Who Really Destroyed the Luftwaffe? (1 Viewer)

[drgondog]

Friendly aircraft can operate without a strong fighter escort. Enemy aircraft must have a strong fighter escort or else they get slaughtered.

Interesting definition. The converse of that is that despite fighter escort, the defending force has air superiority and that whether the attacking force is escorted or not, the defending force prevails.

That circumstance existed through the Fall of 1944, in which escort fighters were only available for ingress and egress to and from, but not over, Germany.

By your definition, Germany had air superiority to the end of the war as they were capable of 'slaughtering' Allied airpower over Germany absent Allied fighters. Is that your thesis?

 

[davebender]

By your definition, Germany had air superiority to the end of the war as they were capable of 'slaughtering' Allied airpower over Germany absent Allied fighters.

I don't think that's true. By the fall of 1944 the Luftwaffe was critically short of aviation gasoline and Allied fighter-Bomber sweeps over German airfields were a daily occurance. Under such circumstances the training of new German pilots was all but impossible and even trained pilots had operations greatly constrained. The Luftwaffe could occasionally hit back hard but those occasions became increasingly fewer and less effective.

 

[riacrato]

There are normally thought to be three levels of control of the air. Air supremacy is the highest, meaning there is complete control of the skies. Air superiority is the next highest, which is being in a more favorable position than the opponent. It is defined in the NATO Glossary as "That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by opposing air forces." Air parity is the lowest level of control, meaning control of the skies only above friendly troop positions.

Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by early 1942. This can be stated because whereas the allies were able to penetrate german controlled airspace with increasing regularity and ease, the same could not be said for german intrusions into allied airspace. german raids over allied controled airspace became virtually impossible from the end of 1942 onward, though they did occur. Only in restricted areas, or areas limited in size were the germans able to claim air parity.

Which territory? I don't think anyone is denying that the Allies had air superiority or supremacy over GB. Continental Europe is a whole different matter.

There were no allied troops in Germany, the Netherlamds, Belgium or France in 1942 and so there was no movement to be denied and no targets to raid. Eventhough simplistic, davebender's definition is interesting and does the situation more justice in my opinion. The LW forces could still operate freely in 1942 and most of 1943, whereas Allied forces needed strong escorts to avoid prohibitive losses. That changed in 1944 even over airspace where there were still no Allied ground troops.

 

[drgondog]

Which territory? I don't think anyone is denying that the Allies had air superiority or supremacy over GB. Continental Europe is a whole different matter.

There were no allied troops in Germany, the Netherlamds, Belgium or France in 1942 and so there was no movement to be denied and no targets to raid. Eventhough simplistic, davebender's definition is interesting and does the situation more justice in my opinion. The LW forces could still operate freely in 1942 and most of 1943, whereas Allied forces needed strong escorts to avoid prohibitive losses. That changed in 1944 even over airspace where there were still no Allied ground troops.

Who asserts that the LW could operate freely over Germany - anywhere in Germany - without being challenged during daylight hours.. starting in January 1944 when Doolittle issued the directive to attack the LW anywhere, in the air and on the ground. 1942 and most of 1943 is not the focus of the debate.

Galland makes no such assertion, in fact states the contrary, that the LW could not even safely assemble or take off or land in the Spring and Summer of 1944. That is not to say they could not take off, assemble or land - just not with disregard for 8th AF long range fighters. The LW had no ability to deny the RN or USN operations anywhere they chose to operate anywhere in the West. The LW was powerless over the Invasion front, The LW was powerless in daylight ops anywhere over Germany. In short, the LW did not even have Parity.

For the record Dave asserts that the Allies did not have air superiority over Central Europe until the Fall 1944... I must must admit confusion regarding Dave's assertion that the LW could deny the USAAF from roaming anywhere at will and do anything they wished from March, 1944 through the end of the war...

or conversely that the LW could achieve its own objectives over its own airspace against the USAAF - much less deny the USAAF from attaining theirs.

Somewhere in that scenario is a kernel of agreed 'air superiority'.

 

[riacrato]

I don't agree with Dave in his assessment as to when air superiority to whatever degree went to the Allies over Western Europe, I merely disagreed with "Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by early 1942", at least if this is to mean "everywhere" over Continental Europe.

 

[drgondog]

I don't agree with Dave in his assessment as to when air superiority to whatever degree went to the Allies over Western Europe, I merely disagreed with "Air parity, tending towards air superiority had been achieved over the germans by early 1942", at least if this is to mean "everywhere" over Continental Europe.

I agree with you.

Parity over the English Channel, if it occurred at all by 1943, is only because the Luftwaffe had more pressing allocations elsewhere. There was no reason to beef up the Kanal Front based on any established threat by the Allies during daylight.

8th AF was flying what could best be described as 'raids' on a less than 100 bomber scale over targets in France until January 1943, when they finally went to Wilhemshaven for first attack on Germany..

 

[parsifal]

The definition I gave is textbook stuff. In the context of a strategic bombing campaign, where the locations of troop concentrations is secondary to the location of the strikes formations, the troop concentration concept should be substituted with bomber formations.

Now, I say that air parity had been reached, tending toward air superiority, because by 1942, the LW was no longer in a position to mount massed raids over enemy controlled territory, whereas the allies were able to mount substantial attacks over german controlled territory with tolerable losses. Abeit at night for the deep penetration stuff, but even this capability had been denied (substantially) to the germans over allied controlled territory.

This part of the equation only amounts to air parity, since in 1942, as you rightly point out, the germans still controlled large portions of their air spaces (to the point of excercising air supremacy over those portions of their airspace), at least during the daylight hours. However, the fact that they had withdrawn, (and this was forced on them, by mounting losses in their battles over france principally) from defending parts of their territory, in particular, over NW France, by 1942, suggests that this air parity was tending toward Allied superiority. all the allies needed from that point was to develop the fighter aircraft with the legs to reach into the traditional areas of german controlled airspace, to complete the dominance over the LW....enter the mustang.

This is consistent with what actually happened. The Germans did not wake up one morning in early 1944 and suddenly find they had lost control of the skies over their own country. It was a process years in the making, with contributory effect found all the way back to 1940, and beyond. Actions by the RAF and the VVS in 1942, affected in a direct and tangible way, outcomes observed in 1944. Without those actions , the outcome in 1944 would have been completely different

 

[drgondog]

The definition I gave is textbook stuff. In the context of a strategic bombing campaign, where the locations of troop concentrations is secondary to the location of the strikes formations, the troop concentration concept should be substituted with bomber formations.

Now, I say that air parity had been reached, tending toward air superiority, because by 1942, the LW was no longer in a position to mount massed raids over enemy controlled territory, whereas the allies were able to mount substantial attacks over german controlled territory with tolerable losses. Abeit at night for the deep penetration stuff, but even this capability had been denied (substantially) to the germans over allied controlled territory.

This part of the equation only amounts to air parity, since in 1942, as you rightly point out, the germans still controlled large portions of their air spaces (to the point of excercising air supremacy over those portions of their airspace), at least during the daylight hours. However, the fact that they had withdrawn, (and this was forced on them, by mounting losses in their battles over france principally) from defending parts of their territory, in particular, over NW France, by 1942, suggests that this air parity was tending toward Allied superiority. all the allies needed from that point was to develop the fighter aircraft with the legs to reach into the traditional areas of german controlled airspace, to complete the dominance over the LW....enter the mustang.

This is consistent with what actually happened. The Germans did not wake up one morning in early 1944 and suddenly find they had lost control of the skies over their own country. It was a process years in the making, with contributory effect found all the way back to 1940, and beyond. Actions by the RAF and the VVS in 1942, affected in a direct and tangible way, outcomes observed in 1944. Without those actions , the outcome in 1944 would have been completely different

I agree your points. No question regarding the process beginning as far back as BoB and all the struggles in Africa and Mediterranean. Having said that, the LW was resource constrained and after the BoB picked and chose different tactical/strategic points in time to 'get serious'

One thing to remember about Kanal Front. It wasn't really reinforced with JG2 and JG26 more or less a constant from 1942 onward.

From my perspective, the LW deemed the airspace over Holland and France as a 'Parity' region, and when the 8th came into play, they were the tripwire to initiate the battle with the reserves beyond the German border.

I believe the only real important targets were sub pens like St Nazaire and Lille, etc and the 8th never did much against the pens themselves - even the 2,000 pound bombs were inadequate - so the LW never considered the 8th to be big enough of a threat to contest every mile over France all the time.

What received substantial reinforcement was LuftFlotte Reich. The LW stripped Ost and Sud to pour reinforcements into Germany as the threat of daylight bombing became more real and entirely up to destruction of conventional manufacturing and refining centers..

 

[stona]

You have a lot more faith in WWII era heavy bombers then I do.

Personally I think Germany could have been defeated just as quickly (and perhaps more so) if there had been no British and U.S. heavy bombers at all.

That's a moot point. You could argue that the diversion of resources and aircraft to a strategic bomber force,whose efficacity is certainly debatable,damned nearly lost us the war. The Battle of the Atlantic was a far closer run thing than it needed to be as a result.
Steve

 

[drgondog]

That's a moot point. You could argue that the diversion of resources and aircraft to a strategic bomber force,whose efficacity is certainly debatable,damned nearly lost us the war. The Battle of the Atlantic was a far closer run thing than it needed to be as a result.
Steve

Steve - what is the point you are making?

If the value and impact of the strategic bomber force was not high, why did the LW expend so much resource, including stripping the East and South of fighter resources to try to stop them?

 

[parsifal]

Extensive studies were made after the war on the impact of strategic bombing. The most famous of them was of course the USSBS. Some have argued these studies are essentially apologies for the time and effort put into , but this seems a very big pill to swallow. The simple fact that the Germans poured so much effort into trying to stop the bombers suggests such conspiracy arguments ring very hollow.

What the war showed was that strategic bombing could not win the war outright. In this respect it did not live up to the fantastic claims made prewar. It still achieved a lot, and despite the losses suffered, meted out far greater destruction than it received.

In the case of Britain the alternative.... a continental land based strategy based on a mass ground army, was simply not a feasible option. Even as it stood, with just 13 divisions in the frontline in Europe in 19844, the British suffered such acute manpower shortages, that wholsale unit disbandments were the norm rather than the exception. This explains a lot behind Monty's caution....every man lost was a man lost for good, with little possibility fore replacement. Britiain determiined from the outbreak of the war that she simply could not field a mass army, and suffer the same casualty rates as had been sustained 20 years earlier. The 55000 aircrew lost during WWII pale into insignificance compared to the 2 million casualties suffered in the battlefields of France. The British lacked the resources to do that, AND fight a modern war of machines and production. They rightly chose the development of a strategic bomber force, to hit the germans in the only way possible. They courted, and succeeded in forming a grand alliance with the Russians and the Americans, to defeat evil.

 

[drgondog]

That was a very good summary..

 

[fastmongrel]

That was a very good summary..

I agree that was very well put Parsifal. I wonder what the 20/20 hindsight brigade who criticise the British bombing strategy in WWII think Britain should have done to strike back at the German economy and help Russia.

 

[BombTaxi]

Great summary Parsifal. You have also demonstrated that WW1 was an anomaly in British policy - the first and only time the UK fielded a mass conscript army in the Continental style, rather than acting as the financial and political hub of a coalition, as it had done in nearly every European war since the 1700s. The experiment shattered Britain, perhaps irreparably. As a result, it was demographically, politically and financially impossible to repeat the policy. Hence the development of the bomber arm as a relatively much cheaper means of force projection than either the mass army or the dreadnought-era battlefleet, which in any case had been rendered illegal by the Washington and London treaties. Looking at it with the same eyes as the 20/20 brigade, I see Britain having no other viable choice for projecting power onto the Continent after 1919...

 

[Civettone]

The problem with the Luftwaffe or even with Germany in WW2 was IDEOLOGY. Nazi leaders like Goering believed that training was of inferior importance. A German pilot needed courage and fighting spirit. That would overcome every obstacle. And Germans are in essence superior fighters than all other races. Or so they thought.
They needed a reality check but all that happened was the guy with the funny mustache giving orders and the rest of the bunch following them as much as they could even if it was counterproductive.

Kris

 

[BombTaxi]

Kris, I think your comments hold true for the latter stages of the war, where Germany was suffering from crippling manpower shortages. But German pilots early in the war, like their counterparts in the other belligerent nations were very highly trained. While the Nazi leadership and it's apparatchiks may have trumpeted the virtues of the Aryan warrior, the commanders of the armed forces, for the most part, understood that excellently trained and motivated men with top-class equipment are what win wars. In this they were simply continuing a tradition going right back to the Prussian armed forces. It was also reflected in the German approach to war-fighting. Blitzkrieg was not a philosophy based on elan and Aryan vigour, but an extremely carefully thought-out means to bring overwhelming force to bear at critical points. You need trained thinkers, not zealous berserkers, to make that work.

 

[drgondog]

For Tail End Charlie -

Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..

The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk

 

[tomo pauk]

I know it was aimed for TEC, but...
In aggregate (from quotes from that forum), mighty bombing campaigns from 1943 on (night) 1944 (around-a-clock) on were causes for lost at BoB, Moscow, Alamein, Stalingrad, Tunis, Sicily, Kursk, Ukraine... Plus, not telling Western investigators that Soviets contributed single iota to defeat Germany is quite telling.

No wonder they lost the war.

 

[Matt308]

That was a very good summary..

Parsifal, that was truly elegant. And certainly explains the war doctrine of modern engagements. Well done.

 

[BombTaxi]

For Tail End Charlie -

Here are some quotes from folks Not American, Not Brit, not somebody's grandfather on the forum - regarding opinions regarding air superiority..

The Reich's Ex-leaders Explain Why They Were Beaten - World War 2 Talk

Like other posters, I smell a rat in the total absence of any mention of the Soviets role in defeating Germany. While I am supporter of the strategic bombing campaigns, they alone did not win the war. The USSR invading Germany and seizing it's capital won the war...

However, the Western allies did totally shatter the LW. Of that there is no doubt.