Just to put it in perspective, my reference shows that six sevenths of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from the US.
Without context your quote is difficult to factor. The reference to "The Allies" presumably means the Western Allies, as the Soviets never released there petroleum production figures.
Also the figure of "WW2 petroleum use" presumably includes all of WWII up to 1945, the oil needs of the later Pacific war were huge compared to the earlier 1942 needs. {think B-29 MPG fleet ops 5,000 miles from base}
Does your figure is 6/7 includes
ALL petroleum used for all purposes {including domestic} in the Allied countries? That might be the case, as the US domestic use {private industrial} was huge compared to the UK or USSR which had critical shortages of oil and used more coal. I could believe the {western} "Allies" did could get about 85% of oil from the US for use in Europe, but almost all of the oil needs for the Desert war, Indian Ocean theater for Russia came from British refineries in the Persian Gulf in 1942. The Allies had a critical shortage of ships, so they didn't send oil from the US to the MidEast theater, nor could they send British oil from the MidEast around the Cape to Europe.
Another factor - the British refinery in Abadan {Persian Gulf} was a major supplier of "AvGas" used in the Desert Army sent to the Soviets, how would the air battles be affected if the Allies USSR didn't have AvGas? {and if the Axis did?}
O.K. then Malta? Can I change my answer?
I have a different perspective on the war then perhaps the gentlemen from other allied countries but I respect your opinions and they are probably right. Both of my grandfathers fought the Japanese at Iwo Jima and elsewhere. The feeling I get from my family members was that there was much fear at the time about the Japanese intentions. At Guadalcanal the allies were able to defeat the Japanese using combined arms in a significant way thus culminating in the eventual defeat of Japan. Before the campaign the Japanese had the initiative but after they could only defend. It was the turning point of WW2 for Americans.
My Grandfather fought for the British in the Med, so it's understandable that our perspective are different.
The biggest difference in my mind is that even had the US lost at Guadalcanal, there were other islands in the further west that could be defended. {San Cristobal, Santa Cruz in the Solomons, New Hebridies, New Caledonia etc} Also the fact that by summer '42 the Japanese didn't have the ships of maritime transport to seriously threaten Eastern Australia or New Zealand, let alone the Western USA.
On the other hand, if the British lose Malta there is no other Allied base between Gibraltar and Alexandria, the Axis would be able to send supplies to Rommel with much fewer losses.
Parsifal:
The IJN didn't have the sealift necessary to effectively support large numbers of forces scattered over such a vast amount of area as the central and west Pacific. No matter how many troops were committed to China and Burma, to say in theory that could have been moved to NG or the atolls is just that .... "in theory". In reality, they just couldn't be supplied to be effective, and in many cases, the small islands could only hold a certain number of troops before it got so crowded to be indefensible.
Wargame the Pacific war all you want, and one thing always comes to light. It doesn't matter how many troops and airplanes the Japanese have in CBI, NEI, NG and the Aleutions, the USN strategy will win every single time.
Pretty accurate Syscom, by the Japanese not trying to interrupt the US buildup in the Pacific, they were almost in a no-win situation by summer '42. Midway was end of any realistic chance for victory. {as posted in the other Pacific thread}
The Japanese were truly on the defense from summer 1942 on.
Yup.
Japan was a maritime power just as Britain is. The only thing necessary to defeat Japan was to defeat it's navy and supporting air power and thus wrench control of the seas from it. It's armies on the mainland in Asia were then irrelevant. The Guadalcanal campaign was a major step in that process. Midway was the beginning of the end for Japan, Guadalcanal was the end of the beginning.
The question is how important was Guadalcanal, and how critical would be it's loss?
If the US had lost there in mid '42, I think it would just be a minor setback, which the Japanese didn't have the ability to exploit