Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 922
- Sep 30, 2021
The USAAF had a total of 3 P-38 groups available for Europe from late 1942 until mid October 1943, the question being where they were going to be the most effective. Similarly the USAAF had 3 P-47 groups available in April 1943, with a fourth in mid August 1943. The ETO logs first P-47 arrivals in December 1942, the MTO in October 1943 with the 12th Air Force having a P-47 group on strength in December, by which stage there were 9 operational and 1 not operational P-47 groups in Britain.
Why would anyone put a turbo supercharger on a ground attack aircraft? The USAAF in 1942 was acquiring dive bombers from USN production plus had the A-31/35, and as it turned out they could have probably deployed dive bombers in France in 1944 with few problems from enemy aircraft. More A-36, using P-40 as the fighter bombers like the RAF was doing with Hurricanes were also options. The pressing allied need was enough fighters with comparable or better performance to the axis ones and during the first half of 1943 the axis fighters were coming to the allies, or at least disputing the front line. That changed in the second half of 1943.
As of August 1942 the production plan was to leave the P-39 in full production to October 1943, going through the D, F, K, L, M, N and Q versions, then switching to the P-63, P-40 production would end in May 1943 with the P-40L, Curtiss switching to the P-47G, which would start production in November 1942. Republic built P-47 would go to the D version in February 1943, as of September 1943 the planned peak monthly output for each factory would be reached, Curtiss 273, Farmingdale 183, Evansville 133, while over at Inglewood it was 105 P-51, or over 5 P-47 per P-51 per month, all up during 1943 Curtiss would build 1,979 P-47, Farmingdale 2,160 and Evansville 977. Inglewood would resume P-51 production in May 1943, with 825 built by the end of 1943. As it turned out total 1943 production was Curtiss 271 P-47, Farmingdale 3,024 P-47, Evansville 1,131 P-47, Inglewood 1,533 P-51, and the not mentioned in the schedule Dallas 177 P-51. If you like the USAAF scheduled 5,115 P-47 for 1943 and received 4,426.
Part of the question is how much of the self defending bomber idea the 8th Air Force held for so much longer than others was because they had to, given their targets, and then how that played out in the early decision for fighters and bombers to fight their separate battles. Eaker was asking the British for local drop tank production, in February 1943 the 8th had been warned the stretched British industry could not handle rush orders, in June the 8th was interested in large numbers of drop tanks but it took until early October for local production to receive final design approval.
The USAAF had 3 P-38 and 2 Spitfire groups available in early 1943, joined by 3 P-47 groups in April, for the ETO and MTO, the only fighters available that had the altitude ability and performance to at least match the Bf109G and Fw190A. The Luftwaffe spent the first half of 1943 minimising its fighter commitment in the ETO while trying hard to dispute MTO airspace. The losses the Luftwaffe took in the MTO, the tactical and strategic benefits the allies gained there through 1943 all say the USAAF made the correct call on where it put its better fighters in early 1943. Remembering the people in early 1943 were operating off a more optimistic schedule for USAAF growth, so the P-38 groups sent to the MTO were expected to be replaced sooner than what happened.
One thing that was not apparent at the time but clear now, the Mediterranean command team was going to command Overlord, as they were the most experienced allied commanders. Doolittle and Spaatz learnt a lot about heavy bomber raids and their escort requirements in 1943, which needed P-38s. In the period June 1942 to April 1943 inclusive 461 USAAF heavy bomber sorties attacked targets in Germany, according to the statistical digest the USAAF in the ETO launched 3,722 heavy bomber sorties while losing a total of 122 to enemy aircraft in the 10 months, the MTO 5,802 sorties losing 42 to enemy aircraft.
How true or simplified is the story the A-36 was ordered and built as a way to keep the Inglewood production line open when there were no USAAF orders for the fighter version?
Why would anyone put a turbo supercharger on a ground attack aircraft? The USAAF in 1942 was acquiring dive bombers from USN production plus had the A-31/35, and as it turned out they could have probably deployed dive bombers in France in 1944 with few problems from enemy aircraft. More A-36, using P-40 as the fighter bombers like the RAF was doing with Hurricanes were also options. The pressing allied need was enough fighters with comparable or better performance to the axis ones and during the first half of 1943 the axis fighters were coming to the allies, or at least disputing the front line. That changed in the second half of 1943.
As of August 1942 the production plan was to leave the P-39 in full production to October 1943, going through the D, F, K, L, M, N and Q versions, then switching to the P-63, P-40 production would end in May 1943 with the P-40L, Curtiss switching to the P-47G, which would start production in November 1942. Republic built P-47 would go to the D version in February 1943, as of September 1943 the planned peak monthly output for each factory would be reached, Curtiss 273, Farmingdale 183, Evansville 133, while over at Inglewood it was 105 P-51, or over 5 P-47 per P-51 per month, all up during 1943 Curtiss would build 1,979 P-47, Farmingdale 2,160 and Evansville 977. Inglewood would resume P-51 production in May 1943, with 825 built by the end of 1943. As it turned out total 1943 production was Curtiss 271 P-47, Farmingdale 3,024 P-47, Evansville 1,131 P-47, Inglewood 1,533 P-51, and the not mentioned in the schedule Dallas 177 P-51. If you like the USAAF scheduled 5,115 P-47 for 1943 and received 4,426.
Part of the question is how much of the self defending bomber idea the 8th Air Force held for so much longer than others was because they had to, given their targets, and then how that played out in the early decision for fighters and bombers to fight their separate battles. Eaker was asking the British for local drop tank production, in February 1943 the 8th had been warned the stretched British industry could not handle rush orders, in June the 8th was interested in large numbers of drop tanks but it took until early October for local production to receive final design approval.
The USAAF had 3 P-38 and 2 Spitfire groups available in early 1943, joined by 3 P-47 groups in April, for the ETO and MTO, the only fighters available that had the altitude ability and performance to at least match the Bf109G and Fw190A. The Luftwaffe spent the first half of 1943 minimising its fighter commitment in the ETO while trying hard to dispute MTO airspace. The losses the Luftwaffe took in the MTO, the tactical and strategic benefits the allies gained there through 1943 all say the USAAF made the correct call on where it put its better fighters in early 1943. Remembering the people in early 1943 were operating off a more optimistic schedule for USAAF growth, so the P-38 groups sent to the MTO were expected to be replaced sooner than what happened.
One thing that was not apparent at the time but clear now, the Mediterranean command team was going to command Overlord, as they were the most experienced allied commanders. Doolittle and Spaatz learnt a lot about heavy bomber raids and their escort requirements in 1943, which needed P-38s. In the period June 1942 to April 1943 inclusive 461 USAAF heavy bomber sorties attacked targets in Germany, according to the statistical digest the USAAF in the ETO launched 3,722 heavy bomber sorties while losing a total of 122 to enemy aircraft in the 10 months, the MTO 5,802 sorties losing 42 to enemy aircraft.
How true or simplified is the story the A-36 was ordered and built as a way to keep the Inglewood production line open when there were no USAAF orders for the fighter version?
