Which was more important to war Malta vs Guadalcanal

[syscom3]

In the end it would still degrade the AK capability, even far out in Egypt. Think about. 50% less supplies is still 50% less supplies.

Would you rather have more or less supplies?

Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.

 

[syscom3]

I came out with the disparaging remarks about Guadacanal because it was just one of the battles of attrition being undertaken at that time against the Japanese. There were similar battles being fought in China, Burma, New Guinea, and under the oceans of the japanese empire, as well as the mining and sabotage efforts throughout Southeast asia, by groups like Sparrowforce and the Darwin Wing that were having every bit as debilitating effect as Guadacanal

The key to defeating Japan rested solely on the defeat of her maritime forces.

CBI was a sideshow in that capacity.

NG wore down the IJA, but not the IJN. Plus it wasnt untill middle 1943 that the 5th AF began to make its force felt in the SW Pacific.

Darwin was in the periphery, contributing little in the scheme of things.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.

Why coudn't it?

 

[Amsel]

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.

 

[Freebird]

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.

Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat

The Axis were loosing 50% of their Afrika Corps supplies to Malta based aircraft thats a whole lot of capability .

And even more to the subs DD's based on Malta

That is a lot. But did it really impact the AK's ability to fight way out in Egypt?

It had a huge impact, the British basically strangled the Axis supply line in NA. By summer 1942, the British aircraft in the Med were deliberatly looking for Axis oilers because they knew how important it was.

Obviously more is better. But would it have made any difference at El Alamein?

Yes. Malta was the key to holding North Africa

I suspect Cyrenica was the furthest that the Tunisian supply train could adaquatly supply. Once you go further and further east, no ammount of road traffic from Tunis can keep you supplied.

Without the pressure on the Axis supply lines from Malta they could have brought supplies to ports farther in, to Bengazhi or Tobruk, both in German control in summer '42

Very few oil fields in North Africa at that time. In fact, not that much production in the Middle East. Most of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from US.

Most of the petroleum used in Western Europe came from the US. The primary supply for the Desert Army for Russia were the MidEast oilfields, from the refinery at Abadan. The Allies didn't have enough ships to send oil around the Cape from the USA. There were also 2 pipelines going from the Persian Gulf through Jordan, to the Med in Palestine

 

[Marcel]

Guadacanal due to the Japanese being a greater threat to the American mainland.

Hmm, yeah, maybe for you Americans, then...

 

[Juha]

Hello Syscom
Afrika Korps main supply harbours were Tripoli and Benghazi. Tunisia didn't play a role before Torch, Vichy French didn't like Italians. Land transport was a problem, that was why Tobruk with its rather limited harbour capacity was so important. The lost supply had very significant impact on Rommel's operations at times, was it the number of AFVs anf other vehicles or the amount of fuel available.

Juha

 

[renrich]

Just to put it in perspective, my reference shows that six sevenths of the petroleum used by the allies in WW2 came from the US.

 

[syscom3]

If what Juha says is correct, then allied ships and aircraft based in Egypt could have done just as good a job of hitting axis ships off of Cyrenica as the ones based on Malta.

 

[parsifal]

The key to defeating Japan rested solely on the defeat of her maritime forces.

CBI was a sideshow in that capacity.

NG wore down the IJA, but not the IJN. Plus it wasnt untill middle 1943 that the 5th AF began to make its force felt in the SW Pacific.

Darwin was in the periphery, contributing little in the scheme of things.

I would clarify that a little by saying the key to defeating Japan lay solely in eating up her slender reserves, whether they be the tying down of field formations so as to avert a concentration of effort at the decisive point, the destruction of oil production facilities, the loss of merchant shipping, the destruction of aircrew and aircraft, or the sinking of frontline ships. Sinking the frontline ships was, incidentally the least important aspect of winning the war against Japan. She was defeated because her merchant marines were decimated, because she could not concentrate on any one theatre with her ground forces, and because she lost control of the air. The loss of efficiency in her navy, industry and the loss of ships outright all came about as a result of that.

Your justification and dismissal of places like the CBI and NG only makes sense from an American perspective. Americans are notoriously bad at grasping the concept of the indirect approach, and the position and opinions you are adopting are a classic microcosm of that. CBI and NG were important because , in the case of the former they sucked out vital ground troops, attrited air assets, and soaked up vital supply. NG was important because it was here that the bulk of the Japanese land forces were tied down and defeated (and in any event your assertion that naval forces of the IJN were not being attritioned on this front is patently incorrect anyway, most notably losses occurred at Milne Bay, off Buna, and later, with the assistance of your 5th Air Force, in the Bismarck Sea ). Meanwhile, from as early as March 1942, increasing pressure was being applied to the Japanese air assets in Rabaul, by mixed formations of RAAF and 5AF formations, that prevented them from ever bringing their full force of air units to bear on the SoPac forces . Intreresting that you refer to NG as a sideshow, since it occupied the attentions of more than 60% of the allied ground AND air forces in the SWPA/SoPac until the latter part of 1943 (Australia contributing something more than 500000 troops to the theatre to approximately 150000 US). The Japanese forces on Guadacanal never exceeded 20000, yet by the end of 1942 the Australians, and Eichelbergers formations were engaging twice that number . In the Darwin TO, the US and Australian formations were tying down more than 550 A/C at any given moment, from August 1942 on (and incidentally were contributing far more in shipping losses to the Japanese through the aerial mining camapigns throughout SE Asia). if the Japanese had had the opportunity to concentrate these forces off Guadacanal as well as the air formations they were forced to divert to the NG front, the outcome on Guadacanal would have been different.

Luckily for all of us, and despite all the innefficiencies in their armies, the KMT and CCP in China managed to tie up 37 of the 52 Divs available to the Japanese (and proportions remained more or less like that as the numbers of Divs increased. Without the CBI, China would have folded, and instead of 20000 men of the IJA, you would have faced 200000 on places like Guadacanal. Sure they would have starved, but this was never an issue for the IJA.

And certainly, Macarthur would not agree with you. Macs great contribution to military strategy was his understanding of attritional warfare, and the importance of the indirect approach. His island hopping and bypassing of japanese strongpoints is testament that at the end he understood how to defeat the Japanese...isolate them, then go round the.. but isolating them was achieved by a combination of naval supremacy, tonnage warfare, air suppression, and tying down of reserves. without all of these ingredients 9and more, your victory would not have been possible. guadacanal was a part of that, an important part, but it was not the pivotal point in the whole equation in which all other aspects are un-important.

 

[Juha]

Hello Syscom
Quote:"then allied ships and aircraft based in Egypt could have done just as good a job of hitting axis ships off of Cyrenica as the ones based on Malta."

Yes, but those from Malta were much better situated to
a) attack supply routes between Italy and Tripoli
b) attack supply routes between Italy and Benghazi up to near the coast of Cyrenica. In fact when Germans were able to use Benghazi they occupied at least most of Cyrenica and so anti-shipping sorties from Egypt had to make a large detour out of sea before entering over Bay of Sirte.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat



And even more to the subs DD's based on Malta



It had a huge impact, the British basically strangled the Axis supply line in NA. By summer 1942, the British aircraft in the Med were deliberatly looking for Axis oilers because they knew how important it was.



Without the pressure on the Axis supply lines from Malta they could have brought supplies to ports farther in, to Bengazhi or Tobruk, both in German control in summer '42

Most of the petroleum used in Western Europe came from the US. The primary supply for the Desert Army for Russia were the MidEast oilfields, from the refinery at Abadan. The Allies didn't have enough ships to send oil around the Cape from the USA. There were also 2 pipelines going from the Persian Gulf through Jordan, to the Med in Palestine

Off topic, but for the Alamein buildup, the British were required to divert over 1000 ships via the cape, and this was just the hardware and army thingys. Foodstuffs and a lot of ammunition came from Australia and India, mostly

If the axis had been able to support the additional 3 divs they wanted to send after the fall of tobruk, there would never have been an Alamein. It would have been an Ala-massacre..... Rommel would have been sitting in Cairo eating dates by October, and probably pushing on into Palestine, Syria and Iraq, with every likelihood the Turks joining the Axis once the British influence had been removed from the scene, and they found themselves surrounded by Axis forces

 

[Amsel]

Huh? A victory by the Japanese at Guadal doesn't mean that the US is in any more danger. The question is which battle was more important, not which Axis power was a bigger threat



And even more to the subs DD's based on Malta



It had a huge impact, the British basically strangled the Axis supply line in NA. By summer 1942, the British aircraft in the Med were deliberatly looking for Axis oilers because they knew how important it was.



Without the pressure on the Axis supply lines from Malta they could have brought supplies to ports farther in, to Bengazhi or Tobruk, both in German control in summer '42

Most of the petroleum used in Western Europe came from the US. The primary supply for the Desert Army for Russia were the MidEast oilfields, from the refinery at Abadan. The Allies didn't have enough ships to send oil around the Cape from the USA. There were also 2 pipelines going from the Persian Gulf through Jordan, to the Med in Palestine

O.K. then Malta? Can I change my answer?

I have a different perspective on the war then perhaps the gentlemen from other allied countries but I respect your opinions and they are probably right. Both of my grandfathers fought the Japanese at Iwo Jima and elsewhere. The feeling I get from my family members was that there was much fear at the time about the Japanese intentions. At Guadalcanal the allies were able to defeat the Japanese using combined arms in a significant way thus culminating in the eventual defeat of Japan. Before the campaign the Japanese had the initiative but after they could only defend. It was the turning point of WW2 for Americans.

 

[syscom3]

Parsifal:

The IJN didn't have the sealift necessary to effectively support large numbers of forces scattered over such a vast amount of area as the central and west Pacific. No matter how many troops were committed to China and Burma, to say in theory that could have been moved to NG or the atolls is just that .... "in theory". In reality, they just couldn't be supplied to be effective, and in many cases, the small islands could only hold a certain number of troops before it got so crowded to be indefensible. And you also forget about the huge qualitative advantage the USN had over the IJN in the island hopping campaigns across the Central Pacific, supported by fast carrier battle groups.

And stop with this nonsense about "the indirect approach". It was decisively proven that the route to victory was the dash across the Pacific from Tarawa ending in the Mariana's. No doubt the battles in the Solomons and NG sped things up, but in reality, the USN would never have been stopped by the IJN (after late 1943), the IJA or the Japanese airpower. In fact, the war was essentially won in the summer of 1944, regardless of what happened in NG or the CBI.

Wargame the Pacific war all you want, and one thing always comes to light. It doesn't matter how many troops and airplanes the Japanese have in CBI, NEI, NG and the Aleutions, the USN strategy will win every single time.

As for the allied forces in Darwin, they were so few in number, all they did was let the Japanese know they were there …. And that's about it.

 

[renrich]

The options the Allies had in the summer of 1942 if they were going to take the war to the Japanese were, as McArthur wanted to do, attack and occupy Rabaul or take Tulagi. McArthur to take Rabaul would have had to utilise all the USN's strength in the Pacific, all four carriers. King did not trust McArthur with those assets, perhaps rightly so. The less ambitious undertaking was to take Tulagi and the airfield on Guadalcanal which would soon be complete. Those four carriers would only be available for four days and Fletcher must husband them carefully. The campaign was fought on a shoestring and it was a meatgrinder for both sides. The IJN lost two BBs and many lesser units. The Allies lost two carriers and many lesser units. The IJN also lost many seasoned pilots where as the Allies honed their amphibious operations and carrier operations. The Japanese were truly on the defense from summer 1942 on. To me the CBI was the sideshow. The Japanese were never going to conquer and occupy China or India. The operations there were mainly for public relations IMO.

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal:

The IJN didn't have the sealift necessary to effectively support large numbers of forces scattered over such a vast amount of area as the central and west Pacific. No matter how many troops were committed to China and Burma, to say in theory that could have been moved to NG or the atolls is just that .... "in theory". In reality, they just couldn't be supplied to be effective, and in many cases, the small islands could only hold a certain number of troops before it got so crowded to be indefensible. And you also forget about the huge qualitative advantage the USN had over the IJN in the island hopping campaigns across the Central Pacific, supported by fast carrier battle groups.

And stop with this nonsense about "the indirect approach". It was decisively proven that the route to victory was the dash across the Pacific from Tarawa ending in the Mariana's. No doubt the battles in the Solomons and NG sped things up, but in reality, the USN would never have been stopped by the IJN (after late 1943), the IJA or the Japanese airpower. In fact, the war was essentially won in the summer of 1944, regardless of what happened in NG or the CBI.

Wargame the Pacific war all you want, and one thing always comes to light. It doesn't matter how many troops and airplanes the Japanese have in CBI, NEI, NG and the Aleutions, the USN strategy will win every single time.

As for the allied forces in Darwin, they were so few in number, all they did was let the Japanese know they were there …. And that's about it.

Ah, the Japanese did have sufficient sealift to get their troops to the Pacific outposts, although the losses to their Merchant Shipping by 1944 made this movement of troops difficult, and the effct of those troops transitory....it was too late by then.

In 1942, the Pacific Theatre had something in the order of 5 divisions along the Pacific flank, including the South Seas. By 1944 this had expanded to over 20 Divs, and by 1945 to over 30. So history straight away blows your argument about insufficient sealift to the weeds.....the Japanese in 1944 were moving far greater numbers of troops than you credit them.....if this relocation had occurred in 1942, the US forces attacking them would have suffered catastrophic losses to their force structure, and would have been forced to halt their counterattack. This would have given the japanese exactly what they needed...time to regain their balance.

The Japanese troop trasfers arrived too late, and as you say the naval supremacy by that stage was biting very deep. however, in 1942 when it mattered, what would have been the result for the US ground forces...... in Saipan where your vaunted "direct" approach was displayed in all its brutish dumbness, there were more casualties than had been experienced in more than two years of fighting in the SWpac. At Iwo the toll on US forces was even higher, whilst at Okinawa the losses were beginning to actually hurt the US military. Now whilst the outcome was never in doubt (that was a given from the first day of the war), the question begs as to whether the "direct" approach adopted by King and his cronies was the optimal strategy, and secondly, if those losses had been sustained earlier when it mattered, whether ther would have been a halt to the US counteroffensive. I think it would, and I think the result would have been a delay in the eventual collapse.

In the air the same effect applies. The biggest problem for theJapanese in their air forces was a lack of depth, and an inability to concentrate. At the beginning of the war there were about 2000 a/c in both air forces. After the conquests, there were so many garrsoning committments, that the ability for the Japanese to concentrate their forces at the decisive points, like Guadacanal was very difficult. Their ability to rotate forces, such as was US policy, was impossible. Japan needed all forces in the frontline, all of the time...there was no possibility to rotate the forces (even if the Japanese had been disposed to that strategy). Remove the threats from Darwin (which again I repeat was undertaking a very successful mining campaign in SE Asia, with greater losses to shipping than ever occurred on you so-called "main front"), the CBI and China, and instead of being confronted with approximately 500 in the Gilberts, you will be confronted with approxmately 2500....the US fast carriers would have been fast alright....fast sinking that is .

Your critique of the fast carriers and their effect is flawed. It was their mobility, and their ability to concentrate in sections of the front, destroying the opposition in detail, and then disappearing before the enemy had the chance to concentrate that made them powerful (another example of the "indirect" approach which you are rejecting) that made them so powerful. When forced to slug it out with the Japanese, such as at Okinawa, where it was all too late, the losses for the US carriers began to rise (something like 700 lossesout of a force structure of about 2000)

 

[renrich]

Japan was a maritime power just as Britain is. The only thing necessary to defeat Japan was to defeat it's navy and supporting air power and thus wrench control of the seas from it. It's armies on the mainland in Asia were then irrelevant. The Guadalcanal campaign was a major step in that process. Midway was the beginning of the end for Japan, Guadalcanal was the end of the beginning.

 

[parsifal]

Japan was a maritime power just as Britain is. The only thing necessary to defeat Japan was to defeat it's navy and supporting air power and thus wrench control of the seas from it. It's armies on the mainland in Asia were then irrelevant. The Guadalcanal campaign was a major step in that process. Midway was the beginning of the end for Japan, Guadalcanal was the end of the beginning.

On that basis, it should not have been necessary to take any of the Japanese island outposts, and the whole of the Guadacanal camapign, and all the other island battles were pointless .....sorry, but I just see that as illogical, to say nothing of being disrespectful about the cost in lives that was paid to take them

In fact the defeat of Japan was a combination of factors, tied up with what the textbooks call "sea control" and "sea denial". Intrinsically linked to those concepts is the war of attrition that had to be constantly waged so as to prevent the Japanese from developing meaningful reserves. this is why it was important to keep suppressing and hammering away at the so-called bypassed outposts...if they were given a chance to recover, they would repair the facilities, restock the supplies, fly in new units, and wreak havoc on the allied rear area communications. If the peripheral areas were allowed to go quiet, the vast air and land garrisons that the Japanese were forced to maintain in these areas, would have been allowed to redeploy to the main axes of advance. If the ground troops had been able to be released.....the US three or four divs they were able to project in 1942-3 would have been facing 20 or 30 Japanese divs, battle hardened, and at that time fully the equal of the green American formations

The reason the island outposts were important was that they allowed land based air to influence the sea battle. If the Japanese had been able to concentrate their air power they may have caused greater losses, and forced the Americans to stall their advance. if they got time, the Japanese might have staged a partial recovery.

Now that the reason for taking the islands is perhaps clearer , the other big issue that goes with island battles was the cost in manpower that goes with taking them. If the cost had been any higher than it was in 1942, the Americans could not have replaced their Infantry losses, and would not have been able to press on to the next phase of their offensive. This would have given the Japanese time to fortify their positions, train and build new air groups....and the cycle becomes ever more vicious and costly as this process gets repeated and repeated etc...

 

[pbfoot]

One thing being overlooked is the fact that Malta led to Italy being a non factor or it removed one of the legs from the Axis . If Malta had fallen Italy more then likely would have stuck it out a lot longer , the Italian Navy would have been able to hold the Med and there would not have been a soft under belly

 

[syscom3]

I will have to agree Malta was more important in dictating the conduct of the battle in the MTO. Just the delay of the allies in retaking North Africa by a just a few months would have changed the whole strategy of the war in that theater.

For Guadalcanal, even if Japan had won the battle of Guadalcanal, it was a situation of "I won and now I cant do anything".