Well, with Wright R-1820 that were in some DC-3...Maybe the US screwed up by not sticking the R-1830 from a DC-3 into a very small airframe with limited fuel and limited guns (two .50s and two .30s?) and sending them out to conquer the Luftwaffe.
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Well, with Wright R-1820 that were in some DC-3...Maybe the US screwed up by not sticking the R-1830 from a DC-3 into a very small airframe with limited fuel and limited guns (two .50s and two .30s?) and sending them out to conquer the Luftwaffe.
I know the story of ANT-42/TB-7/Pe-8 in details - not from wiki. Thousands of Il-2 (another big mistake of the Soviets) sucked all the resources which possibly could be used more efficiently. The efforts of Mikulin's design office were focused on the improving of M-38, and the execution of other projects (including supercharged high-altitude engines) was not carried out intensively enough.They did produce small numbers of the PE-8 with AM-35s, diesels (3 types) and M-82 engines.
I use wiki for cut and paste so I don't have to type as much.I know the story of ANT-42/TB-7/Pe-8 in details - not from wiki.
There are several monographs and books devoted to the TB-7 history. Unfortunately, all of them are either in Russian or in German - e.g., an outstanding book by Ulrich Unger "Pe-8. Der sowjetische Fernbomber", 1993. I haven't found any mention in the book from Gordon, et al. that engine life time was the reason for the production cancelling. Moreover, you can find the following text: "After the outbreak of war the plant began production of Pe-2s, which drew heavily on the factory's resources, but TB-7 production continued." on the page 134. The book by Kotelnikov gives just a brief description of events or/and technical details.I use wiki for cut and paste so I don't have to type as much.
"Soviet Combat Aircraft of the Second World War", vol two, by Yefim Gordan and Dmitri Khazanov say just about the same thing.
I also try to double check things in "Russian Piston Aero Engines" by Vladimir Kotelnikov.
I can agree that the P.7 was superior in 1932-1933. Perhaps, P.11 was the best in 1935. But the serial I-15 outperformed the P.7 in 1934, and the I-16 type 5 outperformed the P.11 in 1936. The evolution of fighters was too fast in 1930s.please forgive me a local patriotism (i think fully justified) for the first half of the 1930's decade without any doubts winners are PZL P.7/P.11 fighters
yes and no - theoretically you are correct but from practical standpoint performance of the I-15/16 from serial production was far from handbook data (something with traditional soviet/russian approach to the product quality especially true in a term of engines), I-16's handling was difficult to the point that pilot's main job was not to be killed by it's own airplane, fighting with possible enemy was somehow secondary task, both soviet airplanes has suffered from totally unreliable armament. I would say in reality in level flight performance of this airplanes was pretty much equal with significant edge for PZL fighters side for dogfight scenarios and possibility combat evading with step diving.I can agree that the P.7 was superior in 1932-1933. Perhaps, P.11 was the best in 1935. But the serial I-15 outperformed the P.7 in 1934, and the I-16 type 5 outperformed the P.11 in 1936. The evolution of fighters was too fast in 1930s.
The metal construction of Polish monoplanes was certainly a serious advantage.
The difference was not so significant - even taking into account some performance degradation in series production, the I-15 was equal to and the I-16 Type 5 was superior to the P.11. After the weight of the I-16 was reduced, the superiority increased.from practical standpoint performance of the I-15/16 from serial production was far from handbook data
It is not true. Takeoff, landing and low speed flight were the major difficulties; piloting at medium and high altitudes was not challenging, as reflected in both test reports and pilots' memories.I-16's handling was difficult to the point that pilot's main job was not to be killed by it's own airplane, fighting with possible enemy was somehow secondary task
Could you please cite the source? The armament (2xSchKAS) was insufficient, but equal to P.11 and quite reliable. Moreover, armament was reinforced - either with additional PV-1 (about 100 aircraft in 1937) or with cannons in some later types. P.11c armament was reinforced with two small-bore MGs only in 1938 on about 1/3 of all available aircraft of this type that resulted in a certain deterioration of flight performance.both soviet airplanes has suffered from totally unreliable armament
The discussion prompted me to read some excellent Polish books on the PZL P.7/P.11 fighters. In fact, we attempt - very implicitly! - to estimate the real parameters as well as their "weighting coefficients" necessary for correct evaluation of the qualities of the airplane in order to find out how optimal the design decisions were at different time points.This has all the makings of one of those endless debates, which will never end, and all adherents just go away exhausted and unsatisfied.
The problem is that there were many exceptions at that time that do not allow a clear classification with two "clusters" only. I guess, the examples are well-known for the audience, but I can go in details if necessary.the fighters of the thirties can be grouped in two categories: early open cockpit based on WWI thinking, and closed cockpit, retractable gear, highly streamlined setting the stage for the next decade.
about Shkas following Wikipedia :The difference was not so significant - even taking into account some performance degradation in series production, the I-15 was equal to and the I-16 Type 5 was superior to the P.11. After the weight of the I-16 was reduced, the superiority increased.
It is not true. Takeoff, landing and low speed flight were the major difficulties; piloting at medium and high altitudes was not challenging, as reflected in both test reports and pilots' memories.
Could you please cite the source? The armament (2xSchKAS) was insufficient, but equal to P.11 and quite reliable. Moreover, armament was reinforced - either with additional PV-1 (about 100 aircraft in 1937) or with cannons in some later types. P.11c armament was reinforced with two small-bore MGs only in 1938 on about 1/3 of all available aircraft of this type that resulted in a certain deterioration of flight performance.
Undoubtedly, an experienced P.11 pilot could win over a less experienced I-16 Type 5 pilot, but when pilots were equally (and adequately) trained, the I-16 gave an undeniable advantage.
or from other russian source we have clear statement that basically I-16 type 5 armament wasn't really working at least up to around 1937.The ShKAS machine gun had a high rate of fire but it also had 48 ways of jamming. Some of them could be fixed immediately, some could not. And 1,800 rounds a minute was an insanely high rate of fire. If you pulled the trigger too long, the ShKAS would fire all its ammo in one go and that would be it!!
Note that i said "can be," and you perfectly make my point about how these open ended questions often degenerate into mind numbing quibbles.The problem is that there were many exceptions at that time that do not allow a clear classification with two "clusters" only. I guess, the examples are well-known for the audience, but I can go in details if necessary.
This has all the makings of one of those endless debates, which will never end, and all adherents just go away exhausted and unsatisfied.
The clear statement sounds somewhat different. Namely: the main defects were eliminated during 1935. Since 1936, no serious problems with the I-16 ShKAS have been noted. You can find it in the same source - the army tests of the Type 5 in May-November 1936 revealed no any significant reliability problems of ShKAS.or from other russian source we have clear statement that basically I-16 type 5 armament wasn't really working at least up to around 1937.
Why?PZL fighters and I-16 wasn't the same era airplanes
The problem was that often the practical implementation of a good idea was rather mediocre. Both technical and technological levels were frequently insufficient to recognize all the advantages of good ideas - and the I-16 is a prime example of this. The poor quality of materials and design flaws could drastically reduce the real value of innovations. Thus, the I-16 originally had a closed cockpit, but the low quality of Soviet plexiglas, poorly designed sliding canopy mechanics and heavy splashing with engine oil led the military to demand an open cockpit. It should be noted that the windscreen for the open cockpit of the I-16 was designed at the factory, not in the design bureau. So, the military's desire to have an open cockpit was quite reasonable at that time. It is approximately the same with the retractable chassis. It increased weight of the airplane, required more effort from the pilot, and the contribution to aerodynamic drag at speeds up to 450 km/h was not so great, poor nosing was much more important. There were proposals of the serial plant to build I-16 with non-retractable landing gear - this version was successfully tested in October 1935.What is somewhat interesting is how long it took the military to figure out that such things like monoplanes, retracting landing gear and enclosed cockpits were actually good ideas.
Like Thumpalumpacus says, look at it as a discussion not a debate.This has all the makings of one of those endless debates, which will never end, and all adherents just go away exhausted and unsatisfied. I'd like to point out yet again, my abhorrence of useless superlatives like first, fastest, and above all, best.
To frame the open-ended proposition, the fighters of the thirties can be grouped in two categories: early open cockpit based on WWI thinking, and closed cockpit, retractable gear, highly streamlined setting the stage for the next decade.
The first group has adherents for the P-26, PZL, I-15/16, and Claude ... each has appeal with attention to speed, maneuverability, firepower, and appearance ... besides the parochial interests. In a lot of ways, it comes down to an argument as to which is the most important feature. Few competed more than occasionally head to head.
The mid to late 30s saw Curtiss, Caudron, Seversky, Messerschmidt, Hawker, MiG, Supermarine, Mitsubisihi, Dewotaine, Nakajima, etc., etc. come along, all in various levels and pressures of development. Again, quibbles will arise as to the date of first flight, and which version to compare to another. (It should be noted that as a group, these fighters gained up to 100 mph, 10,000' ceiling, much more firepower, and up to double the range compared to the early group.)
Again, it will become a contest full of adjectives, adverbs ... modifiers and qualifiers!
How about we just list the wide variety of wild and wonderful products from so many inspired, talented yet also limited engineers and designers?
We can then expound on the features and lore of those we've studied, sharing our knowledge, and not wasting energy on useless wrangling.