Which was the best night fighter?

P :

why hard to understand or discuss ? you will have to be more specific to me on those........

E ~ sadly still not much written in the way of operations by both sides and how they co-incided with each other, but this will change in the fall of 08 with Dr. Boitens massive work RAF vs the Nachtjagd

I found the thing about the wooden nose cone for the Ju 88's radar antena:

Late 1944 the Morgenstern (Morning-star) antenna, consisting of three sets of two, 90º crossed dipole elements per set, on a central, forward projecting mast, was developed and this was small enough to be fitted into the nose (of a Ju 88 ) covered with a wooden cone.

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Hi Erich

Its difficult for me to understand, because ther is so little written material about it. Perhaps I will need to wait for this book you mention.

I was mostly intersted to hear your opinion on the main elements that makes for a good Night Fighter. Earlier I made a post that suggested a tentative shortlist for these qualities. I would be very interested to see what shortlist you would suggest...

I worked for ten years handing off interceptors to GCI , to get a fighter into position so he can make an attack with consideration to speed and altitude is the biggest factor. Radar was in it's infancy ground clutter , weather and the poor servicability of the radar all made the fighter cop (gci controller) the biggest key to the puzzle

Par let me think about this for a few days - too much on my mind right now I need some clarity of thought

PB

Seems reasonable enough, but how can youo explain, or give proportional importance to the british NFs who were operating without the benfit of GCI whilst over Germany. Or did it? AFAIK the Brit NFs were pretty much on their own whilst over enemy territory. So perhaps it has greater importance than I have given it, but it does not apply to every situation, and perhaps therefore, should lose marks on that because it is not universally applicable???

parsifal said:

PB

Seems reasonable enough, but how can youo explain, or give proportional importance to the british NFs who were operating without the benfit of GCI whilst over Germany. Or did it? AFAIK the Brit NFs were pretty much on their own whilst over enemy territory. So perhaps it has greater importance than I have given it, but it does not apply to every situation, and perhaps therefore, should lose marks on that because it is not universally applicable???

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Most of the kills by Comonwealth nightfighters from what I've read is they lurked near airfields hoping to catch one but more often then not they nailed em in the circuit when the rwy lights were turned on

First, let me recommend an outstanding book on the RAF night fighter/Serrate effort, besides those already mentioned in this thread.

"Pursuit Through Darkened Skies" by Micheal Allen, DFC**. He was the R/O for a very successful crew and flew Turbinlite Havocs, Beaus on both Home Defense and Intruder missions, then finished up on Mosquitos in the latter role.

He goes into great detail on the various methods of offensive ops.

However, getting back to the topic of 'best night fighter' and quantifying it, I stick to GCI and good comms being the key to effective night fighting. As the vast majority of victories on both sides at night were on the defensive end of it, GCI had the major role in that.

I also dispute the figures given for the MK VIII - perhaps with absolutely perfect conditions, but the norm was well inside 10 miles. You have to account for atmospheric conditions of both the fighter and the target, the quality of maintenance of the airborne set, the skills of the average R/O, etc, etc. With the MK IV, the range was essentially halved and pretty much forget about low flyers (with exceptions, I'll admit).

By the way, a good controller could/can bring the fighter into a tactically advantageous intercept position. Even in WWII, those British LW sets could discriminate to within 1/2 mile thus the controller could get the fighter within 1/2 mile without the two blips on the scope merging into one blob. A big hassle, however, was the roughly 60 mile wide area a single GCI station could 'see.' Fighters had to constantly be handed off to a series of stations as a fight progressed.

GCI stations were set up on ships for various invasions, then came ashore very quickly and followed the advancing troops pretty closely to the front line so GCI was on the continent for the Allies as well as in the UK. Not to mention the Pacific.

Controlling is also an art as well as a science. A intuitive controller could get the fighter in even closer to where the fighter could make a visual. Again, perfect conditions, but it happened.

Modern equipment is amazing and can let the controller see very close action.

PB, I too was a GCI guy, both ground and then on E-3s.

brickhistory said:

First, let me recommend an outstanding book on the RAF night fighter/Serrate effort, besides those already mentioned in this thread.

"Pursuit Through Darkened Skies" by Micheal Allen, DFC**. He was the R/O for a very successful crew and flew Turbinlite Havocs, Beaus on both Home Defense and Intruder missions, then finished up on Mosquitos in the latter role.

He goes into great detail on the various methods of offensive ops.

However, getting back to the topic of 'best night fighter' and quantifying it, I stick to GCI and good comms being the key to effective night fighting. As the vast majority of victories on both sides at night were on the defensive end of it, GCI had the major role in that.

I also dispute the figures given for the MK VIII - perhaps with absolutely perfect conditions, but the norm was well inside 10 miles. You have to account for atmospheric conditions of both the fighter and the target, the quality of maintenance of the airborne set, the skills of the average R/O, etc, etc. With the MK IV, the range was essentially halved and pretty much forget about low flyers (with exceptions, I'll admit).

By the way, a good controller could/can bring the fighter into a tactically advantageous intercept position. Even in WWII, those British LW sets could discriminate to within 1/2 mile thus the controller could get the fighter within 1/2 mile without the two blips on the scope merging into one blob. A big hassle, however, was the roughly 60 mile wide area a single GCI station could 'see.' Fighters had to constantly be handed off to a series of stations as a fight progressed.

GCI stations were set up on ships for various invasions, then came ashore very quickly and followed the advancing troops pretty closely to the front line so GCI was on the continent for the Allies as well as in the UK. Not to mention the Pacific.

Controlling is also an art as well as a science. A intuitive controller could get the fighter in even closer to where the fighter could make a visual. Again, perfect conditions, but it happened.

Modern equipment is amazing and can let the controller see very close action.

PB, I too was a GCI guy, both ground and then on E-3s.

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I just handed them off worked tower at ADG base

B]However, getting back to the topic of 'best night fighter' and quantifying it, I stick to GCI and good comms being the key to effective night fighting. As the vast majority of victories on both sides at night were on the defensive end of it, GCI had the major role in that. [/B]

Not sure that that is a true statement for the RAF. The german blitz ended in May 1941, with roughly 140 aerial victories to their (ie the RAFs) credit (very, very rough figures). Thereafter there were some intruder raids over england, and of course the "Baby blitz" of 1944. Notwithstanding this continued activity, I seriously doubt that the numbers of german losses over England, would exceed the numbers of german losses (due to RAF NFs) over germany. Quite the opposite actually.

I also dispute the figures given for the MK VIII - perhaps with absolutely perfect conditions, but the norm was well inside 10 miles. You have to account for atmospheric conditions of both the fighter and the target, the quality of maintenance of the airborne set, the skills of the average R/O, etc, etc. With the MK IV, the range was essentially halved and pretty much forget about low flyers (with exceptions, I'll admit).


Again what you are saying does not correlate to what either Gunston says, or some of the other bits and pieces that I have lying around. This is something I downloaded some months ago

AI MK X AIRCRAFT INTERCEPTION RADAR

The AI MK X is a modified version of the American SCR 720 Radar. It required a two man crew, the operator giving instructions to the pilot over the intercom. It was used in aircraft like the Mosquito for nightfighter operations. The system radiates 0.75 microsecond pulses in the centimetric band at 9.1 cms. The peak power being approximately 70 KW. The aerial system, housed in a Perspex dome on the nose of the aircraft, consists of a small vertical dipole at the centre of a parabolic dish, the dipole being used for both transmission and reception.

The first British designed centimetric AI radar was the AI MK VII /MK VIII, this had a similar performance to the MK X although the scanning and display methods differ considerably. A British MK IX system was also developed that was more sophisticated, as it had 'lock and follow' capabilities, but problems in meeting production quantities and timescales required, prevented it from being adopted and the American MK X was used instead.

The MK VIII scanning system was what is termed a 'spiral scan'. In this system the dish is rotated about it axis and gradually deflected sideways, tracing out a spiral in the sky, out to an angle of about 45 degrees, The deflection then returns slowly to the zero position when the process is repeated.

In the MK X, the parabolic dish is rotated continually about its vertical axis. It is also slowly tilted up and down which effectively traces out a helix in the sky, much like looking out from the centre of a coil spring. The rear half of the scan, some 210 degrees, is blanked off, as its field of view is interrupted by the structure of the aircraft. The presentation of the information displayed to the operator is also different. In the MK VIII, a single tube with a circular display was used. The target range is measured from the centre of the tube with the target appearing as a segment of a circle, its angular position defining the azimuth and elevation and the length of the segment showing how much the target is off axis. As the target approached the axis of the aircraft, the segment gradually extended to a full circle.

The MK X has two tubes, the left one or the 'C' scope displaying the target as a spot on an azimuth/ elevation grid. The right one or the'B' tube has again an azimuth calibration on the horizontal axis but the vertical axis shows the range of the target. A range marker line, adjustable by the operator, can be moved up and down the trace to select a particular target. The control used to adjust the marker is calibrated in range, giving a more accurate reading from that obtained from the graticule markings. Only when this marker line overlays the target does the target appear on the left hand 'C' tube. The amount of vertical scanning or tilt can be selected by the operator and has 5 switched ranges. The maximum scan is +40 degrees to -20 degrees down to -5 degrees to +10 degrees. A fixed -5 degrees is used when homing onto a beacon. The range can also be selected from 2 miles, 5 miles, 10 miles up to 100 miles for use with a homing beacon.

I dont accept all the claims made by this guy, however, he is basically right to assert that the quality of British radar was far superiior to that of the germans. You are right to assert that in poor conditions, radar effectiveness will be downgraded, but wouldnt that also apply to the germans, who were relying on far weaker pulse signals in their AI than the centiemtric radars that made up the British inventory.

So it is a furphy to assert a typical range for radar, but an effective range is probably not so much of a heresy. If the accepted "effective range" of german AI was say six miles, the effective range for AI mk Viii has to be rated as at least 12 miles, and probably closer to 15 miles, in a given atmospheric state. Hard to accept, but the allies were just years ahead of the germans when it came to active detection systems (well, until the very end of the war, when it didnt matter any more).

By the way, a good controller could/can bring the fighter into a tactically advantageous intercept position. Even in WWII, those British LW sets could discriminate to within 1/2 mile thus the controller could get the fighter within 1/2 mile without the two blips on the scope merging into one blob. A big hassle, however, was the roughly 60 mile wide area a single GCI station could 'see.' Fighters had to constantly be handed off to a series of stations as a fight progressed.

He cant if he is being spoofed and jammed by various means, including (but not just) window. This was what was happening to the NJG units with increasing effectiveness throughout 1944

GCI stations were set up on ships for various invasions, then came ashore very quickly and followed the advancing troops pretty closely to the front line so GCI was on the continent for the Allies as well as in the UK. Not to mention the Pacific.


Dont have any information on this, but what you say sounds reasonable, except that the allies did not reach Germany until the end of 1944. There would be many that would argue that it was all over by that stage. Perhaps that is overdsimplyfying things, but for most of the battle for germany, Allied GCI was out of range

Controlling is also an art as well as a science. A intuitive controller could get the fighter in even closer to where the fighter could make a visual. Again, perfect conditions, but it happened.

Less and less as the war progressed and the allies got the upper hand in ECM and other measures

Modern equipment is amazing and can let the controller see very close action.

PB, I too was a GCI guy, both ground and then on E-3s.[/

I acknowlwdgww your skill, but I have a background in radar operations as well, although not airborne as suchQUOTE]

pbfoot said:

Most of the kills by Comonwealth nightfighters from what I've read is they lurked near airfields hoping to catch one but more often then not they nailed em in the circuit when the rwy lights were turned on

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PB referring to your comment about most losses to NFs occuring near german airfields, I have to disagree, at least to the extent of saying that a significant number of shoot downs occurred near the bomber streams themsleves. this is certainly asserted by Gunston. I cant emphatically say, because I dont have figures to back the statements up (which is one of the reasons I say constantly that it is a hard subject), but from the one person who was there (Gunston. he was a RAF NF pilot that post war became an aviation writer...I think he is still alive actually), the suggestion is that the majority of the action was around the bomber streams themselves.

This is the combat diary of 410 intruders its interesting reading , 418 sqn the highest scoring RCAF unit used to stalk the airfields maybe thats why they were sucessful
The History of 410 Cougar Squadron - Introduction
The History of the 418 Squadron

Hi PB

I had a quick look at these sites, and to be honest dont see any conflict with what either of us were saying.

418 sqn flew Flower Missions whilst attached to Bomber Command which are not actually escort missions. they are intruder missions, giving the NFs much greater freedom, and not tying the unit to bomber escort. Also from August 44 on they were attached to the tactical Air force, and so passed out of the main focus of this debate. there is a twofold reason for me saying this, firstly, in tactical operations the allies flew comparatively few night bomber missions. Secondly, it appears the sqn was mostly employed in daylight ops, which is reflected in their kill stats, over 75% of their kills were in daylight

Regarding 410 squadron, the sqn does not appear to have ever been part of the bomber offensive. It too appears to have operated mostly by day, in various tactical ops

I will stand quickly corrected if you think i have misread these unit histories

Reading 410 sqn stuff I found almost all ref was to nightwork

Having looked again, i think you are right, but do you agree that this unit was mostly employed on tactical operations, i havent studied tactical operations at night very much, but i suspect that the tactics and methods may well be quite different to those used in the strategic campaign.

parsifal,

We disagree. I'm very confident in the numbers destroyed by the RAF, and later, USAAF, under the control of GCI - both over the UK and then over the continent - as compared to those achieved by offensive night fighters. Please don't take it as denigrating the work done by the latter, but the numbers simply don't match.

Besides the relatively few destroyed by GCI-controlled night fighters during the Blitz, hundreds were shot down during the remainder of the war including ones over the continent under GCI control. Just because the coverage didn't reach into Germany (not true by the way, the long-range SCR 720B, et al, had a 100 mile or better look, depending on the location)

I'm not disputing that the Allies were more advanced and increasingly so as the war progressed as compared to the Germans (and Italians), but I am also confident in the more typical range of the MK IV and MK VIII radars.

Serrate, being a passive receiver, as you mentioned, had a far greater range. But became increasingly ineffective as well as the Luftwaffe cottoned to the fact that they were being targeted with their own emissions. It wasn't a new concept as the Luftwaffe nailed lots of Monica-equipped bombers using a similiar system.

410 RCAF was a night fighter squadron, at least according to their history and the several aircrew - pilots and R/Os I've interviewed for magazine stories.

By the way, there is no difference in 'tactical' and 'strategic' night fighter operations. They both tried to shoot down the enemy at night. A strategic result would eventually be the decimation of the Luftwaffe night fighter force - also due to a lack of fuel, safe havens, etc - but the tactical methods were the same whether flying to a Luftwaffe beacon or airfield or free-lancing along the bomber stream.

I'm done.

Hi BrickHistory

SCR 720B was an airborne AI radar, which was designated AI mk X in Britain. It was designed for the P-61, and was based around teechnology and research gifted to the Americans at the beginning of the war by the british. I am not aware of it being used in a ground based sense, which would be strange to me, given that were true ground based radars many times more powerful in England at that stage of the war. Moreover, the 100 mile range is indeed possible with this technology (as it was for the mk VIII, though with lesser definition), but only under ideal conditions, and only if the radar was airborne. Are you defining GCI as including airborne elements as well. Moreover, even with a 100 mile range, that is not enough to even reach holland, let alone germany, from bases in England. SCR 720/ AI mk X (the same thing) was adopted by the british in place of the AI Mk IX, which at the time showed great promise but simply was judged as too great an expenditure of resources.

The AI mk VIII was quite similar to performance to the SCR 720B but used a different type of scan method, and display.

I cant answer what the exact numbers of fighters shot down over friendly territory versus those shot down over enemy territory are, but you will need to come up with a better proof than simply to say "hundreds" were shot down, rather than the relatively few over german technology. I dont believe there is a definitive answer as to the precise numbers of german NFs and NBs lost over either theatre. if there is, Ive never seen it. Erich is saying there is a definitive book coming out soon, which i am eagerly awaiting

Serrate was not a new concept for the germans, but it was a new concept for the Brits, and one which allowed the allied night fighters over germany to interrogate tailing aircraft, and immediately determine if that a/c was a Lichtenstein equipped unit, or not. You are absolutely right that the germans were generally more advanced in passive detection, but that is hardly the point of discussion right now. Fact is, that with Serrate and the advanced AIs allowed to penetrate german controlled skies , the Allies could at last provide some real protection for the bomber streams. I should concede at this ppoint that Mk VIII and MK X radars were prohibited from entering continental airspace until after June 1944. before that, I believe that only MK IV equipped units wer allowed over the continent, which did have much more severe range limits and poorer definition (though still far ahead of the german AI)

Im not disputing that 410th was an NF squadron, but the posts put up by PB dont show it to be connected to Bomber Command. It seems to have spent most of the war attached to the tactical Commands. The 418th spent some time attached to Bomber Commandd, but was being used on Intruder operations. It too converted to the tactical support role, and achieved 75% of its kills in dayight, according to the posts put up by PB.

Which brings me to your last point about "tactical" operations an d "strategic" operations. IMO there is a huge difference. The main one being that apart from the strategic campaign against Germany by the RAF, allied night bomber operations in a tactical sense were few and far between (or at least not nearly so deep in their penetrations of enemy airspace, and not nearly so organized or sustained), this meant that the quarry (the Luftwaffe) was not being attracted to a stream of aircraft several hundred miles long, blazing a trail of signature across the German sky. What this did (ie the bomber aattacks over germany), apart from getting a lot of RAF planes shot down, was to provide an inherent focussing point for both the RAF and the LW, which i doubt existed in the tactical arena.

I am happy to bump the importance of GCI up the list, based on your arguments. however, at least some of what you are saying, regarding the use of GCI over germany is simply untrue, and the use of GCI by the germans downgraded in its effects, because of the allied jamming and spoofing efforts during the war. So i am left wondering just how much it should be bumped up. You are obviously wanting to put it above the effects of on-board radars, but I guess we will have to remain in disagreement on that, because IMO it was the onboard systems in the allied NFs that were the prime detection methods whereas you have a completely different viewpoint.

Finger trouble on my part. The ground-based long range set was the SCR-270B, not the - 720 AI as you point out. The -270 was used for long-range detection

Most GCI sites used the British LW set/USAAF designator SCR-602. These feed their data back to a filter center usually located with the -270 where the plots were inscribed in grease pencil on a plexiglass plotting where a controller would allocate interceptors based on the threat(s).

The LW sites could and did employ a controller as well, but, as mentioned previously, was limited in range.

As for the rest, enjoy your research. Gunston is a great researcher and writer. There are others as well. As well as National Archives, Air Force History Offices, etc with much of the documentation necessary to buttress such claims.

Although centered on Fifth Air Force ops, the following should be helpful. The numbers in the text are for the footnotes which I did not include due to length of the post. The rest of the article will be in subsequent posts. Mods, I'll delete if it's too much.
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Fifth Air Force's Army:
Signal Aircraft Warning Battalions in the Southwest Pacific

Air Force units are usually composed of the traditional flights, squadrons, groups and wings. During World War II, the US Army Air Forces also included platoons, companies and battalions. Some of the largest and most important of these "army" units were the Signal Aircraft Warning Battalions (SAW BN) which used the new technology of radar to provide early warning and air defense.
These battalions served in all theaters and developed somewhat differently depending on the tactical considerations of the specific theater. This article looks at the evolution and use of SAW units associated with the Fifth Army Air Force during World War II.

UNEASY ALLIANCE

At the onset of World War II, the Army Air Force* (AAF) was just beginning to come to grips with the concepts of radar and early warning. It also was grappling with the US Army Signal Corps for control of the equipment and personnel associated with these concepts.
It was only in 1937 that the first successful Signal Corps use of radar to detect aircraft was demonstrated at Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey. 1 The Signal Corps was responsible for developing, procuring and fielding all US Army electronics. Radar was just one more developing technology under their purview.
But even in the years preceding this historic event, the AAF struggled to gain control over aviation-related communication and other electronic equipment and personnel.2 The AAF argued that only airmen could know what specific equipment was needed for aviation. Radar was just one more bone of contention between the two organizations.

However, by the outbreak of the war, the Signal Corps and the AAF had established an uneasy working arrangement. The Signal Corps would develop, procure and logistically support the technical equipment needed to conduct radar early warning. It would also train the personnel to operate the equipment and extract the information the new technology provided. 3 The AAF would simultaneously form units that could use and act on the provided tactical information.4

The Signal Corps still a part of the larger 'ground' Army, organized its tactical radar units into platoons – usually led by a lieutenant with 40-50 men; companies – 2-4 platoons led by a captain, and battalions – 2 – 4 companies led by a major or lieutenant colonel.5 These standard Army formations had to be integrated into the AAF organizational chart that used squadrons, groups and wings.

Initially, the AAF used fighter control squadrons (FCS), complete with pursuit pilots, to process the tactical information provided by SAW BNs to intercept unknown radar tracks. The pilot controllers would use very high frequency (VHF) radios to scramble friendly fighters and place them in the most advantageous position to identify and, if necessary, shoot down the 'bogey.' This technique was, and is, called ground controlled intercept (GCI).6
The fighter control squadrons were a direct result of Gen Spaatz and other American observers to the Battle of Britain during the summer of 1940. The US Army Air Force personnel saw how the Royal Air Force used pilots as controllers to successfully direct fighter squadrons to defend the British homeland against a numerically superior enemy. The lessons learned were brought back and placed into practice albeit a bit differently than the RAF model. The RAF owned all facets of the airborne radar system, from the research facilities, the radars and operating personnel, and the end-users, the interceptors. 7 The US violated the basic tenet of war fighting in that the responsibility of radar for early warning and for intercepting the enemy was split between two commands, the Signal Corps and the Air Force. Eventually, this situation would be rectified, but not until nearly the end of the war.
Unfortunately, the first example of this "marriage" was tragically unsuccessful. On December 7, 1941, a Signal Corps operator working at a remote site on Opana Point detected a large formation of aircraft approaching from the north of Oahu, Hawaii. Only recently trained in the complexities of the SCR-270B radar set, Private Joe Lockard picked up a large plot of blips. Following his instructions, he telephoned the information to the radar information center at Ft. Shafter, Honolulu.8

There, a young P-40 pilot never trained in early warning procedures or in appropriate tactical response to such warnings made the now-famous command of "Well, don't worry about it."9 Thus, the last chance of challenging the outcome of the attack on Pearl Harbor was lost. The first engagement of the American war did use radar but not effectively.

ON THE JOB TRAINING

The Signal Corps, stretched like every other U.S. military function, expanded rapidly to meet the demands for radars and the men to operate them. A huge electronics training base was set up at Drew Field, near Tampa, Florida. Here the vast majority of radar men undertook their training in electronics, field living operations and even in some cases, basic training.10

The only operational early warning radars then in the U.S. inventory were the large, bulky SCR-268/270 long-range radars. These could provide excellent long-range coverage but as stated, were difficult to move in a hurry since they consisted of 66 tons of equipment. What was needed was a lightweight, smaller radar set that could go ashore on the first day of any offensive invasion or be situated quickly as the tactical situation dictated for a defensive campaign.

Mr. Jake Herring, a radar technician with the rank of T4 (a corporal with specialist technical training) eventually assigned to a SAW battalion in the Southwest Pacific, remembers that after his induction into the Army in September 1942, he went through six weeks of rushed basic training at Drew before beginning his radar training.

In a baritone, rich with the coastal accent of North Carolina, he recounts, "We did our basic training there at Drew Field, then I was sent to Kansas City, Missouri for a month of radio school. I was immediately sent back to Drew to begin radar training. We went through our course, learning to operate the SCR-602 mobile radar set."11

The –602 was a US produced version of a British lightweight (LW) mobile radar set. It was designed to provide forward radar coverage for a sector, reporting its findings to a control center or filter center located further back from the front. 12The –602 had a range of up to 100 miles in optimum conditions although 60-70 miles was more common and more importantly, weighed only two tons. 13 It was used in conjunction with other LW sites and the larger and less mobile SCR-268/270 long-range radar to build a graphic representation or 'picture' for air battle commanders.
At the filter center, operators would track the overall picture of a developing air battle on a plexiglass plotting board and controllers would make adjustments to the number and placements of Allied fighters to deal with the approaching aircraft. Again, the concepts were based heavily upon earlier British experiences.14

Not coincidentally, the AAF developed Drew Field as a night fighter training base. Many radar warriors, both airborne and ground-based, learned and practiced their skills in mock maneuvers on the flat scrubby fields and in the dark, humid skies of central Florida. 15

Herring continues his reminisce, "After graduating from my course, we were sent out for a month-long field exercise. We set up six platoons, each with a –602 radar reporting back to the control center. Each platoon, by the way was a self-contained unit. We had two cooks, two medics, two truck drivers, and five four-man radar teams. We could load all our gear into two 2-½ ton truck s and a jeep and move out in just a few hours.

"Each team had four basic duties: one guy would work as a plotter, one as a radio operator, one as a guard – nobody was allowed into the tent if we were working, and one man as a radar operator. We would switch off duties about once an hour to keep 'fresh' and not miss anything on the radar scope."16
In addition to the LW and heavy long-range radars, a Signal Aircraft Warning company and later battalion, had ground observer platoons. These were just what the name implies. The ground observer was a specially trained signalman who would go into areas where radars couldn't be sited due to topography limitations or more commonly because the infantry was engaged in combat. Using portable VHF radios and field telephones, these soldiers would voice-tell their observations of aircraft sightings back to the filter center. Their reports were incorporated into the picture to fill out any gaps in radar coverage. 17
As experience with using the electronic realm to guide missions increased, the ground observers were also used later in the war to direct radar-guided ground attack aircraft. A strike squadron would be vectored to a target area by a controller using radar; once over the area, the ground observers would call in corrections for subsequent bomb drops.18

With all these personnel needed to meet the Signal Corps mission requirements of operating radar equipment and detecting aircraft, a SAW battalion could easily number more than a thousand officers and men all designed to get the information to the controller assigned to the fighter control squadron.19
Much smaller, a fighter control squadron (FCS) consisted of fighter pilots and enlisted radio operators initially. Later in the war, specialist officer radar controllers replaced some of the pilots guiding aircraft. In addition, the missions controlled via radar increased from strictly vectoring fighters into intercept position to controlling bombing strikes, providing navigational vectors to lost aircraft, controlling air-sea rescue missions, and weather reporting and warning among others.20

By the time Herring reported for duty at Drew Field, the Signal Corps and AAF had reached a more reasonable accommodation. In September 1942, the two organizations agreed to put the Signal Aircraft Warning units under Air Force operational control. While the Signal Corps continued as the supplier of equipment and troops to operate it, the SAW units would work under the operational orders of the Air Force.
This arrangement continued throughout the war.21

FIFTH AIR FORCE EXPERIENCES

On December 9, 1941, the 8th Fighter Control Squadron was activated at Mitchell Field, New York. It was immediately assigned for deployment to the Pacific. By June 1942, it was based at Milne Bay, New Guinea as part of Fifth Air Force's V Fighter Command. 22

In the shoe-string days of the early Southwest Pacific campaigns, the 8th FCS used a hodge-podge of Australian and US radar equipment and an equally assorted collection of fighter aircraft to defend the hard-pressed troops of the New Guinea fighting. 23
The SAW units supporting the 8th were likewise challenged to support the air defense requirements of the theater. Trained personnel and replacement parts for existing radar sets were in extremely short supply and used a mix of US and Australian parts and troops to function.24

By November 1943, however, the Allied forces in the area were strong enough to press ahead with operations to drive the Japanese from outside the New Guinea archipelago. Based at Finchaven, the SAW BNs and 8th FCS first went on the offensive in support of the invasion of New Britain. By isolating or destroying the major Japanese port at Rabaul on that island, the Allies could continue to drive north, eventually towards the Philippines. Reaching that ultimate goal would be difficult however.

Finchhaven, New Guinea became "radar central" for the Southwest Pacific. New personnel destined for existing battalions and newly assigned battalions arrived at the jungle town to be incorporated into the theater.25

When not assigned to a combat operation, the radar men would conduct training. In addition to the technical practice needed to correctly interpret the data on a radar scope, the troops had to practice setting up and breaking down their sites. Units would spend a planned week out in the field, having simulated a combat assault. Then they would emplace their equipment, calibrating the radar for true north, making sure the equipment stayed dry in the unrelenting humidity of the jungle, and always, always seeking the best and highest place to site the antenna.26

The reason for the quest for height is due to line of sight consideration. If an SCR-602 was situated on a flat plain, an aircraft approaching at 1,000 feet wouldn't be detected until it was within 15 miles. Put the radar on a 400 ft hill and detection range jumped to 50 miles. Higher flying aircraft could be detected at even longer ranges.27

Another consideration for radar placement is the need to avoid close by obstructions like buildings or trees. These obstructions would reflect the electromagnetic energy emitted from the transmitter and reflect it back in massive doses causing "clutter" on the radar scope. Clutter is simply an area on the scope that can't be used for detecting aircraft because of the high level of background reflections.28

Not infrequently, these week-long jaunts went longer. The torrential thunderstorms so common to the area could and did change a rough dirt road into a raging stream. Many times the troops were cut off and had to be resupplied with C-rations and fuel from air drops until the remote jungle track dried out enough to support truck movement.29

For the first campaign not conducted on New Guinea, the SAW BNs went in with the infantry. On D+1 for the invasion of New Britain, the first LW radar platoon went ashore. Assisting the 1st Marine Division, and under fire from the Japanese, the radar proved its worth by picking up Japanese aircraft sortieing from Rabaul. With the 10 minutes or so of advanced warning thus provided, the Allies were able to gain air superiority over the battlefield in a relatively short time period.30

Jake Herring relates his experience from this invasion, "We set up our radar on a small island just off the main invasion beach called Duke Island. One day a 'Betty' bomber came over at tree-top level surprising everybody. He sprayed everything in sight with machine gun fire and dropped a bomb on a barge anchored out in the bay. He zoomed off without being shot at.

"That night we had a Major King, one of the better officers we had as far as I was concerned, killed by a Japanese infiltrator. We found the major's body the next morning with his head severed by a bayonet or a machete." 31
Herring remained on New Britain until April 1944. 32

By the time of the next planned Allied advance to the island of Biak, the integration of Signal Corps SAW BNs and Air Force FCS was nearly seamless. Indeed, retired Chief Master Sergeant Joe Newman was a Signal Corps radio maintenance man assigned to the 8th FCS and for his entire time in the Pacific was under the administrative and operational control of that Air Force squadron. Even though he wore the distinctive Signal Corps emblem on his garrison hat and the aiguillette on his seldom-worn Class A's, he worked daily in the FCS filter center. At the end of the war, he actually found out he had been transferred to the Army Air Force but never informed. (The Chief went on to have a 30-year USAF career.)33

In April 1944, after a refitting period back at Finchaven, the Herring's 596th SAW Battalion sailed aboard an LST (landing ship tank) to support the invasion of Biak. Landing at the neighboring islet of Los Negros, Herring's unit ran ashore under Japanese fire. 34

As the battle progressed, the US troops were on the south side of an east-west oriented Japanese runway just up from the beach and the defending troops were on the north side of the runway. So close were the opposing forces that Herring recalls that the radar couldn't operate at night because the little two cylinder gasoline generator that powered the radar gave off a blue exhaust flame at night. Like a magnet for rifle fire, the blue flickering drew danger onto the radar site. So at night the radar men shut down operations and manned defensive fighting positions.35

One of the advantages of the self-contained aspect of the LW units was the ability to conduct air intercept operations on its own. In the perfect world, as mentioned previously, the LW sites reported back to a master filter center. However when the radar units were first establishing themselves in a new area each site could work intercepts in its own smaller areas. A controller would be attached to the LW platoon and run fighters onto targets within the limited coverage of the LWs. Not nearly as efficient as the fully integrated LW and heavy SCR-271 designed operations, it was nevertheless better than nothing.36
As the war progressed, the pace of island recapturing increased. In July 1944, Noumfour Island in the Dutch East Indies was slated for seizure from the Japanese.

Herring's battalion went in with the Army's 503d Parachute Regiment.

It was during this operation that Herring first saw the fruit of his labors. A plot was picked up on the SCR-602 radar and the Air Force controller attached to the LW platoon vectored a P-61 nightfighter on the track. Continuing the intercept, the controller guided the Black Widow until the radar operator on the big black-painted fighter picked up the bogey. He, in turn, provided vectors to the pilot until the pilot visually sighted the target. Confirming it was a "bandit," actually a Japanese "Betty" twin-engined medium bomber; the pilot proceeded to torch the bomber with the P-61's four 20mm cannons and four .50 caliber machine guns. 37

It just so happened that the intercept actually took place overhead the radar site. Herring and his fellow soldiers were able to spill out of the radar tent and watch the streaks of light racing from the fighter to the victim. Then they saw a big flash, and then many streamers of flames float down from the sky. The fighter pilot radioed, "Splash one bandit."38

Jake Herring's battalion, the 596th SAW, was one of only many that served in the Southwest Pacific Theater. The author found references in the U.S. National Archives at College Park of 11 separate SAW BNs during V Fighter Command operations. With an average of 1,000 officers and men in each, one can readily see that there were substantial numbers of troops involved in air warning and defense missions.

With all the Signal Corps troops involved, the actually Army Air Forces-owned personnel involved with ground control of radar and fighter aircraft was relatively few in number. For most of V Fighter Command's operations, the 8th Fighter Control Squadron did yeoman's work for the theater.
The 8th FCS sent detachments of enlisted aircraft plotters and rated pilots to operations and sites throughout the Southwest Pacific. Initially, the pilots learned the job under fire. They did the best they could while learning how best to employ radar in guiding interceptors onto targets. The Air Force thought that only a pilot could properly translate the obscure oscilloscope tracings into a verbal 'picture' that an airborne fighter could understand.39
As time progressed many combat tour-expired fighter pilots were recycled into controller positions. Even this pool of resources was not enough to meet the expanding mission demands and 'pure' controllers were eventually trained and sent into combat. Freshly minted 2d lieutenants would attend radar and controller school back in the States and come to New Guinea for some seasoning. These controllers went on to become the backbone of the FCS units. In March 1942, the 8th had 6 flying officers and 83 enlisted troops. 40 By February 1944, the 8th FCS had four flying officers assigned, 11 non-flying officer controllers and 231 enlisted.41