1"
root strength ratios
vertical______________1.37_____:_____1.00
longitudinal__________2.50_____:_____1.00

_____I do not know the thickness distribution (ie the thickness at a given number of stations from fore to aft at the root) for either of the airfoils, but we can assume that the Davis airfoil has a greater average thickness % due the lesser chord length and higher airfoil T/C ratio. This would decrease the advantage the B-17 wing has in the vertical - possibly eliminating the advantage based only on the vertical load vectors.
_____However, even if the vertical strengths were equal, the combined vectors of vertical and longitudinal (ie the non-perfect vertical and horizontal load vectors) would still give the B-17 wing the edge in terms of longitudinal and twisting loads (I think).
_____Again, this is assuming similar construction techniques and materials. Without detail diagrams of the station thickness, and of the distribution of individual structure assembly members, it is not practical to do a FEA for the wings.
_____We know (I think) that within similar TOGW wing loading neither wing had any particular tendency to fail, so I think it is safe to say that in a practical sense both wings were strong enough subject to the loads applied in use - when intact.
_____Also in theory, subject to the caveats above, the greater physical dimensions of the B-17 wing should provide greater resistance to damage. One example would be if an AA round detonated inside the wing midway between the main and aft spars. Assuming the distance between the B-17 fore and aft spars is greater than that for the B-24, the reduction in force of the blast at the spars (based on the inverse squared law) would favor the B-17.
_____If we had the individual weights of the wing structures (not including the engines, landing gear, or fuel tanks) we could get a feel for the difference in construction. For example, it the weight was the same for the 1420 ft2 B-17 wing as for the 1048 ft2 B-24 wing, then we could assume the B-24 wing individual structural members were heavier/thicker, and/or there were significantly more structural members - either/both of which could make a significant difference in strength and/or resistance to damage.
_____Aside from the differences mentioned above, the only information I have run across re design differences in construction of the 2 wings, is that the B-24 wing used "spars as heavy stringers". I do not know what this means or how to apply it in terms of strength of the wing. Both aircraft were designed to the same ultimate G load at a given weight (ie 4G at ~56,000 lbs)

That's all I got

 

[drgondog]

Thank you, that genuinely helps explain it. I imagine the tech needed for such escort range COULD have been made ready on the Jugs earlier if the USAAF were willing to find it, but that's a bit more what if than the original statement I made…

The February 1942 Fighter Conference, hosted by the CiC AAF deemed extending fighter ranges to be extremely important. The deveopment of 60, 75, 110 and 150gal combat tanks was assigned high priority to AAF-Materiel Command. The 60gal tank emerged first and applied to the P-39 and the P-40. The 75 gal and 110 gal combat tanks were next and produced in quantity by June 1943.

Materiel Command under the leadership of Oliver Echols did not (IMO) apply their best and brightest resources to the project, or acquire the subcontractors as fast as could be managed as evidenced by Arnold's 'irritation' in May 1942 by the lack of progress and ordering regular status reports.

As to the technolgies of a self sealing tank combat tank? The combined aviation contractors (e.g. NAA and Curtiss and Bell) already had input and ideas from RAF with respect to removable self sealing fuel cells, and Firestone/Goodyear supplied the suitable bladders - but IIRC nobody had produced a self sealing external fuel tank, nor subjected them to destructive testing.

Another factor was simply that AAF wasn't specifying external racks and fuel cell pressurization as a requirement. Neither Lockheed, NAA or Republic were encouraged or funded to develop external racks for ferry tank attachments. NAA and Lockheed had the foresight to realize that long range ferry was a desirable feature and both had developed schemes to extend range well beyond production article internal fuel capability in 1941. Lockheed via pylon/fuel feed (unpressurized) and NAA via removing wing guns/ammo and replacing wit standard kit of 26gal auxillary fuel cell,leaving only the cowl guns in March 1941. Both delivered absent RFP. Crickets from Republic.

NAA installed a fuel pump, and plumbing to external pylon, for first flight of prototype A-36 in May 1942, approximately five months after Lockheed on the P-38E pylon kits of December 1941. Note that Republic didn't deliver a C/L rack on the P-47C-2 until nearly a year later, nor prototype pylon on D-6 (six total) until July 1943, nor production pylon/fuel feed on D-15/-16 until Jan/February 1944.

Note for the record that Republic apparently was uninterested in the CAS role in 1942/1943, never seeking a place at the table with the A-36, P-40 or P-39 - nor wing pylons, or C/L rack as late as December1942, when it was equipped to carry external ordnance. You can lay the absence of development to two factors - namely misunderstanding the magnitude of future escort requirements, and lacking the simple imagination regarding the effectiveness of a Fighter with triple the tactical footprint of a Spitfire or the equal of a P-38, yet also having capability to carry bombs in a tactical role. The lack of foresight also precluded the necesary strengthening of the wing to permit wing racks for either bombs or fuel tanks. Neither Lockheed or NAA misunderstood the value of Range.

Greg pontificated on the great bomber mafia conspiracy, but AAF believed in the P-47 and made every effort to prod Republic in February 1942 through June 1943 to get more internal fuel as well as external combat tank capability - to what end? They had the example of the A-36/P-51A and P-38 with external wing racks and fuel feed capability in mid 1942.

How was it AAF Leadership's fault? IMO, the 'great mistake' AAF/Eisenhower/Marshall made was to divert P-38 from the assigned escort role for 8th AF and send to Africa for Torch. IMO it would have been better to send the P-47 to MTO instead.

 

[Timppa]

1.) The wing was not stressed to carry even 500 pounds under the wing,

install the necessary doublers for the spars,

What doublers was installed for the spars (not local reinforcements) ?
Sorry my bullshit meter just peaked.

 

[pbehn]

What doublers was installed for the spars (not local reinforcements) ?
Sorry my bullshit meter just peaked.

The use of uncalibrated BS meters can lead to embarrassing posts being made.

 

[drgondog]

What doublers was installed for the spars (not local reinforcements) ?
Sorry my bullshit meter just peaked.

Timppa - what do you think a 'doubler' is? The wing spars and stringers were not redesigned until the XP-47N when internal fuel was added to the wing.

I'll have to look to see whether the solution was to replace wing panels between the spars with the next gauge thickness to effectively add cap thickness and improve torque resistance, or add doublers to the spar webs to take out the higher cap loads due to bending or all the above. I suspect the primary focus would have been from just outside the pylon C/L to Wing attach points and look to see what what the new stress loads were for a.) Stringers, b.) Skin shear for panels and spar web, c.) Spar cap loads due to AoA loading of a dive pullout with bombs attached. Redesigning the spar and introducing as production article would probably never have been approved by War Production Board.

Also, due to the side loads on the pylons in yaw I would be interested in the entire area next to the pylon including the ribs and the fitting between fwd and aft spars.

What about you? you have an approach that Republic should have considered when they advised Burtonwood BAD1 regarding the wing mods required to install pylons and fuel feed for pre-P-47D-15 models?

 

[pbehn]

The February 1942 Fighter Conference, hosted by the CiC AAF deemed extending fighter ranges to be extremely important. The deveopment of 60, 75, 110 and 150gal combat tanks was assigned high priority to AAF-Materiel Command. The 60gal tank emerged first and applied to the P-39 and the P-40. The 75 gal and 110 gal combat tanks were next and produced in quantity by June 1943.

Materiel Command under the leadership of Oliver Echols did not (IMO) apply their best and brightest resources to the project, or acquire the subcontractors as fast as could be managed as evidenced by Arnold's 'irritation' in May 1942 by the lack of progress and ordering regular status reports.

As to the technolgies of a self sealing tank combat tank? The combined aviation contractors (e.g. NAA and Curtiss and Bell) already had input and ideas from RAF with respect to removable self sealing fuel cells, and Firestone/Goodyear supplied the suitable bladders - but IIRC nobody had produced a self sealing external fuel tank, nor subjected them to destructive testing.

Another factor was simply that AAF wasn't specifying external racks and fuel cell pressurization as a requirement. Neither Lockheed, NAA or Republic were encouraged or funded to develop external racks for ferry tank attachments. NAA and Lockheed had the foresight to realize that long range ferry was a desirable feature and both had developed schemes to extend range well beyond production article internal fuel capability in 1941. Lockheed via pylon/fuel feed (unpressurized) and NAA via removing wing guns/ammo and replacing wit standard kit of 26gal auxillary fuel cell,leaving only the cowl guns in March 1941. Both delivered absent RFP. Crickets from Republic.

NAA installed a fuel pump, and plumbing to external pylon, for first flight of prototype A-36 in May 1942, approximately five months after Lockheed on the P-38E pylon kits of December 1941. Note that Republic didn't deliver a C/L rack on the P-47C-2 until nearly a year later, nor prototype pylon on D-6 (six total) until July 1943, nor production pylon/fuel feed on D-15/-16 until Jan/February 1944.

Note for the record that Republic apparently was uninterested in the CAS role in 1942/1943, never seeking a place at the table with the A-36, P-40 or P-39 - nor wing pylons, or C/L rack as late as December1942, when it was equipped to carry external ordnance. You can lay the absence of development to two factors - namely misunderstanding the magnitude of future escort requirements, and lacking the simple imagination regarding the effectiveness of a Fighter with triple the tactical footprint of a Spitfire or the equal of a P-38, yet also having capability to carry bombs in a tactical role. The lack of foresight also precluded the necesary strengthening of the wing to permit wing racks for either bombs or fuel tanks. Neither Lockheed or NAA misunderstood the value of Range.

Greg pontificated on the great bomber mafia conspiracy, but AAF believed in the P-47 and made every effort to prod Republic in February 1942 through June 1943 to get more internal fuel as well as external combat tank capability - to what end? They had the example of the A-36/P-51A and P-38 with external wing racks and fuel feed capability in mid 1942.

How was it AAF Leadership's fault? IMO, the 'great mistake' AAF/Eisenhower/Marshall made was to divert P-38 from the assigned escort role for 8th AF and send to Africa for Torch. IMO it would have been better to send the P-47 to MTO instead.

In my opinion it is a sad and sorry tale that cannot ever be fully explained. There is no real reason why the P-47 wasnt in service with increased internal fuel and working drop tanks C/L or wing mounted by mid 1943. That would not have allowed an escorted raid on Schweinfurt but would have allowed the USAAF to push the LW out of north Germany and the Ruhrgebiet long before "Big Week". The P-47 was designed as an interceptor, but when deployed to the UK, the UK didnt need interceptors. Before its arrival B-17 missions were escorted by Spitfires. The range of an early P-47 could just take it to the edge of Belgium and Netherlands escorting bombers, and this was known before they were ever sent. It is easy to blame the "Bomber Mafia" with some conspiracy theory, if a manufacturer drags their feet, the US didnt have the possibility that Stalin had of executing a few to concentrate minds. There are many examples on WW2 aviation history of manufacturers breaking their balls to win or keep a contract, sadly. Republic and the P-47 isnt one of them. The people who designed the P-47 had the design flair to make the only successful turbo S/E fighter but increasing its range and putting on wing tanks were problems beyond their capabilities, and the product of a malign group called the "Bomber Mafia"? It is just too silly to consider.

 

[GregP]

And all this is a false history?

 

[pbehn]

And all this is a false history?

I was referring to Gregs history of the P-47 and his bomber maaaafia conspiracy theory.

 

[special ed]

The P-47 Fuel tank troubles may have been fallout from the board ousting Seversky from his own company. As I recall, Seversky took a trip to Europe and while there, he was removed from the company. I read all of this long ago, so it should be available on the internet. The company was then run by people who wanted to make money from what Seversky had built. I don't remember if Kartvelli was still chief designer after the dust settled.

 

[Shortround6]

The P-47 Fuel tank troubles may have been fallout from the board ousting Seversky from his own company. As I recall, Seversky took a trip to Europe and while there, he was removed from the company. I read all of this long ago, so it should be available on the internet. The company was then run by people who wanted to make money from what Seversky had built. I don't remember if Kartvelli was still chief designer after the dust settled.

Seversky was outed in April/May of 1939. In part because he sold 22 two seat P-35 type fighters to the Japanese in 1938 (?) and the USAAC wanted nothing to do with him.

The people who wanted to "make money" were trying to keep the company from going bankrupt. The Seversky/Republic order book was very thin in the fall of 1939.
Seversky had build about 100-120 aircraft total during the 1930s. This includes 77 P-35s.
Kartvelli was most definitely the chief designer.
In the fall of 1939 Republic had orders for 13 YP-43s and 80 P-44s. (P-43 with a P & W R-2180 engine) and orders for 60-120 EP-106 (upgraded P-35s) for Sweden. and some B6 two seaters.
They were also working on this

With an Allison engine and tiny wing.

Kartvelli realizes that the P-44 and AP-10/XP-47 are dead ends (no armor, no self sealing fuel tanks, and too few guns) an pitches the XP-47 with the R-2800 engine to the AAF in Mau/June of 1940. Please note that is after the prototype Vought XF4U first flies by a few days.

Army goes for it and the P-44 and XP-47A are dead. By Sept 1940 Republic has orders for 733 P-47B and P-47C aircraft.

Republic has also gotten some contracts for P-43 fighters to keep the production lines going while the P-47 is being worked on.

Not all aircraft companies were equal in size and capability. In 1940 Republic rolled 104 single seat fighters out the door, two of them were YP-43s.
Lockheed built YP-38 but were building Hudsons by the hundreds.
Brewster was the 2nd largest fighter builder in 1940 with 160 aircraft.
Bell built 24 aircraft (including YFM-1s)
Curtiss built 1287 single seat fighters in 1940 and was the 800lb gorilla in the room.

Getting back to Republic, they complete the XP-47 in May of 1941. Not as good as North American but not too bad compared to most other companies or countries.
In Oct 1941 Republic gets an order for 850 P-47Ds for the Farmingdale plant. Army also wants a pressure cabin fitted to one P-47B as the XP-47E.

Jan 1942, Republic gets an order for 1050 P-47Ds to be built in Evansville Indiana (it doesn't exist yet) and Curtiss gets an order for 354 P-47Gs.

March 1942 sees Republic roll out 5 P-47Bs.

In Sept 1942 Republic test flies the first Evansville P-47D, 4 days before the plant is fully completed. Please note that this flight was 5 days after the first P-47C was completed at Farmingdale and about 1 month before the first Curtiss built P-47G is flown.

Anybody think that maybe the guys at Republic were a little busy in 1941-42?
By March of 1943 Republic is out producing Lockheed.
P-47 production went from 170 in Jan 1943 to 660 in Dec 1943.



Perhaps they could have done better with the improvements.

But blaming corporate greed seems to be the wrong track.

What did the USAAC tell them they wanted and when?

At what point in 1943 do you want to disrupt the production lines?
P-39s and P-40s are not going to be able to escort anything in Western Europe in 1943.

 

[GregP]

I was referring to Gregs history of the P-47 and his bomber maaaafia conspiracy theory.

A - OK. No sweat. Actually, Iwas trying to get back on topic, but in a roundabout way.

Carry on, General.

Recall: We have casualties NOT because we are at war, but because the ENEMY is at war! Advance to the rear! Make it so.