Which popular WW2 aircraft and air combat "histories" are simply not true?
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drgondog
Major
Timppa - When I stated that the wing was not re-designed until the N I was implying that The P-47D wing, spar, ribs and stringers remained the same - but local modiications that could be applied to the spar or skins such as doublers and/or changes to augment bending load acceptable stresses could be applied to the existing wing to enable 1000 pound outboard loads that were not contemplated until mid-July 1943 when AAF called for more fuel in existing fighters.That is what I was saying.
I don't have "an approach", sorry. Jeez.
Now we agree
Snautzer01
Honourably banned
- 38,244
- Mar 26, 2007
Before you make an ass of yourself, you might want to know that drgondog is an established and published writer on the subject of ww2 airplanes.Now we agree
Well I have Facebook, the Encyclopedia Britannica of online facts and figures.
GregP
Major
Encyclopedia? You forget Wikipedia!
Wiki - The best source other than "no source!"
Wiki - The best source other than "no source!"
SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
I just go with the voices in my head.
Thumpalumpacus
Captain
said! 
33k in the air
Staff Sergeant
- 1,219
- Jan 31, 2021
All these jokes are kraken me up!
Just Schmidt
Senior Airman
Sometimes no source beats wiki.
drgondog
Major
Forgot to mention that while Republic did provide for a ferry tank or C/L bomb with the new keel on the P-47C-2 & subsequent, neither the XP-47B, nor the P-47B, nor the C-1 were so designed or contemplated. Republic did ot have the foresight to deliver a wing that at least had the Potential to carry external fuel tanks for very long ferry range after December 7.
In contrast, by December 7th 1941, Lockheed had designed, installe and tested both the pyons, fuel feed mods (but no pressurization) AND the 165 and 330gal steel ferry tank - as kits for P-38E and production article for P-38F & Subs. NAA had designed, installed auxilliary 26 gal fuel cells slaved to Mains as kits. Wing armament was removed but the twin 50cal cowl guns remained - extending range to 1700mi for Mustang I. Kits were delivered with every Mustang I. Additionally the A-36, a modified NA-83, was on the drawing board ready for Arnold/Spaatz visit first week of January 1942. Not only did the bomb racks and dive brakes make it suitable for attack, but the wing was aslo designed with the plumbing, slaved to vacuum pump, to carry 60 and 75gal external tanks - ready for approval by end of 1941.
Did Republic keep up? Did Republic have a solution Dec 1942? No. Did Republic have production article P-47D-15 in combat December 1943? No
If there was a 'fault',, it lay with Republic as they were not responding to a Wright Field RFP, instead given a free had to 'design something fast at high altitude with an R-2800 to match the USN XF4U'.
The Fighter Conference hosted by Arnold in February 1942 prioritized the long range fighter, including development of self sealed combat tanks. On March 2, 1942 Arnold instructed Materiel Command "Increase range of Pursuit, Dive Bombers and Light bombers'. Did Republic set external wing ferry or ombat tanks as high priority? No.
Thus you may state that a.) Materiel Division fell down, or b.) that the job of developing, testing, finalizing design and issuing contracts took longer than anyone in AAF anticpated, or c.) that CO of 8th AF, Gen. Eaker was not as resourceful as Kenney in 5th AF who subcontracted non-sealing large tanks for external range extension.
If you choose c.) recall that only in SWP could a fighter fly long distances ove water without having to deal with flak or fighters - and do so at medium altitudes. Kenney never had to deal with high altitude pressuriaztion issues.
Personally, I lay the primary root cause of slow combat tank development at the feet of Materiel Command bureaucracy under Echols - Not the "bomber mafia" at AAF-Hq..
On the critical path for ETO VIII FC issues were a.) obtain the newer C/D with Keel and bomb rack, b.) develop field modification to slave vacuum pump for instrumentation to serve the external fuel tank feed, c.) modify a wholly unsuited and unweildy 205 gal 'tub' tank with 2x drag over the soon to arrive 75 gal combat tank - with a horizontal fin to push away from fuselage when dropped.
I don't even blame Eaker. When his P-38s were taken away, he knew that the P-47 as delivered, had no hope of acting as target escort to provide cover for 8th BC medium and deep penetrations. He still felt he could win a war of attrition over the LW but in this, he wasbadly misguided by his Inteligence sources who led him to believe the high claim rates of his bomber gunners.
That said, he 'begged for P-38/P-51B' and enlisted help of Asst SecWar Bob Lovett to Hap Arnold in June 1943. At the same time Arnold recovering from heart attack in summer 1943, Barney Giles lit a fire under NAA, Lockheed and Republic to install more internal fuel.
NAA and Lockheed tested prototypes of fuselage fuel tank (Mustang B) and LE fuel tank (Lockheed J) in July. Republic? No. November? No. January, 1944? No. February - yes, seven months after NAA and Lockheed.
AAF at fault?
Shortround6
Major General
Perhaps?
Perhaps the AAF was not leaning on Republic hard enough.
What other Issues was Republic dealing with?
.......................................P-38..........................P-47.....................P-51
1942
Jan.................................116...........................0............................84
Feb................................127...........................0............................84
Mar...............................100...........................5............................52
Apr................................100...........................1............................86
May..............................100.........................10............................84
Jun................................105.........................26............................84
Jul.................................170.........................38.............................76
Aug................................80..........................61............................24
Sep...............................132.........................67............................60
Oct...............................145.........................66............................**
Nov..............................144......................116............................**
Dec..............................160.......................142............................**
total...........................1479.......................532..........................634*
** does not include A-36 production.
1943
Jan.................................175...........................170............................**
Feb................................168...........................151............................**
Mar...............................193...........................232.............................70
Apr................................122...........................244..........................121
May................................84............................307..........................121
Jun................................180...........................307............................20
Jul..................................264...........................382............................91
Aug...............................102...........................434.........................175
Sep................................155...........................496.........................201
Oct................................381...........................496..........................284
Nov...............................387...........................589..........................295
Dec...............................316...........................660..........................332
total ..........................2497.........................4428.......................1710+ A-36 production.
P-38s and P-51s had problems.
The P-47 had a few problems, like poor propeller and the need for water injection (at least in Europe)
Perhaps the AAF should have emphasized the need for more fuel/range more and de-emphasized the need for increased production a bit more?
drgondog
Major
The P-47-11 had production article W/I R-2800 and kits upgraded previous production models. The paddle blades were operational late December/early Jan 1944. They were conceptalized and designed about the time -51B/P-38J prototype internal fuel capacity issues were solved.
AAF Did emphasize the need for more range February 1942. 16mo before NAA and Lockheed added internal fuel, 24 mo before P-47D-25 added internal fuel.
As to production figures cited above, recall that NAA was delivering AT-6s and B-25s as well as subcontracting B-24s. Yet both Lockheed dnd NAA accomodated AAF and the War Board by inserting fuselage tank production articles 5 mo. after flight testing and were in production with the extra tanks before Republic had the additional 65gal design only Approved in late December 1944.
Republic, Lockheed and NAA all 'got the word' February 1944. NAA had the prototype A-36 flying with external racks and internal fuel feed in May 1942. All future Allison and Packard powered Mustang airframes had external wing fuel tank configuration in production beginning Oct 1942 - a full year before Republic.
What point were you making?
Shortround6
Major General
We know what the result was, we are discussing how they got there and perhaps who should get the blame.
You are quite right, NAA did have a number of programs going, as did Lockheed. The Hudson, Loadstar/Ventura and sub contracting (Vega Aircraft).
NAA both had more than one production facility they were managing before 1942/43
Republic had been a smaller company in 1939-40. Perhaps they needed stronger 'guidance'? Perhaps getting Evansville up and running took some effort?
In some small companies engineers got swapped back and forth between detail design of the aircraft and plant design (machinery layout and jigs/fixtures) as companies got larger the engineers stayed pretty much in one department.
In Feb 1942, Republic had one prototype flying and the first "Production" airframes in the shop. 5 get rolled out in March 1942. Things get a bit squishy here, May of 1942 was supposed to be the target date for the operational date. Spring and Summer of 1942 sees several P-47s catch fire in flight and they are running into compressibility problems. They are also trying to help out Curtiss with the P-47G. 1st long fuselage P-47C rolls of the Farmingdale line in Sept 1942.
The 56th fighter group doesn't go operational until Nov 1942, In Connecticut.
The Feb 1942 request for more range may not have been as high on the list of "things to do" over the summer and fall of 1942 at Republic.
It may be poor communications between Republic and the AAF?
Lockheed's ability to increase internal fuel was helped a lot by changing the intercoolers and getting them out of the wing leading edge which freed up a lot of volume. Perhaps they had other ideas on paper (larger fuselage pod?)
Not all designs were as easy to modify. There is a story about Stalin telling three of his fighter designers that he wanted more fuel/endurance from their fighters and two agreeing at the same meeting, the 3rd couldn't figure out how during the meeting but said he would work on it. A very dangerous answer to Stalin At the end of the meeting Stalin asked again and the designer gave the same answer. Stalin let him go but the Designer knew he was on shaky ground. He did eventually find a way but I can't remember if that required a change in wing structure? (Metal spars instead of wood)
Better/more drop tank options are a bit different than more internal fuel and should have been addressed sooner.
You are quite right, NAA did have a number of programs going, as did Lockheed. The Hudson, Loadstar/Ventura and sub contracting (Vega Aircraft).
NAA both had more than one production facility they were managing before 1942/43
Republic had been a smaller company in 1939-40. Perhaps they needed stronger 'guidance'? Perhaps getting Evansville up and running took some effort?
In some small companies engineers got swapped back and forth between detail design of the aircraft and plant design (machinery layout and jigs/fixtures) as companies got larger the engineers stayed pretty much in one department.
In Feb 1942, Republic had one prototype flying and the first "Production" airframes in the shop. 5 get rolled out in March 1942. Things get a bit squishy here, May of 1942 was supposed to be the target date for the operational date. Spring and Summer of 1942 sees several P-47s catch fire in flight and they are running into compressibility problems. They are also trying to help out Curtiss with the P-47G. 1st long fuselage P-47C rolls of the Farmingdale line in Sept 1942.
The 56th fighter group doesn't go operational until Nov 1942, In Connecticut.
The Feb 1942 request for more range may not have been as high on the list of "things to do" over the summer and fall of 1942 at Republic.
It may be poor communications between Republic and the AAF?
Lockheed's ability to increase internal fuel was helped a lot by changing the intercoolers and getting them out of the wing leading edge which freed up a lot of volume. Perhaps they had other ideas on paper (larger fuselage pod?)
Not all designs were as easy to modify. There is a story about Stalin telling three of his fighter designers that he wanted more fuel/endurance from their fighters and two agreeing at the same meeting, the 3rd couldn't figure out how during the meeting but said he would work on it. A very dangerous answer to Stalin
At the end of the meeting Stalin asked again and the designer gave the same answer. Stalin let him go but the Designer knew he was on shaky ground. He did eventually find a way but I can't remember if that required a change in wing structure? (Metal spars instead of wood) Better/more drop tank options are a bit different than more internal fuel and should have been addressed sooner.
drgondog
Major
True - but a couple of points might be useful.
1.) while the NAA Dallas plant opened in late September 1941, both Evansville and Buffalo produced P-47D/G nealy a year before Dallas produced their first P-51C in August 1943.
2.) In context, Republic had two plants (plus Bell Buffalo) fully operational producing P-47D just when NAA produced the second A-36 and flew XP-51B for first time.
It took Evansville less elapsed time from breaking ground (3-42) and finishing (9-42) as the Dallas plant. When Dalla operational it produced AT-6, then B-25/24s and AT-6. The first P-47D-2s were in combat before the tooling was being set up for the P-51C.
The origninal X73 project manager was lifted from NA-73 producion design leader to oversee all Dallas operations in late 1940 - Sevresky/Republic was rich in both design and production Pursuit specialty engineers - far more than NAA
The P-47B issues were a result of somewhat half baked P-47B 'production' airframes. Note that when compressibility, stability and structural integrity issues were discovered, they lengthened the fuselage and installed metal control surfaces on the empennage -
P-47C-1 first production with changes in Sept 1942. Six months to identify a major issue, design, test and insert in six months. The 56th were guinea pigs for the P-47B.
The point I would make here is that Republic had both superb design and production engineers to solve a critical issue that fast.
Bodie devotes significan ink on the somewhat documented disdain that Kartveli's didain for 'goobering' up His wings with external pylons. 'His' Arplane was a high altitude point defense to coastal defense interceptor that already was a hog in climb compared to Euro standards. In Fall of 1942 there was no contemplation of the future P-47 escort role. He may have inhereted a leeetle bit of Seversky attitude re: AAC/AAF telling him how to design airplanes.
That would be a 'communication' problem.
True - but Lockheed inherently had better range performance with just 300 gallons internal fuel in the wings. The 'Range Extension' issue was primarily solved by designing removable pylons and installing plumbing for a 165 or 330 gal external (non-sealed) tank for ferry purposes. That was 18month before Cass Hough finally adopted the 205gal Hog tank Republic designed for low/medium altitude Ferry to VIII FC in July 1943..
The intercooler design was before the notion of 55gal LE tanks was conceived - and had as primary purpose to solve the Allison HP Available issues due to inadequate intercooler above 1000 Hp. The movement (and LE vacancy wih structure) was a happy accident and better than earlier 80 gal fuselage tank for aft CG issue.
The ever, unfailing bottom line was that the controlling Combat Radius factor was internal fuel. External fuel could only get you past the Point of No Return on internal fuel.Not all designs were as easy to modify. There is a story about Stalin telling three of his fighter designers that he wanted more fuel/endurance from their fighters and two agreeing at the same meeting, the 3rd couldn't figure out how during the meeting but said he would work on it. A very dangerous answer to Stalin
Better/more drop tank options are a bit different than more internal fuel and should have been addressed sooner.
I know what the internal fuel problem was. The damn 70 gal Aux tank filled up ALL the available space. Republic was faced with sticking fuel in wing (major redesign but accomplished with the N) or redesign the fuselage under the cockpit (not trivial - but that is what Republic did, combined wth the Bubble canopy incorporation.
The latter was a slightly better alternative to short term crisis, but had Kartaveli began new wing design when Fighter Conference issued call for 'more Pursuit range', the P-47N branch would have started maybe a year ealier, at least when re-designing the P-47C or when they played with laminar flow wing.
IMO - it belongs to Republic. That said it wan't until late 1942 that AAC/AAF prohibition of use of ferry tanks was partially lifted.
Shortround6
Major General
Thank you for extra information/explanation.
Even the BT-8 was pretty much a P-35 with fixed landing gear and 450hp engine instead of the twin wasp.
Same wing span and area of the P-35.
NAA also had a couple of twin engine bombers in the portfolio in addition to the NA-16 series
AAF, we want more range, but you can't use external ferry tanks to do it (except for the P-39 and P-40).
Republic, we are giving you 305 gallons of fuel already, what do you want?
Yes the P-47 was bit of fuel hog but the climb to 25,000ft was the real killer. You used up a lot fuel before you even started to fly to the target.
You could burn about 45 gallons just climbing from 5000ft to 25,000ft which was equal to 48-50 minutes at a low altitude, low speed cruise. Throw in the 15 minutes of combat and the "book" range disappeared rather quickly.
Now at some point in the summer or fall of 1942 somebody at Republic should have looked at the actual fuel consumption figures and crossed it with what the AAF wanted to do (to heck with the 8th Air Force) and start figuring out the range thing.
You may be correct on this, however NAA may have been more wide spread experience. Seversky/Republic was basically a two product company. The P-35-P-43 and off shoots and the P-47.
Even the BT-8 was pretty much a P-35 with fixed landing gear and 450hp engine instead of the twin wasp.
Same wing span and area of the P-35.
NAA also had a couple of twin engine bombers in the portfolio in addition to the NA-16 series
Well, there is a bit of problem.
AAF, we want more range, but you can't use external ferry tanks to do it (except for the P-39 and P-40).
Republic, we are giving you 305 gallons of fuel already, what do you want?
Yes the P-47 was bit of fuel hog but the climb to 25,000ft was the real killer. You used up a lot fuel before you even started to fly to the target.
You could burn about 45 gallons just climbing from 5000ft to 25,000ft which was equal to 48-50 minutes at a low altitude, low speed cruise. Throw in the 15 minutes of combat and the "book" range disappeared rather quickly.
Now at some point in the summer or fall of 1942 somebody at Republic should have looked at the actual fuel consumption figures and crossed it with what the AAF wanted to do (to heck with the 8th Air Force) and start figuring out the range thing.
In an era where engines and air frames along with lots of other major stuff needed like turrets were developed by committed and enthusiastic teams and companies, I dont think a military procurement department could force a company to be a good company if their heart wasnt in the project. The USAAF were performing escorted bombing raids in Europe before the P-48 arrived in England. Between their arrival in late 1942 and starting operations in April 1943 what did the makers think they would be used for? Regardless of all the communications and directions they were given to increase internal and external fuel, what did they think and do? Republic started off in pole position and finished last, I just dont see how the various advocates of the P-48 can claim there was a conspiracy against it. When you look at the hurdles the P-51, F4-U Lancaster and Mosquito had to jump over just to get in production, Republic had a comparatively easy ride.
Geoffrey Sinclair
Staff Sergeant
- 779
- Sep 30, 2021
USAAF Statistical Digest figures,
Farmingdale produced 153 military aircraft in 1940, 170 in 1941 and 626 in 1942 (110 P-47, 516 P-43).
Evansville produced 10 P-47D in 1942 starting in October, Farmingdale took until February 1943 to switch from C to D.
Inglewood produced 1,245 military aircraft in 1940, 1,843 in 1941 and 1,904 in 1942.
Dallas produced 711 military aircraft in 1941, starting in April, and 3,967 in 1942.
The North American figures have plenty of trainers, Inglewood produced 171 B-25 in 1941, starting in February, another 1,119 in 1942, 138 P-51 in 1941 starting in August, and 776 P-51/A-36 in 1942.
CAA Figures, Lockheed is Burbank A and B
March 1940, Inglewood 5,075 employees, Farmingdale 1,613, Lockheed 6,805
December 1940 Inglewood 8,244 employees, Dallas 185, Farmingdale 2,455, Lockheed 20,138
December 1941 Inglewood 15,637 employees, Dallas 7,346, Kansas City 1,186, Farmingdale 4,922, Lockheed 53,221
December 1942 Inglewood 24,352 employees, Dallas 20,345, Kansas City 12,960, Farmingdale 13,227, Evansville 2,437, Lockheed 71,533
December 1943 Inglewood 24,471 employees, Dallas 20,206, Kansas City 15,704, Farmingdale 16,525, Evansville 7,379, Lockheed 82,280
So Republic was generally a year or so behind North American's expansion.
Factory space authorised July 1940 to August 1945 cost
North American Grand Prarie total $35,654,000, public $34,507,000, private $1,147,000
North American Inglewood total $13,757,000, public $10,413,000, private $3,344,000
North American Kansas City total $30,359,000 all public
North American Kansas City upgrade total $3,951,000 all public
Republic Evansville total $14,517,000 all public
Republic Farmingdale total $19,383,000, public $18,767,000, private $616,000
Republic also received another $10,000,000 public money for various other locations making aircraft parts for P-47
P-38J, 3 in September 1942, 7 in June 1943 then series production from August onwards.
P-47D-15-RE 42-75615, in mid October 1943, mostly accepted after the 29 sized D-16 block.
P-47D-15-RA 42-23143, in late November 1943
P-47D-25-RE 43-26389, in February 1944, 3 D-25 for month, then production from mid March
P-47D-26-RA 42-28189, in late April 1944, 3 D-26 in April, then production from mid May.
Francis Dean yardstick ranges. The P-38J and H around 800 miles with 300 gallons, the P-47C 950 miles on 305 gallons. Then comes the P-38J with 410 gallons 1,150 miles, the P-47D with 375 gallons 1,050 miles. How much difference between P-38 and P-47 fuel comsumption, air miles per gallon across an 8th Air Force mission including combat? Did Republic have to find space for less or more fuel to match the P-38?
The P-38 had room where its pre J model cooling system was located with plans to change the cooling system predating using the space for fuel, the P-51 had space in the rear fuselage, balance helped by fitting a heavier engine, but already a better range on exiting fuel.
Farmingdale produced 153 military aircraft in 1940, 170 in 1941 and 626 in 1942 (110 P-47, 516 P-43).
Evansville produced 10 P-47D in 1942 starting in October, Farmingdale took until February 1943 to switch from C to D.
Inglewood produced 1,245 military aircraft in 1940, 1,843 in 1941 and 1,904 in 1942.
Dallas produced 711 military aircraft in 1941, starting in April, and 3,967 in 1942.
The North American figures have plenty of trainers, Inglewood produced 171 B-25 in 1941, starting in February, another 1,119 in 1942, 138 P-51 in 1941 starting in August, and 776 P-51/A-36 in 1942.
CAA Figures, Lockheed is Burbank A and B
March 1940, Inglewood 5,075 employees, Farmingdale 1,613, Lockheed 6,805
December 1940 Inglewood 8,244 employees, Dallas 185, Farmingdale 2,455, Lockheed 20,138
December 1941 Inglewood 15,637 employees, Dallas 7,346, Kansas City 1,186, Farmingdale 4,922, Lockheed 53,221
December 1942 Inglewood 24,352 employees, Dallas 20,345, Kansas City 12,960, Farmingdale 13,227, Evansville 2,437, Lockheed 71,533
December 1943 Inglewood 24,471 employees, Dallas 20,206, Kansas City 15,704, Farmingdale 16,525, Evansville 7,379, Lockheed 82,280
So Republic was generally a year or so behind North American's expansion.
Factory space authorised July 1940 to August 1945 cost
North American Grand Prarie total $35,654,000, public $34,507,000, private $1,147,000
North American Inglewood total $13,757,000, public $10,413,000, private $3,344,000
North American Kansas City total $30,359,000 all public
North American Kansas City upgrade total $3,951,000 all public
Republic Evansville total $14,517,000 all public
Republic Farmingdale total $19,383,000, public $18,767,000, private $616,000
Republic also received another $10,000,000 public money for various other locations making aircraft parts for P-47
P-38J, 3 in September 1942, 7 in June 1943 then series production from August onwards.
P-47D-15-RE 42-75615, in mid October 1943, mostly accepted after the 29 sized D-16 block.
P-47D-15-RA 42-23143, in late November 1943
P-47D-25-RE 43-26389, in February 1944, 3 D-25 for month, then production from mid March
P-47D-26-RA 42-28189, in late April 1944, 3 D-26 in April, then production from mid May.
Francis Dean yardstick ranges. The P-38J and H around 800 miles with 300 gallons, the P-47C 950 miles on 305 gallons. Then comes the P-38J with 410 gallons 1,150 miles, the P-47D with 375 gallons 1,050 miles. How much difference between P-38 and P-47 fuel comsumption, air miles per gallon across an 8th Air Force mission including combat? Did Republic have to find space for less or more fuel to match the P-38?
The P-38 had room where its pre J model cooling system was located with plans to change the cooling system predating using the space for fuel, the P-51 had space in the rear fuselage, balance helped by fitting a heavier engine, but already a better range on exiting fuel.
